tomdeboneandClaude Opus 5
786a892658
Die AppView soll die Access-Tokens der PDS prüfen können, ohne dass PDS_JWT_SECRET den PDS-Prozess verlässt. Verifiziert wird ES256 mit dem *öffentlichen* Teil des P-256-Schlüssels — den veröffentlicht die PDS jetzt als verificationMethod (Multikey) in ihrem DID-Dokument. Damit fällt auch die hartkodierte Service-DID: describeServer gab stur did:web:pds.maarcadetweet.local zurück, unabhängig von PDS_PUBLIC_URL. Beide Endpoints leiten sie jetzt aus einer Quelle ab (AppConfig::pds_did(), did:web-Regel mit %3A-kodiertem Port). Der `iss` des Access-Tokens baute die DID zuvor ohne Port-Kodierung zusammen — also in einer Form, der kein did:web-Resolver folgen könnte. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013HC9HLrUU1LNwkzp8nkDLX
79 lines
2.7 KiB
Rust
79 lines
2.7 KiB
Rust
use anyhow::Result;
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use at_crypto::jwt::JwtClaims;
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use at_crypto::ecdsa::P256Keypair;
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use at_shared::config::AppConfig;
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pub fn server_p256_keypair(cfg: &AppConfig) -> Result<P256Keypair> {
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use p256::elliptic_curve::sec1::ToEncodedPoint;
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let raw = hex::decode(cfg.pds_jwt_secret.trim_start_matches("0x"))?;
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if raw.len() < 32 {
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anyhow::bail!("PDS_JWT_SECRET must be ≥ 32 bytes for P-256 key");
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}
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let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
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bytes.copy_from_slice(&raw[..32]);
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let sk = p256::SecretKey::from_bytes((&bytes).into())
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.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("p256 sk: {e}"))?;
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let vk = sk.public_key();
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let pt = vk.to_encoded_point(false);
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let mut mb_raw = vec![0x80u8, 0x12u8];
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mb_raw.extend_from_slice(pt.x().unwrap());
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mb_raw.extend_from_slice(pt.y().unwrap());
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let secret_hex = hex::encode(sk.to_bytes());
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let public_multibase = at_crypto::multibase_util::encode_b58btc(&mb_raw);
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Ok(P256Keypair {
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secret_hex,
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public_multibase,
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})
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}
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pub fn server_p256_public_multibase(cfg: &AppConfig) -> Result<String> {
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Ok(server_p256_keypair(cfg)?.public_multibase)
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}
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pub fn issue_access_jwt(
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cfg: &AppConfig,
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did: &str,
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_handle: &str,
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) -> Result<(String, i64)> {
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let kp = server_p256_keypair(cfg)?;
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let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
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let exp = now + 3600;
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let claims = JwtClaims {
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// Same derivation as `describeServer` and `/.well-known/did.json`
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// (`AppConfig::pds_did`), so a verifier can take `iss`, resolve
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// the did:web document and arrive at the key this token is
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// signed with. The previous inline version dropped the
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// percent-encoding of the port, producing an `iss` that no
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// did:web resolver could follow.
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iss: cfg.pds_did(),
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sub: did.to_string(),
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aud: "did:web:appview.maarcadetweet.local".into(),
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iat: now,
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exp,
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jti: Some(uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string()),
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scope: Some("com.atproto.access".into()),
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};
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let token = at_crypto::jwt::issue_jwt(&kp, &claims)?;
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Ok((token, exp))
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}
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pub fn issue_refresh_jwt(
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cfg: &AppConfig,
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did: &str,
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) -> Result<(String, i64)> {
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let kp = server_p256_keypair(cfg)?;
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let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
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let exp = now + 90 * 24 * 3600;
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let claims = JwtClaims {
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iss: "did:web:refresh.maarcadetweet.local".into(),
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sub: did.to_string(),
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aud: "did:web:refresh.maarcadetweet.local".into(),
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iat: now,
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exp,
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jti: Some(uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string()),
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scope: Some("com.atproto.refresh".into()),
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};
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let token = at_crypto::jwt::issue_jwt(&kp, &claims)?;
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Ok((token, exp))
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}
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