feat(pds): DID-Dokument unter /.well-known/did.json ausliefern

Die AppView soll die Access-Tokens der PDS prüfen können, ohne dass
PDS_JWT_SECRET den PDS-Prozess verlässt. Verifiziert wird ES256 mit dem
*öffentlichen* Teil des P-256-Schlüssels — den veröffentlicht die PDS
jetzt als verificationMethod (Multikey) in ihrem DID-Dokument.

Damit fällt auch die hartkodierte Service-DID: describeServer gab stur
did:web:pds.maarcadetweet.local zurück, unabhängig von PDS_PUBLIC_URL.
Beide Endpoints leiten sie jetzt aus einer Quelle ab
(AppConfig::pds_did(), did:web-Regel mit %3A-kodiertem Port). Der `iss`
des Access-Tokens baute die DID zuvor ohne Port-Kodierung zusammen —
also in einer Form, der kein did:web-Resolver folgen könnte.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013HC9HLrUU1LNwkzp8nkDLX

crates/pds-server/src/jwt_issuer.rs

@@ -39,7 +39,13 @@ pub fn issue_access_jwt(
     let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
     let exp = now + 3600;
     let claims = JwtClaims {
-        iss: format!("did:web:{}", cfg.pds_public_url.trim_start_matches("http://").trim_start_matches("https://")),
+        // Same derivation as `describeServer` and `/.well-known/did.json`
+        // (`AppConfig::pds_did`), so a verifier can take `iss`, resolve
+        // the did:web document and arrive at the key this token is
+        // signed with. The previous inline version dropped the
+        // percent-encoding of the port, producing an `iss` that no
+        // did:web resolver could follow.
+        iss: cfg.pds_did(),
         sub: did.to_string(),
         aud: "did:web:appview.maarcadetweet.local".into(),
         iat: now,

crates/pds-server/src/main.rs

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ pub fn router(state: AppState) -> Router {
     Router::new()
         .route("/", get(root))
         .route("/healthz", get(healthz))
+        .route("/.well-known/did.json", get(did_document))
         .route(
             "/xrpc/com.atproto.server.describeServer",
             get(describe_server),
@@ -163,9 +164,69 @@ async fn healthz() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     Json(json!({ "ok": true }))
 }
 
+/// `GET /.well-known/did.json` — the PDS's own DID document.
+///
+/// This is how the AppView (and any other relying party) learns the
+/// P-256 public key that the access JWTs in
+/// `Authorization: Bearer …` are signed with. Without it the AppView
+/// could not verify a token at all, and the only alternative would be
+/// shipping `PDS_JWT_SECRET` to a second service — a private signing
+/// key crossing a service boundary, for a check that needs nothing but
+/// the public half.
+///
+/// Nothing in this response is secret. `publicKeyMultibase` is the
+/// uncompressed P-256 point derived from `PDS_JWT_SECRET` by
+/// [`jwt_issuer::server_p256_public_multibase`]; the secret itself
+/// never leaves this process.
+///
+/// The document id is [`AppConfig::pds_did`], i.e. it follows
+/// `PDS_PUBLIC_URL` — so a `did:web:` resolver that starts from the DID,
+/// rebuilds the URL and fetches this path lands back here rather than at
+/// some other host's document.
+async fn did_document(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, (axum::http::StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
+    let did = state.cfg.pds_did();
+    let public_multibase = jwt_issuer::server_p256_public_multibase(&state.cfg).map_err(|e| {
+        // A malformed `PDS_JWT_SECRET` is the one way this fails, and
+        // it is exactly the failure that also breaks every token this
+        // server issues — surface it instead of publishing a document
+        // with a missing key.
+        (
+            axum::http::StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            Json(json!({
+                "error": "InternalServerError",
+                "message": format!("server key unavailable: {e}"),
+            })),
+        )
+    })?;
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "@context": [
+            "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
+            "https://w3id.org/security/multikey/v1",
+        ],
+        "id": did,
+        "verificationMethod": [{
+            // `#atproto` is the fragment AT Proto uses for a repo's
+            // signing key; we reuse it for the server key so a generic
+            // did:web consumer finds it in the usual place.
+            "id": format!("{did}#atproto"),
+            "type": "Multikey",
+            "controller": did,
+            "publicKeyMultibase": public_multibase,
+        }],
+        "service": [{
+            "id": "#atproto_pds",
+            "type": "AtprotoPersonalDataServer",
+            "serviceEndpoint": state.cfg.pds_public_url,
+        }],
+    })))
+}
+
 async fn describe_server(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<DescribeServerResp> {
     Json(DescribeServerResp {
-        did: "did:web:pds.maarcadetweet.local".into(),
+        // Derived from `PDS_PUBLIC_URL`, never hardcoded — see
+        // `AppConfig::pds_did`. The same value ids the document at
+        // `/.well-known/did.json`.
+        did: state.cfg.pds_did(),
         available_user_domains: vec![state
             .cfg
             .pds_handle_dns_zone

crates/pds-server/tests/pds_integration.rs

@@ -38,11 +38,86 @@ async fn describe_server() {
         .json()
         .await
         .unwrap();
-    assert!(r["did"].is_string());
+    // The DID is derived from `PDS_PUBLIC_URL`, not hardcoded — so we
+    // assert the *shape* (any deployment must produce a did:web) and
+    // leave the exact value to `at_shared::config`'s unit tests.
+    let did = r["did"].as_str().expect("describeServer must return a did");
+    assert!(did.starts_with("did:web:"), "did = {did}");
     assert!(r["available_user_domains"].is_array());
     assert_eq!(r["invite_code_required"], json!(false));
 }
 
+/// `GET /.well-known/did.json` — the document the AppView fetches to
+/// learn the key our access tokens are signed with.
+///
+/// Two properties matter beyond "it returns JSON": the document's `id`
+/// must be the same DID `describeServer` advertises (otherwise a client
+/// that trusts one and resolves the other ends up at a different
+/// identity), and it must carry a usable `publicKeyMultibase`.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn did_document_publishes_the_server_key() {
+    if !wait_for_pds().await {
+        eprintln!("pds not running, skipping");
+        return;
+    }
+    let c = client().await;
+    let doc: Value = c
+        .get(format!("{}/.well-known/did.json", PDS_URL))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let id = doc["id"].as_str().expect("did document needs an id");
+    assert!(id.starts_with("did:web:"), "id = {id}");
+
+    let described: Value = c
+        .get(format!("{}/xrpc/com.atproto.server.describeServer", PDS_URL))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        described["did"].as_str().unwrap(),
+        id,
+        "describeServer and the did document must name the same identity"
+    );
+
+    let vm = &doc["verificationMethod"][0];
+    assert_eq!(vm["type"], json!("Multikey"));
+    assert_eq!(vm["controller"], json!(id));
+    assert_eq!(vm["id"], json!(format!("{id}#atproto")));
+    let key = vm["publicKeyMultibase"]
+        .as_str()
+        .expect("verificationMethod needs publicKeyMultibase");
+    // base58-btc multibase — the `z` prefix the AppView's decoder wants.
+    assert!(key.starts_with('z'), "key = {key}");
+
+    // And it really is the key our tokens verify against: mint a
+    // session and check the access JWT against the published key.
+    let handle = format!("didjson_{}.maarcadetweet.local", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
+    let acc: Value = c
+        .post(format!("{}/xrpc/com.atproto.server.createAccount", PDS_URL))
+        .json(&json!({"handle": handle, "password": "hunter2hunter2"}))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let jwt = acc["access_jwt"].as_str().expect("access_jwt");
+    let claims = at_crypto::jwt::verify_jwt(jwt, key)
+        .expect("access token must verify against the published key");
+    assert_eq!(claims.sub, acc["did"].as_str().unwrap());
+    assert_eq!(claims.scope.as_deref(), Some("com.atproto.access"));
+    // `iss` is the same did:web the document identifies.
+    assert_eq!(claims.iss, id);
+}
+
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn create_account_session_refresh_resolve() {
     if !wait_for_pds().await {