ci: Release-Workflow für den Desktop-Client

Das Repo hatte keine CI. Der Workflow folgt dem Muster, das im
Nachbarprojekt lserver produktiv läuft: Tag v*.*.* baut, lädt die
Bundles als Artefakte hoch und hängt sie an ein Gitea-Release.

Zwei Jobs. Windows läuft auf dem Runner-Label `windows` (VM 131
winbuild) und liefert MSI und NSIS. Linux läuft bewusst NICHT auf
`ubuntu-latest`: auf diesem Runner ist das Label auf
docker://node:22-bookworm gemappt, also einen Container mit Node, aber
ohne Rust und ohne GTK — der Job wäre bei cargo abgebrochen.
Nachgesehen in /var/lib/gitea-runner/.runner. Das Host-Label heißt
linux-amd64 und hat die vollständige Toolchain.

macOS hat keinen Runner; der Weg für lokale .dmg-Builds steht als
Kommentar im Workflow und in docs/tauri-release.md.

AppImage ist ein eigener Schritt mit continue-on-error, weil es laut
Infrastruktur-Doku an linuxdeploy/FUSE scheitert — deb und rpm sollen
davon nicht mitgerissen werden. APPIMAGE_EXTRACT_AND_RUN und NO_STRIP
sind gesetzt, patchelf war auf dem Runner nicht installiert und wurde
nachgezogen.

Vermerkt ist auch die Falle, die lserver einen Tag CI gekostet hat:
sobald .gitea/workflows/ existiert, ignoriert Gitea .github/workflows/
vollständig — ohne roten Lauf, einfach still.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013HC9HLrUU1LNwkzp8nkDLX

.env.example

@@ -61,9 +61,45 @@ S3_BUCKET_APPVIEW=maarcadetweet-appview
 PLC_DIRECTORY_URL=https://plc.directory
 # PLC_DIRECTORY_URL=http://127.0.0.1:2582
 
+# --- Registrierung ---
+# Verlangt createAccount einen Einladungscode? Default false, damit Dev-
+# Instanzen und die Integrationstests frei Konten anlegen können — eine
+# öffentlich erreichbare PDS gehört auf true gestellt, sonst kann jeder
+# beliebig viele Repos anlegen. Der Server warnt beim Start, solange es
+# aus ist. Codes erzeugen: `pds-server invite create --count 5 --uses 1`
+PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=false
+
 # --- AppView ingest auth (optional, dev ok if unset) ---
+# Wenn gesetzt, muss die PDS denselben Wert als Header
+# `X-Ingest-Secret` mitschicken; ist er nicht gesetzt, nimmt
+# /internal/ingest-commit unauthentifizierte Writes entgegen (jeder,
+# der den Port erreicht, kann Posts/Follows/Notifications fälschen).
+# Die AppView warnt beim Start, solange er fehlt.
 # APPVIEW_INGEST_SECRET=change-me-to-a-shared-secret-between-pds-and-appview
 
+# --- AppView auth (Bearer-Token der PDS) ---
+# Erzwingt ein gültiges Access-JWT auf den privaten Endpoints
+# (/api/notifications, /api/notifications/count,
+# /api/notifications/seen, /api/timeline/home); `sub` im Token muss
+# dem `did`-Parameter entsprechen, sonst 403. Default: true.
+# Den öffentlichen P-256-Schlüssel holt sich die AppView von
+# `PDS_INTERNAL_URL` (sonst `PDS_PUBLIC_URL`) unter
+# /.well-known/did.json — `PDS_JWT_SECRET` verlässt die PDS nie.
+# Auf `false` verhält sich die AppView wie vor der Auth-Einführung
+# (alles öffentlich): nötig für die fail-open-Integrationstests mit
+# synthetischen DIDs und für eine Instanz, die schon per VPN
+# abgeschottet ist. Die AppView warnt beim Start laut, wenn er aus ist.
+# APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED=true
+# Kommaseparierte Allowlist der Browser-Origins, die `/api/*` aufrufen
+# dürfen. Nicht gesetzt = bisheriges Verhalten
+# (`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`) plus Startup-Warnung.
+# Der Tauri-Webview hat je nach Plattform eine eigene Origin:
+# macOS/iOS `tauri://localhost`, Windows `http://tauri.localhost`,
+# im Dev-Modus der Vite-Server `http://127.0.0.1:1430`.
+# `Authorization` steht immer in den erlaubten Headern (sonst
+# scheitert der Preflight), `allow_credentials` bleibt aus.
+# APPVIEW_CORS_ORIGINS=tauri://localhost,http://127.0.0.1:1430
+
 # --- Tauri-Client (Build-/Laufzeit-Overrides des Desktop-Clients) ---
 # MAARCADETWEET_PDS_URL=http://127.0.0.1:2583
 # MAARCADETWEET_APPVIEW_URL=http://127.0.0.1:2584

.gitea/workflows/release.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+name: Release Desktop Client
+
+# Baut den Tauri-Client aus crates/tauri-app fuer Windows und Linux, laedt die
+# Bundles als Job-Artefakte hoch und haengt sie an ein Gitea-Release zum Tag.
+#
+# ACHTUNG — Verzeichnis-Falle (hat im Nachbarprojekt lserver einen Tag CI
+# gekostet): Sobald `.gitea/workflows/` existiert, ignoriert Gitea
+# `.github/workflows/` KOMPLETT. In diesem Repo gibt es kein `.github/`, also
+# ist heute nichts betroffen — wer aber spaeter einen Workflow unter
+# `.github/workflows/` anlegt, bekommt keinen Lauf und auch keinen roten
+# Fehler, sondern schlicht Stille. Alle Workflows gehoeren hierher.
+#
+# VOR DEM TAG VERSION BUMPEN (analog zu lserver, wo package.json gebumpt wird):
+# Die Version im Release kommt aus dem Tag, die Version IM Artefaktnamen aus
+# der Config. Beide muessen zusammenpassen, sonst heisst die Datei zu einem
+# Tag v0.2.0 weiterhin `maarcadetweet_0.1.0_x64-setup.exe`:
+#   * crates/tauri-app/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json  -> "version"
+#   * crates/tauri-app/src-tauri/Cargo.toml       -> [package] version
+#   * crates/tauri-app/package.json               -> "version" (Konsistenz)
+# Details: docs/tauri-release.md, Abschnitt "Release-Checkliste".
+#
+# macOS: DAFUER GIBT ES KEINEN RUNNER. Weder Gitea-Instanz noch Infrastruktur
+# haben einen macOS-Host; .dmg/.app werden lokal gebaut und von Hand an das
+# hier erzeugte Release gehaengt:
+#   cd crates/tauri-app && npm ci && npm run tauri -- build --ci
+#   # Artefakte: src-tauri/target/release/bundle/dmg/*.dmg  und  macos/*.app
+#   # Universal-Build: npm run tauri -- build --ci --target universal-apple-darwin
+# Danach im Gitea-Release "Edit release" -> Dateien anhaengen. Ohne
+# Notarisierung meldet Gatekeeper die App als nicht verifiziert (siehe
+# docs/tauri-release.md, Abschnitt 9 "Offene Punkte").
+
+on:
+  push:
+    tags:
+      - "v*.*.*"
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+jobs:
+  windows:
+    name: Windows (MSI + NSIS)
+    # Label `windows` = act_runner auf der Build-VM winbuild (192.168.1.69),
+    # Win11, cargo 1.98.1, Node 24, Tauri-CLI 2.11.4. Laut Infrastruktur-Doku
+    # on-demand — laeuft die VM nicht, wird der Job nie geplant (Gitea zeigt
+    # dann gar keinen Lauf an, keinen fehlgeschlagenen).
+    runs-on: windows
+    timeout-minutes: 60
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        shell: powershell
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      # package-lock.json liegt unter crates/tauri-app/ -> npm ci (reproduzierbar).
+      # Kein `npm install`: das wuerde den Lock im Build veraendern.
+      - name: Install frontend dependencies
+        working-directory: crates/tauri-app
+        run: npm ci
+
+      # package.json definiert `"tauri": "tauri"` — der npm-Umweg nutzt die
+      # @tauri-apps/cli-devDependency aus dem Lock (2.x) statt einer global
+      # installierten `cargo tauri`-Version, ist also an das Repo gebunden.
+      # `cargo tauri build --ci` waere gleichwertig, haengt aber an dem, was
+      # gerade auf dem Runner installiert ist.
+      # bundle.targets in tauri.conf.json steht auf "all" -> unter Windows
+      # heisst das msi + nsis.
+      - name: Build Tauri bundles
+        working-directory: crates/tauri-app
+        run: npm run tauri -- build --ci
+
+      - name: Bundles auflisten
+        working-directory: crates/tauri-app
+        run: |
+          $bundle = "src-tauri\target\release\bundle"
+          Get-ChildItem -Path $bundle -Recurse -Include *.msi, *.exe |
+            ForEach-Object { Write-Host "$($_.FullName) ($([math]::Round($_.Length / 1MB)) MB)" }
+
+      - name: Upload bundles
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: maarcadetweet-windows
+          path: |
+            crates/tauri-app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/msi/*.msi
+            crates/tauri-app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/nsis/*.exe
+          retention-days: 30
+
+      - name: Gitea-Release anlegen und Bundles anhaengen
+        if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
+        env:
+          GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          $ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"
+          $api  = "$env:GITHUB_SERVER_URL/api/v1/repos/$env:GITHUB_REPOSITORY"
+          $tag  = $env:GITHUB_REF_NAME
+          $auth = "Authorization: token $env:GITEA_TOKEN"
+
+          # Release-Notes aus dem passenden CHANGELOG-Abschnitt ziehen.
+          # CHANGELOG.md existiert in diesem Repo noch nicht — sobald es
+          # angelegt wird (Format `## [0.2.0] - ...` wie bei lserver), landet
+          # der Abschnitt automatisch im Release.
+          $notes = "Automatisch gebaut aus $env:GITHUB_SHA."
+          $version = $tag.TrimStart("v")
+          if (Test-Path CHANGELOG.md) {
+            # Ausdruecklich als UTF-8 lesen: Windows PowerShell 5.1 nimmt sonst
+            # die ANSI-Codepage und macht aus "Aenderungen" Buchstabensalat.
+            $lines = [IO.File]::ReadAllText((Resolve-Path CHANGELOG.md), [Text.UTF8Encoding]::new($false)) -split "`r?`n"
+            $start = ($lines | Select-String -Pattern "^## \[$([regex]::Escape($version))\]" | Select-Object -First 1)
+            if ($start) {
+              $from = $start.LineNumber
+              $rest = $lines[$from..($lines.Count - 1)]
+              $next = ($rest | Select-String -Pattern "^## \[" | Select-Object -First 1)
+              $take = if ($next) { $next.LineNumber - 2 } else { $rest.Count - 1 }
+              if ($take -ge 0) { $notes = ($rest[0..$take] -join "`n").Trim() }
+            }
+          }
+
+          $body = @{ tag_name = $tag; name = "maarcadetweet $tag"; body = $notes } | ConvertTo-Json -Depth 3
+          $bodyFile = Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP "release.json"
+          [IO.File]::WriteAllText($bodyFile, $body, [Text.UTF8Encoding]::new($false))
+
+          # Beide Jobs (windows + linux) haengen an DASSELBE Release und laufen
+          # parallel. Deshalb: anlegen versuchen, und wenn das scheitert (der
+          # andere Job war schneller, oder es ist ein Re-Run), das vorhandene
+          # Release per Tag holen.
+          $created = curl.exe -s -X POST -H $auth -H "Content-Type: application/json" --data-binary "@$bodyFile" "$api/releases" | ConvertFrom-Json
+          if (-not $created.id) {
+            $created = curl.exe -s -H $auth "$api/releases/tags/$tag" | ConvertFrom-Json
+          }
+          if (-not $created.id) { throw "Konnte kein Release fuer $tag anlegen oder finden." }
+
+          $bundle = "crates\tauri-app\src-tauri\target\release\bundle"
+          $files = Get-ChildItem -Path $bundle -Recurse -Include *.msi, *.exe
+          if (-not $files) { throw "Keine Windows-Bundles unter $bundle gefunden." }
+          foreach ($f in $files) {
+            $name = [Uri]::EscapeDataString($f.Name)
+            curl.exe -s -o NUL -w "Asset-Upload $($f.Name): HTTP %{http_code}`n" -X POST -H $auth -F "attachment=@$($f.FullName)" "$api/releases/$($created.id)/assets?name=$name"
+          }
+          Write-Host "Release: $env:GITHUB_SERVER_URL/$env:GITHUB_REPOSITORY/releases/tag/$tag"
+
+  linux:
+    name: Linux (deb + rpm + AppImage)
+    # NICHT `ubuntu-latest` — auf diesem Runner (VM ci-runner, 192.168.1.72)
+    # ist dieses Label auf `docker://node:22-bookworm` gemappt, also einen
+    # Container mit Node, aber ohne Rust und ohne GTK. Der Job braeche dort
+    # bei `cargo` ab. Nachgesehen in /var/lib/gitea-runner/.runner:
+    #   labels: ['ubuntu-latest:docker://node:22-bookworm', 'linux-amd64:host']
+    # `linux-amd64` ist das Host-Label, und auf dem Host liegen Rust
+    # (/root/.cargo/bin, auch ohne Login-Shell im PATH), Node 22 und die
+    # Tauri-GTK-Deps. Der Runner-Dienst laeuft als root.
+    runs-on: linux-amd64
+    timeout-minutes: 60
+    defaults:
+      run:
+        shell: bash
+    env:
+      # linuxdeploy/appimagetool werden als AppImage aus ~/.cache/tauri
+      # gestartet und brauchen sonst FUSE, was in der VM nicht zuverlaessig
+      # funktioniert (siehe MAARCADE-INFRASTRUKTUR.md: "AppImage scheitert an
+      # linuxdeploy/FUSE"). Mit dieser Variable entpacken sie sich selbst.
+      APPIMAGE_EXTRACT_AND_RUN: "1"
+      # Das Release-Profil in src-tauri/Cargo.toml strippt bereits selbst;
+      # linuxdeploys eigener strip-Lauf ist dann nur eine weitere Fehlerquelle.
+      NO_STRIP: "true"
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: Toolchain melden
+        run: |
+          node --version
+          npm --version
+          cargo --version || echo "cargo fehlt im PATH — ggf. ~/.cargo/env sourcen"
+
+      - name: Install frontend dependencies
+        working-directory: crates/tauri-app
+        run: npm ci
+
+      # bundle.targets in tauri.conf.json ist "all" -> unter Linux sind das
+      # deb, rpm und appimage. Bewusst in zwei Aufrufe getrennt: der
+      # AppImage-Schritt ist der fragile (Downloads von linuxdeploy +
+      # appimagetool beim ersten Lauf, FUSE), und wenn er faellt, sollen deb
+      # und rpm trotzdem im Release landen. Der zweite Aufruf ist billig — der
+      # Cargo-Release-Build ist dann schon im target/-Cache.
+      - name: Build Tauri bundles (deb + rpm)
+        working-directory: crates/tauri-app
+        run: npm run tauri -- build --ci --bundles deb,rpm
+
+      - name: Build Tauri bundle (AppImage)
+        working-directory: crates/tauri-app
+        continue-on-error: true
+        run: npm run tauri -- build --ci --bundles appimage
+
+      - name: Bundles auflisten
+        run: |
+          find crates/tauri-app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle \
+            \( -name '*.deb' -o -name '*.rpm' -o -name '*.AppImage' \) \
+            -printf '%p (%kK)\n' || true
+
+      - name: Upload bundles
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: maarcadetweet-linux
+          path: |
+            crates/tauri-app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/deb/*.deb
+            crates/tauri-app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/rpm/*.rpm
+            crates/tauri-app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle/appimage/*.AppImage
+          # AppImage darf fehlen (siehe continue-on-error oben), deb/rpm nicht —
+          # ein komplett leerer Upload soll auffallen.
+          if-no-files-found: error
+          retention-days: 30
+
+      - name: Gitea-Release anlegen und Bundles anhaengen
+        if: startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/v')
+        env:
+          GITEA_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          api="${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/api/v1/repos/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}"
+          tag="${GITHUB_REF_NAME}"
+          version="${tag#v}"
+
+          # Gleiche CHANGELOG-Logik wie im Windows-Job. Die Datei existiert
+          # heute nicht; ohne sie bleibt es beim Fallback-Text.
+          notes="Automatisch gebaut aus ${GITHUB_SHA}."
+          if [ -f CHANGELOG.md ]; then
+            section="$(awk -v v="$version" '
+              /^## \[/ { if (found) exit; if ($0 ~ "^## \\[" v "\\]") { found = 1; next } }
+              found { print }
+            ' CHANGELOG.md)"
+            if [ -n "$(printf '%s' "$section" | tr -d '[:space:]')" ]; then
+              notes="$section"
+            fi
+          fi
+
+          # jq ist auf dem Runner nicht garantiert, Node 22 schon.
+          payload="${RUNNER_TEMP}/release.json"
+          NOTES="$notes" TAG="$tag" node -e '
+            const fs = require("fs");
+            fs.writeFileSync(process.argv[1], JSON.stringify({
+              tag_name: process.env.TAG,
+              name: `maarcadetweet ${process.env.TAG}`,
+              body: process.env.NOTES,
+            }));
+          ' "$payload"
+
+          # Anlegen oder — falls der Windows-Job schneller war bzw. das Release
+          # vom Re-Run schon existiert — das vorhandene holen.
+          id="$(curl -s -X POST -H "Authorization: token ${GITEA_TOKEN}" \
+                 -H "Content-Type: application/json" --data-binary "@${payload}" \
+                 "${api}/releases" | node -e 'let s="";process.stdin.on("data",d=>s+=d).on("end",()=>{try{process.stdout.write(String(JSON.parse(s).id||""))}catch{}})')"
+          if [ -z "$id" ]; then
+            id="$(curl -s -H "Authorization: token ${GITEA_TOKEN}" \
+                   "${api}/releases/tags/${tag}" | node -e 'let s="";process.stdin.on("data",d=>s+=d).on("end",()=>{try{process.stdout.write(String(JSON.parse(s).id||""))}catch{}})')"
+          fi
+          if [ -z "$id" ]; then
+            echo "Konnte kein Release fuer ${tag} anlegen oder finden." >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+          bundle="crates/tauri-app/src-tauri/target/release/bundle"
+          found=0
+          while IFS= read -r f; do
+            found=1
+            name="$(basename "$f")"
+            code="$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST \
+                     -H "Authorization: token ${GITEA_TOKEN}" \
+                     -F "attachment=@${f}" \
+                     "${api}/releases/${id}/assets?name=${name}")"
+            echo "Asset-Upload ${name}: HTTP ${code}"
+          done < <(find "$bundle" \( -name '*.deb' -o -name '*.rpm' -o -name '*.AppImage' \) | sort)
+          [ "$found" -eq 1 ] || { echo "Keine Linux-Bundles unter ${bundle} gefunden." >&2; exit 1; }
+
+          echo "Release: ${GITHUB_SERVER_URL}/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}/releases/tag/${tag}"

Cargo.lock

@@ -51,14 +51,18 @@ dependencies = [
  "axum",
  "base64",
  "chrono",
+ "ciborium",
+ "cid",
  "dotenvy",
  "futures",
+ "p256",
  "reqwest",
  "rustls",
  "serde",
  "serde_json",
  "sqlx",
  "tokio",
+ "tokio-tungstenite",
  "tower",
  "tower-http",
  "tracing",
@@ -286,6 +290,7 @@ checksum = "edca88bc138befd0323b20752846e6587272d3b03b0343c8ea28a6f819e6e71f"
 dependencies = [
  "async-trait",
  "axum-core",
+ "base64",
  "bytes",
  "futures-util",
  "http",
@@ -304,8 +309,10 @@ dependencies = [
  "serde_json",
  "serde_path_to_error",
  "serde_urlencoded",
+ "sha1",
  "sync_wrapper",
  "tokio",
+ "tokio-tungstenite",
  "tower",
  "tower-layer",
  "tower-service",
@@ -1884,6 +1891,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "ciborium",
  "cid",
  "dotenvy",
+ "futures",
  "hex",
  "k256",
  "p256",
@@ -1894,6 +1902,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "sha2",
  "sqlx",
  "tokio",
+ "tokio-tungstenite",
  "tower",
  "tower-http",
  "tracing",

README.md

@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ crates/tauri-app/       Tauri 2 + Svelte 5 + Vite + TS Desktop-Client
   └── src-tauri/        Rust-IPC-Layer
 
 lexicons/app/twi/post.json     Custom Lexicon mit maxLength: 160
+lexicons/app/bsky/            like, repost, follow, actor.profile
 migrations/pds/                PDS-DB-Schema (users, repos, blobs, sessions, plc_ops)
 migrations/appview/            AppView-DB-Schema (posts, likes, follows, notifications, profiles, jetstream_cursor)
 docs/                          Deployment, Architektur, Tauri-Release (siehe unten)
@@ -68,6 +69,8 @@ cargo run -p appview
 | 6  Tauri-UI-Logik an Backend koppeln | ✅ done — LoginScreen, NavRail, PostCard, ComposeBox, Profile/Compose/Search/Settings-Views |
 | 7  Polish (Tray, Notifications, Auto-Update) | ✅ done — Tray-Icon custom (`tauri::include_image!`), Notification-Click navigiert via `app://notification`-Event + `openThread`-Helper zu Thread-Detail, Auto-Update in Dev inert (Production-Weg: [`docs/tauri-release.md`](docs/tauri-release.md)) |
 | 8  Social-Graph + Benachrichtigungen | ✅ done — `notifications`-Tabelle, Schreibpfad im Jetstream-Indexer (idempotent, keine Selbst-Notifications), `/api/notifications[/count|/seen]`, `/api/followers`, `/api/following`, eigene `/api/thread`-Route; im Client Notifications-View mit Unread-Badge und klickbare Follower-/Following-Listen im Profil |
+| 9  Auth + Performance | ✅ done — AppView prüft Bearer-Tokens (ES256, Schlüssel aus dem neuen `/.well-known/did.json` der PDS, fail closed); Timeline und Notifications nur noch für die eigene DID; CORS-Allowlist statt `Any`; Indizes für Handle-Lookup und Cold-Start-Feed |
+| 10  Lokaler Firehose | ✅ done — `com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos` auf der PDS (Event in derselben Transaktion wie der Commit, `seq`-Cursor mit lückenfreiem Replay, WebSocket-Frames in atproto-Form); die AppView konsumiert ihn mit persistiertem Cursor. Ein verlorener Push ist damit nicht mehr endgültig. |
 
 ## Tests
 
@@ -81,11 +84,13 @@ Stand zuletzt gegen den lokalen Dev-Stack (docker compose + laufender PDS + AppV
 Rust-Workspace grün (u.a. 27 MST, 24 PDS-Integration, 49 AppView-Lib, 14 AppView-Integration),
 Frontend grün. Zwei Vorbehalte:
 
-* Die DB-gestützten Integrationstests sind *fail-open* — ohne erreichbare Postgres/PDS
-  überspringen sie sich selbst und melden das nur auf stderr. Ein grüner Lauf ohne
-  laufenden Stack sagt also weniger, als er aussieht.
-* Einige Tests hängen am Zustand der Dev-Datenbank; auf einer frischen DB können
-  `handle_sync`-Tests abweichen. Wer sie ernst nimmt, prüft sie gegen eine definierte DB.
+* Die DB-gestützten Tests sind *fail-open*: **ohne `DATABASE_URL_APPVIEW` in der
+  Umgebung überspringen sie sich selbst** und melden das nur auf stderr. `cargo test
+  --workspace` in einer nackten Shell meldet dann grün, ohne sie ausgeführt zu haben —
+  für einen aussagekräftigen Lauf `set -a; . ./.env; set +a` voranstellen und PDS +
+  AppView laufen lassen.
+* Läuft die Auth (Default), holen sich die Integrationstests echte Tokens von der PDS
+  bzw. signieren sie aus `PDS_JWT_SECRET`; ohne erreichbare PDS überspringen sie.
 
 `crates/tauri-app/src-tauri` hat ein eigenes `[workspace]` und ist **nicht** Teil des
 Root-Workspace; `cargo test --workspace` von oben erfasst den IPC-Layer nicht.
@@ -100,11 +105,14 @@ Root-Workspace; `cargo test --workspace` von oben erfasst den IPC-Layer nicht.
 
 ## Bekannte Lücken
 
-* Die eigene PDS speist **keinen** Firehose (`com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos` fehlt) —
-  eigene Records erreichen die AppView nur über den Best-Effort-Push
-  `POST /internal/ingest-commit`.
-* Die AppView-Leseschnittstelle hat **keine Auth** und CORS `Any`; bei
-  `/api/notifications` sind das erstmals halbwegs private Daten.
+* Der Firehose ist **lokal**: er verbindet die eigenen zwei Dienste. Ein fremder
+  Relay erfährt von dieser PDS weiterhin nichts.
+* Die Frame-Hülle ist spec-konformes DAG-CBOR, die Blöcke darin nicht: CIDs
+  innerhalb von Commit-Blöcken sind Strings statt Tag-42-Links. Ein fremder
+  atproto-Consumer liest die Frames, scheitert aber an den Blockinhalten. Das
+  zu ändern hieße, jede CID im System zu ändern — inklusive der
+  `did:plc:`-Ableitung.
+* `firehose_events` wird nie beschnitten.
 * Notifications werden nie gelöscht: Unlike/Unfollow lässt die Zeile stehen, und der
   Dedupe-Key macht sie „einmal pro (Empfänger, Autor, Art, Subject) für immer".
 * Auto-Update ist nur dokumentiert, nicht verdrahtet: niemand ruft `check()` auf, das
@@ -112,8 +120,6 @@ Root-Workspace; `cargo test --workspace` von oben erfasst den IPC-Layer nicht.
 * Reply-Notifications gehen verloren, wenn die Antwort vor ihrem Parent indiziert wird
   (kein Nachlauf) — bei Jetstream möglich.
 * `at-blob` spricht MinIO ohne Signature V4 — echtes AWS S3 funktioniert damit nicht.
-* Die PDS liefert kein `.well-known/did.json`; `describeServer` gibt die DID hart
-  als `did:web:pds.maarcadetweet.local` zurück.
 
 ## Design
 

crates/appview/Cargo.toml

@@ -35,13 +35,27 @@ at-shared = { workspace = true }
 at-firehose = { workspace = true }
 at-crypto = { workspace = true }
 at-identity = { workspace = true }
+reqwest = { workspace = true }
 uuid = { workspace = true }
 rustls = { version = "0.23", default-features = false, features = ["ring", "std", "logging", "tls12"] }
 base64 = { workspace = true }
 futures = { workspace = true }
+# The local PDS firehose (`src/pds_firehose.rs`): a WebSocket carrying
+# DAG-CBOR frames whose `blocks` field is a CAR of record blocks.
+# `tokio-tungstenite` for the socket, `cid` for the block addresses,
+# `ciborium` for the record blocks themselves (they are written with
+# `ciborium::into_writer` on the PDS side, so it is their exact inverse).
+# The frame envelope is decoded by `src/cbor.rs`, which needs no crate.
+tokio-tungstenite = { workspace = true }
+cid = { workspace = true }
+ciborium = { workspace = true }
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 reqwest = { workspace = true }
 serde_json = { workspace = true }
 uuid = { workspace = true }
+# Unit tests in `src/auth.rs` build a P-256 verification key in the
+# same `0x8012 + uncompressed point` encoding the PDS publishes, which
+# needs the curve's `ToEncodedPoint`.
+p256 = { workspace = true }

crates/appview/src/auth.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,735 @@
+//! Bearer-token authentication for the AppView's private endpoints.
+//!
+//! ## What is being proven
+//!
+//! The PDS already issues an ES256 access JWT on
+//! `com.atproto.server.createSession` / `createAccount`. That token
+//! carries `sub = <did>`, `scope = "com.atproto.access"` and
+//! `aud = "did:web:appview.maarcadetweet.local"` — it was always meant
+//! to be presented *here*. All the AppView has to do is verify the
+//! signature and read `sub`.
+//!
+//! ## Where the key comes from
+//!
+//! Verifying an ES256 signature needs only the public half of the PDS's
+//! P-256 key. The PDS publishes it in its DID document at
+//! `GET /.well-known/did.json` (see `pds-server/src/main.rs`), so
+//! `PDS_JWT_SECRET` never leaves the PDS process. We fetch that
+//! document once, cache the `publicKeyMultibase` behind an `RwLock`,
+//! and re-fetch on a verification failure so an operator can rotate
+//! `PDS_JWT_SECRET` without restarting the AppView.
+//!
+//! Two failure modes are deliberately handled differently:
+//!
+//!  - **PDS unreachable at startup.** The AppView has always booted
+//!    independently of the PDS (it indexes the firehose, which has
+//!    nothing to do with the local PDS), and a crash-loop on a
+//!    colocated service that happens to boot second would be a
+//!    self-inflicted outage. So startup only *warns*; the first
+//!    authenticated request retries the fetch.
+//!  - **PDS unreachable when a token must be checked.** There is no
+//!    safe way to guess, so the request gets a `503`. Fail closed —
+//!    never fail open.
+//!
+//! ## Error contract
+//!
+//! The body shape matches every other AppView error
+//! (`{"error": …, "message": …}`). The `error` codes are load-bearing:
+//!
+//! | case                                   | status | `error`           |
+//! |----------------------------------------|--------|-------------------|
+//! | no / malformed `Authorization` header  | 401    | `AuthMissing`     |
+//! | bad signature, expired, wrong `scope`  | 401    | `TokenInvalid`    |
+//! | valid token, but `sub` ≠ requested did | 403    | `Forbidden`       |
+//! | PDS key not obtainable                 | 503    | `AuthUnavailable` |
+//!
+//! **`TokenInvalid` is a contract with the desktop client**: seeing it,
+//! the client refreshes its access JWT (`com.atproto.server.refreshSession`)
+//! and retries the request once. Renaming it silently logs every user
+//! out an hour after login.
+
+use at_crypto::jwt::JwtClaims;
+use axum::async_trait;
+use axum::extract::FromRequestParts;
+use axum::http::request::Parts;
+use axum::http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode};
+use axum::Json;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
+use tokio::sync::RwLock;
+use tracing::{debug, warn};
+
+use crate::state::AppState;
+
+/// The scope an *access* token carries. Refresh tokens are minted with
+/// `com.atproto.refresh` by the same key, so without this check a
+/// refresh token — which lives for 90 days instead of an hour — would
+/// be accepted as a session credential everywhere.
+const ACCESS_SCOPE: &str = "com.atproto.access";
+
+/// Minimum spacing between two key re-fetches triggered by a failed
+/// verification.
+///
+/// Re-fetching on failure is what makes key rotation work without a
+/// restart. Doing it on *every* failure would also hand anyone who can
+/// reach the AppView a free amplifier: a stream of garbage tokens
+/// becomes a stream of requests to the PDS. One re-fetch per minute is
+/// far quicker than any plausible rotation cadence needs and costs the
+/// PDS nothing.
+const KEY_REFETCH_MIN_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
+
+/// HTTP timeout for the DID-document fetch. The PDS is colocated; if it
+/// doesn't answer in two seconds it isn't answering, and a request
+/// blocked on auth is a request the user is staring at.
+const DID_DOC_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(2);
+
+// -- error type --------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// Everything that can go wrong between "a request arrived" and "we know
+/// which DID it belongs to". Converted into the AppView's standard error
+/// body by [`AuthError::into_response_parts`].
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum AuthError {
+    /// No `Authorization` header, or one that isn't `Bearer <token>`.
+    Missing,
+    /// Signature, expiry or scope check failed. The client's cue to
+    /// refresh its access token and retry.
+    Invalid(String),
+    /// Authenticated fine, but the token belongs to somebody else.
+    Forbidden,
+    /// We could not obtain the PDS's public key, so we cannot decide.
+    Unavailable(String),
+}
+
+impl AuthError {
+    pub fn into_response_parts(self) -> (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
+        let (status, code, message) = match self {
+            AuthError::Missing => (
+                StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
+                "AuthMissing",
+                "missing Authorization: Bearer header".to_string(),
+            ),
+            AuthError::Invalid(detail) => {
+                (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, "TokenInvalid", detail)
+            }
+            AuthError::Forbidden => (
+                StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
+                "Forbidden",
+                "token sub does not match the requested did".to_string(),
+            ),
+            AuthError::Unavailable(detail) => (
+                StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE,
+                "AuthUnavailable",
+                format!("cannot verify tokens: {detail}"),
+            ),
+        };
+        (
+            status,
+            Json(json!({
+                "error": code,
+                "message": message,
+            })),
+        )
+    }
+}
+
+impl From<AuthError> for (StatusCode, Json<Value>) {
+    fn from(e: AuthError) -> Self {
+        e.into_response_parts()
+    }
+}
+
+// -- key cache ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[derive(Default)]
+struct CachedKey {
+    multibase: Option<String>,
+    /// When we last *attempted* a fetch — successful or not. Throttles
+    /// the on-failure refresh path; see [`KEY_REFETCH_MIN_INTERVAL`].
+    last_attempt: Option<Instant>,
+}
+
+/// The PDS signing key, lazily fetched and cached.
+///
+/// Lives in [`AppState`] behind an `Arc`, so all handlers share one
+/// cache and one HTTP client.
+pub struct PdsKeys {
+    http: reqwest::Client,
+    /// Fully-qualified URL of the PDS's DID document.
+    did_doc_url: String,
+    /// The `aud` every access token must carry: this AppView's own
+    /// service DID. See [`verify_with_key`] for why it's checked.
+    expected_aud: String,
+    inner: RwLock<CachedKey>,
+}
+
+impl PdsKeys {
+    /// Build a cache pointed at `base_url` (no trailing slash required),
+    /// accepting only tokens addressed to `expected_aud`.
+    pub fn new(base_url: &str, expected_aud: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
+        let http = reqwest::Client::builder()
+            .timeout(DID_DOC_TIMEOUT)
+            .build()
+            .expect("reqwest client build should never fail");
+        Self {
+            http,
+            did_doc_url: format!(
+                "{}/.well-known/did.json",
+                base_url.trim_end_matches('/')
+            ),
+            expected_aud: expected_aud.into(),
+            inner: RwLock::new(CachedKey::default()),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Same PDS the handle-sync worker talks to: `PDS_INTERNAL_URL`
+    /// when set, else `PDS_PUBLIC_URL`.
+    pub fn from_config(cfg: &at_shared::config::AppConfig) -> Self {
+        Self::new(&cfg.pds_base_url(), cfg.appview_did())
+    }
+
+    pub fn did_doc_url(&self) -> &str {
+        &self.did_doc_url
+    }
+
+    /// The cached key, if we have ever fetched one.
+    pub async fn cached(&self) -> Option<String> {
+        self.inner.read().await.multibase.clone()
+    }
+
+    /// Fetch the DID document and replace the cached key.
+    ///
+    /// Called once at startup (best effort), on the first authenticated
+    /// request if startup failed, and — throttled — after a failed
+    /// verification.
+    pub async fn refresh(&self) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
+        // Record the attempt before the await so two concurrent
+        // failures can't both decide they're the first one.
+        self.inner.write().await.last_attempt = Some(Instant::now());
+
+        let resp = self.http.get(&self.did_doc_url).send().await?;
+        if !resp.status().is_success() {
+            anyhow::bail!(
+                "{} returned {}",
+                self.did_doc_url,
+                resp.status().as_u16()
+            );
+        }
+        let doc: Value = resp.json().await?;
+        let key = extract_public_key_multibase(&doc)?;
+        {
+            let mut guard = self.inner.write().await;
+            guard.multibase = Some(key.clone());
+        }
+        debug!(url = %self.did_doc_url, "loaded PDS signing key");
+        Ok(key)
+    }
+
+    /// The key to verify with, fetching it if we don't have one yet.
+    async fn key_or_fetch(&self) -> Result<String, AuthError> {
+        if let Some(k) = self.cached().await {
+            return Ok(k);
+        }
+        self.refresh().await.map_err(|e| {
+            warn!(url = %self.did_doc_url, error = %e, "PDS signing key unavailable");
+            AuthError::Unavailable(format!(
+                "PDS did document at {} not reachable: {e}",
+                self.did_doc_url
+            ))
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// Re-fetch after a verification failure, at most once per
+    /// [`KEY_REFETCH_MIN_INTERVAL`]. Returns the new key only when it
+    /// actually differs from `stale` — re-running the same failing
+    /// verification against an unchanged key proves nothing.
+    async fn refetch_if_stale(&self, stale: &str) -> Option<String> {
+        {
+            let guard = self.inner.read().await;
+            if let Some(last) = guard.last_attempt {
+                if last.elapsed() < KEY_REFETCH_MIN_INTERVAL {
+                    return None;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        match self.refresh().await {
+            Ok(fresh) if fresh != stale => {
+                warn!("PDS signing key changed; re-verifying with the rotated key");
+                Some(fresh)
+            }
+            Ok(_) => None,
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(error = %e, "PDS key re-fetch after verification failure failed");
+                None
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Verify an access token and return its claims.
+    ///
+    /// Retries exactly once against a freshly fetched key, so a rotated
+    /// `PDS_JWT_SECRET` costs one extra HTTP round trip rather than a
+    /// restart.
+    pub async fn verify_access_token(&self, token: &str) -> Result<JwtClaims, AuthError> {
+        let key = self.key_or_fetch().await?;
+        match verify_with_key(token, &key, &self.expected_aud) {
+            Ok(claims) => Ok(claims),
+            Err(first) => {
+                let Some(fresh) = self.refetch_if_stale(&key).await else {
+                    return Err(first);
+                };
+                verify_with_key(token, &fresh, &self.expected_aud).map_err(|_| first)
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Pull `verificationMethod[].publicKeyMultibase` out of a DID document.
+///
+/// We take the first entry that carries a `publicKeyMultibase` rather
+/// than insisting on a fragment name: the PDS writes `#atproto`, but a
+/// document served by a proxy or a future PDS version may order or name
+/// its methods differently, and any key in the document is a key the
+/// controller published for itself. A document with none is an error,
+/// not an empty key — silently caching `""` would turn every later
+/// verification into a confusing signature failure.
+fn extract_public_key_multibase(doc: &Value) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
+    let methods = doc
+        .get("verificationMethod")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_array())
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("did document has no verificationMethod array"))?;
+    for m in methods {
+        if let Some(k) = m.get("publicKeyMultibase").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
+            if !k.is_empty() {
+                return Ok(k.to_string());
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    anyhow::bail!("did document has no verificationMethod with publicKeyMultibase")
+}
+
+/// Signature + expiry + scope check against one specific key.
+///
+/// `verify_jwt` handles the ES256 signature and `exp` (with a 30 s
+/// leeway for clock skew); the scope check is ours, and it is the line
+/// that keeps a 90-day refresh token from working as a session
+/// credential.
+fn verify_with_key(
+    token: &str,
+    pubkey_multibase: &str,
+    expected_aud: &str,
+) -> Result<JwtClaims, AuthError> {
+    let claims = at_crypto::jwt::verify_jwt(token, pubkey_multibase)
+        .map_err(|e| AuthError::Invalid(format!("invalid token: {e}")))?;
+    match claims.scope.as_deref() {
+        Some(ACCESS_SCOPE) => {}
+        other => {
+            return Err(AuthError::Invalid(format!(
+                "token scope {:?} is not {ACCESS_SCOPE}",
+                other.unwrap_or("<none>")
+            )))
+        }
+    }
+    // Audience. `at_crypto::jwt::verify_jwt` sets `validate_aud = false`
+    // because it has no way of knowing who the caller is, so the check
+    // belongs here.
+    //
+    // What it buys: the PDS signs tokens for *its* AppView. Without an
+    // audience check, a token handed to any other service that trusts
+    // the same PDS key would be replayable here — and, the other way
+    // round, a token this AppView issued trust in could be replayed
+    // there. It is the difference between "the PDS vouches for this
+    // user" and "the PDS vouches for this user *talking to us*".
+    //
+    // A mismatch is `TokenInvalid` rather than `Forbidden` on purpose:
+    // that is the code the desktop client refreshes on, so a
+    // deployment that changes `APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL` heals itself on the
+    // next refresh instead of stranding every signed-in user.
+    if claims.aud != expected_aud {
+        return Err(AuthError::Invalid(format!(
+            "token audience {:?} is not {expected_aud:?}",
+            claims.aud
+        )));
+    }
+    Ok(claims)
+}
+
+/// Extract the bearer token from an `Authorization` header.
+///
+/// The scheme match is case-insensitive (RFC 7235 says it is) — some
+/// HTTP clients send `bearer`.
+fn bearer_token(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<String, AuthError> {
+    let raw = headers
+        .get("authorization")
+        .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
+        .ok_or(AuthError::Missing)?;
+    let (scheme, token) = raw.split_once(' ').ok_or(AuthError::Missing)?;
+    if !scheme.eq_ignore_ascii_case("bearer") {
+        return Err(AuthError::Missing);
+    }
+    let token = token.trim();
+    if token.is_empty() {
+        return Err(AuthError::Missing);
+    }
+    Ok(token.to_string())
+}
+
+// -- extractor ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// The authenticated DID of the caller.
+///
+/// `None` means auth is switched off for this instance
+/// (`APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED=false`) — *not* "anonymous but allowed
+/// through". When auth is on, this is always `Some` by construction:
+/// the extractor rejects the request otherwise.
+///
+/// Handlers must still call [`AuthedDid::ensure_matches`] with the DID
+/// the request asks about. Proving *who you are* is not the same as
+/// proving *whose notifications you may read*.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct AuthedDid(pub Option<String>);
+
+impl AuthedDid {
+    /// 403 unless the token's `sub` is the DID the request targets.
+    ///
+    /// With auth disabled this is a no-op, which is exactly what
+    /// `APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED=false` means.
+    pub fn ensure_matches(&self, did: &str) -> Result<(), (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
+        match self.0.as_deref() {
+            None => Ok(()),
+            Some(sub) if sub == did => Ok(()),
+            Some(_) => Err(AuthError::Forbidden.into_response_parts()),
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The caller's DID, if authenticated.
+    ///
+    /// No handler needs it yet — every private endpoint takes the DID
+    /// as a parameter and compares it — but an endpoint that acts
+    /// purely on "whoever is calling" would read it here instead of
+    /// trusting a query parameter.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    pub fn did(&self) -> Option<&str> {
+        self.0.as_deref()
+    }
+}
+
+#[async_trait]
+impl FromRequestParts<AppState> for AuthedDid {
+    type Rejection = (StatusCode, Json<Value>);
+
+    async fn from_request_parts(
+        parts: &mut Parts,
+        state: &AppState,
+    ) -> Result<Self, Self::Rejection> {
+        if !state.cfg.appview_auth_required {
+            // Opt-out instance. The startup log says so in capitals.
+            return Ok(AuthedDid(None));
+        }
+        let token = bearer_token(&parts.headers).map_err(AuthError::into_response_parts)?;
+        let claims = state
+            .pds_keys
+            .verify_access_token(&token)
+            .await
+            .map_err(AuthError::into_response_parts)?;
+        Ok(AuthedDid(Some(claims.sub)))
+    }
+}
+
+// -- startup posture ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// Log, once at boot, every way this instance is configured to be less
+/// strict than the defaults.
+///
+/// All three of these are legitimate configurations — a VPN-only
+/// deployment, a dev box, a single-machine setup — and all three are
+/// also exactly what an accidentally-public instance looks like. The
+/// only defence that survives a hurried deployment is a log line the
+/// operator cannot miss, so each one is a `warn!` naming the variable
+/// that turns it back on.
+pub fn log_startup_posture(cfg: &at_shared::config::AppConfig) {
+    if !cfg.appview_auth_required {
+        warn!(
+            "APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED=false — /api/notifications* and \
+             /api/timeline/home are served to ANY caller for ANY did. \
+             Only safe when this instance is unreachable from untrusted \
+             networks."
+        );
+    }
+    if cfg.appview_cors_origins.is_empty() {
+        warn!(
+            "APPVIEW_CORS_ORIGINS unset — sending Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * \
+             so any web page can call this AppView from a browser. Set it to the \
+             origins your client actually uses, e.g. \
+             'tauri://localhost,http://127.0.0.1:1430'."
+        );
+    }
+    if cfg.appview_ingest_secret.is_none() {
+        warn!(
+            "APPVIEW_INGEST_SECRET unset — POST /internal/ingest-commit accepts \
+             unauthenticated writes into the index (anyone who can reach this port \
+             can forge posts, follows and notifications). Set the same value here \
+             and on the PDS."
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+// -- tests -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use at_crypto::ecdsa::P256Keypair;
+    use at_crypto::jwt::{issue_jwt, JwtClaims};
+    use axum::http::HeaderValue;
+
+    /// A throwaway server key plus its `publicKeyMultibase`, in the
+    /// exact encoding the PDS publishes: `0x8012` (P-256) followed by
+    /// the *uncompressed* affine coordinates. `P256Keypair::generate`
+    /// stores a compressed point, which `verify_jwt` cannot decode — so
+    /// this mirrors `pds-server`'s `server_p256_keypair`.
+    fn test_key() -> (P256Keypair, String) {
+        let kp = P256Keypair::generate().unwrap();
+        let vk = kp.verifying_key().unwrap();
+        let pt = vk.to_encoded_point(false);
+        let mut raw = vec![0x80u8, 0x12u8];
+        raw.extend_from_slice(pt.x().unwrap());
+        raw.extend_from_slice(pt.y().unwrap());
+        let multibase = at_crypto::multibase_util::encode_b58btc(&raw);
+        (kp, multibase)
+    }
+
+    /// The audience the tests' AppView identifies as — what
+    /// `AppConfig::appview_did()` would return for
+    /// `APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL=http://127.0.0.1:2584`.
+    const TEST_AUD: &str = "did:web:127.0.0.1%3A2584";
+
+    fn mint(kp: &P256Keypair, did: &str, scope: &str, ttl_secs: i64) -> String {
+        mint_for(kp, did, scope, ttl_secs, TEST_AUD)
+    }
+
+    fn mint_for(
+        kp: &P256Keypair,
+        did: &str,
+        scope: &str,
+        ttl_secs: i64,
+        aud: &str,
+    ) -> String {
+        let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
+        issue_jwt(
+            kp,
+            &JwtClaims {
+                iss: "did:web:127.0.0.1%3A2583".into(),
+                sub: did.into(),
+                aud: aud.into(),
+                iat: now - 1,
+                exp: now + ttl_secs,
+                jti: None,
+                scope: Some(scope.into()),
+            },
+        )
+        .unwrap()
+    }
+
+    fn header_map(value: &str) -> HeaderMap {
+        let mut h = HeaderMap::new();
+        h.insert("authorization", HeaderValue::from_str(value).unwrap());
+        h
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn missing_header_is_auth_missing() {
+        assert_eq!(bearer_token(&HeaderMap::new()), Err(AuthError::Missing));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn malformed_header_is_auth_missing() {
+        // No scheme, wrong scheme, and an empty token all read as
+        // "the client never presented a credential" — 401 AuthMissing,
+        // not TokenInvalid, so the client re-authenticates instead of
+        // burning a refresh round trip.
+        assert_eq!(bearer_token(&header_map("abc.def.ghi")), Err(AuthError::Missing));
+        assert_eq!(bearer_token(&header_map("Basic dXNlcjpwdw==")), Err(AuthError::Missing));
+        assert_eq!(bearer_token(&header_map("Bearer   ")), Err(AuthError::Missing));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bearer_scheme_is_case_insensitive() {
+        assert_eq!(bearer_token(&header_map("bearer tok")).unwrap(), "tok");
+        assert_eq!(bearer_token(&header_map("Bearer tok")).unwrap(), "tok");
+    }
+
+    /// A token minted for a different AppView must not work here, and
+    /// must fail as `TokenInvalid` so the client refreshes rather than
+    /// treating it as a permanent rejection.
+    #[test]
+    fn token_for_another_audience_is_rejected() {
+        let (kp, mb) = test_key();
+        let token = mint_for(
+            &kp,
+            "did:plc:alice",
+            ACCESS_SCOPE,
+            3600,
+            "did:web:someone-elses-appview.example",
+        );
+        let err = verify_with_key(&token, &mb, TEST_AUD).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err, AuthError::Invalid(ref m) if m.contains("audience")),
+            "expected an audience rejection, got {err:?}"
+        );
+        let (status, body) = err.into_response_parts();
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+        assert_eq!(body.0["error"], "TokenInvalid");
+
+        // The same token *is* fine for the AppView it was minted for.
+        assert!(
+            verify_with_key(&token, &mb, "did:web:someone-elses-appview.example").is_ok()
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn error_bodies_carry_the_documented_codes() {
+        // These strings are a contract: the desktop client keys its
+        // "refresh and retry" behaviour off `TokenInvalid`.
+        let (s, b) = AuthError::Missing.into_response_parts();
+        assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+        assert_eq!(b.0["error"], "AuthMissing");
+        let (s, b) = AuthError::Invalid("x".into()).into_response_parts();
+        assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
+        assert_eq!(b.0["error"], "TokenInvalid");
+        let (s, b) = AuthError::Forbidden.into_response_parts();
+        assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+        assert_eq!(b.0["error"], "Forbidden");
+        let (s, b) = AuthError::Unavailable("pds down".into()).into_response_parts();
+        assert_eq!(s, StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
+        assert_eq!(b.0["error"], "AuthUnavailable");
+        // Every body carries both fields the client parses.
+        assert!(b.0["message"].as_str().unwrap().contains("pds down"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn valid_access_token_verifies() {
+        let (kp, mb) = test_key();
+        let token = mint(&kp, "did:plc:alice", ACCESS_SCOPE, 3600);
+        let claims = verify_with_key(&token, &mb, TEST_AUD).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(claims.sub, "did:plc:alice");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn garbage_token_is_invalid() {
+        let (_, mb) = test_key();
+        let err = verify_with_key("not-a-jwt", &mb, TEST_AUD).unwrap_err();
+        assert!(matches!(err, AuthError::Invalid(_)));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn token_signed_by_another_key_is_invalid() {
+        let (kp, _) = test_key();
+        let (_, other_mb) = test_key();
+        let token = mint(&kp, "did:plc:alice", ACCESS_SCOPE, 3600);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            verify_with_key(&token, &other_mb, TEST_AUD).unwrap_err(),
+            AuthError::Invalid(_)
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn refresh_scope_is_rejected() {
+        // The refresh token is signed by the same key and lives 90
+        // days. Without the scope check it would be a session token.
+        let (kp, mb) = test_key();
+        let token = mint(&kp, "did:plc:alice", "com.atproto.refresh", 3600);
+        let err = verify_with_key(&token, &mb, TEST_AUD).unwrap_err();
+        match err {
+            AuthError::Invalid(msg) => assert!(msg.contains("com.atproto.refresh")),
+            other => panic!("expected Invalid, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn expired_token_is_rejected() {
+        // Beyond `verify_jwt`'s 30 s leeway.
+        let (kp, mb) = test_key();
+        let token = mint(&kp, "did:plc:alice", ACCESS_SCOPE, -120);
+        assert!(matches!(
+            verify_with_key(&token, &mb, TEST_AUD).unwrap_err(),
+            AuthError::Invalid(_)
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ensure_matches_enforces_sub_equals_did() {
+        let me = AuthedDid(Some("did:plc:alice".into()));
+        assert!(me.ensure_matches("did:plc:alice").is_ok());
+        let (status, body) = me.ensure_matches("did:plc:bob").unwrap_err();
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
+        assert_eq!(body.0["error"], "Forbidden");
+        // A prefix of the real DID must not pass.
+        assert!(me.ensure_matches("did:plc:ali").is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ensure_matches_is_a_noop_when_auth_disabled() {
+        let off = AuthedDid(None);
+        assert!(off.ensure_matches("did:plc:anyone").is_ok());
+        assert_eq!(off.did(), None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn did_doc_key_extraction() {
+        let doc = json!({
+            "id": "did:web:127.0.0.1%3A2583",
+            "verificationMethod": [{
+                "id": "did:web:127.0.0.1%3A2583#atproto",
+                "type": "Multikey",
+                "controller": "did:web:127.0.0.1%3A2583",
+                "publicKeyMultibase": "zQ3shokFTS3brHcDQrn82RUDfCZESWL1ZdCEJwekUDPQiYBme"
+            }]
+        });
+        assert_eq!(
+            extract_public_key_multibase(&doc).unwrap(),
+            "zQ3shokFTS3brHcDQrn82RUDfCZESWL1ZdCEJwekUDPQiYBme"
+        );
+
+        // A document without a usable key must error rather than cache
+        // an empty string.
+        assert!(extract_public_key_multibase(&json!({})).is_err());
+        assert!(extract_public_key_multibase(&json!({
+            "verificationMethod": [{"id": "#x", "type": "Multikey"}]
+        }))
+        .is_err());
+        assert!(extract_public_key_multibase(&json!({
+            "verificationMethod": [{"publicKeyMultibase": ""}]
+        }))
+        .is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn did_doc_url_is_built_from_the_base_url() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            PdsKeys::new("http://127.0.0.1:2583", TEST_AUD).did_doc_url(),
+            "http://127.0.0.1:2583/.well-known/did.json"
+        );
+        // A trailing slash must not produce a double slash — some
+        // servers 404 on it.
+        assert_eq!(
+            PdsKeys::new("http://pds:3000/", TEST_AUD).did_doc_url(),
+            "http://pds:3000/.well-known/did.json"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn verification_fails_closed_when_the_pds_is_unreachable() {
+        // Port 1 on loopback: nothing listens there, so the fetch fails
+        // fast. The result must be a 503, never a pass-through.
+        let keys = PdsKeys::new("http://127.0.0.1:1", TEST_AUD);
+        let err = keys.verify_access_token("whatever").await.unwrap_err();
+        assert!(
+            matches!(err, AuthError::Unavailable(_)),
+            "expected Unavailable, got {err:?}"
+        );
+        let (status, body) = err.into_response_parts();
+        assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);
+        assert_eq!(body.0["error"], "AuthUnavailable");
+    }
+}

crates/appview/src/car.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+//! CAR v1 *reader*.
+//!
+//! The repo has a writer (`pds-server/src/car.rs`) but no reader the
+//! AppView could use: `pds-server` is a binary crate with no library
+//! target, so its `parse` helper is unreachable from here. The PDS
+//! firehose hands us a CAR in every `#commit` frame's `blocks` field, so
+//! the AppView needs its own.
+//!
+//! Format (<https://ipld.io/specs/transport/car/carv1/>):
+//!
+//! ```text
+//! [ varint: header_len | DAG-CBOR header ]      { version: 1, roots: [CID] }
+//! [ varint: section_len | CID | block bytes ]   block 1
+//! [ varint: section_len | CID | block bytes ]   block 2
+//! ...
+//! ```
+//!
+//! The header is decoded with [`crate::cbor`], which accepts both the
+//! spec's `tag(42) + bytes(0x00 || cid)` link and the bare
+//! `tag(42) + bytes(cid)` this codebase's writer emits.
+//!
+//! Only structure is validated. Block CIDs are *not* re-hashed here:
+//! the firehose connection is to our own PDS over the cluster-internal
+//! URL, and a mismatch would mean a bug rather than an attack. See
+//! [`verify_block_cids`] for the opt-in check the tests use.
+
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Result};
+use cid::Cid;
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+
+use crate::cbor;
+
+/// The parsed CAR header.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct CarHeader {
+    pub version: u64,
+    pub roots: Vec<Cid>,
+}
+
+/// One `(CID, bytes)` pair out of a CAR file.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct CarBlock {
+    pub cid: Cid,
+    pub data: Vec<u8>,
+}
+
+/// A CAR file's header plus its blocks, in file order.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct Car {
+    pub header: CarHeader,
+    pub blocks: Vec<CarBlock>,
+}
+
+impl Car {
+    /// Index the blocks by CID for lookup by the commit's `ops`.
+    ///
+    /// Duplicate CIDs keep the first occurrence, matching the writer's
+    /// own de-duplication.
+    pub fn block_map(&self) -> HashMap<Cid, &[u8]> {
+        let mut map = HashMap::with_capacity(self.blocks.len());
+        for b in &self.blocks {
+            map.entry(b.cid).or_insert(b.data.as_slice());
+        }
+        map
+    }
+
+    /// The first root, if the header declares one.
+    ///
+    /// `allow(dead_code)`: the ingest path doesn't need the commit
+    /// block itself (the ops carry the record CIDs), but a CAR reader
+    /// that cannot name its root is a reader with a hole in it, and the
+    /// tests read it.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    pub fn root(&self) -> Option<Cid> {
+        self.roots().first().copied()
+    }
+
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    pub fn roots(&self) -> &[Cid] {
+        &self.header.roots
+    }
+}
+
+/// Parse a CAR v1 byte stream.
+pub fn parse(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Car> {
+    let mut p = 0usize;
+
+    let (header_len, n) = read_varint(bytes, p)?;
+    p += n;
+    let header_end = checked_end(bytes, p, header_len, "CAR header")?;
+    let header = decode_header(&bytes[p..header_end])?;
+    p = header_end;
+
+    let mut blocks = Vec::new();
+    while p < bytes.len() {
+        let (section_len, n) = read_varint(bytes, p)?;
+        let section_start = p + n;
+        let section_end = checked_end(bytes, section_start, section_len, "CAR section")?;
+        let section = &bytes[section_start..section_end];
+        let cid = Cid::read_bytes(section)
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid CID in CAR section at offset {section_start}: {e}"))?;
+        let cid_len = cid.encoded_len();
+        if cid_len > section.len() {
+            bail!("CAR section at {section_start} is shorter than its CID");
+        }
+        blocks.push(CarBlock {
+            cid,
+            data: section[cid_len..].to_vec(),
+        });
+        p = section_end;
+    }
+
+    Ok(Car { header, blocks })
+}
+
+/// Re-hash every block and compare against its declared CID.
+///
+/// Not called on the ingest path (see the module docs); the CAR reader
+/// tests use it to prove the reader hands back the bytes the writer put
+/// in, unshifted by an off-by-one in the section framing.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub fn verify_block_cids(car: &Car) -> Result<()> {
+    for b in &car.blocks {
+        let recomputed = at_crypto::cid::cid_for_cbor(&b.data)?;
+        if recomputed != b.cid {
+            bail!("CAR block CID mismatch: declared {}, computed {recomputed}", b.cid);
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn decode_header(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<CarHeader> {
+    let value = cbor::decode(bytes)?;
+    let version = value
+        .get("version")
+        .and_then(|v| v.as_i64())
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("CAR header missing `version`"))?;
+    if version != 1 {
+        bail!("unsupported CAR version {version} (only v1 is defined for atproto)");
+    }
+    // `roots` is required by the spec but may legitimately be empty.
+    let roots = match value.get("roots") {
+        Some(v) => v
+            .as_array()
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("CAR header `roots` is not an array"))?
+            .iter()
+            .map(|item| {
+                item.as_cid()
+                    .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("CAR header root is not a CID link"))
+            })
+            .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?,
+        None => Vec::new(),
+    };
+    Ok(CarHeader {
+        version: version as u64,
+        roots,
+    })
+}
+
+/// LEB128 unsigned varint, the length prefix CAR uses.
+fn read_varint(bytes: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<(u64, usize)> {
+    let mut value: u64 = 0;
+    let mut shift = 0u32;
+    let mut i = offset;
+    loop {
+        let b = *bytes
+            .get(i)
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("varint extends past end of CAR input at {offset}"))?;
+        i += 1;
+        value |= u64::from(b & 0x7f) << shift;
+        if b & 0x80 == 0 {
+            return Ok((value, i - offset));
+        }
+        shift += 7;
+        if shift >= 64 {
+            bail!("varint longer than 64 bits at offset {offset}");
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn checked_end(bytes: &[u8], pos: usize, len: u64, what: &str) -> Result<usize> {
+    let len = usize::try_from(len).map_err(|_| anyhow!("{what} length overflows usize"))?;
+    let end = pos
+        .checked_add(len)
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("{what} length overflows"))?;
+    if end > bytes.len() {
+        bail!("{what} length {len} exceeds input (offset {pos}, total {})", bytes.len());
+    }
+    Ok(end)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub(crate) mod test_writer {
+    //! A byte-for-byte copy of `pds-server/src/car.rs`'s encoder, so the
+    //! reader's tests exercise *the writer's* output rather than a
+    //! convenient fiction.
+    //!
+    //! Copied rather than imported because `pds-server` has no library
+    //! target. If the writer ever changes shape, the integration test
+    //! `pds_firehose_integration::car_reader_parses_a_real_repo_export`
+    //! is the tripwire: it parses a CAR produced by the running PDS.
+
+    use cid::Cid;
+
+    fn cbor_head(out: &mut Vec<u8>, major: u8, n: u64) {
+        let m = (major & 0x07) << 5;
+        if n < 24 {
+            out.push(m | n as u8);
+        } else if n < 0x100 {
+            out.push(m | 24);
+            out.push(n as u8);
+        } else if n < 0x10000 {
+            out.push(m | 25);
+            out.push((n >> 8) as u8);
+            out.push(n as u8);
+        } else if n < 0x100_0000 {
+            out.push(m | 26);
+            out.push((n >> 16) as u8);
+            out.push((n >> 8) as u8);
+            out.push(n as u8);
+        } else {
+            out.push(m | 27);
+            out.push((n >> 24) as u8);
+            out.push((n >> 16) as u8);
+            out.push((n >> 8) as u8);
+            out.push(n as u8);
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn cbor_text(out: &mut Vec<u8>, s: &str) {
+        cbor_head(out, 3, s.len() as u64);
+        out.extend_from_slice(s.as_bytes());
+    }
+
+    fn cbor_bytes(out: &mut Vec<u8>, b: &[u8]) {
+        cbor_head(out, 2, b.len() as u64);
+        out.extend_from_slice(b);
+    }
+
+    pub fn encode_header(roots: &[Cid]) -> Vec<u8> {
+        let mut out = Vec::new();
+        cbor_head(&mut out, 5, 2);
+        cbor_text(&mut out, "version");
+        cbor_head(&mut out, 0, 1);
+        cbor_text(&mut out, "roots");
+        cbor_head(&mut out, 4, roots.len() as u64);
+        for cid in roots {
+            cbor_head(&mut out, 6, 42);
+            cbor_bytes(&mut out, &cid.to_bytes());
+        }
+        out
+    }
+
+    fn write_varint(out: &mut Vec<u8>, mut n: u64) {
+        loop {
+            let mut byte = (n & 0x7f) as u8;
+            n >>= 7;
+            if n != 0 {
+                byte |= 0x80;
+            }
+            out.push(byte);
+            if n == 0 {
+                return;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[derive(Default)]
+    pub struct CarWriter {
+        blocks: Vec<(Cid, Vec<u8>)>,
+    }
+
+    impl CarWriter {
+        pub fn new() -> Self {
+            Self::default()
+        }
+
+        pub fn append(&mut self, cid: Cid, data: &[u8]) {
+            if self.blocks.iter().any(|(c, _)| *c == cid) {
+                return;
+            }
+            self.blocks.push((cid, data.to_vec()));
+        }
+
+        pub fn finish(&self, roots: &[Cid]) -> Vec<u8> {
+            let header = encode_header(roots);
+            let mut out = Vec::new();
+            write_varint(&mut out, header.len() as u64);
+            out.extend_from_slice(&header);
+            for (cid, data) in &self.blocks {
+                let cid_bytes = cid.to_bytes();
+                write_varint(&mut out, (cid_bytes.len() + data.len()) as u64);
+                out.extend_from_slice(&cid_bytes);
+                out.extend_from_slice(data);
+            }
+            out
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::test_writer::CarWriter;
+    use super::*;
+    use at_crypto::cid::cid_for_cbor;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn round_trips_a_single_block() {
+        let data = b"hello world".to_vec();
+        let cid = cid_for_cbor(&data).unwrap();
+        let mut w = CarWriter::new();
+        w.append(cid, &data);
+        let car = parse(&w.finish(&[cid])).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(car.header.version, 1);
+        assert_eq!(car.roots(), &[cid]);
+        assert_eq!(car.blocks.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(car.blocks[0].data, data);
+        verify_block_cids(&car).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn round_trips_many_blocks_in_order() {
+        let payloads: Vec<Vec<u8>> = (0..6)
+            .map(|i| format!("block-{i}").into_bytes())
+            .collect();
+        let cids: Vec<Cid> = payloads.iter().map(|p| cid_for_cbor(p).unwrap()).collect();
+        let mut w = CarWriter::new();
+        for (cid, data) in cids.iter().zip(&payloads) {
+            w.append(*cid, data);
+        }
+        let car = parse(&w.finish(&[cids[3]])).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(car.root(), Some(cids[3]));
+        assert_eq!(car.blocks.len(), 6);
+        for (i, b) in car.blocks.iter().enumerate() {
+            assert_eq!(b.cid, cids[i]);
+            assert_eq!(b.data, payloads[i]);
+        }
+        verify_block_cids(&car).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn block_map_finds_blocks_by_cid() {
+        let a = b"record a".to_vec();
+        let b = b"record b".to_vec();
+        let (ca, cb) = (cid_for_cbor(&a).unwrap(), cid_for_cbor(&b).unwrap());
+        let mut w = CarWriter::new();
+        w.append(ca, &a);
+        w.append(cb, &b);
+        let car = parse(&w.finish(&[ca])).unwrap();
+        let map = car.block_map();
+        assert_eq!(map.get(&ca).copied(), Some(a.as_slice()));
+        assert_eq!(map.get(&cb).copied(), Some(b.as_slice()));
+        assert!(!map.contains_key(&cid_for_cbor(b"absent").unwrap()));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn handles_a_multi_byte_varint_section_length() {
+        // A >127 byte block forces a two-byte varint, which is where an
+        // off-by-one in the length prefix would show up.
+        let data = vec![0x42u8; 500];
+        let cid = cid_for_cbor(&data).unwrap();
+        let mut w = CarWriter::new();
+        w.append(cid, &data);
+        let car = parse(&w.finish(&[cid])).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(car.blocks[0].data.len(), 500);
+        verify_block_cids(&car).unwrap();
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn accepts_an_empty_root_list() {
+        let data = b"orphan".to_vec();
+        let cid = cid_for_cbor(&data).unwrap();
+        let mut w = CarWriter::new();
+        w.append(cid, &data);
+        let car = parse(&w.finish(&[])).unwrap();
+        assert!(car.roots().is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(car.blocks.len(), 1);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_truncated_input() {
+        let data = b"hello".to_vec();
+        let cid = cid_for_cbor(&data).unwrap();
+        let mut w = CarWriter::new();
+        w.append(cid, &data);
+        let bytes = w.finish(&[cid]);
+        // Cut into the last block's payload.
+        assert!(parse(&bytes[..bytes.len() - 3]).is_err());
+        // Cut inside the header.
+        assert!(parse(&bytes[..3]).is_err());
+        // Nothing at all.
+        assert!(parse(&[]).is_err());
+    }
+}

crates/appview/src/cbor.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,442 @@
+//! A minimal, allocation-honest CBOR reader — just enough to decode the
+//! frames of `com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos` and the header of a CAR
+//! file.
+//!
+//! ## Why not `ciborium`?
+//!
+//! Two reasons, and both come from what the wire format actually is.
+//!
+//! 1. **Two values per message.** A subscribeRepos frame is *two*
+//!    DAG-CBOR values written back to back (header, then body) inside
+//!    one WebSocket binary message. A `serde`-shaped reader gives us
+//!    "decode one value from this slice" and no cursor we can resume
+//!    from, so we would have to guess where the header ended.
+//! 2. **Tag 42.** DAG-CBOR encodes a CID link as `tag(42) +
+//!    bytes(<cid>)`. `ciborium`'s `serde` mapping turns tags into a
+//!    private newtype dance that does not survive a round trip through
+//!    `serde_json::Value`, which is the shape the rest of the AppView
+//!    speaks.
+//!
+//! So this module decodes CBOR into its own small [`Cbor`] tree with an
+//! explicit byte offset, which makes "read the header, then read the
+//! body from where the header stopped" a two-line function.
+//!
+//! ## What it deliberately does not do
+//!
+//! No indefinite-length items (DAG-CBOR forbids them; we reject them
+//! rather than guess), no half floats beyond a plain `f64` widening, no
+//! canonicalisation checks. It is a *reader* for input we already
+//! decided to trust at the transport layer, with hard length checks so
+//! a malformed frame returns `Err` instead of panicking.
+//!
+//! Record blocks inside the CAR payload are NOT decoded with this
+//! module: they are written by `ciborium::into_writer(&serde_json::Value)`
+//! on the PDS side (see `pds-server/src/routes/repo.rs`), which means
+//! CIDs inside a record are plain strings, not tag-42 links. Their
+//! inverse is `ciborium::from_reader::<serde_json::Value, _>`, and
+//! that is what [`crate::pds_firehose`] uses for them.
+
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Result};
+use cid::Cid;
+
+/// A decoded CBOR value.
+///
+/// `Nint` carries the already-negated value (CBOR stores `-1 - n`), so
+/// callers never have to remember the bias.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub enum Cbor {
+    Uint(u64),
+    Nint(i64),
+    Bytes(Vec<u8>),
+    Text(String),
+    Array(Vec<Cbor>),
+    /// Kept as an ordered key/value list rather than a map: DAG-CBOR
+    /// keys are text and already canonically ordered, and a `Vec` keeps
+    /// the decoder free of hashing while the maps we read have a
+    /// handful of entries at most.
+    Map(Vec<(Cbor, Cbor)>),
+    Tag(u64, Box<Cbor>),
+    Bool(bool),
+    Null,
+    Undefined,
+    Float(f64),
+}
+
+impl Cbor {
+    /// Look up a text key in a map. `None` for non-maps and misses.
+    pub fn get(&self, key: &str) -> Option<&Cbor> {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Map(entries) => entries.iter().find_map(|(k, v)| match k {
+                Cbor::Text(s) if s == key => Some(v),
+                _ => None,
+            }),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The value as a signed integer, accepting both CBOR integer
+    /// majors. `None` when the value is not an integer, or when an
+    /// unsigned value exceeds `i64::MAX` (which cannot happen for a
+    /// `seq`, but silently wrapping would be worse than a miss).
+    pub fn as_i64(&self) -> Option<i64> {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Uint(n) => i64::try_from(*n).ok(),
+            Cbor::Nint(n) => Some(*n),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_str(&self) -> Option<&str> {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Text(s) => Some(s.as_str()),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> Option<&[u8]> {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Bytes(b) => Some(b.as_slice()),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_bool(&self) -> Option<bool> {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Bool(b) => Some(*b),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_array(&self) -> Option<&[Cbor]> {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Array(items) => Some(items.as_slice()),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn is_null(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self, Cbor::Null | Cbor::Undefined)
+    }
+
+    /// Decode a DAG-CBOR CID link: `tag(42) + bytes(...)`.
+    ///
+    /// The spec prefixes the CID bytes with a single `0x00` (the
+    /// multibase "identity" marker), because a CID inside a byte string
+    /// has no textual multibase prefix to carry. **This repository's own
+    /// writer omits that byte** — `pds-server/src/car.rs` writes
+    /// `cbor_bytes(&cid.to_bytes())` — so we accept both spellings: a
+    /// leading `0x00` is skipped, anything else is parsed as-is. Being
+    /// lenient here costs nothing (a real CIDv1 never starts with
+    /// `0x00`, and CIDv0 starts with `0x12`) and it means the AppView
+    /// keeps working whether the PDS follows the spec or the house
+    /// convention.
+    pub fn as_cid(&self) -> Option<Cid> {
+        let inner = match self {
+            Cbor::Tag(42, inner) => inner.as_ref(),
+            // A bare byte string where a link is expected: CARs written by
+            // older builds of this PDS tagged the root CID without the
+            // `0x00` identity prefix, and some encoders drop the tag
+            // entirely. Both still have to parse.
+            Cbor::Bytes(_) => self,
+            // A record block written from `serde_json::Value` spells a
+            // CID as a plain string — accept that too, so callers do
+            // not need a second code path for the block contents.
+            Cbor::Text(s) => return s.parse::<Cid>().ok(),
+            _ => return None,
+        };
+        let raw = inner.as_bytes()?;
+        let raw = match raw.first() {
+            Some(0x00) => &raw[1..],
+            _ => raw,
+        };
+        Cid::read_bytes(raw).ok()
+    }
+}
+
+/// Decode exactly one CBOR value starting at `pos`.
+///
+/// Returns the value and the offset just past it, so a caller can read
+/// the next value from the same buffer — which is precisely what a
+/// two-value subscribeRepos frame needs.
+pub fn decode_at(bytes: &[u8], pos: usize) -> Result<(Cbor, usize)> {
+    let (major, arg, mut p) = read_head(bytes, pos)?;
+    match major {
+        0 => Ok((Cbor::Uint(arg), p)),
+        1 => {
+            // CBOR negative integers store `-1 - n`. Values below
+            // `i64::MIN` cannot occur in anything we consume, and
+            // wrapping them would produce a positive number, so bail.
+            let n = i64::try_from(arg)
+                .map_err(|_| anyhow!("negative integer out of i64 range"))?;
+            Ok((Cbor::Nint(-1 - n), p))
+        }
+        2 => {
+            let end = checked_end(bytes, p, arg, "byte string")?;
+            let v = bytes[p..end].to_vec();
+            Ok((Cbor::Bytes(v), end))
+        }
+        3 => {
+            let end = checked_end(bytes, p, arg, "text string")?;
+            let s = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[p..end])
+                .map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid UTF-8 in CBOR text: {e}"))?
+                .to_string();
+            Ok((Cbor::Text(s), end))
+        }
+        4 => {
+            let mut items = Vec::with_capacity(sane_capacity(arg));
+            for _ in 0..arg {
+                let (v, next) = decode_at(bytes, p)?;
+                items.push(v);
+                p = next;
+            }
+            Ok((Cbor::Array(items), p))
+        }
+        5 => {
+            let mut entries = Vec::with_capacity(sane_capacity(arg));
+            for _ in 0..arg {
+                let (k, next) = decode_at(bytes, p)?;
+                let (v, next) = decode_at(bytes, next)?;
+                entries.push((k, v));
+                p = next;
+            }
+            Ok((Cbor::Map(entries), p))
+        }
+        6 => {
+            let (inner, next) = decode_at(bytes, p)?;
+            Ok((Cbor::Tag(arg, Box::new(inner)), next))
+        }
+        7 => match arg {
+            20 => Ok((Cbor::Bool(false), p)),
+            21 => Ok((Cbor::Bool(true), p)),
+            22 => Ok((Cbor::Null, p)),
+            23 => Ok((Cbor::Undefined, p)),
+            // Floats arrive as the raw bit pattern in `arg`; the width
+            // is implied by the additional-information byte, which
+            // `read_head` has already consumed. We only ever see f64 in
+            // practice (DAG-CBOR requires it), so the narrower widths
+            // are decoded for completeness rather than need.
+            _ => Ok((Cbor::Float(f64::from_bits(arg)), p)),
+        },
+        other => bail!("unsupported CBOR major type {other}"),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Decode a single CBOR value that must span the whole buffer.
+pub fn decode(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Cbor> {
+    let (v, end) = decode_at(bytes, 0)?;
+    if end != bytes.len() {
+        bail!("trailing bytes after CBOR value ({} left)", bytes.len() - end);
+    }
+    Ok(v)
+}
+
+/// Read a CBOR head: major type plus its argument.
+///
+/// Indefinite-length encodings (`additional information == 31`) are
+/// rejected: DAG-CBOR forbids them, and accepting them would mean
+/// implementing break-stop scanning for input that should never carry
+/// it.
+fn read_head(bytes: &[u8], pos: usize) -> Result<(u8, u64, usize)> {
+    let first = *bytes
+        .get(pos)
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("CBOR read past end of input at {pos}"))?;
+    let major = first >> 5;
+    let low = first & 0x1f;
+    let (arg, extra) = match low {
+        0..=23 => (low as u64, 0usize),
+        24 => (read_uint(bytes, pos + 1, 1)?, 1),
+        25 => (read_uint(bytes, pos + 1, 2)?, 2),
+        26 => (read_uint(bytes, pos + 1, 4)?, 4),
+        27 => (read_uint(bytes, pos + 1, 8)?, 8),
+        31 => bail!("indefinite-length CBOR item is not valid DAG-CBOR"),
+        other => bail!("reserved CBOR additional information {other}"),
+    };
+    // For major 7 the "argument" of a float is the raw bit pattern, and
+    // f32/f16 need widening before `f64::from_bits` makes sense.
+    let arg = match (major, low) {
+        (7, 25) => f64::from(half_to_f32(arg as u16)).to_bits(),
+        (7, 26) => f64::from(f32::from_bits(arg as u32)).to_bits(),
+        _ => arg,
+    };
+    Ok((major, arg, pos + 1 + extra))
+}
+
+fn read_uint(bytes: &[u8], pos: usize, len: usize) -> Result<u64> {
+    if pos + len > bytes.len() {
+        bail!("truncated CBOR integer of {len} byte(s) at {pos}");
+    }
+    let mut n: u64 = 0;
+    for b in &bytes[pos..pos + len] {
+        n = (n << 8) | u64::from(*b);
+    }
+    Ok(n)
+}
+
+/// IEEE-754 half → single. Only reached for `f16` inputs, which nothing
+/// in this protocol emits; kept so a stray value decodes instead of
+/// erroring out mid-frame.
+fn half_to_f32(bits: u16) -> f32 {
+    let sign = ((bits >> 15) & 1) as u32;
+    let exp = ((bits >> 10) & 0x1f) as u32;
+    let frac = (bits & 0x3ff) as u32;
+    let out = match exp {
+        0 if frac == 0 => sign << 31,
+        0 => {
+            // Subnormal: renormalise.
+            let mut e = -1i32;
+            let mut f = frac;
+            while f & 0x400 == 0 {
+                f <<= 1;
+                e -= 1;
+            }
+            let exp32 = (127 - 15 + e) as u32;
+            (sign << 31) | (exp32 << 23) | ((f & 0x3ff) << 13)
+        }
+        0x1f => (sign << 31) | (0xff << 23) | (frac << 13),
+        _ => (sign << 31) | ((exp + 127 - 15) << 23) | (frac << 13),
+    };
+    f32::from_bits(out)
+}
+
+/// Bounds-check a string/bytes payload before slicing it.
+fn checked_end(bytes: &[u8], pos: usize, len: u64, what: &str) -> Result<usize> {
+    let len = usize::try_from(len).map_err(|_| anyhow!("{what} length overflows usize"))?;
+    let end = pos
+        .checked_add(len)
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("{what} length overflows"))?;
+    if end > bytes.len() {
+        bail!("{what} of {len} byte(s) exceeds input at offset {pos}");
+    }
+    Ok(end)
+}
+
+/// Cap the pre-allocation a declared array/map length can trigger. A
+/// corrupt frame claiming `map(2^40)` must not make us reserve 40 GiB
+/// before the first missing byte errors out; the collection still grows
+/// naturally for genuinely large inputs.
+fn sane_capacity(declared: u64) -> usize {
+    usize::try_from(declared.min(1024)).unwrap_or(0)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use at_crypto::cid::cid_for_cbor;
+
+    /// Build `{"op": 1, "t": "#commit"}` by hand — the exact bytes the
+    /// PDS writes for a regular frame header.
+    fn commit_header_bytes() -> Vec<u8> {
+        let mut v = vec![0xA2]; // map(2)
+        v.push(0x62); // text(2)
+        v.extend_from_slice(b"op");
+        v.push(0x01); // uint 1
+        v.push(0x61); // text(1)
+        v.extend_from_slice(b"t");
+        v.push(0x67); // text(7)
+        v.extend_from_slice(b"#commit");
+        v
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn decodes_a_frame_header() {
+        let v = decode(&commit_header_bytes()).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.get("op").unwrap().as_i64(), Some(1));
+        assert_eq!(v.get("t").unwrap().as_str(), Some("#commit"));
+        assert!(v.get("missing").is_none());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn decodes_negative_op_of_an_error_header() {
+        // {"op": -1} → map(1), text(2)"op", nint(0) = -1
+        let bytes = vec![0xA1, 0x62, b'o', b'p', 0x20];
+        let v = decode(&bytes).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(v.get("op").unwrap().as_i64(), Some(-1));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn decodes_multi_byte_integers() {
+        // uint16 300, uint32 70000, uint64 2^33, nint -300
+        assert_eq!(decode(&[0x19, 0x01, 0x2C]).unwrap().as_i64(), Some(300));
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&[0x1A, 0x00, 0x01, 0x11, 0x70]).unwrap().as_i64(),
+            Some(70000)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            decode(&[0x1B, 0, 0, 0, 2, 0, 0, 0, 0]).unwrap().as_i64(),
+            Some(8_589_934_592)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(decode(&[0x39, 0x01, 0x2B]).unwrap().as_i64(), Some(-300));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn decode_at_reads_two_values_back_to_back() {
+        // This is the whole reason the module exists: a frame is header
+        // + body concatenated with no separator.
+        let mut buf = commit_header_bytes();
+        let body_start = buf.len();
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&[0xA1, 0x63, b's', b'e', b'q', 0x18, 0x2A]); // {"seq": 42}
+        let (header, next) = decode_at(&buf, 0).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(next, body_start);
+        assert_eq!(header.get("t").unwrap().as_str(), Some("#commit"));
+        let (body, end) = decode_at(&buf, next).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(end, buf.len());
+        assert_eq!(body.get("seq").unwrap().as_i64(), Some(42));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn decodes_tag_42_cid_link_both_spellings() {
+        let cid = cid_for_cbor(b"a block").unwrap();
+        let raw = cid.to_bytes();
+
+        // House spelling: tag(42) + bytes(<cid>) with no 0x00 prefix.
+        let mut bare = vec![0xD8, 42]; // tag(42) via 1-byte extension
+        bare.push(0x58); // bytes, 1-byte length
+        bare.push(raw.len() as u8);
+        bare.extend_from_slice(&raw);
+        assert_eq!(decode(&bare).unwrap().as_cid(), Some(cid));
+
+        // Spec spelling: the same, with the identity multibase prefix.
+        let mut prefixed = vec![0xD8, 42, 0x58, (raw.len() + 1) as u8, 0x00];
+        prefixed.extend_from_slice(&raw);
+        assert_eq!(decode(&prefixed).unwrap().as_cid(), Some(cid));
+
+        // And the string spelling records use.
+        let text = {
+            let s = cid.to_string();
+            let mut v = vec![0x78, s.len() as u8];
+            v.extend_from_slice(s.as_bytes());
+            v
+        };
+        assert_eq!(decode(&text).unwrap().as_cid(), Some(cid));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn decodes_simple_values_and_containers() {
+        // [true, false, null] → array(3)
+        let v = decode(&[0x83, 0xF5, 0xF4, 0xF6]).unwrap();
+        let items = v.as_array().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(items[0].as_bool(), Some(true));
+        assert_eq!(items[1].as_bool(), Some(false));
+        assert!(items[2].is_null());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_truncated_and_indefinite_input() {
+        // text(7) claiming 7 bytes but carrying 2.
+        assert!(decode(&[0x67, b'a', b'b']).is_err());
+        // Indefinite-length array.
+        assert!(decode(&[0x9F, 0x01, 0xFF]).is_err());
+        // Trailing garbage after a complete value.
+        assert!(decode(&[0x01, 0x02]).is_err());
+        // Empty input.
+        assert!(decode(&[]).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn oversized_declared_length_errors_instead_of_allocating() {
+        // map(2^32) with nothing behind it. Must return Err quickly
+        // rather than trying to reserve the declared capacity.
+        let bytes = vec![0xBA, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF];
+        assert!(decode(&bytes).is_err());
+    }
+}

crates/appview/src/firehose.rs

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicI64, AtomicU64, Ordering};
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::time::Duration;
 use tokio::sync::mpsc;
-use tracing::{debug, info, trace, warn};
+use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
 
 use crate::indexer;
 
@@ -31,6 +31,18 @@ pub struct Stats {
     /// writes this; `/healthz` reads it. Wrapped in `Arc` so the consumer
     /// can hold its own clone without borrowing from us.
     pub jetstream_connected: Arc<AtomicBool>,
+    /// Whether the **local PDS** firehose WebSocket is currently up
+    /// ([`crate::pds_firehose`]). Separate from `jetstream_connected`
+    /// because the two streams fail independently and for different
+    /// reasons: a dead Jetstream means no view of the wider network, a
+    /// dead PDS firehose means the AppView has lost the guaranteed
+    /// delivery path for its *own* users' records and is running on the
+    /// best-effort push alone. `/healthz` has to be able to say which.
+    pub pds_connected: AtomicBool,
+    /// Number of `#commit` frames applied from the PDS firehose.
+    pub pds_frames_processed: AtomicU64,
+    /// Highest `seq` applied from the PDS firehose in this process.
+    pub pds_last_seq: AtomicI64,
 }
 
 impl Default for Stats {
@@ -40,6 +52,9 @@ impl Default for Stats {
             last_event_time_us: AtomicI64::new(0),
             last_cursor_persisted_us: AtomicI64::new(0),
             jetstream_connected: Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false)),
+            pds_connected: AtomicBool::new(false),
+            pds_frames_processed: AtomicU64::new(0),
+            pds_last_seq: AtomicI64::new(0),
         }
     }
 }
@@ -50,6 +65,9 @@ impl std::fmt::Debug for Stats {
             .field("events_processed", &self.events_processed())
             .field("last_event_time_us", &self.last_event_time_us.load(Ordering::Relaxed))
             .field("jetstream_connected", &self.jetstream_connected())
+            .field("pds_connected", &self.pds_connected())
+            .field("pds_frames_processed", &self.pds_frames_processed())
+            .field("pds_last_seq", &self.pds_last_seq())
             .finish()
     }
 }
@@ -85,6 +103,23 @@ impl Stats {
     pub fn jetstream_connected(&self) -> bool {
         self.jetstream_connected.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
     }
+
+    /// Is the local PDS firehose connected right now?
+    pub fn pds_connected(&self) -> bool {
+        self.pds_connected.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
+    }
+
+    pub fn pds_frames_processed(&self) -> u64 {
+        self.pds_frames_processed.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
+    }
+
+    /// Highest PDS-firehose `seq` this process has applied. 0 before the
+    /// first frame — note this is the *in-process* high-water mark, not
+    /// the persisted cursor, which lives in `pds_firehose_cursor` and
+    /// survives restarts.
+    pub fn pds_last_seq(&self) -> i64 {
+        self.pds_last_seq.load(Ordering::Relaxed)
+    }
 }
 
 /// The thing the Jetstream consumer calls once per event.

crates/appview/src/handle_sync.rs

@@ -153,7 +153,10 @@ impl HandleSyncWorker {
 
     /// The SELECT half of [`Self::run_once`]: up to [`BATCH_SIZE`]
     /// distinct DIDs still waiting for a handle.
-    async fn select_candidates(&self) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
+    ///
+    /// Public so integration tests can assert on the batch cap without
+    /// depending on what else the live indexer left pending.
+    pub async fn select_candidates(&self) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
         let rows: Vec<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
             r#"SELECT DISTINCT did
                FROM posts
@@ -177,7 +180,7 @@ impl HandleSyncWorker {
     /// freshly seeded DID may simply not make the batch — which made
     /// the dispatch tests fail for reasons that had nothing to do with
     /// dispatch. Passing the DIDs in removes that coupling.
-    async fn resolve_batch(&self, dids: Vec<String>) -> Result<SyncReport> {
+    pub async fn resolve_batch(&self, dids: Vec<String>) -> Result<SyncReport> {
         let mut report = SyncReport::default();
         if dids.is_empty() {
             return Ok(report);
@@ -576,6 +579,66 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(h.as_deref(), Some("from-ingest"));
     }
 
+    /// The documented PDS-first rule: the local PDS is asked before the
+    /// method dispatch, so a `did:key:` user hosted here resolves
+    /// without ever dialing plc.directory. This is the flip side of
+    /// `unknown_methods_are_skipped` — same DID method, opposite
+    /// outcome, and the difference is solely whether the PDS hosts it.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn pds_resolves_did_key_before_method_dispatch() {
+        let Some(db) = try_test_db().await else {
+            eprintln!("appview DB unavailable; skipping");
+            return;
+        };
+        let did = format!("did:key:z{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
+        let _ = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM posts WHERE did = $1")
+            .bind(&did)
+            .execute(&db)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        seed_post(&db, &did, "rk", "").await.unwrap();
+
+        // The PDS hosts this user; the outbound resolvers know nothing
+        // and must never be consulted.
+        let pds = StubResolver::new(HashMap::from([(
+            did.clone(),
+            Some("local-user.maarcadetweet.local".into()),
+        )]))
+        .into_arc();
+        let plc_log: Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>> = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
+        let plc = TrackingResolver::new(
+            HashMap::from([(did.clone(), Some("must-not-be-used".into()))]),
+            Arc::clone(&plc_log),
+        );
+        let plc_arc: Arc<dyn DidHandleResolver> = Arc::new(plc);
+
+        let worker = HandleSyncWorker {
+            db: db.clone(),
+            pds_resolver: pds,
+            plc_resolver: Arc::clone(&plc_arc),
+            web_resolver: plc_arc,
+            interval_secs: 999,
+        };
+        let report = worker.resolve_batch(vec![did.clone()]).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            report.resolved, 1,
+            "a did:key hosted by the local PDS must resolve, got {report:?}"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            get_handle(&worker.db, &did).await.as_deref(),
+            Some("local-user.maarcadetweet.local")
+        );
+        assert!(
+            plc_log.lock().unwrap().is_empty(),
+            "the PDS answered, so no outbound resolver may be consulted"
+        );
+
+        let _ = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM posts WHERE did = $1")
+            .bind(&did)
+            .execute(&db)
+            .await;
+    }
+
     /// Dispatch test: a `did:web:` DID must be routed to the
     /// `web_resolver` (not the PLC one). Without this routing, every
     /// `did:web:` post would stay `@<did-prefix>…` forever.
@@ -606,9 +669,18 @@ mod tests {
         )]))
         .into_arc();
 
+        // The local PDS is consulted before the method dispatch (see the
+        // module docs), and it does NOT host this DID — a foreign
+        // `did:web:` is exactly the case where it answers "don't know".
+        // Wiring one of the other stubs in here instead would make the
+        // PDS claim a DID it doesn't have, and the test would be
+        // asserting against the documented PDS-first rule rather than
+        // against the method dispatch it's named for.
+        let pds = StubResolver::new(HashMap::new()).into_arc();
+
         let worker = HandleSyncWorker {
             db: db.clone(),
-            pds_resolver: Arc::clone(&plc),
+            pds_resolver: pds,
             plc_resolver: plc,
             web_resolver: web,
             interval_secs: 999,
@@ -665,9 +737,16 @@ mod tests {
         let plc_arc: Arc<dyn DidHandleResolver> = Arc::new(plc);
         let web_arc: Arc<dyn DidHandleResolver> = Arc::new(web);
 
+        // A DID the local PDS does not host — otherwise the PDS-first
+        // rule would (correctly) resolve it and this test would be
+        // measuring the wrong thing. The "local PDS *does* host it"
+        // case is covered by `pds_resolves_did_key_before_method_dispatch`.
+        let pds_arc: Arc<dyn DidHandleResolver> =
+            Arc::new(StubResolver::new(HashMap::new()));
+
         let worker = HandleSyncWorker {
             db: db.clone(),
-            pds_resolver: Arc::clone(&plc_arc),
+            pds_resolver: pds_arc,
             plc_resolver: plc_arc,
             web_resolver: web_arc,
             interval_secs: 999,

crates/appview/src/indexer.rs

@@ -693,24 +693,46 @@ where
 
 // -- follows ---------------------------------------------------------------
 
+/// Insert or update the follow edge `follower_did -> subject_did`.
+///
+/// `rkey` is the record key of the `app.bsky.graph.follow` record this
+/// edge came from. It is stored as a *second access path* to the row —
+/// the primary key stays `(follower_did, subject_did)`, which is what
+/// keeps this upsert idempotent across the push path, the firehose and
+/// any replay of either. See migration 0011 for the full reasoning.
+///
+/// Pass `None` only when the caller genuinely has no rkey. On conflict
+/// the column is `COALESCE(EXCLUDED.rkey, follows.rkey)`: a newer record
+/// overwrites it (youngest record wins, so a re-follow's rkey replaces
+/// the old one and a stale delete for the old rkey can no longer match),
+/// but a caller that omits the rkey must not blank out one another
+/// transport already recorded — that would re-open the very gap this
+/// column closes.
 pub async fn upsert_follow(
     db: &PgPool,
     follower_did: &str,
     subject_did: &str,
+    rkey: Option<&str>,
     record: Option<&Value>,
 ) -> Result<()> {
     let created_at = parse_created_at(
         record.and_then(|r| r.get("createdAt")).and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
     );
+    // An empty rkey is not an rkey — treat it like the absent case so a
+    // caller forwarding a blank field can't write a row that a
+    // `WHERE rkey = ''` delete would later match by accident.
+    let rkey = rkey.filter(|r| !r.is_empty());
     sqlx::query(
-        r#"INSERT INTO follows (follower_did, subject_did, created_at)
-           VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
+        r#"INSERT INTO follows (follower_did, subject_did, rkey, created_at)
+           VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)
            ON CONFLICT (follower_did, subject_did) DO UPDATE SET
+             rkey       = COALESCE(EXCLUDED.rkey, follows.rkey),
              created_at = EXCLUDED.created_at,
              indexed_at = now()"#,
     )
     .bind(follower_did)
     .bind(subject_did)
+    .bind(rkey)
     .bind(created_at)
     .execute(db)
     .await?;
@@ -733,6 +755,12 @@ pub async fn upsert_follow(
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Delete the follow edge by its relationship identity.
+///
+/// This is the PDS-push path: `/internal/ingest-commit` carries the
+/// `subject_did` from the PDS's own snapshot, so the row can be
+/// addressed directly. Idempotent — deleting an edge that is already
+/// gone is a no-op, not an error.
 pub async fn delete_follow(
     db: &PgPool,
     follower_did: &str,
@@ -748,6 +776,78 @@ pub async fn delete_follow(
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Delete the follow edge that came from record `rkey` in
+/// `follower_did`'s repo.
+///
+/// This is the firehose / Jetstream path. A delete op carries only
+/// `did` + `rkey` and no record body, so the subject DID has to be
+/// recovered from the row itself — which is exactly what the `rkey`
+/// column added in migration 0011 is for. The `DELETE ... RETURNING`
+/// resolves and removes in one statement (the same shape
+/// [`delete_like`] uses to recover its `post_uri`), so there is no
+/// window in which another writer could move the row between the
+/// lookup and the delete.
+///
+/// Returns the `subject_did` that was unfollowed, or `None` when
+/// nothing matched. `None` is a normal outcome, never an error:
+///
+///  * the row predates migration 0011 and has no rkey (the push path
+///    with its `subject_did` still handles those), or
+///  * the delete already landed over the other transport, or
+///  * the follow was re-created under a newer rkey, in which case this
+///    delete is a stale replay and the live edge must be left alone.
+///
+/// The caller logs and moves on — an unfollow we cannot place must not
+/// stall the frames queued behind it.
+pub async fn delete_follow_by_rkey(
+    db: &PgPool,
+    follower_did: &str,
+    rkey: &str,
+) -> Result<Option<String>> {
+    if rkey.is_empty() {
+        // Guard the degenerate case explicitly: `rkey = ''` can never
+        // identify a record, and letting it through would mean an empty
+        // value written by some future caller could be matched here.
+        tracing::warn!(
+            follower_did,
+            "follow delete with an empty rkey; nothing to do"
+        );
+        return Ok(None);
+    }
+    // Deleted with `fetch_all` rather than `fetch_optional` because the
+    // index on `(follower_did, rkey)` is deliberately not unique (see
+    // migration 0011): in the pathological case of a duplicated rkey,
+    // every matching row is a follow whose record is gone, so all of
+    // them should go.
+    let rows: Vec<(String,)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "DELETE FROM follows WHERE follower_did = $1 AND rkey = $2 \
+         RETURNING subject_did",
+    )
+    .bind(follower_did)
+    .bind(rkey)
+    .fetch_all(db)
+    .await?;
+
+    match rows.into_iter().next() {
+        Some((subject_did,)) => {
+            tracing::debug!(
+                follower_did, rkey, subject_did,
+                "applied an unfollow by rkey"
+            );
+            Ok(Some(subject_did))
+        }
+        None => {
+            tracing::debug!(
+                follower_did, rkey,
+                "follow delete by rkey matched no row (already gone, \
+                 re-created under a newer rkey, or indexed before the \
+                 rkey column existed); skipping"
+            );
+            Ok(None)
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 /// Extract the subject DID from a follow record (`{ "subject": "did:..."}`).
 pub fn follow_subject_did(record: Option<&Value>) -> Option<String> {
     record?
@@ -906,8 +1006,21 @@ pub async fn apply_commit(
                 applied = true;
             }
             "app.bsky.graph.follow" => {
-                let subject_did = match op.action.as_str() {
-                    "create" => match follow_subject_did(op.record.as_ref()) {
+                // Both actions need the rkey. On a create it is stored
+                // alongside the edge; on a delete it is the *only*
+                // thing identifying the edge, because a delete op
+                // carries no record body and therefore no subject DID.
+                let rkey = op
+                    .rkey
+                    .clone()
+                    .or_else(|| {
+                        op.path
+                            .as_deref()
+                            .and_then(|p| p.rsplit('/').next().map(str::to_string))
+                    })
+                    .filter(|r| !r.is_empty());
+                if op.action == "create" {
+                    let subject_did = match follow_subject_did(op.record.as_ref()) {
                         Some(s) => s,
                         None => {
                             tracing::warn!(
@@ -915,33 +1028,35 @@ pub async fn apply_commit(
                             );
                             continue;
                         }
-                    },
-                    "delete" => {
-                        // Jetstream delete on follows carries no record
-                        // value, so we can't know which subject was
-                        // unfollowed. The PDS-driven internal ingest path
-                        // handles this — it knows the subject from its
-                        // own snapshot.
-                        tracing::warn!(
-                            "follow delete via Jetstream lacks subject; \
-                             route through /internal/ingest-commit instead"
-                        );
-                        continue;
-                    }
-                    _ => continue,
-                };
-                if op.action == "create" {
+                    };
                     upsert_follow(
                         db,
                         &ev.did,
                         &subject_did,
+                        rkey.as_deref(),
                         op.record.as_ref(),
                     )
                     .await?;
+                    applied = true;
                 } else if op.action == "delete" {
-                    delete_follow(db, &ev.did, &subject_did).await?;
+                    // The rkey → subject_did lookup added in migration
+                    // 0011. Before it, this arm could only log and skip,
+                    // which left unfollows depending entirely on the
+                    // PDS's best-effort push: one lost request and the
+                    // follow stayed indexed forever.
+                    let Some(rkey) = rkey else {
+                        tracing::warn!(
+                            did = %ev.did,
+                            "follow delete op has no rkey; skipping"
+                        );
+                        continue;
+                    };
+                    delete_follow_by_rkey(db, &ev.did, &rkey).await?;
+                    // Applied even when no row matched: the event was
+                    // understood and acted on, which is what this flag
+                    // reports (same as the post / like / repost deletes).
+                    applied = true;
                 }
-                applied = true;
             }
             "app.bsky.actor.profile" => {
                 // Jetstream carries profile records as plain
@@ -1356,8 +1471,10 @@ mod tests {
         .unwrap();
         assert_eq!(count, 1);
 
-        // Delete via the internal API (not via Jetstream — Jetstream
-        // delete on follows doesn't carry the subject).
+        // Delete through the PDS-push path, which addresses the edge by
+        // `(follower, subject)` because the PDS knows the subject from
+        // its own snapshot. (The firehose path deletes by rkey instead
+        // — see `firehose_unfollow_deletes_by_rkey` below.)
         delete_follow(&db, "did:plc:test", "did:plc:b").await.unwrap();
         let (count,): (i64,) = sqlx::query_as(
             "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM follows WHERE follower_did = $1 AND subject_did = $2",
@@ -1369,6 +1486,274 @@ mod tests {
         .unwrap();
         assert_eq!(count, 0);
     }
+
+    // -- unfollow over the firehose ---------------------------------------
+    //
+    // The tests below cover the gap migration 0011 closes: a delete op
+    // carries only `did` + `rkey`, so the edge has to be recoverable
+    // from the rkey alone. They use per-run unique DIDs because the
+    // suite shares one database with every other test module.
+
+    fn follow_did(tag: &str) -> String {
+        format!("did:plc:follow_{}_{}", tag, uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple())
+    }
+
+    /// A commit event shaped like the ones `pds_firehose::events_from_frame`
+    /// hands to `apply_commit`: single-op, `record` present on create and
+    /// absent on delete.
+    fn follow_event(
+        did: &str,
+        rkey: &str,
+        action: &str,
+        subject: Option<&str>,
+    ) -> JetstreamEvent {
+        let mut commit = json!({
+            "operation": action,
+            "collection": "app.bsky.graph.follow",
+            "rkey": rkey,
+            "path": format!("app.bsky.graph.follow/{rkey}"),
+        });
+        if let Some(subject) = subject {
+            commit["cid"] = json!("bafyfollow");
+            commit["record"] = json!({
+                "subject": subject,
+                "createdAt": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
+            });
+        }
+        JetstreamEvent {
+            did: did.to_string(),
+            time_us: 1_700_000_000_000_000,
+            kind: "commit".into(),
+            commit: Some(commit),
+            identity: None,
+            account: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    async fn follow_rows(db: &PgPool, follower: &str) -> Vec<(String, Option<String>)> {
+        sqlx::query_as(
+            "SELECT subject_did, rkey FROM follows WHERE follower_did = $1 \
+             ORDER BY subject_did",
+        )
+        .bind(follower)
+        .fetch_all(db)
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+    }
+
+    /// The core case: a follow that arrived over the firehose is removed
+    /// by a delete op that names nothing but the rkey.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn firehose_unfollow_deletes_by_rkey() {
+        let Some(db) = try_test_db().await else {
+            eprintln!("appview DB unavailable; skipping");
+            return;
+        };
+        let follower = follow_did("er");
+        let subject = follow_did("ee");
+
+        apply_commit(&db, &follow_event(&follower, "frk1", "create", Some(&subject)))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            follow_rows(&db, &follower).await,
+            vec![(subject.clone(), Some("frk1".to_string()))],
+            "the create must store the rkey next to the edge"
+        );
+
+        // The delete op carries no record and no subject — only the rkey.
+        let applied = apply_commit(&db, &follow_event(&follower, "frk1", "delete", None))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(applied, "a follow delete is now actionable, not skipped");
+        assert!(
+            follow_rows(&db, &follower).await.is_empty(),
+            "the unfollow must remove the edge"
+        );
+
+        // Replaying the same delete (reconnect, or the push path racing
+        // the firehose) must stay a silent no-op.
+        apply_commit(&db, &follow_event(&follower, "frk1", "delete", None))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(follow_rows(&db, &follower).await.is_empty());
+
+        let _ = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM notifications WHERE recipient_did = $1")
+            .bind(&subject)
+            .execute(&db)
+            .await;
+    }
+
+    /// A delete for an rkey we never indexed resolves to nothing. That
+    /// is a normal outcome (the follow was never seen, or is already
+    /// gone), so it must not error and must not touch other rows.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn delete_follow_by_unknown_rkey_is_a_noop() {
+        let Some(db) = try_test_db().await else {
+            eprintln!("appview DB unavailable; skipping");
+            return;
+        };
+        let follower = follow_did("er");
+        let subject = follow_did("ee");
+
+        upsert_follow(&db, &follower, &subject, Some("frk1"), None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+
+        let removed = delete_follow_by_rkey(&db, &follower, "no-such-rkey")
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert!(removed.is_none(), "an unknown rkey resolves to no subject");
+        assert_eq!(
+            follow_rows(&db, &follower).await,
+            vec![(subject.clone(), Some("frk1".to_string()))],
+            "an unmatched delete must leave every other edge alone"
+        );
+
+        // An empty rkey is guarded separately — it can never identify a
+        // record, and must not be allowed to match a blank column.
+        assert!(delete_follow_by_rkey(&db, &follower, "")
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_none());
+        assert_eq!(follow_rows(&db, &follower).await.len(), 1);
+
+        delete_follow(&db, &follower, &subject).await.unwrap();
+        let _ = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM notifications WHERE recipient_did = $1")
+            .bind(&subject)
+            .execute(&db)
+            .await;
+    }
+
+    /// Rows written before migration 0011 have `rkey IS NULL`: there was
+    /// nothing to backfill them from. A delete-by-rkey must not find
+    /// them (and certainly must not match NULL against anything), while
+    /// the push path that names the subject keeps working.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn legacy_row_without_rkey_still_deletes_via_subject() {
+        let Some(db) = try_test_db().await else {
+            eprintln!("appview DB unavailable; skipping");
+            return;
+        };
+        let follower = follow_did("legacy");
+        let subject = follow_did("ee");
+
+        // Insert the way migration 0001 through 0010 did — no rkey.
+        sqlx::query(
+            "INSERT INTO follows (follower_did, subject_did, created_at) \
+             VALUES ($1, $2, now())",
+        )
+        .bind(&follower)
+        .bind(&subject)
+        .execute(&db)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+        let removed = delete_follow_by_rkey(&db, &follower, "frk1").await.unwrap();
+        assert!(
+            removed.is_none(),
+            "a row with no rkey is unreachable by rkey — by design"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(follow_rows(&db, &follower).await.len(), 1);
+
+        // The PDS push, which carries the subject, still removes it.
+        delete_follow(&db, &follower, &subject).await.unwrap();
+        assert!(follow_rows(&db, &follower).await.is_empty());
+    }
+
+    /// Follow → unfollow → follow again produces a fresh rkey. The edge
+    /// must stay a single row (the primary key is the relationship, not
+    /// the record), the newest rkey must win, and a stale delete for the
+    /// old rkey must not tear down the live follow.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn refollow_keeps_one_row_and_the_newest_rkey_wins() {
+        let Some(db) = try_test_db().await else {
+            eprintln!("appview DB unavailable; skipping");
+            return;
+        };
+        let follower = follow_did("er");
+        let subject = follow_did("ee");
+
+        apply_commit(&db, &follow_event(&follower, "frk1", "create", Some(&subject)))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        apply_commit(&db, &follow_event(&follower, "frk2", "create", Some(&subject)))
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            follow_rows(&db, &follower).await,
+            vec![(subject.clone(), Some("frk2".to_string()))],
+            "one edge, carrying the youngest record's rkey"
+        );
+
+        // The old rkey is stale: its delete must find nothing.
+        assert!(delete_follow_by_rkey(&db, &follower, "frk1")
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .is_none());
+        assert_eq!(
+            follow_rows(&db, &follower).await.len(),
+            1,
+            "a replayed delete for a superseded record must not unfollow"
+        );
+
+        // The current rkey does delete it.
+        assert_eq!(
+            delete_follow_by_rkey(&db, &follower, "frk2").await.unwrap(),
+            Some(subject.clone()),
+            "the delete resolves the subject it removed"
+        );
+        assert!(follow_rows(&db, &follower).await.is_empty());
+
+        let _ = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM notifications WHERE recipient_did = $1")
+            .bind(&subject)
+            .execute(&db)
+            .await;
+    }
+
+    /// A follow that first arrives over the PDS push (no rkey stored by
+    /// an older AppView, or a caller that has none) and is then seen
+    /// again over the firehose must end up with the rkey — otherwise
+    /// the firehose could never delete it. And a later push that omits
+    /// the rkey must not blank it out again.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn rkey_is_filled_in_but_never_blanked_out() {
+        let Some(db) = try_test_db().await else {
+            eprintln!("appview DB unavailable; skipping");
+            return;
+        };
+        let follower = follow_did("er");
+        let subject = follow_did("ee");
+
+        upsert_follow(&db, &follower, &subject, None, None).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            follow_rows(&db, &follower).await,
+            vec![(subject.clone(), None)]
+        );
+
+        // The firehose replay of the same follow supplies the rkey.
+        upsert_follow(&db, &follower, &subject, Some("frk1"), None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            follow_rows(&db, &follower).await,
+            vec![(subject.clone(), Some("frk1".to_string()))]
+        );
+
+        // A subsequent write without one must leave it in place.
+        upsert_follow(&db, &follower, &subject, None, None).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            follow_rows(&db, &follower).await,
+            vec![(subject.clone(), Some("frk1".to_string()))],
+            "COALESCE keeps the rkey the other transport already gave us"
+        );
+
+        delete_follow(&db, &follower, &subject).await.unwrap();
+        let _ = sqlx::query("DELETE FROM notifications WHERE recipient_did = $1")
+            .bind(&subject)
+            .execute(&db)
+            .await;
+    }
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -1555,7 +1940,9 @@ mod notification_tests {
             .await
             .unwrap();
         // Self-follow is legal in the protocol; it must stay silent too.
-        upsert_follow(&db, &author, &author, None).await.unwrap();
+        upsert_follow(&db, &author, &author, Some("frk1"), None)
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
 
         let total: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
             "SELECT COUNT(*)::BIGINT FROM notifications WHERE recipient_did = $1",
@@ -1657,10 +2044,10 @@ mod notification_tests {
         seed_post(&db, &subject, "p1").await;
 
         let record = json!({ "subject": subject, "createdAt": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z" });
-        upsert_follow(&db, &follower, &subject, Some(&record))
+        upsert_follow(&db, &follower, &subject, Some("frk1"), Some(&record))
             .await
             .unwrap();
-        upsert_follow(&db, &follower, &subject, Some(&record))
+        upsert_follow(&db, &follower, &subject, Some("frk1"), Some(&record))
             .await
             .unwrap();
         assert_eq!(

crates/appview/src/ingest.rs

@@ -15,8 +15,31 @@
 //! }
 //! ```
 //!
-//! In production this endpoint would be protected with mTLS and a token
-//! minted by the PDS; for now it's open inside the cluster.
+//! ## Who may call this
+//!
+//! This is the AppView's only write path, and it is not a browser
+//! endpoint: it is excluded from the CORS layer in
+//! [`crate::routes::router`], because an `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`
+//! header here would only ever help a web page forge index entries.
+//!
+//! Authentication is the shared secret `APPVIEW_INGEST_SECRET`,
+//! compared in constant time against the caller's `X-Ingest-Secret`
+//! header:
+//!
+//! - **set** → enforced. A missing or wrong header is `401
+//!   AuthenticationRequired`.
+//! - **unset** → anonymous writes are accepted, and the AppView shouts
+//!   about it once at startup (see
+//!   [`crate::auth::log_startup_posture`]). Refusing to start would
+//!   break every existing single-machine dev setup for a service that,
+//!   in that configuration, is bound to loopback anyway; accepting
+//!   silently is how an internet-facing deployment ends up letting
+//!   anyone forge posts, follows and notifications. So: keep working,
+//!   but never quietly.
+//!
+//! A future hardening step is mTLS or a PDS-minted token, at which
+//! point the shared secret becomes the fallback rather than the only
+//! line.
 
 use crate::indexer;
 use crate::state::AppState;
@@ -51,8 +74,13 @@ pub struct IngestCommitReq {
 }
 
 /// Authenticate internal ingest requests.
-/// - If `APPVIEW_INGEST_SECRET` env var is unset: dev mode, accept anything.
-/// - If set: require `X-Ingest-Secret: <value>` header to match.
+///
+/// - `APPVIEW_INGEST_SECRET` unset: accept anonymous writes (dev mode —
+///   the startup log warns, see the module docs for why this isn't a
+///   hard failure).
+/// - Set: require a matching `X-Ingest-Secret` header. The comparison
+///   is constant-time so a caller can't recover the secret byte by byte
+///   from response timings.
 pub fn check_ingest_secret(
     headers: &HeaderMap,
     configured: Option<&str>,
@@ -192,10 +220,15 @@ async fn apply(
                         .map(str::to_string)
                 })
                 .ok_or_else(|| bad_request("follow create requires subject_did or record.subject"))?;
+            // Forward the rkey too. The push path doesn't need it to
+            // apply *this* write — it has the subject — but storing it
+            // is what lets a later firehose delete (which carries only
+            // did + rkey) find this row. See migration 0011.
             indexer::upsert_follow(
                 &state.db,
                 &req.did,
                 &subject,
+                Some(req.rkey.as_str()),
                 req.record.as_ref(),
             )
             .await

crates/appview/src/lib.rs

@@ -3,9 +3,13 @@
 //! tests under `tests/` import from here so they can build a worker
 //! against a stub resolver without booting the binary.
 
+pub mod auth;
+pub mod car;
+pub mod cbor;
 pub mod firehose;
 pub mod handle_sync;
 pub mod indexer;
 pub mod ingest;
+pub mod pds_firehose;
 pub mod routes;
 pub mod state;

crates/appview/src/main.rs

@@ -7,10 +7,14 @@ use tokio::sync::mpsc;
 use tracing::info;
 use tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter;
 
+mod auth;
+mod car;
+mod cbor;
 mod firehose;
 mod handle_sync;
 mod indexer;
 mod ingest;
+mod pds_firehose;
 mod routes;
 mod state;
 
@@ -81,8 +85,59 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
         });
     }
 
+    // Local PDS firehose. The push path (`/internal/ingest-commit`) is
+    // the fast way a local commit reaches the index; this is the
+    // guaranteed one — it carries a durable cursor, so anything the
+    // push dropped while the AppView was down is replayed on connect.
+    // See the module docs in `pds_firehose.rs` for why both exist.
+    if cfg.pds_firehose_enabled {
+        let start_seq = pds_firehose::cursor_get(&db).await.unwrap_or(0);
+        let base = cfg.pds_base_url();
+        info!(
+            url = %pds_firehose::subscribe_url(&base, (start_seq > 0).then_some(start_seq)),
+            cursor = start_seq,
+            "starting the local PDS firehose consumer"
+        );
+        let consumer = pds_firehose::PdsFirehose::new(db.clone(), base, stats.clone())
+            .with_max_backoff_secs(30);
+        tokio::spawn(consumer.run_forever());
+    } else {
+        tracing::warn!(
+            "PDS_FIREHOSE_ENABLED=false — local commits reach the index only through \
+             the best-effort `/internal/ingest-commit` push; a push lost to a restart \
+             or a network error will NOT be recovered"
+        );
+    }
+
     let state = AppState::new(cfg.clone(), db.clone(), stats.clone());
 
+    // Announce every relaxed security switch before we serve anything.
+    auth::log_startup_posture(&cfg);
+
+    // Pre-load the PDS's published signing key so the first
+    // authenticated request doesn't pay for the round trip.
+    //
+    // Best effort on purpose: the AppView has always started
+    // independently of the PDS, and in a compose file the two race. A
+    // hard failure here would turn "the PDS booted two seconds later"
+    // into "the AppView is in a crash loop". If the fetch fails, the
+    // first authenticated request retries it — and answers `503
+    // AuthUnavailable` if the PDS is still unreachable. Never open.
+    if cfg.appview_auth_required {
+        match state.pds_keys.refresh().await {
+            Ok(_) => info!(
+                url = %state.pds_keys.did_doc_url(),
+                "loaded PDS signing key for token verification"
+            ),
+            Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
+                url = %state.pds_keys.did_doc_url(),
+                error = %e,
+                "could not load the PDS signing key at startup; will retry on the \
+                 first authenticated request (which fails with 503 until it works)"
+            ),
+        }
+    }
+
     // Back-fill the `handle` column on posts that the Jetstream
     // indexer inserted with an empty placeholder. The worker dispatches
     // by DID method: `did:plc:` → PLC directory, `did:web:` → a
@@ -102,12 +157,12 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
     // inside docker compose) — `pds_public_url` may not be reachable
     // from inside the cluster when TLS / DNS is set up for outside
     // clients only.
-    let pds_base_url = cfg
-        .pds_internal_url
-        .clone()
-        .unwrap_or_else(|| cfg.pds_public_url.clone());
+    //
+    // `AppConfig::pds_base_url()` owns that fallback so the handle
+    // resolver and the signing-key fetch in `auth.rs` can never end up
+    // pointed at different PDS instances.
     let pds_resolver: Arc<dyn at_identity::DidHandleResolver> = Arc::new(
-        at_identity::pds_handle::PdsHandleResolver::new(pds_base_url),
+        at_identity::pds_handle::PdsHandleResolver::new(cfg.pds_base_url()),
     );
 
     let handle_sync = handle_sync::HandleSyncWorker {

crates/appview/src/routes.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,30 @@
 //! - `ingest_commit`: the internal-only writer used by the PDS, owned
 //!   in `crate::ingest`.
 //!
+//! ## Public vs. private
+//!
+//! Most of what the AppView serves is public by construction: in AT
+//! Proto a post, a profile, a follow edge and a like are records in a
+//! public repo, replicated over the firehose. Those endpoints
+//! (`/api/profile*`, `/api/search`, `/api/post/*`, `/api/thread*`,
+//! `/api/followers`, `/api/following`) need no credential.
+//!
+//! Two things are *not* public, and they are the reason this service
+//! has authentication at all:
+//!
+//!  - `/api/notifications*` — who interacted with you, and the read
+//!    state of that list. Nothing in the protocol makes it readable by
+//!    anyone but the recipient.
+//!  - `/api/timeline/home` — the timeline is assembled from the
+//!    viewer's follow graph, so serving it to an arbitrary `did`
+//!    parameter answers "what does this person's feed look like" for
+//!    any DID a caller cares to type.
+//!
+//! Both require a valid PDS-issued access token whose `sub` equals the
+//! `did` in the request ([`crate::auth`]). The check is two steps on
+//! purpose: the extractor proves *who* the caller is, and
+//! `ensure_matches` proves they are asking about themselves.
+//!
 //! The cursor format used by `timeline_home` is opaque: it's a
 //! `base64url(micros):uri` pair, which is what [`cursor::encode`] and
 //! [`cursor::decode`] produce/consume.
@@ -19,11 +43,14 @@ use axum::{
     routing::{get, post},
     Json, Router,
 };
+use axum::http::{header, HeaderValue, Method};
 use chrono::{DateTime, TimeZone, Utc};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
-use tower_http::cors::{Any, CorsLayer};
+use tower_http::cors::{AllowOrigin, Any, CorsLayer};
+use tracing::warn;
 
+use crate::auth::AuthedDid;
 use crate::state::AppState;
 
 pub mod cursor;
@@ -35,25 +62,73 @@ use types::{
     ProfileResponse, SearchResponse, ThreadFullResponse, TimelineResponse,
 };
 
-pub fn router(state: AppState) -> Router {
-    // CORS: the Tauri webview's origin is the Vite dev server
-    // (`http://127.0.0.1:1430`) in dev or the bundled `tauri://` /
-    // `asset://` origin in production. Either way it's a cross-origin
-    // fetch against this service's `http://127.0.0.1:2584` listen
-    // address, so the browser blocks the response without an explicit
-    // allow-origin header. We allow any origin — the AppView's
-    // public read endpoints (`/api/...`) carry no auth cookie and
-    // the AppView runs alongside the user's own PDS, not on the
-    // open internet; production deployments behind a reverse proxy
-    // can tighten this via the proxy itself.
-    let cors = CorsLayer::new()
-        .allow_origin(Any)
-        .allow_methods(Any)
-        .allow_headers(Any);
+/// Build the CORS layer for the browser-facing routes.
+///
+/// The Tauri webview is a cross-origin caller: in dev its origin is the
+/// Vite server (`http://127.0.0.1:1430`), in a packaged build it is a
+/// platform-specific scheme — `tauri://localhost` on macOS/iOS,
+/// `http://tauri.localhost` on Windows. Either way the browser drops
+/// the response unless we send `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`.
+///
+/// `APPVIEW_CORS_ORIGINS` is a comma-separated allowlist, e.g.
+/// `tauri://localhost,http://127.0.0.1:1430`. When it is unset we keep
+/// the historic wildcard so no existing deployment breaks on upgrade —
+/// [`crate::auth::log_startup_posture`] warns about that at startup.
+///
+/// `Authorization` has to be in `allow_headers`: it is not a
+/// CORS-safelisted header, so without it the browser's preflight fails
+/// and the authenticated endpoints become unreachable from the webview
+/// — with an error that looks nothing like an auth problem.
+///
+/// `allow_credentials` stays off. We authenticate with a bearer token
+/// the client attaches deliberately, never with an ambient cookie, so
+/// there is nothing for a hostile page to replay — and turning it on
+/// would additionally make the wildcard origin illegal.
+fn cors_layer(cfg: &at_shared::config::AppConfig) -> CorsLayer {
+    let base = CorsLayer::new()
+        .allow_methods([Method::GET, Method::POST, Method::OPTIONS])
+        .allow_headers([
+            header::AUTHORIZATION,
+            header::CONTENT_TYPE,
+            header::ACCEPT,
+        ]);
 
-    Router::new()
+    if cfg.appview_cors_origins.is_empty() {
+        return base.allow_origin(Any);
+    }
+
+    // Anything unparseable as a header value is dropped with a warning
+    // rather than panicking the process — a stray quote in the env var
+    // must not take the service down. If *every* entry is bad we fall
+    // back to the wildcard and say so, because an empty allowlist would
+    // silently break every browser client.
+    let mut origins: Vec<HeaderValue> = Vec::new();
+    for raw in &cfg.appview_cors_origins {
+        match HeaderValue::from_str(raw) {
+            Ok(v) => origins.push(v),
+            Err(_) => warn!(origin = %raw, "APPVIEW_CORS_ORIGINS: ignoring unparseable origin"),
+        }
+    }
+    if origins.is_empty() {
+        warn!("APPVIEW_CORS_ORIGINS contained no usable origin; falling back to allow-any");
+        return base.allow_origin(Any);
+    }
+    base.allow_origin(AllowOrigin::list(origins))
+}
+
+pub fn router(state: AppState) -> Router {
+    let cors = cors_layer(&state.cfg);
+
+    // Browser-facing surface. Everything here answers a `fetch()` from
+    // the desktop client, so it carries the CORS layer.
+    let api = Router::new()
         .route("/", get(root))
+        // --- private: token required, `sub` must equal `did` ---
         .route("/api/timeline/home", get(timeline_home))
+        .route("/api/notifications", get(notifications))
+        .route("/api/notifications/count", get(notifications_count))
+        .route("/api/notifications/seen", post(notifications_seen))
+        // --- public: AT Proto public records ---
         .route("/api/profile", get(profile_query))
         .route("/api/profile/:handle", get(profile_path))
         .route("/api/search", get(search))
@@ -66,15 +141,20 @@ pub fn router(state: AppState) -> Router {
         // implementation, so they can't drift.
         .route("/api/thread", get(thread_query))
         .route("/api/thread/*uri", get(thread_path))
-        .route("/api/notifications", get(notifications))
-        .route("/api/notifications/count", get(notifications_count))
-        .route("/api/notifications/seen", post(notifications_seen))
         .route("/api/followers", get(followers))
         .route("/api/following", get(following))
         .route("/healthz", get(healthz))
-        .route("/internal/ingest-commit", post(crate::ingest::ingest_commit))
-        .layer(cors)
-        .with_state(state)
+        .layer(cors);
+
+    // Server-to-server surface. `/internal/ingest-commit` is called by
+    // the PDS with a shared secret, never by a browser, so it stays
+    // outside the CORS layer: handing it an
+    // `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header would only ever help a web
+    // page try to write to the index.
+    let internal = Router::new()
+        .route("/internal/ingest-commit", post(crate::ingest::ingest_commit));
+
+    api.merge(internal).with_state(state)
 }
 
 async fn root() -> Json<Value> {
@@ -115,13 +195,21 @@ const MAX_LIMIT: i64 = 100;
 /// surface.
 const MAX_FOLLOWED_DIDS: usize = 1000;
 
+/// `GET /api/timeline/home?did=…`
+///
+/// **Authenticated.** The timeline is derived from the viewer's follow
+/// graph, so `did` must be the caller's own DID — otherwise this
+/// endpoint would answer "what does this account's feed look like" for
+/// any DID at all.
 async fn timeline_home(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: AuthedDid,
     Query(q): Query<TimelineQuery>,
 ) -> Result<Json<TimelineResponse>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
     if q.did.is_empty() {
         return Err(bad_request("did is required"));
     }
+    auth.ensure_matches(&q.did)?;
     let limit = clamp_limit(q.limit);
 
     // Look up the set of DIDs this user follows, then build the
@@ -230,20 +318,51 @@ async fn timeline_home(
             .map_err(db_err)?,
         }
     } else {
-        // Graph-aware branch: filter `posts.did` to the followee set
-        // plus the requesting user's own DID. `target_dids` has been
-        // deduped and capped at MAX_FOLLOWED_DIDS, and the user's own
-        // DID is guaranteed to be in the set.
+        // Graph-aware branch: the followee set plus the requesting
+        // user's own DID. `target_dids` has been deduped and capped at
+        // MAX_FOLLOWED_DIDS, and the user's own DID is guaranteed to
+        // be in the set.
+        //
+        // ## Why this is a LATERAL and not `did = ANY($2)`
+        //
+        // The straightforward `WHERE did = ANY($2) ORDER BY indexed_at
+        // DESC LIMIT n` is a plan-stability trap once
+        // `posts_feed_indexed_at_uri_idx` exists (migration 0009, added
+        // for the cold-start feed). The planner sees an index that
+        // already yields rows in `indexed_at DESC` order and assumes it
+        // will hit `n` matching rows early — so it walks the global
+        // feed and filters. When the followees are sparse (a fresh
+        // account following accounts that haven't posted), "early"
+        // means millions of rows: measured on the dev instance, 2.87 M
+        // rows discarded and 28 s per request, while the same query
+        // took 62 ms with the per-DID index. It also flipped between
+        // the two plans depending on how often the prepared statement
+        // had run, so it looked intermittent.
+        //
+        // Expressing the intent — "for each followee, their newest
+        // posts, merged" — takes that plan off the table: `unnest` is a
+        // relation the planner can size, and each iteration is a bounded
+        // range scan on `posts_did_indexed_at_uri_idx`. Fetching `$1`
+        // per followee is what makes it correct: the global top-N is
+        // always a subset of the union of the per-followee top-Ns.
         match cursor_ts {
             Some(ts) => sqlx::query_as::<_, PostRowWithIndexed>(
-                r#"SELECT uri, did, handle, rkey, collection, text, cid,
-                          parent_uri, root_uri, embed, langs, created_at,
-                          indexed_at
-                   FROM posts
-                   WHERE collection IN ('app.twi.post','app.bsky.feed.post')
-                     AND did = ANY($2::text[])
-                     AND (indexed_at, uri) < ($3, $4)
-                   ORDER BY indexed_at DESC, uri DESC
+                r#"SELECT t.uri, t.did, t.handle, t.rkey, t.collection,
+                          t.text, t.cid, t.parent_uri, t.root_uri,
+                          t.embed, t.langs, t.created_at, t.indexed_at
+                   FROM unnest($2::text[]) AS f(did)
+                   CROSS JOIN LATERAL (
+                       SELECT p.uri, p.did, p.handle, p.rkey, p.collection,
+                              p.text, p.cid, p.parent_uri, p.root_uri,
+                              p.embed, p.langs, p.created_at, p.indexed_at
+                       FROM posts p
+                       WHERE p.did = f.did
+                         AND p.collection IN ('app.twi.post','app.bsky.feed.post')
+                         AND (p.indexed_at, p.uri) < ($3, $4)
+                       ORDER BY p.indexed_at DESC, p.uri DESC
+                       LIMIT $1
+                   ) t
+                   ORDER BY t.indexed_at DESC, t.uri DESC
                    LIMIT $1"#,
             )
             .bind(fetch)
@@ -254,13 +373,21 @@ async fn timeline_home(
             .await
             .map_err(db_err)?,
             None => sqlx::query_as::<_, PostRowWithIndexed>(
-                r#"SELECT uri, did, handle, rkey, collection, text, cid,
-                          parent_uri, root_uri, embed, langs, created_at,
-                          indexed_at
-                   FROM posts
-                   WHERE collection IN ('app.twi.post','app.bsky.feed.post')
-                     AND did = ANY($2::text[])
-                   ORDER BY indexed_at DESC, uri DESC
+                r#"SELECT t.uri, t.did, t.handle, t.rkey, t.collection,
+                          t.text, t.cid, t.parent_uri, t.root_uri,
+                          t.embed, t.langs, t.created_at, t.indexed_at
+                   FROM unnest($2::text[]) AS f(did)
+                   CROSS JOIN LATERAL (
+                       SELECT p.uri, p.did, p.handle, p.rkey, p.collection,
+                              p.text, p.cid, p.parent_uri, p.root_uri,
+                              p.embed, p.langs, p.created_at, p.indexed_at
+                       FROM posts p
+                       WHERE p.did = f.did
+                         AND p.collection IN ('app.twi.post','app.bsky.feed.post')
+                       ORDER BY p.indexed_at DESC, p.uri DESC
+                       LIMIT $1
+                   ) t
+                   ORDER BY t.indexed_at DESC, t.uri DESC
                    LIMIT $1"#,
             )
             .bind(fetch)
@@ -1046,13 +1173,19 @@ struct NotificationsQuery {
 /// of the list. The tiebreak here is the row's `id` rather than a URI
 /// (a notification has no URI of its own), which the shared
 /// [`cursor`] codec carries in its string slot.
+///
+/// **Authenticated**: `did` is the recipient, so the caller has to be
+/// that recipient. This is the endpoint that made authentication
+/// necessary in the first place.
 async fn notifications(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: AuthedDid,
     Query(q): Query<NotificationsQuery>,
 ) -> Result<Json<NotificationsResponse>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
     if q.did.is_empty() {
         return Err(bad_request("did is required"));
     }
+    auth.ensure_matches(&q.did)?;
     let limit = clamp_limit(q.limit);
     let keyset = decode_cursor(q.cursor.as_deref())?;
     // The cursor's string slot holds the row id. A client that hands
@@ -1121,13 +1254,18 @@ struct NotificationCountQuery {
 /// scales with the number of *unread* rows, not the user's lifetime
 /// notification history. That matters because the client polls this
 /// for its tray badge.
+///
+/// **Authenticated**, same rule as the list itself: an unread count is
+/// still information about someone else's inbox.
 async fn notifications_count(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: AuthedDid,
     Query(q): Query<NotificationCountQuery>,
 ) -> Result<Json<NotificationCountResponse>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
     if q.did.is_empty() {
         return Err(bad_request("did is required"));
     }
+    auth.ensure_matches(&q.did)?;
     let count: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar(
         "SELECT COUNT(*)::BIGINT FROM notifications \
           WHERE recipient_did = $1 AND read_at IS NULL",
@@ -1165,13 +1303,20 @@ struct NotificationsSeenReq {
 /// updates nothing and reports `updated: 0`. `read_at` is set to
 /// `now()` (when we recorded the ack), not to `seenAt` (which is a
 /// client-supplied watermark and could be arbitrarily far in the past).
+///
+/// **Authenticated**, and the only *write* among the private
+/// endpoints: without the check anyone could clear another user's
+/// unread badge. `AuthedDid` runs before `Json` because the body
+/// extractor consumes the request — axum requires body extractors last.
 async fn notifications_seen(
     State(state): State<AppState>,
+    auth: AuthedDid,
     Json(req): Json<NotificationsSeenReq>,
 ) -> Result<Json<NotificationSeenResponse>, (StatusCode, Json<Value>)> {
     if req.did.is_empty() {
         return Err(bad_request("did is required"));
     }
+    auth.ensure_matches(&req.did)?;
     let res = sqlx::query(
         r#"UPDATE notifications
               SET read_at = now()
@@ -1393,6 +1538,16 @@ async fn actor_list(
 
 // -- healthz ----------------------------------------------------------------
 
+/// Liveness probe.
+///
+/// Both ingest streams report separately. `jetstream_connected` is the
+/// public network's view; `pds_firehose_connected` is the local PDS's
+/// guaranteed delivery path for our own users' records. A deployment
+/// can be perfectly healthy for reads with the first one down, but a
+/// `pds_firehose_enabled: true, pds_firehose_connected: false` pair
+/// means local commits are riding on the best-effort push alone — which
+/// is exactly the state an operator wants to see in a probe rather than
+/// discover from a missing post.
 async fn healthz(State(state): State<AppState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
     let stats = &state.stats;
     Json(json!({
@@ -1400,6 +1555,10 @@ async fn healthz(State(state): State<AppState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
         "lag_ms": stats.lag_ms(),
         "events_processed": stats.events_processed(),
         "jetstream_connected": stats.jetstream_connected(),
+        "pds_firehose_enabled": state.cfg.pds_firehose_enabled,
+        "pds_firehose_connected": stats.pds_connected(),
+        "pds_firehose_frames": stats.pds_frames_processed(),
+        "pds_firehose_seq": stats.pds_last_seq(),
     }))
 }
 

crates/appview/src/state.rs

@@ -2,18 +2,30 @@ use at_shared::config::AppConfig;
 use sqlx::PgPool;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
+use crate::auth::PdsKeys;
 use crate::firehose::Stats;
 
 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct AppState {
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
     pub cfg: AppConfig,
     pub db: PgPool,
     pub stats: Arc<Stats>,
+    /// Cache of the PDS's published signing key, used by the
+    /// [`crate::auth::AuthedDid`] extractor. Shared (`Arc`) so every
+    /// handler verifies against the same cached key and one HTTP
+    /// client, and so a key rotation picked up by one request is
+    /// immediately visible to the rest.
+    pub pds_keys: Arc<PdsKeys>,
 }
 
 impl AppState {
     pub fn new(cfg: AppConfig, db: PgPool, stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Self {
-        Self { cfg, db, stats }
+        let pds_keys = Arc::new(PdsKeys::from_config(&cfg));
+        Self {
+            cfg,
+            db,
+            stats,
+            pds_keys,
+        }
     }
 }

crates/appview/tests/api_integration.rs

@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@
 //! rather than panicking — so `cargo test --workspace` stays green in
 //! environments where the appview hasn't been started.
 
+mod common;
+
+use common::TestAuth;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use std::time::Duration;
 
@@ -46,6 +49,36 @@ async fn db_reachable() -> bool {
     )
 }
 
+/// How this suite authenticates against `/api/timeline/home`, which is
+/// no longer public. `None` means the AppView enforces auth but the
+/// test process cannot mint a token (no `PDS_JWT_SECRET`), in which
+/// case the test skips like it does for a missing service.
+async fn auth_or_skip() -> Option<TestAuth> {
+    TestAuth::probe(&client().await, APPVIEW_URL).await
+}
+
+/// `GET /api/timeline/home` as `did`, with the bearer token attached
+/// when the instance requires one. The seeded DIDs are synthetic, so
+/// the token is minted from the PDS's own signing secret — see
+/// `tests/common/mod.rs`.
+async fn get_timeline(
+    c: &reqwest::Client,
+    auth: &TestAuth,
+    did: &str,
+    extra: &[(&str, &str)],
+) -> reqwest::Response {
+    let mut params: Vec<(&str, &str)> = vec![("did", did)];
+    params.extend_from_slice(extra);
+    auth.apply(
+        c.get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
+            .query(&params),
+        did,
+    )
+    .send()
+    .await
+    .unwrap()
+}
+
 async fn post_ingest(c: &reqwest::Client, body: Value) -> reqwest::Response {
     c.post(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/internal/ingest-commit"))
         .json(&body)
@@ -120,6 +153,7 @@ async fn timeline_returns_seeded_posts() {
         return;
     }
     let c = client().await;
+    let Some(auth) = auth_or_skip().await else { return };
     let did = did_for_test("tl");
 
     // Seed 3 posts with distinct rkeys.
@@ -157,12 +191,7 @@ async fn timeline_returns_seeded_posts() {
     // machine that has run this suite twice) the three rows we just
     // seeded fall outside a 10-row window and the assertions below
     // fail for reasons that have nothing to do with the timeline.
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
-        .query(&[("did", did.as_str()), ("limit", "100")])
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
+    let resp = get_timeline(&c, &auth, &did, &[("limit", "100")]).await;
     assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 200);
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
     let posts = body["posts"].as_array().expect("posts is array");
@@ -222,6 +251,7 @@ async fn timeline_paginates_with_cursor() {
         return;
     }
     let c = client().await;
+    let Some(auth) = auth_or_skip().await else { return };
     let did = did_for_test("pg");
 
     // Seed 50 posts.
@@ -246,28 +276,14 @@ async fn timeline_paginates_with_cursor() {
     tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
 
     // Page 1: limit=20.
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
-        .query(&[("did", did.as_str()), ("limit", "20")])
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
+    let resp = get_timeline(&c, &auth, &did, &[("limit", "20")]).await;
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
     let page1 = body["posts"].as_array().unwrap().clone();
     let cursor1 = body["cursor"].as_str().expect("page1 cursor");
     assert_eq!(page1.len(), 20, "page1 should be exactly 20");
 
     // Page 2: with cursor.
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
-        .query(&[
-            ("did", did.as_str()),
-            ("limit", "20"),
-            ("cursor", cursor1),
-        ])
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
+    let resp = get_timeline(&c, &auth, &did, &[("limit", "20"), ("cursor", cursor1)]).await;
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
     let page2 = body["posts"].as_array().unwrap().clone();
     assert_eq!(page2.len(), 20, "page2 should be exactly 20");
@@ -285,16 +301,7 @@ async fn timeline_paginates_with_cursor() {
 
     // Page 3: tail — fewer than 20 expected, cursor=null.
     let cursor2 = body["cursor"].as_str().expect("page2 cursor");
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
-        .query(&[
-            ("did", did.as_str()),
-            ("limit", "20"),
-            ("cursor", cursor2),
-        ])
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
+    let resp = get_timeline(&c, &auth, &did, &[("limit", "20"), ("cursor", cursor2)]).await;
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
     let page3 = body["posts"].as_array().unwrap().clone();
     assert!(page3.len() <= 20, "page3 should be <= 20");
@@ -484,6 +491,7 @@ async fn timeline_filters_to_followees() {
         return;
     }
     let c = client().await;
+    let Some(auth) = auth_or_skip().await else { return };
     let url = std::env::var("DATABASE_URL_APPVIEW").unwrap();
     let pool = sqlx::PgPool::connect(&url).await.unwrap();
 
@@ -503,12 +511,7 @@ async fn timeline_filters_to_followees() {
 
     tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
 
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
-        .query(&[("did", alice.as_str()), ("limit", "100")])
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
+    let resp = get_timeline(&c, &auth, &alice, &[("limit", "100")]).await;
     assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 200);
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
     let posts = body["posts"].as_array().expect("posts is array");
@@ -555,18 +558,14 @@ async fn timeline_includes_own_posts() {
         return;
     }
     let c = client().await;
+    let Some(auth) = auth_or_skip().await else { return };
     let alice = did_for_test("alone");
 
     // Alice posts without seeding any follows.
     seed_posts(&c, &alice, &["alice's first post", "alice's second post"]).await;
     tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
 
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
-        .query(&[("did", alice.as_str()), ("limit", "100")])
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
+    let resp = get_timeline(&c, &auth, &alice, &[("limit", "100")]).await;
     assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 200);
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
     let posts = body["posts"].as_array().expect("posts is array");
@@ -605,6 +604,7 @@ async fn timeline_caps_followee_list() {
         return;
     }
     let c = client().await;
+    let Some(auth) = auth_or_skip().await else { return };
     let url = std::env::var("DATABASE_URL_APPVIEW").unwrap();
     let pool = sqlx::PgPool::connect(&url).await.unwrap();
 
@@ -624,12 +624,7 @@ async fn timeline_caps_followee_list() {
     seed_posts(&c, &alice, &["poweruser post"]).await;
     tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(100)).await;
 
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
-        .query(&[("did", alice.as_str()), ("limit", "50")])
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
+    let resp = get_timeline(&c, &auth, &alice, &[("limit", "50")]).await;
     assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 200);
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
     let posts = body["posts"].as_array().expect("posts is array");

crates/appview/tests/auth_integration.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+//! End-to-end tests for AppView authentication.
+//!
+//! Unlike the other suites in this directory these use a **real**
+//! token: the test creates an account on the running PDS
+//! (`com.atproto.server.createAccount`, the same call the desktop
+//! client makes at signup) and presents the access JWT it gets back to
+//! the AppView. That is the whole point — it exercises the actual key
+//! distribution path (PDS signs → publishes its public key at
+//! `/.well-known/did.json` → AppView fetches and verifies), which a
+//! self-minted token would bypass.
+//!
+//! Fail-open like the rest of the suites: if the PDS or the AppView
+//! isn't running, or the AppView runs with `APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED=false`,
+//! the test prints a notice and returns successfully.
+
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+const PDS_URL: &str = "http://127.0.0.1:2583";
+
+fn appview_url() -> String {
+    std::env::var("APPVIEW_TEST_URL").unwrap_or_else(|_| "http://127.0.0.1:2584".to_string())
+}
+
+/// 30 s, not the 5 s the sibling suites use.
+///
+/// The authenticated happy path for `/api/timeline/home` runs the
+/// cold-start query (a brand-new account follows nobody, so the handler
+/// falls back to the global recent feed). On a developer machine whose
+/// AppView has been indexing the public firehose for a while that scan
+/// takes seconds — a timeout there would look like an auth failure and
+/// is nothing of the sort.
+fn client() -> reqwest::Client {
+    reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(30))
+        .build()
+        .unwrap()
+}
+
+async fn up(c: &reqwest::Client, base: &str) -> bool {
+    for _ in 0..20 {
+        if let Ok(r) = c.get(format!("{base}/healthz")).send().await {
+            if r.status().is_success() {
+                return true;
+            }
+        }
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(250)).await;
+    }
+    false
+}
+
+/// A freshly created PDS account.
+struct Account {
+    did: String,
+    access_jwt: String,
+    refresh_jwt: String,
+}
+
+/// Guard for every test here: both services up **and** the AppView
+/// actually enforcing auth. Returns the client plus a new account.
+async fn ready() -> Option<(reqwest::Client, Account)> {
+    let c = client();
+    if !up(&c, &appview_url()).await {
+        eprintln!("appview not running, skipping");
+        return None;
+    }
+    if !up(&c, PDS_URL).await {
+        eprintln!("pds not running, skipping");
+        return None;
+    }
+    // Probe: does this instance enforce auth? An operator running with
+    // `APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED=false` (the mode the other suites use)
+    // would otherwise see every assertion here fail for the one reason
+    // that isn't a bug.
+    let probe = c
+        .get(format!("{}/api/notifications/count", appview_url()))
+        .query(&[("did", "did:plc:auth_probe")])
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .ok()?;
+    if probe.status().as_u16() != 401 {
+        eprintln!(
+            "appview does not enforce auth (probe returned {}), skipping",
+            probe.status()
+        );
+        return None;
+    }
+    let acc = create_account(&c).await?;
+    Some((c, acc))
+}
+
+async fn create_account(c: &reqwest::Client) -> Option<Account> {
+    let handle = format!("auth_{}.maarcadetweet.local", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
+    let r: Value = c
+        .post(format!("{PDS_URL}/xrpc/com.atproto.server.createAccount"))
+        .json(&json!({ "handle": handle, "password": "hunter2hunter2" }))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .ok()?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .ok()?;
+    Some(Account {
+        did: r["did"].as_str()?.to_string(),
+        access_jwt: r["access_jwt"].as_str()?.to_string(),
+        refresh_jwt: r["refresh_jwt"].as_str()?.to_string(),
+    })
+}
+
+/// `GET /api/notifications?did=…` with an optional bearer token.
+async fn get_notifications(
+    c: &reqwest::Client,
+    did: &str,
+    token: Option<&str>,
+) -> reqwest::Response {
+    let mut rb = c
+        .get(format!("{}/api/notifications", appview_url()))
+        .query(&[("did", did)]);
+    if let Some(t) = token {
+        rb = rb.bearer_auth(t);
+    }
+    rb.send().await.unwrap()
+}
+
+/// Assert the AppView's standard error envelope: the status, and the
+/// `error` code the desktop client branches on.
+async fn assert_error(r: reqwest::Response, status: u16, code: &str) {
+    let got = r.status().as_u16();
+    let body: Value = r.json().await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(got, status, "unexpected status; body = {body}");
+    assert_eq!(body["error"], json!(code), "unexpected error code: {body}");
+    assert!(
+        body["message"].is_string(),
+        "error body must carry a message: {body}"
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn own_token_reads_own_notifications() {
+    let Some((c, acc)) = ready().await else { return };
+    let r = get_notifications(&c, &acc.did, Some(&acc.access_jwt)).await;
+    assert_eq!(r.status().as_u16(), 200);
+    let body: Value = r.json().await.unwrap();
+    // A brand-new account has no notifications, but the shape must be
+    // the normal list response, not an error.
+    assert!(body["notifications"].is_array(), "body = {body}");
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn no_token_is_401_auth_missing() {
+    let Some((c, acc)) = ready().await else { return };
+    let r = get_notifications(&c, &acc.did, None).await;
+    assert_error(r, 401, "AuthMissing").await;
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn foreign_did_is_403() {
+    let Some((c, acc)) = ready().await else { return };
+    // A valid token, but asking about somebody else's inbox. This is
+    // the case the endpoint used to answer with a 200.
+    let r = get_notifications(&c, "did:plc:somebodyelse", Some(&acc.access_jwt)).await;
+    assert_error(r, 403, "Forbidden").await;
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn garbage_token_is_401_token_invalid() {
+    let Some((c, acc)) = ready().await else { return };
+    let r = get_notifications(&c, &acc.did, Some("not.a.jwt")).await;
+    assert_error(r, 401, "TokenInvalid").await;
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn refresh_token_is_not_accepted() {
+    let Some((c, acc)) = ready().await else { return };
+    // Signed by the same key and valid for 90 days — only the `scope`
+    // claim separates it from a session credential.
+    let r = get_notifications(&c, &acc.did, Some(&acc.refresh_jwt)).await;
+    assert_error(r, 401, "TokenInvalid").await;
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn seen_write_requires_matching_token() {
+    let Some((c, acc)) = ready().await else { return };
+    let url = format!("{}/api/notifications/seen", appview_url());
+
+    // Somebody else's unread badge: 403, nothing written.
+    let r = c
+        .post(&url)
+        .bearer_auth(&acc.access_jwt)
+        .json(&json!({ "did": "did:plc:somebodyelse" }))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_error(r, 403, "Forbidden").await;
+
+    // No credential at all: 401.
+    let r = c
+        .post(&url)
+        .json(&json!({ "did": &acc.did }))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_error(r, 401, "AuthMissing").await;
+
+    // Own inbox: allowed (zero rows updated — the account is new).
+    let r = c
+        .post(&url)
+        .bearer_auth(&acc.access_jwt)
+        .json(&json!({ "did": &acc.did }))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(r.status().as_u16(), 200);
+    let body: Value = r.json().await.unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(body["ok"], json!(true));
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn timeline_home_is_authenticated() {
+    let Some((c, acc)) = ready().await else { return };
+    let base = appview_url();
+
+    let r = c
+        .get(format!("{base}/api/timeline/home"))
+        .query(&[("did", acc.did.as_str())])
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_error(r, 401, "AuthMissing").await;
+
+    let r = c
+        .get(format!("{base}/api/timeline/home"))
+        .query(&[("did", "did:plc:somebodyelse")])
+        .bearer_auth(&acc.access_jwt)
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_error(r, 403, "Forbidden").await;
+
+    let r = c
+        .get(format!("{base}/api/timeline/home"))
+        .query(&[("did", acc.did.as_str())])
+        .bearer_auth(&acc.access_jwt)
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(r.status().as_u16(), 200);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn public_endpoints_stay_public() {
+    let Some((c, acc)) = ready().await else { return };
+    let base = appview_url();
+
+    // Profiles, search, follower lists and the health probe are public
+    // records in AT Proto. Putting them behind auth would be a
+    // behaviour change no protocol rule asks for — assert they still
+    // answer without a token.
+    for (path, params) in [
+        ("/api/profile", vec![("did", acc.did.as_str())]),
+        ("/api/search", vec![("q", "hello")]),
+        ("/api/followers", vec![("did", acc.did.as_str())]),
+        ("/api/following", vec![("did", acc.did.as_str())]),
+        ("/healthz", vec![]),
+    ] {
+        let r = c
+            .get(format!("{base}{path}"))
+            .query(&params)
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            r.status().as_u16(),
+            200,
+            "{path} must remain public, got {}",
+            r.status()
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+/// The AppView can only verify anything because the PDS publishes its
+/// public key. If this document ever stops carrying a usable key, every
+/// authenticated request degrades to `503 AuthUnavailable` — so assert
+/// the shape the AppView parses.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn pds_publishes_a_usable_signing_key() {
+    let c = client();
+    if !up(&c, PDS_URL).await {
+        eprintln!("pds not running, skipping");
+        return;
+    }
+    let doc: Value = c
+        .get(format!("{PDS_URL}/.well-known/did.json"))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let id = doc["id"].as_str().expect("did document needs an id");
+    assert!(id.starts_with("did:web:"), "id = {id}");
+    let vm = &doc["verificationMethod"][0];
+    assert_eq!(vm["type"], json!("Multikey"));
+    assert_eq!(vm["controller"], json!(id));
+    let key = vm["publicKeyMultibase"]
+        .as_str()
+        .expect("verificationMethod needs publicKeyMultibase");
+    // base58-btc multibase: the `z` prefix is what the AppView's
+    // decoder expects.
+    assert!(key.starts_with('z'), "key = {key}");
+}

crates/appview/tests/common/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+//! Shared test support for the AppView integration suites.
+//!
+//! ## Why the suites need this
+//!
+//! `/api/notifications*` and `/api/timeline/home` require a
+//! PDS-issued access token whose `sub` equals the `did` in the request.
+//! The suites, however, seed synthetic DIDs (`did:plc:ntf_…`) through
+//! `/internal/ingest-commit` — accounts the PDS has never heard of, so
+//! there is no `createSession` that would hand out a token for them.
+//!
+//! The way out is that a token is just an ES256 JWT signed with the
+//! server key derived from `PDS_JWT_SECRET`. A test that can read that
+//! secret (from the process environment, or from the repo `.env` the
+//! dev stack itself was started with) can mint a token for any DID it
+//! likes — the same thing `pds-server/src/jwt_issuer.rs` does.
+//!
+//! ## Fail-open, like the rest of the suites
+//!
+//! [`TestAuth::probe`] asks the running AppView whether it enforces
+//! auth at all:
+//!
+//! - not enforcing (`APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED=false`) → no header needed;
+//! - enforcing and we have the secret → mint per-DID tokens;
+//! - enforcing and we don't → `None`, and the caller skips, exactly as
+//!   it already skips when the service or the database is down.
+
+#![allow(dead_code)]
+
+use at_crypto::ecdsa::P256Keypair;
+use at_crypto::jwt::{issue_jwt, JwtClaims};
+
+/// Audience the PDS stamps into access tokens — and, since the
+/// audience check landed, the value the AppView insists on: its own
+/// service DID, derived from `APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL`. A token minted with
+/// anything else is rejected as `TokenInvalid`, which is exactly what
+/// we want a wrong value here to look like.
+///
+/// Derived the same way `AppConfig::appview_did()` does it, from the
+/// same environment variable, so this helper can't drift from the
+/// service it's impersonating the PDS for.
+fn appview_aud() -> String {
+    let url = std::env::var("APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL")
+        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "http://127.0.0.1:2584".to_string());
+    at_shared::config::did_web_from_url(&url)
+}
+
+/// The scope the AppView insists on. A token with any other scope —
+/// `com.atproto.refresh`, say — is rejected with `TokenInvalid`.
+pub const ACCESS_SCOPE: &str = "com.atproto.access";
+
+/// How the suite should authenticate against the AppView under test.
+///
+/// `Clone` because a test that pages through results in a closure has
+/// to hand each iteration its own copy, exactly like the client and the
+/// base URL next to it.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub enum TestAuth {
+    /// `APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED=false`: send no `Authorization` header.
+    Disabled,
+    /// Auth is enforced; mint tokens with this hex secret.
+    Secret(String),
+}
+
+impl TestAuth {
+    /// Decide how (or whether) this suite can talk to the AppView.
+    ///
+    /// Returns `None` when the AppView enforces auth but no
+    /// `PDS_JWT_SECRET` is reachable — the caller should print a notice
+    /// and return, keeping `cargo test --workspace` green on a machine
+    /// without the dev stack's environment.
+    pub async fn probe(c: &reqwest::Client, base_url: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        // An unauthenticated probe against a private endpoint. We only
+        // look at the status: 401 means the extractor is active. A DID
+        // that doesn't exist is fine — the auth check runs first.
+        let status = c
+            .get(format!("{base_url}/api/notifications/count"))
+            .query(&[("did", "did:plc:auth_probe")])
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .ok()?
+            .status()
+            .as_u16();
+        if status != 401 && status != 503 {
+            return Some(TestAuth::Disabled);
+        }
+        match pds_jwt_secret() {
+            Some(secret) => Some(TestAuth::Secret(secret)),
+            None => {
+                eprintln!(
+                    "appview enforces auth (probe returned {status}) but PDS_JWT_SECRET \
+                     is not set and no .env was found — skipping"
+                );
+                None
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Attach an `Authorization: Bearer` header for `did`, if needed.
+    pub fn apply(&self, rb: reqwest::RequestBuilder, did: &str) -> reqwest::RequestBuilder {
+        match self {
+            TestAuth::Disabled => rb,
+            TestAuth::Secret(secret) => match mint_access_jwt(secret, did, ACCESS_SCOPE, 3600) {
+                Some(token) => rb.bearer_auth(token),
+                None => rb,
+            },
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// A token for `did` — for tests that want to send a *wrong* one on
+    /// purpose. `None` when auth is disabled, in which case the test
+    /// that needs it should skip.
+    pub fn token_for(&self, did: &str) -> Option<String> {
+        match self {
+            TestAuth::Disabled => None,
+            TestAuth::Secret(secret) => mint_access_jwt(secret, did, ACCESS_SCOPE, 3600),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// `PDS_JWT_SECRET` from the environment, falling back to the repo
+/// `.env` — the same file the running dev stack loaded at startup, so
+/// the minted tokens verify against the key the PDS actually publishes.
+pub fn pds_jwt_secret() -> Option<String> {
+    if let Ok(v) = std::env::var("PDS_JWT_SECRET") {
+        if !v.trim().is_empty() {
+            return Some(v);
+        }
+    }
+    // `dotenvy::dotenv` walks up from the current directory, which for
+    // a test binary is the crate root — so this finds the workspace
+    // `.env` two levels up. It never overrides a real env var.
+    let _ = dotenvy::dotenv();
+    std::env::var("PDS_JWT_SECRET")
+        .ok()
+        .filter(|v| !v.trim().is_empty())
+}
+
+/// Mint an access JWT for `did`, signed with the PDS's server key.
+///
+/// Mirrors `pds-server/src/jwt_issuer.rs`: the P-256 secret scalar is
+/// the **first 32 bytes** of `PDS_JWT_SECRET` (the config allows a
+/// longer secret), i.e. the first 64 hex characters.
+///
+/// `ttl_secs` may be negative to build a deliberately expired token.
+pub fn mint_access_jwt(
+    secret_hex: &str,
+    did: &str,
+    scope: &str,
+    ttl_secs: i64,
+) -> Option<String> {
+    let hex = secret_hex.trim().trim_start_matches("0x");
+    if hex.len() < 64 || !hex.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit()) {
+        eprintln!("PDS_JWT_SECRET is not ≥32 bytes of hex; cannot mint a test token");
+        return None;
+    }
+    let kp = P256Keypair {
+        secret_hex: hex[..64].to_string(),
+        // Only the signing half is used by `issue_jwt`; the verifier
+        // fetches the public key from the PDS's DID document.
+        public_multibase: String::new(),
+    };
+    let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
+    issue_jwt(
+        &kp,
+        &JwtClaims {
+            iss: "did:web:test".into(),
+            sub: did.to_string(),
+            aud: appview_aud(),
+            iat: now - 1,
+            exp: now + ttl_secs,
+            jti: None,
+            scope: Some(scope.to_string()),
+        },
+    )
+    .ok()
+}

crates/appview/tests/embeds_integration.rs

@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
 //! and returns rather than panicking. The point of the tests is to
 //! catch regressions in CI where the service IS up.
 
+mod common;
+
+use common::TestAuth;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use std::time::Duration;
 
@@ -50,6 +53,32 @@ async fn db_reachable() -> bool {
     )
 }
 
+/// `/api/timeline/home` requires a token whose `sub` is the requested
+/// DID. The DIDs here are synthetic, so the token is minted from the
+/// PDS signing secret — see `tests/common/mod.rs`. `None` → skip.
+async fn auth_or_skip() -> Option<TestAuth> {
+    TestAuth::probe(&client().await, APPVIEW_URL).await
+}
+
+/// `GET /api/timeline/home` as `did`, authenticated when required.
+async fn get_timeline(
+    c: &reqwest::Client,
+    auth: &TestAuth,
+    did: &str,
+    extra: &[(&str, &str)],
+) -> reqwest::Response {
+    let mut params: Vec<(&str, &str)> = vec![("did", did)];
+    params.extend_from_slice(extra);
+    auth.apply(
+        c.get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
+            .query(&params),
+        did,
+    )
+    .send()
+    .await
+    .unwrap()
+}
+
 async fn post_ingest(c: &reqwest::Client, body: Value) -> reqwest::Response {
     c.post(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/internal/ingest-commit"))
         .json(&body)
@@ -125,6 +154,7 @@ async fn timeline_includes_embed() {
         return;
     }
     let c = client().await;
+    let Some(auth) = auth_or_skip().await else { return };
     let did = did_for_test("img");
     let uri = seed_post(
         &c,
@@ -160,12 +190,7 @@ async fn timeline_includes_embed() {
     )
     .await;
 
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
-        .query(&[("did", did.as_str()), ("limit", "10")])
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
+    let resp = get_timeline(&c, &auth, &did, &[("limit", "10")]).await;
     assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 200);
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
     let posts = body["posts"].as_array().unwrap();
@@ -199,6 +224,7 @@ async fn timeline_includes_external_embed() {
         return;
     }
     let c = client().await;
+    let Some(auth) = auth_or_skip().await else { return };
     let did = did_for_test("ext");
     let uri = seed_post(
         &c,
@@ -222,12 +248,7 @@ async fn timeline_includes_external_embed() {
     )
     .await;
 
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
-        .query(&[("did", did.as_str()), ("limit", "10")])
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
+    let resp = get_timeline(&c, &auth, &did, &[("limit", "10")]).await;
     assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 200);
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
     let posts = body["posts"].as_array().unwrap();
@@ -241,12 +262,7 @@ async fn timeline_includes_external_embed() {
             break;
         }
         tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
-        let resp = c
-            .get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
-            .query(&[("did", did.as_str()), ("limit", "10")])
-            .send()
-            .await
-            .unwrap();
+        let resp = get_timeline(&c, &auth, &did, &[("limit", "10")]).await;
         let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
         our = body["posts"]
             .as_array()
@@ -410,6 +426,7 @@ async fn timeline_post_without_embed_has_null_embed() {
         return;
     }
     let c = client().await;
+    let Some(auth) = auth_or_skip().await else { return };
     let did = did_for_test("plain");
     let uri = seed_post(
         &c,
@@ -421,12 +438,7 @@ async fn timeline_post_without_embed_has_null_embed() {
     )
     .await;
 
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{APPVIEW_URL}/api/timeline/home"))
-        .query(&[("did", did.as_str()), ("limit", "10")])
-        .send()
-        .await
-        .unwrap();
+    let resp = get_timeline(&c, &auth, &did, &[("limit", "10")]).await;
     assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 200);
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
     let our = body["posts"]

crates/appview/tests/handle_sync_integration.rs

@@ -175,8 +175,13 @@ async fn sync_resolves_known_did() {
     seed_post(&db, &did, "rkb", "", "second").await.unwrap();
     assert_eq!(count_empty_handle_for(&db, &did).await.unwrap(), 2);
 
+    // Drive the resolve half with our own DID. `run_once()` scans
+    // globally, ordered by DID and capped at BATCH_SIZE, so on a
+    // database that a live indexer keeps topping up, a freshly seeded
+    // DID isn't guaranteed to make the batch — the assertions below
+    // would then be measuring someone else's rows.
     let worker = worker_with(db.clone(), stub.clone());
-    let report: SyncReport = worker.run_once().await.unwrap();
+    let report: SyncReport = worker.resolve_batch(vec![did.clone()]).await.unwrap();
     assert_eq!(report.resolved, 2, "{report:?}");
     assert_eq!(report.failed, 0);
     assert_eq!(report.skipped, 0);
@@ -224,9 +229,16 @@ async fn sync_skips_already_resolved() {
     .into_arc();
 
     let worker = worker_with(db.clone(), stub.clone());
-    let report = worker.run_once().await.unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(report.resolved, 0, "{report:?}");
-    assert_eq!(report.failed, 0);
+    // This test is about the SELECT: a DID whose rows already carry a
+    // handle must never reach a resolver in the first place. So assert
+    // on `select_candidates()` rather than forcing the DID through
+    // `resolve_batch` — that would consult the resolver by definition
+    // and defeat the `query_count == 0` check below.
+    let candidates = worker.select_candidates().await.unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        !candidates.contains(&did),
+        "a DID that already has a handle must not be selected"
+    );
 
     // Both rows must still carry the pre-existing handle.
     let (cnt,): (i64,) = sqlx::query_as(
@@ -279,7 +291,16 @@ async fn sync_respects_limit() {
     let stub = StubResolver::new(mapping).into_arc();
 
     let worker = worker_with(db.clone(), stub.clone());
-    let report = worker.run_once().await.unwrap();
+    // The cap lives in the SELECT, so assert it there; the report of a
+    // full `run_once()` depends on what else is pending database-wide.
+    let candidates = worker.select_candidates().await.unwrap();
+    assert!(
+        candidates.len() as i64 <= BATCH_SIZE,
+        "select must never exceed BATCH_SIZE, got {}",
+        candidates.len()
+    );
+    let batch: Vec<String> = all_dids.iter().take(BATCH_SIZE as usize).cloned().collect();
+    let report = worker.resolve_batch(batch).await.unwrap();
     assert_eq!(
         report.resolved as i64,
         BATCH_SIZE,
@@ -339,7 +360,7 @@ async fn sync_skips_unresolvable_dids() {
     let stub = StubResolver::new(HashMap::new()).into_arc();
 
     let worker = worker_with(db.clone(), stub.clone());
-    let report = worker.run_once().await.unwrap();
+    let report = worker.resolve_batch(vec![did.clone()]).await.unwrap();
     assert_eq!(report.resolved, 0);
     assert_eq!(report.failed, 0);
     assert_eq!(report.skipped, 1, "{report:?}");
@@ -388,14 +409,21 @@ async fn sync_resolves_did_web_via_web_resolver() {
     let plc_arc: Arc<dyn DidHandleResolver> = plc.into_arc();
     let web_arc: Arc<dyn DidHandleResolver> = web.into_arc();
 
+    // The local PDS is consulted before the method dispatch and does
+    // not host a foreign `did:web:` — wiring one of the other stubs in
+    // here would make it claim a DID it doesn't have, and the test
+    // would assert against the PDS-first rule instead of the dispatch.
+    let pds_arc: Arc<dyn DidHandleResolver> =
+        StubResolver::new(HashMap::new()).into_arc();
+
     let worker = HandleSyncWorker {
         db: db.clone(),
-        pds_resolver: Arc::clone(&plc_arc),
+        pds_resolver: pds_arc,
         plc_resolver: plc_arc,
         web_resolver: web_arc,
         interval_secs: 999,
     };
-    let report = worker.run_once().await.unwrap();
+    let report = worker.resolve_batch(vec![did.clone()]).await.unwrap();
     assert_eq!(
         report.resolved, 1,
         "did:web must resolve through the web resolver, got {report:?}"
@@ -442,14 +470,19 @@ async fn sync_resolves_did_plc_via_plc_resolver() {
     let plc_arc: Arc<dyn DidHandleResolver> = plc.into_arc();
     let web_arc: Arc<dyn DidHandleResolver> = web.into_arc();
 
+    // Same reasoning as the did:web test: the PDS doesn't host this
+    // DID, so the method dispatch is what's under test.
+    let pds_arc: Arc<dyn DidHandleResolver> =
+        StubResolver::new(HashMap::new()).into_arc();
+
     let worker = HandleSyncWorker {
         db: db.clone(),
-        pds_resolver: Arc::clone(&plc_arc),
+        pds_resolver: pds_arc,
         plc_resolver: plc_arc,
         web_resolver: web_arc,
         interval_secs: 999,
     };
-    let report = worker.run_once().await.unwrap();
+    let report = worker.resolve_batch(vec![did.clone()]).await.unwrap();
     assert_eq!(
         report.resolved, 1,
         "did:plc must resolve through the PLC resolver, got {report:?}"

crates/appview/tests/notifications_integration.rs

@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
 //! API. That's deliberate: it's the only way to catch a mismatch
 //! between what the write path stores and what the read path joins.
 
+mod common;
+
+use common::TestAuth;
 use serde_json::{json, Value};
 use std::time::Duration;
 
@@ -55,8 +58,12 @@ async fn db_pool() -> Option<sqlx::PgPool> {
 }
 
 /// Guard used at the top of every test. Returns `None` (→ skip) unless
-/// both the HTTP service and the database are up.
-async fn ready() -> Option<(reqwest::Client, sqlx::PgPool)> {
+/// the HTTP service is up, the database is reachable, **and** we know
+/// how to authenticate: `/api/notifications*` now requires a token
+/// whose `sub` is the requested DID, and the DIDs seeded here are
+/// synthetic, so the token has to be minted from the PDS's signing
+/// secret. See `tests/common/mod.rs`.
+async fn ready() -> Option<(reqwest::Client, sqlx::PgPool, TestAuth)> {
     if !wait_for_appview_db().await {
         eprintln!("appview not running, skipping");
         return None;
@@ -65,7 +72,32 @@ async fn ready() -> Option<(reqwest::Client, sqlx::PgPool)> {
         eprintln!("appview DB unreachable, skipping");
         return None;
     };
-    Some((client().await, pool))
+    let c = client().await;
+    let auth = TestAuth::probe(&c, &appview_url()).await?;
+    Some((c, pool, auth))
+}
+
+/// `GET <url>` against a private endpoint, carrying the token for
+/// `did` when the instance enforces auth.
+fn authed_get(
+    c: &reqwest::Client,
+    auth: &TestAuth,
+    url: String,
+    did: &str,
+) -> reqwest::RequestBuilder {
+    auth.apply(c.get(url), did)
+}
+
+/// `POST <url>` against a private endpoint. Same rule as
+/// [`authed_get`] — `/api/notifications/seen` is a write into one
+/// user's read state.
+fn authed_post(
+    c: &reqwest::Client,
+    auth: &TestAuth,
+    url: String,
+    did: &str,
+) -> reqwest::RequestBuilder {
+    auth.apply(c.post(url), did)
 }
 
 async fn post_ingest(c: &reqwest::Client, body: Value) -> reqwest::Response {
@@ -181,7 +213,7 @@ async fn seed_follow(c: &reqwest::Client, follower: &str, subject: &str) {
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn notifications_list_count_and_seen() {
     let base = appview_url();
-    let Some((c, _pool)) = ready().await else {
+    let Some((c, _pool, auth)) = ready().await else {
         return;
     };
     let alice = did_for_test("alice");
@@ -196,8 +228,7 @@ async fn notifications_list_count_and_seen() {
     let reply_uri = seed_reply(&c, &carol, &post_uri, &post_uri, "carol's reply").await;
     seed_follow(&c, &bob, &alice).await;
 
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{base}/api/notifications"))
+    let resp = authed_get(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications"), &alice)
         .query(&[("did", alice.as_str()), ("limit", "50")])
         .send()
         .await
@@ -253,8 +284,7 @@ async fn notifications_list_count_and_seen() {
     }
 
     // The unread count agrees with the list.
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{base}/api/notifications/count"))
+    let resp = authed_get(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications/count"), &alice)
         .query(&[("did", alice.as_str())])
         .send()
         .await
@@ -264,8 +294,7 @@ async fn notifications_list_count_and_seen() {
     assert_eq!(body["count"], json!(3));
 
     // Mark everything seen.
-    let resp = c
-        .post(format!("{base}/api/notifications/seen"))
+    let resp = authed_post(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications/seen"), &alice)
         .json(&json!({ "did": alice }))
         .send()
         .await
@@ -276,8 +305,7 @@ async fn notifications_list_count_and_seen() {
     assert_eq!(body["updated"], json!(3));
 
     // Idempotent: a second call updates nothing and still succeeds.
-    let resp = c
-        .post(format!("{base}/api/notifications/seen"))
+    let resp = authed_post(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications/seen"), &alice)
         .json(&json!({ "did": alice }))
         .send()
         .await
@@ -286,8 +314,7 @@ async fn notifications_list_count_and_seen() {
     assert_eq!(body["updated"], json!(0));
 
     // Count is now zero and the rows carry a read_at.
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{base}/api/notifications/count"))
+    let resp = authed_get(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications/count"), &alice)
         .query(&[("did", alice.as_str())])
         .send()
         .await
@@ -295,8 +322,7 @@ async fn notifications_list_count_and_seen() {
     let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
     assert_eq!(body["count"], json!(0));
 
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{base}/api/notifications"))
+    let resp = authed_get(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications"), &alice)
         .query(&[("did", alice.as_str())])
         .send()
         .await
@@ -311,8 +337,7 @@ async fn notifications_list_count_and_seen() {
         "/api/notifications",
         "/api/notifications/count",
     ] {
-        let resp = c
-            .get(format!("{base}{path}"))
+        let resp = authed_get(&c, &auth, format!("{base}{path}"), &alice)
             .query(&[("did", "")])
             .send()
             .await
@@ -326,7 +351,7 @@ async fn notifications_list_count_and_seen() {
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn notifications_skip_self_interactions() {
     let base = appview_url();
-    let Some((c, _pool)) = ready().await else {
+    let Some((c, _pool, auth)) = ready().await else {
         return;
     };
     let alice = did_for_test("solo");
@@ -335,8 +360,7 @@ async fn notifications_skip_self_interactions() {
     seed_reply(&c, &alice, &post_uri, &post_uri, "and replying too").await;
     seed_follow(&c, &alice, &alice).await;
 
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{base}/api/notifications"))
+    let resp = authed_get(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications"), &alice)
         .query(&[("did", alice.as_str())])
         .send()
         .await
@@ -355,7 +379,7 @@ async fn notifications_skip_self_interactions() {
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn notifications_paginate_with_cursor() {
     let base = appview_url();
-    let Some((c, _pool)) = ready().await else {
+    let Some((c, _pool, auth)) = ready().await else {
         return;
     };
     let alice = did_for_test("popular");
@@ -372,9 +396,9 @@ async fn notifications_paginate_with_cursor() {
         let c = c.clone();
         let alice = alice.clone();
         let base = base.clone();
+        let auth = auth.clone();
         async move {
-            let mut req = c
-                .get(format!("{base}/api/notifications"))
+            let mut req = authed_get(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications"), &alice)
                 .query(&[("did", alice.as_str()), ("limit", "5")]);
             if let Some(cur) = cursor {
                 req = req.query(&[("cursor", cur.as_str())]);
@@ -417,8 +441,7 @@ async fn notifications_paginate_with_cursor() {
     assert_eq!(all.len(), 12);
 
     // A mangled cursor is a 400, not a silent restart at page 1.
-    let resp = c
-        .get(format!("{base}/api/notifications"))
+    let resp = authed_get(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications"), &alice)
         .query(&[("did", alice.as_str()), ("cursor", "!!!garbage!!!")])
         .send()
         .await
@@ -431,7 +454,7 @@ async fn notifications_paginate_with_cursor() {
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn notifications_seen_respects_watermark() {
     let base = appview_url();
-    let Some((c, _pool)) = ready().await else {
+    let Some((c, _pool, auth)) = ready().await else {
         return;
     };
     let alice = did_for_test("watermark");
@@ -442,8 +465,7 @@ async fn notifications_seen_respects_watermark() {
 
     // Read back the first notification's indexed_at — that's the
     // watermark a client would echo after rendering page 1.
-    let body: Value = c
-        .get(format!("{base}/api/notifications"))
+    let body: Value = authed_get(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications"), &alice)
         .query(&[("did", alice.as_str())])
         .send()
         .await
@@ -461,8 +483,7 @@ async fn notifications_seen_respects_watermark() {
     let second = did_for_test("late");
     seed_like(&c, &second, &post_uri).await;
 
-    let resp = c
-        .post(format!("{base}/api/notifications/seen"))
+    let resp = authed_post(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications/seen"), &alice)
         .json(&json!({ "did": alice, "seenAt": watermark }))
         .send()
         .await
@@ -475,8 +496,7 @@ async fn notifications_seen_respects_watermark() {
     );
 
     // The later one is still unread.
-    let body: Value = c
-        .get(format!("{base}/api/notifications/count"))
+    let body: Value = authed_get(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications/count"), &alice)
         .query(&[("did", alice.as_str())])
         .send()
         .await
@@ -487,8 +507,7 @@ async fn notifications_seen_respects_watermark() {
     assert_eq!(body["count"], json!(1));
 
     // snake_case spelling must work identically.
-    let resp = c
-        .post(format!("{base}/api/notifications/seen"))
+    let resp = authed_post(&c, &auth, format!("{base}/api/notifications/seen"), &alice)
         .json(&json!({ "did": alice, "seen_at": null }))
         .send()
         .await
@@ -502,7 +521,7 @@ async fn notifications_seen_respects_watermark() {
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn followers_and_following_lists() {
     let base = appview_url();
-    let Some((c, _pool)) = ready().await else {
+    let Some((c, _pool, _auth)) = ready().await else {
         return;
     };
     let hub = did_for_test("hub");
@@ -591,7 +610,8 @@ async fn followers_and_following_lists() {
     assert_eq!(unique.len(), seen.len(), "paged followers repeat: {seen:?}");
     assert_eq!(seen.len(), 3, "paging lost a follower: {seen:?}");
 
-    // `did` is mandatory.
+    // `did` is mandatory. These two stay public — a follow edge is a
+    // public record — so no token is involved.
     for path in ["/api/followers", "/api/following"] {
         let resp = c
             .get(format!("{base}{path}"))
@@ -610,7 +630,7 @@ async fn followers_and_following_lists() {
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn thread_returns_parents_and_replies() {
     let base = appview_url();
-    let Some((c, _pool)) = ready().await else {
+    let Some((c, _pool, _auth)) = ready().await else {
         return;
     };
     let a = did_for_test("root");
@@ -689,7 +709,7 @@ async fn thread_returns_parents_and_replies() {
 #[tokio::test]
 async fn post_by_uri_stays_backwards_compatible() {
     let base = appview_url();
-    let Some((c, _pool)) = ready().await else {
+    let Some((c, _pool, _auth)) = ready().await else {
         return;
     };
     let a = did_for_test("compat_a");

crates/appview/tests/pds_firehose_integration.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,444 @@
+//! End-to-end tests for the local PDS firehose consumer.
+//!
+//! These are the only tests that put *real* PDS bytes through
+//! [`appview::pds_firehose`]: everything else in the module's own
+//! `#[cfg(test)]` section builds frames from a hand-written DAG-CBOR
+//! encoder, which proves the decoder matches our reading of the
+//! contract but not that the PDS writes what we think it writes.
+//!
+//! Fail-open, like every other suite in this directory. Each test
+//! prints a notice and returns successfully when a precondition is
+//! missing:
+//!
+//!  - the PDS isn't running on `:2583`;
+//!  - `DATABASE_URL_APPVIEW` is unset or the database is unreachable;
+//!  - **`com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos` does not exist yet.** The
+//!    endpoint is being built in `crates/pds-server` in parallel with
+//!    this consumer. Until it lands, the WebSocket upgrade fails and
+//!    these tests skip with a message saying so — they are not proof of
+//!    anything while that line appears in the output.
+//!
+//! What they cover once the endpoint is live:
+//!
+//!  - `frame_from_the_local_pds_indexes_a_post` — subscribe, create a
+//!    record over `com.atproto.repo.createRecord`, and drive the frame
+//!    the PDS emits through the real decode → CAR → indexer path,
+//!    asserting the row lands in `posts`.
+//!  - `replaying_the_same_frame_changes_nothing` — the same frame
+//!    applied twice leaves exactly one row, which is what makes the
+//!    overlap with the `/internal/ingest-commit` push safe.
+//!  - `car_reader_parses_a_real_repo_export` — the AppView's CAR reader
+//!    against a CAR the PDS's *writer* produced (`getRepo`).
+//!  - `healthz_reports_the_firehose_state` — the running AppView's
+//!    probe carries the new fields.
+
+use futures::StreamExt;
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use sqlx::PgPool;
+use std::time::Duration;
+use tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message;
+
+use appview::pds_firehose::{self, Frame};
+
+const PDS_URL: &str = "http://127.0.0.1:2583";
+const PDS_WS: &str = "ws://127.0.0.1:2583";
+
+fn appview_url() -> String {
+    std::env::var("APPVIEW_TEST_URL").unwrap_or_else(|_| "http://127.0.0.1:2584".to_string())
+}
+
+fn client() -> reqwest::Client {
+    reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))
+        .build()
+        .unwrap()
+}
+
+async fn service_up(c: &reqwest::Client, base: &str) -> bool {
+    for _ in 0..12 {
+        if let Ok(r) = c.get(format!("{base}/healthz")).send().await {
+            if r.status().is_success() {
+                return true;
+            }
+        }
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(250)).await;
+    }
+    false
+}
+
+async fn appview_db() -> Option<PgPool> {
+    let url = std::env::var("DATABASE_URL_APPVIEW").ok()?;
+    match tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(2), PgPool::connect(&url)).await {
+        Ok(Ok(pool)) => Some(pool),
+        _ => None,
+    }
+}
+
+struct Account {
+    did: String,
+    access_jwt: String,
+}
+
+async fn create_account(c: &reqwest::Client) -> Option<Account> {
+    let handle = format!("fh_{}.maarcadetweet.local", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
+    let r: Value = c
+        .post(format!("{PDS_URL}/xrpc/com.atproto.server.createAccount"))
+        .json(&json!({ "handle": handle, "password": "hunter2hunter2" }))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .ok()?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .ok()?;
+    Some(Account {
+        did: r["did"].as_str()?.to_string(),
+        access_jwt: r["access_jwt"].as_str()?.to_string(),
+    })
+}
+
+async fn create_post(c: &reqwest::Client, acc: &Account, text: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let r: Value = c
+        .post(format!("{PDS_URL}/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.createRecord"))
+        .bearer_auth(&acc.access_jwt)
+        .json(&json!({
+            "repo": acc.did,
+            "collection": "app.twi.post",
+            "record": { "text": text, "createdAt": "2026-09-10T12:00:00Z" },
+        }))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .ok()?
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .ok()?;
+    r["uri"].as_str().map(str::to_string)
+}
+
+type Ws = tokio_tungstenite::WebSocketStream<
+    tokio_tungstenite::MaybeTlsStream<tokio::net::TcpStream>,
+>;
+
+/// Subscribe to the PDS firehose, or `None` if the endpoint isn't there
+/// yet (see the module docs).
+async fn subscribe() -> Option<Ws> {
+    let url = pds_firehose::subscribe_url(PDS_WS, None);
+    match tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(5), tokio_tungstenite::connect_async(&url)).await
+    {
+        Ok(Ok((ws, _))) => Some(ws),
+        Ok(Err(e)) => {
+            eprintln!(
+                "cannot subscribe to {url}: {e} — the PDS endpoint com.atproto.sync.\
+                 subscribeRepos is probably not implemented yet; skipping"
+            );
+            None
+        }
+        Err(_) => {
+            eprintln!("timed out connecting to {url}; skipping");
+            None
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Read frames until one is a `#commit` for `did`, or the deadline
+/// passes. `#info` frames along the way are tolerated (a fresh
+/// subscription may legitimately be told its cursor is outdated).
+async fn next_commit_for(
+    ws: &mut Ws,
+    did: &str,
+    timeout: Duration,
+) -> Option<pds_firehose::CommitFrame> {
+    let deadline = tokio::time::Instant::now() + timeout;
+    loop {
+        let remaining = deadline.saturating_duration_since(tokio::time::Instant::now());
+        if remaining.is_zero() {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let msg = match tokio::time::timeout(remaining, ws.next()).await {
+            Ok(Some(Ok(m))) => m,
+            Ok(Some(Err(e))) => {
+                eprintln!("firehose read error: {e}");
+                return None;
+            }
+            Ok(None) | Err(_) => return None,
+        };
+        let Message::Binary(bytes) = msg else { continue };
+        match pds_firehose::decode_frame(&bytes) {
+            Ok(Frame::Commit(commit)) if commit.repo == did => return Some(*commit),
+            Ok(Frame::Commit(_)) => continue,
+            Ok(Frame::Info { name, .. }) => {
+                eprintln!("firehose #info: {name}");
+                continue;
+            }
+            Ok(Frame::Error { error, message }) => {
+                eprintln!("firehose error frame: {error} {message:?}");
+                return None;
+            }
+            Ok(Frame::Other { .. }) => continue,
+            Err(e) => {
+                // A frame we cannot decode is a contract failure worth
+                // failing the test over — but only once we know the
+                // endpoint exists, which we do by this point.
+                panic!("could not decode a real PDS firehose frame: {e:#}");
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Everything a live test needs, or `None` with a printed reason.
+async fn ready() -> Option<(reqwest::Client, PgPool, Account, Ws)> {
+    let c = client();
+    if !service_up(&c, PDS_URL).await {
+        eprintln!("pds not running on {PDS_URL}, skipping");
+        return None;
+    }
+    let Some(db) = appview_db().await else {
+        eprintln!("DATABASE_URL_APPVIEW unset or unreachable, skipping");
+        return None;
+    };
+    let Some(acc) = create_account(&c).await else {
+        eprintln!("could not create a PDS account, skipping");
+        return None;
+    };
+    // Subscribe *before* writing anything, so the commit we are about
+    // to make is guaranteed to fall inside the subscription window.
+    let ws = subscribe().await?;
+    Some((c, db, acc, ws))
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn frame_from_the_local_pds_indexes_a_post() {
+    let Some((c, db, acc, mut ws)) = ready().await else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let text = format!("firehose e2e {}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
+    let Some(uri) = create_post(&c, &acc, &text).await else {
+        eprintln!("createRecord failed, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    let Some(commit) = next_commit_for(&mut ws, &acc.did, Duration::from_secs(15)).await else {
+        eprintln!("no #commit frame for {} arrived in time, skipping", acc.did);
+        return;
+    };
+
+    // The frame itself must carry what the contract promises.
+    assert!(commit.seq > 0, "seq must be a positive sequence number");
+    assert_eq!(commit.repo, acc.did);
+    assert!(!commit.rev.is_empty(), "commit frames carry a rev");
+    assert!(
+        !commit.blocks.is_empty(),
+        "a create commit must inline its record block"
+    );
+    let create = commit
+        .ops
+        .iter()
+        .find(|op| op.action == "create" && op.collection() == Some("app.twi.post"))
+        .expect("the frame must contain the post create op");
+    assert!(create.cid.is_some(), "a create op carries the record CID");
+
+    // The blocks field must be a CAR our reader understands, and the
+    // op's CID must resolve inside it.
+    let car = appview::car::parse(&commit.blocks).expect("blocks must be a readable CAR v1");
+    assert!(
+        car.block_map().contains_key(&create.cid.unwrap()),
+        "the record block must be present in the CAR"
+    );
+
+    // And the whole path — frame → CAR → indexer — must land the row.
+    let events = pds_firehose::events_from_frame(&commit).expect("events");
+    assert!(
+        events
+            .iter()
+            .any(|e| e.commit.as_ref().unwrap()["record"]["text"] == json!(text)),
+        "the decoded record must carry the text we posted"
+    );
+
+    // Remove whatever the AppView's own push path already wrote, so the
+    // assertion below is about *this* code applying *this* frame.
+    sqlx::query("DELETE FROM posts WHERE uri = $1")
+        .bind(&uri)
+        .execute(&db)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    pds_firehose::apply_frame(&db, &commit)
+        .await
+        .expect("apply_frame");
+
+    let stored: Option<String> = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT text FROM posts WHERE uri = $1")
+        .bind(&uri)
+        .fetch_optional(&db)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        stored.as_deref(),
+        Some(text.as_str()),
+        "the firehose frame must index the post at {uri}"
+    );
+
+    sqlx::query("DELETE FROM posts WHERE uri = $1")
+        .bind(&uri)
+        .execute(&db)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn replaying_the_same_frame_changes_nothing() {
+    let Some((c, db, acc, mut ws)) = ready().await else {
+        return;
+    };
+    let text = format!("firehose replay {}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
+    let Some(uri) = create_post(&c, &acc, &text).await else {
+        eprintln!("createRecord failed, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+    let Some(commit) = next_commit_for(&mut ws, &acc.did, Duration::from_secs(15)).await else {
+        eprintln!("no #commit frame for {} arrived in time, skipping", acc.did);
+        return;
+    };
+
+    // Three applications: the push already ran, then the firehose, then
+    // a post-restart replay of the same seq.
+    for _ in 0..3 {
+        pds_firehose::apply_frame(&db, &commit)
+            .await
+            .expect("apply_frame");
+    }
+
+    let rows: i64 = sqlx::query_scalar("SELECT count(*) FROM posts WHERE uri = $1")
+        .bind(&uri)
+        .fetch_one(&db)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(rows, 1, "replay must not duplicate {uri}");
+
+    sqlx::query("DELETE FROM posts WHERE uri = $1")
+        .bind(&uri)
+        .execute(&db)
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn car_reader_parses_a_real_repo_export() {
+    // This one needs no firehose: `getRepo` has always served a CAR
+    // produced by the PDS's own writer, which is exactly the encoder
+    // the firehose's `blocks` field reuses.
+    let c = client();
+    if !service_up(&c, PDS_URL).await {
+        eprintln!("pds not running on {PDS_URL}, skipping");
+        return;
+    }
+    let Some(acc) = create_account(&c).await else {
+        eprintln!("could not create a PDS account, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+    if create_post(&c, &acc, "car reader fixture").await.is_none() {
+        eprintln!("createRecord failed, skipping");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let resp = c
+        .get(format!("{PDS_URL}/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.getRepo"))
+        .query(&[("did", acc.did.as_str())])
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    if !resp.status().is_success() {
+        eprintln!("getRepo returned {}, skipping", resp.status());
+        return;
+    }
+    let bytes = resp.bytes().await.unwrap();
+    let car = appview::car::parse(&bytes).expect("getRepo must return a readable CAR v1");
+    assert_eq!(car.header.version, 1);
+    assert!(
+        !car.blocks.is_empty(),
+        "a repo with one record has blocks (commit + MST + record)"
+    );
+    // Every block must hash to the CID the file declares — the strongest
+    // available statement that the reader's section framing is right.
+    appview::car::verify_block_cids(&car).expect("block CIDs must verify");
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn healthz_reports_the_firehose_state() {
+    let c = client();
+    if !service_up(&c, &appview_url()).await {
+        eprintln!("appview not running, skipping");
+        return;
+    }
+    let body: Value = c
+        .get(format!("{}/healthz", appview_url()))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    // A binary built before this feature has none of these keys; say so
+    // rather than failing, because "restart the AppView" is the fix.
+    let Some(enabled) = body.get("pds_firehose_enabled").and_then(Value::as_bool) else {
+        eprintln!(
+            "the running AppView predates the PDS firehose (no pds_firehose_enabled \
+             in /healthz) — rebuild and restart it; skipping"
+        );
+        return;
+    };
+    assert!(
+        body.get("pds_firehose_connected")
+            .and_then(Value::as_bool)
+            .is_some(),
+        "/healthz must report pds_firehose_connected: {body}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        body.get("pds_firehose_seq").and_then(Value::as_i64).is_some(),
+        "/healthz must report pds_firehose_seq: {body}"
+    );
+
+    if !enabled {
+        eprintln!("PDS_FIREHOSE_ENABLED=false on the running AppView; nothing more to check");
+        return;
+    }
+    if !body["pds_firehose_connected"].as_bool().unwrap() {
+        eprintln!(
+            "the AppView is not connected to the PDS firehose — expected while \
+             com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos is still being implemented; skipping \
+             the live-consumption check"
+        );
+        return;
+    }
+
+    // Connected: a new record must move the sequence number the AppView
+    // reports, which is the end-to-end proof that the *service* (not
+    // just this test process) consumes the stream.
+    if !service_up(&c, PDS_URL).await {
+        eprintln!("pds not running, skipping the live-consumption check");
+        return;
+    }
+    let Some(acc) = create_account(&c).await else {
+        eprintln!("could not create a PDS account, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+    let before = body["pds_firehose_seq"].as_i64().unwrap_or(0);
+    if create_post(&c, &acc, "healthz seq probe").await.is_none() {
+        eprintln!("createRecord failed, skipping");
+        return;
+    }
+    for _ in 0..40 {
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(250)).await;
+        let now: Value = c
+            .get(format!("{}/healthz", appview_url()))
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+            .json()
+            .await
+            .unwrap();
+        if now["pds_firehose_seq"].as_i64().unwrap_or(0) > before {
+            return; // consumed
+        }
+    }
+    panic!("the AppView reports the firehose connected but its seq never advanced");
+}

crates/at-firehose/src/consumer.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,5 @@
 use anyhow::Result;
-use futures::{SinkExt, StreamExt};
-use serde_json::json;
+use futures::StreamExt;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
 use std::time::Duration;
@@ -33,6 +32,43 @@ impl JetstreamConsumer {
         }
     }
 
+    /// The URL actually dialled: base URL plus `wantedCollections` and
+    /// `cursor` as query parameters.
+    ///
+    /// This used to connect to the bare URL and then send
+    /// `{"type": "options", "wantedCollections": [...]}` as a text frame.
+    /// Jetstream ignores that, and silently: filters are query parameters,
+    /// and the only message-based path (`options_update`) requires the
+    /// connection to have been opened with `requireHello=true`. So every
+    /// deployment that thought it was subscribing to six collections was in
+    /// fact taking the entire public firehose — measured against
+    /// jetstream1.us-east: 3119 events in 8 s unfiltered versus 520 for a
+    /// single collection. On the dev database that quietly grew to 3.3 M
+    /// posts; on the production instance the AppView had to be switched off
+    /// to stop it filling the disk.
+    ///
+    /// Note what fixing this does *not* solve: the collections this project
+    /// wants (`app.bsky.feed.post` / `like` / `repost` / `graph.follow`) are
+    /// ~97 % of the firehose by volume. Correct filtering is necessary, not
+    /// sufficient — an instance that does not want the whole public network
+    /// in its index wants `wantedDids`, or no Jetstream at all.
+    pub fn subscribe_url(&self) -> String {
+        let mut url = self.url.trim_end_matches('&').to_string();
+        let mut sep = if url.contains('?') { '&' } else { '?' };
+        for c in &self.collections {
+            url.push(sep);
+            url.push_str("wantedCollections=");
+            url.push_str(&urlencode(c));
+            sep = '&';
+        }
+        if self.cursor_us > 0 {
+            url.push(sep);
+            url.push_str("cursor=");
+            url.push_str(&self.cursor_us.to_string());
+        }
+        url
+    }
+
     /// Build a consumer that shares a connection-state flag with the caller.
     pub fn with_connected_flag(mut self, flag: Arc<AtomicBool>) -> Self {
         self.connected = Some(flag);
@@ -81,23 +117,13 @@ impl JetstreamConsumer {
         F: FnMut(JetstreamEvent) -> Fut + Send,
         Fut: std::future::Future<Output = Result<()>> + Send,
     {
-        let (mut ws, _) = tokio_tungstenite::connect_async(&self.url).await?;
-        info!("connected to jetstream: {}", self.url);
+        let url = self.subscribe_url();
+        let (mut ws, _) = tokio_tungstenite::connect_async(&url).await?;
+        info!("connected to jetstream: {url}");
         if let Some(flag) = &self.connected {
             flag.store(true, Ordering::Relaxed);
         }
 
-        if !self.collections.is_empty() || self.cursor_us > 0 {
-            let mut options = json!({ "type": "options" });
-            if !self.collections.is_empty() {
-                options["wantedCollections"] = json!(self.collections);
-            }
-            if self.cursor_us > 0 {
-                options["cursor"] = json!(self.cursor_us);
-            }
-            ws.send(Message::Text(options.to_string())).await?;
-        }
-
         while let Some(msg) = ws.next().await {
             let msg = msg?;
             if let Message::Text(text) = msg {
@@ -109,3 +135,61 @@ impl JetstreamConsumer {
         Ok(())
     }
 }
+
+/// Percent-encode everything outside the unreserved set. Collection NSIDs are
+/// dots and letters today, but a `wantedDids` value carries `:` — encoding
+/// unconditionally keeps this correct if the caller passes one.
+fn urlencode(s: &str) -> String {
+    s.chars()
+        .map(|c| match c {
+            'A'..='Z' | 'a'..='z' | '0'..='9' | '-' | '_' | '.' | '~' => c.to_string(),
+            other => {
+                let mut buf = [0u8; 4];
+                other
+                    .encode_utf8(&mut buf)
+                    .bytes()
+                    .map(|b| format!("%{b:02X}"))
+                    .collect()
+            }
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod url_tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn collections_go_into_the_query_string() {
+        let c = JetstreamConsumer::new(
+            "wss://jetstream1.us-east.bsky.network/subscribe",
+            vec!["app.twi.post".into(), "app.bsky.feed.like".into()],
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            c.subscribe_url(),
+            "wss://jetstream1.us-east.bsky.network/subscribe\
+             ?wantedCollections=app.twi.post&wantedCollections=app.bsky.feed.like"
+                .replace(' ', "")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cursor_is_appended_and_respects_an_existing_query() {
+        let mut c = JetstreamConsumer::new("wss://host/subscribe?compress=false", vec![]);
+        c.cursor_us = 1234;
+        assert_eq!(c.subscribe_url(), "wss://host/subscribe?compress=false&cursor=1234");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_filters_leaves_the_url_alone() {
+        let c = JetstreamConsumer::new("wss://host/subscribe", vec![]);
+        assert_eq!(c.subscribe_url(), "wss://host/subscribe");
+    }
+
+    /// A DID contains `:`, which has to survive as `%3A` in a query value.
+    #[test]
+    fn values_are_percent_encoded() {
+        assert_eq!(urlencode("did:plc:abc"), "did%3Aplc%3Aabc");
+        assert_eq!(urlencode("app.bsky.feed.post"), "app.bsky.feed.post");
+    }
+}

crates/at-shared/src/config.rs

@@ -7,6 +7,62 @@ fn default_handle_sync_interval() -> u64 {
     300
 }
 
+/// Default for `APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED`.
+///
+/// `true` — the AppView's private endpoints (notifications, home
+/// timeline) reject unauthenticated requests. Fail closed: an operator
+/// who forgets the variable gets the safe behaviour, and the only way
+/// to serve another user's notifications to an anonymous caller is to
+/// opt out explicitly.
+fn default_auth_required() -> bool {
+    true
+}
+
+/// Default for `PDS_FIREHOSE_ENABLED`.
+///
+/// `true` — the AppView consumes the local PDS's
+/// `com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos` stream. That stream is the only
+/// *guaranteed* path for a local user's own records: the fast
+/// `POST /internal/ingest-commit` push is best effort, and the public
+/// Jetstream never sees this PDS, so a lost push means a permanently
+/// missing post. Defaulting to on means an operator who never heard of
+/// the variable gets the durable behaviour; switching it off is the
+/// explicit choice (e.g. a PDS too old to serve the endpoint, or a
+/// second AppView instance that should not double-index).
+fn default_pds_firehose_enabled() -> bool {
+    true
+}
+
+/// Default for `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED`.
+///
+/// `false` — `com.atproto.server.createAccount` stays open unless the
+/// operator says otherwise. This is the one security switch in this file
+/// that fails *open*, and it does so for a concrete reason: dozens of
+/// integration tests across `pds-server` and `appview` create throwaway
+/// accounts against a locally running PDS, and every dev instance is
+/// bootstrapped the same way. Defaulting to `true` would break all of
+/// them on the next `cargo test`, and the usual reflex to a suite that
+/// suddenly fails is to switch the new thing off — which lands you at
+/// `false` anyway, only with the flag now looking like the thing that
+/// was in the way rather than the thing that protects the server.
+///
+/// The cost of that choice is that an operator who exposes the PDS
+/// publicly without setting the variable gets an open registration
+/// endpoint. That is paid for at startup: `pds-server` logs a loud
+/// warning on every boot where this is `false`, in the same spirit as
+/// `appview`'s `log_startup_posture`. A warning you have to read once
+/// per restart is the trade for a test suite that keeps working.
+///
+/// That warning also covers the other way this fails open:
+/// [`parse_bool_env`] reads anything it doesn't recognise as `false`, so
+/// `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=ture` leaves registration open. The operator
+/// who typed it sees the same startup warning as the operator who never
+/// set the variable at all, which is the only signal that distinguishes
+/// "I meant to leave it open" from "I thought I had closed it".
+fn default_pds_invite_required() -> bool {
+    false
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize)]
 pub struct AppConfig {
     pub pds_host: String,
@@ -46,6 +102,51 @@ pub struct AppConfig {
     /// directory. Default: 300s (5 minutes).
     #[serde(default = "default_handle_sync_interval")]
     pub appview_handle_sync_interval_secs: u64,
+    /// Whether the AppView enforces bearer-token auth on the endpoints
+    /// that serve a single user's private data (`/api/notifications*`,
+    /// `/api/timeline/home`). Default `true`.
+    ///
+    /// Set `APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED=false` to get the pre-auth behaviour
+    /// (every endpoint public). That mode exists for two callers:
+    /// the fail-open integration suites, which seed synthetic DIDs the
+    /// PDS has never issued a token for, and an instance that is
+    /// already isolated at the network layer (VPN / private subnet).
+    /// The AppView warns loudly at startup when it is off.
+    #[serde(default = "default_auth_required")]
+    pub appview_auth_required: bool,
+    /// Browser origins allowed to call the AppView's `/api/*` routes,
+    /// from the comma-separated `APPVIEW_CORS_ORIGINS`. Empty means
+    /// "no allowlist configured" — the AppView then keeps the historic
+    /// `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` behaviour and warns at startup.
+    ///
+    /// Example (Tauri webview origins differ per platform):
+    /// `APPVIEW_CORS_ORIGINS=tauri://localhost,http://127.0.0.1:1430`
+    #[serde(default)]
+    pub appview_cors_origins: Vec<String>,
+    /// Whether the AppView subscribes to the local PDS firehose
+    /// (`com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos` on
+    /// [`AppConfig::pds_base_url`]). Default `true` — see
+    /// [`default_pds_firehose_enabled`] for why.
+    #[serde(default = "default_pds_firehose_enabled")]
+    pub pds_firehose_enabled: bool,
+    /// Whether `com.atproto.server.createAccount` demands a valid invite
+    /// code. Default `false` — see [`default_pds_invite_required`] for
+    /// why this switch, alone among the security switches here, fails
+    /// open.
+    ///
+    /// When `true`, a request without an `invite_code` (or its
+    /// camelCase `inviteCode` spelling), or with one that is unknown,
+    /// disabled or already used up, is rejected with
+    /// `400 InvalidInviteCode`. The value is also what
+    /// `describeServer` reports as `invite_code_required`, so a client
+    /// can find out before it asks the user for a handle.
+    ///
+    /// Codes are minted out of band with `pds-server invite create`;
+    /// there is no HTTP endpoint that creates them, on purpose — an
+    /// open PDS's registration gate should not come with a second
+    /// public surface that hands out keys to it.
+    #[serde(default = "default_pds_invite_required")]
+    pub pds_invite_required: bool,
 }
 
 impl AppConfig {
@@ -82,6 +183,204 @@ impl AppConfig {
                 .ok()
                 .and_then(|s| s.parse().ok())
                 .unwrap_or_else(default_handle_sync_interval),
+            appview_auth_required: std::env::var("APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED")
+                .ok()
+                .map(|s| parse_bool_env(&s))
+                .unwrap_or_else(default_auth_required),
+            appview_cors_origins: std::env::var("APPVIEW_CORS_ORIGINS")
+                .ok()
+                .map(|s| parse_csv_env(&s))
+                .unwrap_or_default(),
+            pds_firehose_enabled: std::env::var("PDS_FIREHOSE_ENABLED")
+                .ok()
+                .map(|s| parse_bool_env(&s))
+                .unwrap_or_else(default_pds_firehose_enabled),
+            pds_invite_required: std::env::var("PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED")
+                .ok()
+                .map(|s| parse_bool_env(&s))
+                .unwrap_or_else(default_pds_invite_required),
         })
     }
+
+    /// The `did:web:` DID of *this* PDS, derived from `PDS_PUBLIC_URL`.
+    ///
+    /// One derivation, two consumers: `com.atproto.server.describeServer`
+    /// (which used to return a hardcoded `did:web:pds.maarcadetweet.local`
+    /// no matter what the operator configured) and
+    /// `GET /.well-known/did.json`, which publishes the server's signing
+    /// key under exactly this id. If those two ever disagreed, a client
+    /// that trusts `describeServer` would fetch the key document of a
+    /// different identity.
+    pub fn pds_did(&self) -> String {
+        did_web_from_url(&self.pds_public_url)
+    }
+
+    /// The AppView's own service DID, derived from `APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL`.
+    ///
+    /// Also one derivation, two consumers: the PDS stamps it into the
+    /// `aud` of every access token it issues, and the AppView checks
+    /// incoming tokens against it. A token minted for a *different*
+    /// AppView must not be usable here — that's the whole point of an
+    /// audience — so both sides have to agree on the spelling, and the
+    /// only way to guarantee that is to compute it the same way from
+    /// the same configuration.
+    pub fn appview_did(&self) -> String {
+        did_web_from_url(&self.appview_public_url)
+    }
+
+    /// Base URL the AppView uses to reach the PDS.
+    ///
+    /// `PDS_INTERNAL_URL` when set (the cluster-internal hostname),
+    /// otherwise `PDS_PUBLIC_URL`. Both the handle-sync resolver and the
+    /// signing-key fetch go through here, so the two can't end up
+    /// talking to different PDS instances.
+    pub fn pds_base_url(&self) -> String {
+        self.pds_internal_url
+            .clone()
+            .unwrap_or_else(|| self.pds_public_url.clone())
+    }
+}
+
+/// Interpret an environment variable as a boolean.
+///
+/// Accepts the spellings people actually type in a `.env` file. Anything
+/// unrecognised counts as `false` for an explicitly-set variable — the
+/// caller decides what an *absent* variable means (see
+/// [`default_auth_required`]), and a typo like `APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED=ture`
+/// must never silently read as "on" when the operator's intent was to
+/// switch something off... nor as "off" for a security switch. Since
+/// this is only reached when the variable *is* set, and the only
+/// security-relevant user of it defaults to `true` when unset, we treat
+/// unknown values as `false` and rely on the startup warning to make a
+/// disabled auth switch impossible to miss in the logs.
+fn parse_bool_env(raw: &str) -> bool {
+    matches!(
+        raw.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str(),
+        "1" | "true" | "yes" | "on"
+    )
+}
+
+/// Split a comma-separated environment variable into trimmed,
+/// non-empty entries. `"a, b,,c "` → `["a", "b", "c"]`.
+fn parse_csv_env(raw: &str) -> Vec<String> {
+    raw.split(',')
+        .map(|s| s.trim().to_string())
+        .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
+        .collect()
+}
+
+/// Turn an `http(s)://host[:port][/path]` URL into a `did:web:` DID.
+///
+/// The did:web method spec maps the authority to the method-specific
+/// id, with two wrinkles that matter here:
+///
+///  - a port is **percent-encoded** (`:` → `%3A`), because a bare colon
+///    already separates the DID's own segments. `http://127.0.0.1:2583`
+///    is therefore `did:web:127.0.0.1%3A2583`, *not*
+///    `did:web:127.0.0.1:2583` (which would parse as host `127.0.0.1`
+///    plus a path segment `2583`).
+///  - path segments, if any, are appended separated by `:`.
+///
+/// The default ports (80/443) are kept rather than stripped: the
+/// resolution rule is a textual one, and a client that reverses this
+/// mapping has to end up at the same URL we serve the document from.
+pub fn did_web_from_url(url: &str) -> String {
+    // Strip the scheme. We accept a bare `host:port` too, which is what
+    // a misconfigured `PDS_PUBLIC_URL` often contains.
+    let rest = url
+        .trim()
+        .trim_start_matches("https://")
+        .trim_start_matches("http://")
+        .trim_end_matches('/');
+    // Drop any userinfo (`user@host`) and query/fragment — neither has
+    // a place in a did:web identifier.
+    let rest = rest.split(['?', '#']).next().unwrap_or(rest);
+    let rest = rest.rsplit('@').next().unwrap_or(rest);
+
+    let mut parts = rest.split('/');
+    let authority = parts.next().unwrap_or("");
+    let host = authority.replacen(':', "%3A", 1);
+    let mut did = format!("did:web:{host}");
+    for segment in parts.filter(|s| !s.is_empty()) {
+        did.push(':');
+        did.push_str(segment);
+    }
+    did
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn did_web_encodes_port_as_percent_3a() {
+        // The dev default. A literal colon here would be read as a
+        // did:web path segment, so it has to be percent-encoded.
+        assert_eq!(
+            did_web_from_url("http://127.0.0.1:2583"),
+            "did:web:127.0.0.1%3A2583"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            did_web_from_url("https://pds.example.com:8443"),
+            "did:web:pds.example.com%3A8443"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn did_web_without_port_is_plain_host() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            did_web_from_url("https://pds.maarcadetweet.local"),
+            "did:web:pds.maarcadetweet.local"
+        );
+        // Trailing slash must not produce an empty path segment.
+        assert_eq!(
+            did_web_from_url("https://pds.example.com/"),
+            "did:web:pds.example.com"
+        );
+        // Scheme-less input is tolerated.
+        assert_eq!(did_web_from_url("pds.example.com"), "did:web:pds.example.com");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn did_web_appends_path_segments_with_colons() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            did_web_from_url("https://example.com/user/alice"),
+            "did:web:example.com:user:alice"
+        );
+        // Port + path together: only the port gets percent-encoded.
+        assert_eq!(
+            did_web_from_url("http://example.com:2583/pds"),
+            "did:web:example.com%3A2583:pds"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn did_web_ignores_userinfo_query_and_fragment() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            did_web_from_url("https://user@example.com?x=1#frag"),
+            "did:web:example.com"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn bool_env_accepts_common_spellings() {
+        for on in ["1", "true", "TRUE", "  yes ", "on"] {
+            assert!(parse_bool_env(on), "{on} should parse as true");
+        }
+        for off in ["0", "false", "no", "off", "", "nonsense"] {
+            assert!(!parse_bool_env(off), "{off} should parse as false");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn csv_env_trims_and_drops_empties() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_csv_env("tauri://localhost, http://127.0.0.1:1430 ,,"),
+            vec![
+                "tauri://localhost".to_string(),
+                "http://127.0.0.1:1430".to_string()
+            ]
+        );
+        assert!(parse_csv_env("   ").is_empty());
+    }
 }

crates/pds-server/Cargo.toml

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ path = "src/main.rs"
 [dependencies]
 tokio = { workspace = true }
 dotenvy = { workspace = true }
-axum = { workspace = true }
+axum = { workspace = true, features = ["ws"] }
 tower = { workspace = true }
 tower-http = { workspace = true }
 serde = { workspace = true }
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ hex = { workspace = true }
 rand = { workspace = true }
 uuid = { workspace = true }
 bytes = { workspace = true }
+futures = { workspace = true }
 cid = { workspace = true }
 k256 = { workspace = true }
 p256 = { workspace = true }
@@ -56,3 +57,6 @@ sha2 = { workspace = true }
 hex = { workspace = true }
 sqlx = { workspace = true }
 at-crypto = { workspace = true }
+futures = { workspace = true }
+tokio-tungstenite = { workspace = true }
+chrono = { workspace = true }

crates/pds-server/src/car.rs

@@ -17,79 +17,51 @@
 //! The header is `{ version: 1, roots: [CID, ...] }` encoded as DAG-CBOR. In
 //! DAG-CBOR CID links carry the IANA-registered CBOR tag `42`, which the
 //! `ciborium` crate does not emit for `cid::Cid` (it uses serde newtype-struct
-//! tagging instead). We hand-encode the header bytes to keep the file
-//! spec-compliant: a `Map(2)` with text keys `"version"` and `"roots"`, an
-//! unsigned int `1` for the version, and a tagged byte string for each root
-//! CID.
+//! tagging instead). We hand-encode the header bytes through the shared
+//! primitives in [`crate::dag_cbor`]: a `Map(2)` with text keys `"version"`
+//! and `"roots"`, an unsigned int `1` for the version, and a tagged byte
+//! string for each root CID.
+//!
+//! One documented deviation from the DAG-CBOR spec lives in
+//! [`encode_header`] — the root CIDs are tagged but not identity-prefixed.
+//! See the note there; the firehose frames in [`crate::firehose`] do it the
+//! spec-correct way via [`crate::dag_cbor::write_link`].
 //!
 //! Per the spec, CAR v1 stores the raw CID bytes (varint version + codec +
 //! multihash) prefixed to every block, with a leading varint giving the total
 //! length of the section (CID + block).
 
+use crate::dag_cbor::{read_head, write_bytes, write_head, write_text};
 use anyhow::Result;
 use cid::Cid;
 
-/// Encode an unsigned CBOR head (major type in upper 3 bits) with a value.
-///
-/// Supports values up to `u32::MAX` which is more than enough for any realistic
-/// header or array length.
-fn cbor_head(out: &mut Vec<u8>, major: u8, n: u64) {
-    let m = (major & 0x07) << 5;
-    if n < 24 {
-        out.push(m | n as u8);
-    } else if n < 0x100 {
-        out.push(m | 24);
-        out.push(n as u8);
-    } else if n < 0x10000 {
-        out.push(m | 25);
-        out.push((n >> 8) as u8);
-        out.push(n as u8);
-    } else if n < 0x100_0000 {
-        out.push(m | 26);
-        out.push((n >> 16) as u8);
-        out.push((n >> 8) as u8);
-        out.push(n as u8);
-    } else {
-        out.push(m | 27);
-        out.push((n >> 24) as u8);
-        out.push((n >> 16) as u8);
-        out.push((n >> 8) as u8);
-        out.push(n as u8);
-    }
-}
-
-/// Append a CBOR text string.
-fn cbor_text(out: &mut Vec<u8>, s: &str) {
-    cbor_head(out, 3, s.len() as u64);
-    out.extend_from_slice(s.as_bytes());
-}
-
-/// Append a CBOR byte string.
-fn cbor_bytes(out: &mut Vec<u8>, b: &[u8]) {
-    cbor_head(out, 2, b.len() as u64);
-    out.extend_from_slice(b);
-}
-
-/// Append a CBOR tag wrapping the following value.
-fn cbor_tag(out: &mut Vec<u8>, tag: u64) {
-    cbor_head(out, 6, tag);
-}
-
 /// Encode the CAR v1 DAG-CBOR header `{ version: 1, roots: [CID, ...] }`.
 ///
-/// CIDs are encoded as `tag(42) + bytes(<raw-cid-bytes>)` per the DAG-CBOR
-/// spec. This is the canonical IPLD CID-link form.
+/// ### Known deviation: the root CIDs carry no identity prefix
+///
+/// A spec-conformant DAG-CBOR CID link is `tag(42)` wrapping a byte string of
+/// `0x00 || <binary CID>` — the `0x00` being the multibase identity prefix.
+///
+/// Older builds of this server omitted that byte and tagged the bare CID,
+/// which no conformant CAR reader can follow: it reads the first byte as the
+/// CID version and gives up. Since the header is not content-addressed —
+/// nothing hashes it, and no CID anywhere depends on its bytes — fixing it
+/// changes only what goes out on the wire, never an identifier. So it is
+/// fixed, via [`crate::dag_cbor::write_link`], the same writer the firehose
+/// frames use.
+///
+/// [`decode_header`] accepts both spellings, so a CAR captured from an older
+/// build still parses.
 pub fn encode_header(roots: &[Cid]) -> Vec<u8> {
     let mut out = Vec::new();
     // Map(2): { "version": 1, "roots": [...] }
-    cbor_head(&mut out, 5, 2);
-    cbor_text(&mut out, "version");
-    cbor_head(&mut out, 0, 1);
-    cbor_text(&mut out, "roots");
-    cbor_head(&mut out, 4, roots.len() as u64);
+    write_head(&mut out, 5, 2);
+    write_text(&mut out, "version");
+    write_head(&mut out, 0, 1);
+    write_text(&mut out, "roots");
+    write_head(&mut out, 4, roots.len() as u64);
     for cid in roots {
-        cbor_tag(&mut out, 42);
-        cbor_bytes(&mut out, &cid.to_bytes());
+        crate::dag_cbor::write_link(&mut out, cid);
     }
     out
 }
@@ -261,43 +233,83 @@ fn read_section(section: &[u8]) -> Result<(Cid, Vec<u8>)> {
     Ok((cid, data))
 }
 
+/// Decode the CAR header written by [`encode_header`].
+///
+/// Structural only, and deliberately *not* routed through
+/// [`crate::dag_cbor::decode`]: that decoder enforces the `0x00` multibase
+/// identity prefix on every tag-42 link, which our own header does not carry
+/// (see the deviation note on [`encode_header`]). It does share the CBOR head
+/// reader with it, so there is exactly one implementation of that.
 #[allow(dead_code)]
 fn decode_header(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<CarHeader> {
-    // The header is a tiny DAG-CBOR map. We decode only the structure we emit.
     let mut p = 0usize;
-    let (n_items, consumed) = read_head_and_uint(bytes, p, 5)?;
-    p += consumed;
+    let (major, n_items, next) = read_head(bytes, p)?;
+    if major != 5 {
+        anyhow::bail!("CAR header must be a CBOR map, got major type {major}");
+    }
     if n_items != 2 {
         anyhow::bail!("CAR header must have 2 keys, got {n_items}");
     }
+    p = next;
 
     let mut version: Option<u64> = None;
     let mut roots: Vec<Cid> = Vec::new();
 
     for _ in 0..2 {
-        let (key, consumed) = read_head_and_text(bytes, p)?;
-        p += consumed;
+        let (major, len, next) = read_head(bytes, p)?;
+        if major != 3 {
+            anyhow::bail!("CAR header key must be text, got major type {major}");
+        }
+        p = next;
+        if p + len as usize > bytes.len() {
+            anyhow::bail!("CAR header key exceeds header");
+        }
+        let key = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[p..p + len as usize])
+            .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid UTF-8 in CAR header key: {e}"))?
+            .to_string();
+        p += len as usize;
+
         match key.as_str() {
             "version" => {
-                let (v, c) = read_head_and_uint(bytes, p, 0)?;
-                p += c;
+                let (major, v, next) = read_head(bytes, p)?;
+                if major != 0 {
+                    anyhow::bail!("CAR header `version` must be an unsigned int");
+                }
+                p = next;
                 version = Some(v);
             }
             "roots" => {
-                let (n_roots, c) = read_head_and_uint(bytes, p, 4)?;
-                p += c;
+                let (major, n_roots, next) = read_head(bytes, p)?;
+                if major != 4 {
+                    anyhow::bail!("CAR header `roots` must be an array");
+                }
+                p = next;
                 for _ in 0..n_roots {
-                    // tag(42)
-                    let (_, c) = read_head_and_uint(bytes, p, 6)?;
-                    p += c;
-                    // bytes
-                    let (n, c) = read_head_and_uint(bytes, p, 2)?;
-                    p += c;
+                    let (major, tag, next) = read_head(bytes, p)?;
+                    if major != 6 || tag != 42 {
+                        anyhow::bail!("CAR root must be CBOR tag 42, got major {major} tag {tag}");
+                    }
+                    p = next;
+                    let (major, n, next) = read_head(bytes, p)?;
+                    if major != 2 {
+                        anyhow::bail!("CAR root CID must be a byte string");
+                    }
+                    p = next;
                     if p + n as usize > bytes.len() {
                         anyhow::bail!("CAR root CID bytes exceed header");
                     }
-                    let cid_bytes = &bytes[p..p + n as usize];
-                    let cid = Cid::read_bytes(cid_bytes)
+                    // Tolerate both spellings: the conformant
+                    // `0x00 || cid` this server writes today, and the bare
+                    // CID older builds wrote (see `encode_header`). A real
+                    // CID never starts with 0x00 — that byte position holds
+                    // the version varint, and version 0 does not exist — so
+                    // stripping it is unambiguous, not a guess.
+                    let raw = &bytes[p..p + n as usize];
+                    let raw = match raw.first() {
+                        Some(0x00) => &raw[1..],
+                        _ => raw,
+                    };
+                    let cid = Cid::read_bytes(raw)
                         .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid root CID bytes: {e}"))?;
                     p += n as usize;
                     roots.push(cid);
@@ -313,92 +325,54 @@ fn decode_header(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<CarHeader> {
     })
 }
 
-/// Read a CBOR head (single byte for value < 24, otherwise head + varint
-/// extension) and decode its value. Validates that the major type is
-/// `expected_major`. Returns the decoded value and the number of bytes
-/// consumed (head + any extension).
-#[allow(dead_code)]
-fn read_head_and_uint(
-    bytes: &[u8],
-    offset: usize,
-    expected_major: u8,
-) -> Result<(u64, usize)> {
-    if offset >= bytes.len() {
-        anyhow::bail!("CBOR read past end of input");
-    }
-    let first = bytes[offset];
-    let major = first >> 5;
-    if major != expected_major {
-        anyhow::bail!(
-            "expected CBOR major {}, got {}",
-            expected_major,
-            major
-        );
-    }
-    let low = first & 0x1f;
-    let (value, extra) = match low {
-        0..=23 => (low as u64, 0usize),
-        24 => {
-            if offset + 2 > bytes.len() {
-                anyhow::bail!("truncated CBOR uint8");
-            }
-            (bytes[offset + 1] as u64, 1)
-        }
-        25 => {
-            if offset + 3 > bytes.len() {
-                anyhow::bail!("truncated CBOR uint16");
-            }
-            (
-                ((bytes[offset + 1] as u64) << 8) | (bytes[offset + 2] as u64),
-                2,
-            )
-        }
-        26 => {
-            if offset + 5 > bytes.len() {
-                anyhow::bail!("truncated CBOR uint32");
-            }
-            let n = ((bytes[offset + 1] as u64) << 24)
-                | ((bytes[offset + 2] as u64) << 16)
-                | ((bytes[offset + 3] as u64) << 8)
-                | (bytes[offset + 4] as u64);
-            (n, 4)
-        }
-        27 => {
-            if offset + 9 > bytes.len() {
-                anyhow::bail!("truncated CBOR uint64");
-            }
-            let mut n = 0u64;
-            for i in 0..8 {
-                n = (n << 8) | (bytes[offset + 1 + i] as u64);
-            }
-            (n, 8)
-        }
-        other => anyhow::bail!("unsupported CBOR uint tag {other}"),
-    };
-    Ok((value, 1 + extra))
-}
-
-/// Read a CBOR text string with major type 3, returning the string and the
-/// total number of bytes consumed.
-#[allow(dead_code)]
-fn read_head_and_text(
-    bytes: &[u8],
-    offset: usize,
-) -> Result<(String, usize)> {
-    let (n, c) = read_head_and_uint(bytes, offset, 3)?;
-    if offset + c + n as usize > bytes.len() {
-        anyhow::bail!("CBOR text string exceeds buffer");
-    }
-    let s = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[offset + c..offset + c + n as usize])
-        .map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid UTF-8 in CBOR text: {e}"))?;
-    Ok((s.to_string(), c + n as usize))
-}
-
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use at_crypto::cid::cid_for_cbor;
 
+    /// The identity prefix is what makes a root readable by a stock CAR
+    /// library, so assert on the bytes rather than only on the round trip
+    /// through our own parser — which would pass either way.
+    #[test]
+    fn header_roots_carry_the_identity_prefix() {
+        let c = cid_for_cbor(b"a").unwrap();
+        let bytes = encode_header(&[c]);
+        let raw = c.to_bytes();
+        // tag(42) is 0xD8 0x2A, then a byte string one longer than the CID,
+        // whose first content byte is the 0x00 multibase identity prefix.
+        let tag_at = bytes
+            .windows(2)
+            .position(|w| w == [0xD8, 0x2A])
+            .expect("tag(42) must be present");
+        let after_tag = &bytes[tag_at + 2..];
+        let (major, len, next) = read_head(after_tag, 0).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(major, 2, "a link wraps a byte string");
+        assert_eq!(len as usize, raw.len() + 1, "one byte longer than the CID");
+        assert_eq!(after_tag[next], 0x00, "multibase identity prefix");
+        assert_eq!(&after_tag[next + 1..next + 1 + raw.len()], &raw[..]);
+    }
+
+    /// A CAR captured from an older build tagged the bare CID. Those bytes
+    /// must keep parsing — otherwise upgrading the server would strand
+    /// anything that stored a repo export.
+    #[test]
+    fn header_without_identity_prefix_still_parses() {
+        let c = cid_for_cbor(b"legacy").unwrap();
+        // Hand-build the old shape: map(2), "version", 1, "roots", [tag(42)
+        // bytes(<bare cid>)].
+        let mut old = Vec::new();
+        write_head(&mut old, 5, 2);
+        write_text(&mut old, "version");
+        write_head(&mut old, 0, 1);
+        write_text(&mut old, "roots");
+        write_head(&mut old, 4, 1);
+        write_head(&mut old, 6, 42);
+        write_bytes(&mut old, &c.to_bytes());
+
+        let h = decode_header(&old).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(h.roots, vec![c], "legacy root must still decode");
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn header_encodes_cids_with_tag_42() {
         let c1 = cid_for_cbor(b"a").unwrap();

crates/pds-server/src/dag_cbor.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,557 @@
+//! A small, self-contained DAG-CBOR encoder + decoder.
+//!
+//! Why this exists
+//!
+//! `ciborium` (the CBOR crate the rest of the workspace uses) speaks plain
+//! CBOR through serde. It has no notion of an IPLD *CID link*, which DAG-CBOR
+//! encodes as the IANA-registered tag `42` wrapping a byte string whose first
+//! byte is the multibase-identity prefix `0x00` followed by the binary CID.
+//! Serde has no representation for a CBOR tag, so `ciborium` silently encodes
+//! `cid::Cid` as a newtype struct instead — which is *not* DAG-CBOR and which
+//! no atproto consumer can read.
+//!
+//! `car.rs` already hand-rolled the handful of primitives needed for the CAR
+//! v1 header (`{version, roots: [<tag 42 link>]}`). The firehose frames need
+//! exactly the same primitives plus a couple more (arrays of maps, nullable
+//! links, byte strings, i64). Rather than write the encoder twice, both
+//! callers now go through this module.
+//!
+//! ## What "correct DAG-CBOR" means here
+//!
+//! * Map keys are text strings, sorted in the DAG-CBOR canonical order:
+//!   shorter keys first, then bytewise-ascending within a length. This is the
+//!   ordering `@ipld/dag-cbor` (and therefore the reference atproto
+//!   implementation) emits, so a frame produced here is byte-identical to one
+//!   produced by a Typescript PDS for the same logical value.
+//! * Integers use the shortest possible head. Byte and text strings likewise.
+//! * A CID link is `tag(42) || bytes(0x00 || <cid.to_bytes()>)`. The leading
+//!   `0x00` is the multibase identity prefix mandated by the DAG-CBOR spec for
+//!   binary CIDs; forgetting it is the single most common interop bug, so the
+//!   decoder asserts on it too.
+//! * Floats are deliberately *not* supported. DAG-CBOR permits them but
+//!   nothing in this codebase emits one, and accepting them would mean
+//!   deciding on a canonical float encoding we would never exercise.
+//!
+//! ## Scope
+//!
+//! This is not a general CBOR library. It handles definite-length items only
+//! (DAG-CBOR forbids indefinite lengths anyway) and rejects everything it does
+//! not understand rather than guessing. It is used for the *envelope* of
+//! things — CAR headers and firehose frames — never for repo blocks, which
+//! are produced by `at_repo`/`at_crypto` with their own (see
+//! `crate::firehose`) conventions.
+
+use anyhow::{anyhow, bail, Result};
+use cid::Cid;
+
+/// The IPLD CID-link tag. See <https://ipld.io/specs/codecs/dag-cbor/spec/>.
+pub const CID_TAG: u64 = 42;
+
+/// A decoded (or to-be-encoded) DAG-CBOR value.
+///
+/// `Link` is kept distinct from `Bytes` so a round-trip through
+/// [`decode`] / [`encode`] preserves the tag rather than flattening a link
+/// into an anonymous byte string.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
+pub enum Value {
+    Null,
+    Bool(bool),
+    /// Signed integer. CBOR major types 0 (non-negative) and 1 (negative).
+    Int(i64),
+    Bytes(Vec<u8>),
+    Text(String),
+    Array(Vec<Value>),
+    /// Map with text keys. Insertion order is irrelevant — [`encode`] sorts
+    /// into the canonical DAG-CBOR order, and [`decode`] returns keys in the
+    /// order they appeared on the wire.
+    Map(Vec<(String, Value)>),
+    /// An IPLD CID link — `tag(42)` wrapping the identity-prefixed CID bytes.
+    Link(Cid),
+}
+
+impl Value {
+    /// Convenience: build a `Map` from an iterator of pairs.
+    pub fn map<I, K>(pairs: I) -> Value
+    where
+        I: IntoIterator<Item = (K, Value)>,
+        K: Into<String>,
+    {
+        Value::Map(pairs.into_iter().map(|(k, v)| (k.into(), v)).collect())
+    }
+
+    /// Convenience: a text value from anything string-ish.
+    pub fn text(s: impl Into<String>) -> Value {
+        Value::Text(s.into())
+    }
+
+    /// Look up a key in a `Map`. Returns `None` for a non-map or a
+    /// missing key. Used by the tests and by frame consumers.
+    pub fn get(&self, key: &str) -> Option<&Value> {
+        match self {
+            Value::Map(entries) => entries.iter().find(|(k, _)| k == key).map(|(_, v)| v),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_i64(&self) -> Option<i64> {
+        match self {
+            Value::Int(i) => Some(*i),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_str(&self) -> Option<&str> {
+        match self {
+            Value::Text(s) => Some(s.as_str()),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_bool(&self) -> Option<bool> {
+        match self {
+            Value::Bool(b) => Some(*b),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> Option<&[u8]> {
+        match self {
+            Value::Bytes(b) => Some(b.as_slice()),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_array(&self) -> Option<&[Value]> {
+        match self {
+            Value::Array(a) => Some(a.as_slice()),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_link(&self) -> Option<&Cid> {
+        match self {
+            Value::Link(c) => Some(c),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn is_null(&self) -> bool {
+        matches!(self, Value::Null)
+    }
+}
+
+// -- encoding ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// Write a CBOR head: the 3-bit major type plus the argument, using the
+/// shortest encoding that fits.
+///
+/// Public because `car.rs` builds its length-prefixed sections around the same
+/// primitive and there is no reason to have two copies.
+pub fn write_head(out: &mut Vec<u8>, major: u8, n: u64) {
+    let m = (major & 0x07) << 5;
+    if n < 24 {
+        out.push(m | n as u8);
+    } else if n <= u8::MAX as u64 {
+        out.push(m | 24);
+        out.push(n as u8);
+    } else if n <= u16::MAX as u64 {
+        out.push(m | 25);
+        out.extend_from_slice(&(n as u16).to_be_bytes());
+    } else if n <= u32::MAX as u64 {
+        out.push(m | 26);
+        out.extend_from_slice(&(n as u32).to_be_bytes());
+    } else {
+        out.push(m | 27);
+        out.extend_from_slice(&n.to_be_bytes());
+    }
+}
+
+/// Append a CBOR text string (major type 3).
+pub fn write_text(out: &mut Vec<u8>, s: &str) {
+    write_head(out, 3, s.len() as u64);
+    out.extend_from_slice(s.as_bytes());
+}
+
+/// Append a CBOR byte string (major type 2).
+pub fn write_bytes(out: &mut Vec<u8>, b: &[u8]) {
+    write_head(out, 2, b.len() as u64);
+    out.extend_from_slice(b);
+}
+
+/// Append a CID as a DAG-CBOR link: `tag(42) || bytes(0x00 || cid)`.
+///
+/// The `0x00` is the multibase identity prefix. Binary CIDs inside DAG-CBOR
+/// always carry it; the textual form (`bafy…`) never does.
+pub fn write_link(out: &mut Vec<u8>, cid: &Cid) {
+    write_head(out, 6, CID_TAG);
+    let raw = cid.to_bytes();
+    let mut prefixed = Vec::with_capacity(raw.len() + 1);
+    prefixed.push(0x00);
+    prefixed.extend_from_slice(&raw);
+    write_bytes(out, &prefixed);
+}
+
+/// DAG-CBOR canonical map-key order: shorter keys sort first; equal-length
+/// keys sort bytewise ascending.
+///
+/// This is RFC 7049's "canonical CBOR" rule, which DAG-CBOR inherited and
+/// which `@ipld/dag-cbor` implements. (RFC 8949 later switched the *core*
+/// deterministic profile to plain bytewise ordering, but DAG-CBOR did not
+/// follow — using 8949's rule here would produce frames that differ from the
+/// reference implementation's for keys like `"op"` vs `"t"`.)
+fn canonical_key_cmp(a: &str, b: &str) -> std::cmp::Ordering {
+    a.len()
+        .cmp(&b.len())
+        .then_with(|| a.as_bytes().cmp(b.as_bytes()))
+}
+
+/// Encode a value into `out`.
+pub fn encode_into(out: &mut Vec<u8>, value: &Value) {
+    match value {
+        Value::Null => out.push(0xF6),
+        Value::Bool(false) => out.push(0xF4),
+        Value::Bool(true) => out.push(0xF5),
+        Value::Int(i) => {
+            if *i >= 0 {
+                write_head(out, 0, *i as u64);
+            } else {
+                // CBOR major type 1 stores -1-n, so n = -(i+1). Computed on
+                // i64 via `i128` to stay correct at `i64::MIN`, where
+                // `-(i + 1)` would overflow.
+                let n = (-((*i as i128) + 1)) as u64;
+                write_head(out, 1, n);
+            }
+        }
+        Value::Bytes(b) => write_bytes(out, b),
+        Value::Text(s) => write_text(out, s),
+        Value::Array(items) => {
+            write_head(out, 4, items.len() as u64);
+            for item in items {
+                encode_into(out, item);
+            }
+        }
+        Value::Map(entries) => {
+            let mut sorted: Vec<&(String, Value)> = entries.iter().collect();
+            sorted.sort_by(|a, b| canonical_key_cmp(&a.0, &b.0));
+            write_head(out, 5, sorted.len() as u64);
+            for (k, v) in sorted {
+                write_text(out, k);
+                encode_into(out, v);
+            }
+        }
+        Value::Link(cid) => write_link(out, cid),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Encode a value to a fresh `Vec<u8>`.
+///
+/// `#[allow(dead_code)]`: the server itself always appends into an existing
+/// buffer via [`encode_into`] (a frame is two values in one allocation), so
+/// this convenience wrapper is exercised only by the tests that assert on
+/// exact byte sequences. It is kept because the decoder half needs a matching
+/// encoder half to be testable at all.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub fn encode(value: &Value) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    encode_into(&mut out, value);
+    out
+}
+
+// -- decoding ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// -- Why a decoder lives in a server that only encodes ----------------------
+//
+// The PDS never parses a firehose frame in production — it writes them. The
+// decoder exists so the frame *contract* can be tested from the outside: a
+// unit test that only checks "the encoder produced these bytes" locks in
+// whatever the encoder happens to do, including its bugs. Decoding the bytes
+// back and asserting on the structure is what actually verifies that a tag-42
+// link is a link and not a byte string, that the two frame halves are
+// separable, and that a `null` `since` is `null` rather than absent.
+//
+// The integration test uses it for the same reason from the client side, and
+// `crates/appview` builds its consumer against the same shape.
+
+/// Decode exactly one value, requiring it to consume the whole input.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub fn decode(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Value> {
+    let (v, used) = decode_one(bytes)?;
+    if used != bytes.len() {
+        bail!(
+            "trailing bytes after DAG-CBOR value: consumed {used} of {}",
+            bytes.len()
+        );
+    }
+    Ok(v)
+}
+
+/// Decode one value from the front of `bytes`, returning it along with the
+/// number of bytes consumed.
+///
+/// This is the entry point the firehose frame reader needs: a frame is two
+/// concatenated DAG-CBOR values (header then body) with no length prefix
+/// between them, so the only way to find the body is to decode the header and
+/// see where it ended.
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+pub fn decode_one(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<(Value, usize)> {
+    decode_at(bytes, 0).map(|(v, end)| (v, end))
+}
+
+#[allow(dead_code)]
+fn decode_at(bytes: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<(Value, usize)> {
+    let (major, arg, mut p) = read_head(bytes, offset)?;
+    match major {
+        0 => {
+            let i = i64::try_from(arg).map_err(|_| anyhow!("CBOR uint {arg} exceeds i64"))?;
+            Ok((Value::Int(i), p))
+        }
+        1 => {
+            let v = -(arg as i128) - 1;
+            let i = i64::try_from(v).map_err(|_| anyhow!("CBOR nint {v} exceeds i64"))?;
+            Ok((Value::Int(i), p))
+        }
+        2 => {
+            let end = p + arg as usize;
+            if end > bytes.len() {
+                bail!("CBOR byte string exceeds input");
+            }
+            Ok((Value::Bytes(bytes[p..end].to_vec()), end))
+        }
+        3 => {
+            let end = p + arg as usize;
+            if end > bytes.len() {
+                bail!("CBOR text string exceeds input");
+            }
+            let s = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[p..end])
+                .map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid UTF-8 in CBOR text: {e}"))?;
+            Ok((Value::Text(s.to_string()), end))
+        }
+        4 => {
+            let mut items = Vec::with_capacity(arg.min(1024) as usize);
+            for _ in 0..arg {
+                let (v, next) = decode_at(bytes, p)?;
+                items.push(v);
+                p = next;
+            }
+            Ok((Value::Array(items), p))
+        }
+        5 => {
+            let mut entries = Vec::with_capacity(arg.min(1024) as usize);
+            for _ in 0..arg {
+                let (k, next) = decode_at(bytes, p)?;
+                p = next;
+                let key = match k {
+                    Value::Text(s) => s,
+                    other => bail!("DAG-CBOR map keys must be text, got {other:?}"),
+                };
+                let (v, next) = decode_at(bytes, p)?;
+                p = next;
+                entries.push((key, v));
+            }
+            Ok((Value::Map(entries), p))
+        }
+        6 => {
+            if arg != CID_TAG {
+                bail!("unsupported CBOR tag {arg}; DAG-CBOR allows only 42");
+            }
+            let (inner, end) = decode_at(bytes, p)?;
+            let raw = match inner {
+                Value::Bytes(b) => b,
+                other => bail!("CBOR tag 42 must wrap a byte string, got {other:?}"),
+            };
+            let stripped = raw
+                .split_first()
+                .filter(|(first, _)| **first == 0x00)
+                .map(|(_, rest)| rest)
+                .ok_or_else(|| {
+                    anyhow!("CID link missing the 0x00 multibase identity prefix")
+                })?;
+            let cid = Cid::read_bytes(stripped)
+                .map_err(|e| anyhow!("invalid CID inside tag 42: {e}"))?;
+            Ok((Value::Link(cid), end))
+        }
+        7 => match arg {
+            20 => Ok((Value::Bool(false), p)),
+            21 => Ok((Value::Bool(true), p)),
+            22 => Ok((Value::Null, p)),
+            // 23 is `undefined`, 25/26/27 are floats. DAG-CBOR forbids
+            // `undefined`; floats are out of scope (see the module header).
+            other => bail!("unsupported CBOR simple/float value {other}"),
+        },
+        other => bail!("unsupported CBOR major type {other}"),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Read a CBOR head at `offset`, returning `(major, argument, next_offset)`.
+///
+/// Public so `car.rs` can drive its own (deliberately non-conformant, see
+/// there) header parser off the same primitive instead of keeping a second
+/// copy.
+pub fn read_head(bytes: &[u8], offset: usize) -> Result<(u8, u64, usize)> {
+    let first = *bytes
+        .get(offset)
+        .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("CBOR read past end of input at {offset}"))?;
+    let major = first >> 5;
+    let low = first & 0x1f;
+    let (arg, extra) = match low {
+        0..=23 => (low as u64, 0usize),
+        24 => (read_uint(bytes, offset + 1, 1)?, 1),
+        25 => (read_uint(bytes, offset + 1, 2)?, 2),
+        26 => (read_uint(bytes, offset + 1, 4)?, 4),
+        27 => (read_uint(bytes, offset + 1, 8)?, 8),
+        // 28..=30 are reserved; 31 is the indefinite-length marker, which
+        // DAG-CBOR forbids outright.
+        other => bail!("invalid or indefinite CBOR head 0x{other:02x}"),
+    };
+    Ok((major, arg, offset + 1 + extra))
+}
+
+fn read_uint(bytes: &[u8], offset: usize, width: usize) -> Result<u64> {
+    if offset + width > bytes.len() {
+        bail!("truncated CBOR integer of width {width}");
+    }
+    let mut n: u64 = 0;
+    for b in &bytes[offset..offset + width] {
+        n = (n << 8) | *b as u64;
+    }
+    Ok(n)
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use at_crypto::cid::cid_for_cbor;
+
+    fn round_trip(v: Value) {
+        let bytes = encode(&v);
+        let back = decode(&bytes).expect("decode");
+        // Maps come back in canonical (encoded) order, so compare the
+        // re-encoding rather than the structure for map-bearing values.
+        assert_eq!(encode(&back), bytes, "re-encode must be stable");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn scalars_round_trip() {
+        for v in [
+            Value::Null,
+            Value::Bool(true),
+            Value::Bool(false),
+            Value::Int(0),
+            Value::Int(23),
+            Value::Int(24),
+            Value::Int(255),
+            Value::Int(256),
+            Value::Int(65_535),
+            Value::Int(65_536),
+            Value::Int(i64::MAX),
+            Value::Int(-1),
+            Value::Int(-24),
+            Value::Int(-1000),
+            Value::Int(i64::MIN),
+            Value::Text("hello".into()),
+            Value::Text(String::new()),
+            Value::Bytes(vec![1, 2, 3]),
+            Value::Bytes(Vec::new()),
+        ] {
+            let bytes = encode(&v);
+            assert_eq!(decode(&bytes).unwrap(), v, "round trip of {v:?}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn int_heads_are_shortest_form() {
+        assert_eq!(encode(&Value::Int(1)), vec![0x01]);
+        assert_eq!(encode(&Value::Int(24)), vec![0x18, 24]);
+        assert_eq!(encode(&Value::Int(-1)), vec![0x20]);
+        assert_eq!(encode(&Value::Int(-25)), vec![0x38, 24]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cid_link_carries_tag_42_and_identity_prefix() {
+        let cid = cid_for_cbor(b"a block").unwrap();
+        let bytes = encode(&Value::Link(cid));
+        // 0xD8 0x2A == tag(42) in two-byte form.
+        assert_eq!(&bytes[0..2], &[0xD8, 0x2A]);
+        // Then a byte string whose first content byte is the 0x00 prefix.
+        let (_major, len, p) = read_head(&bytes, 2).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(len as usize, cid.to_bytes().len() + 1);
+        assert_eq!(bytes[p], 0x00);
+        assert_eq!(decode(&bytes).unwrap(), Value::Link(cid));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn link_without_identity_prefix_is_rejected() {
+        let cid = cid_for_cbor(b"x").unwrap();
+        let mut bytes = Vec::new();
+        write_head(&mut bytes, 6, CID_TAG);
+        // Deliberately omit the leading 0x00.
+        write_bytes(&mut bytes, &cid.to_bytes());
+        let e = decode(&bytes).unwrap_err().to_string();
+        assert!(e.contains("identity prefix"), "got: {e}");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn map_keys_are_sorted_length_first() {
+        // The firehose header is exactly this shape, and the reference
+        // implementation emits `t` before `op` because it is shorter.
+        let v = Value::map([("op", Value::Int(1)), ("t", Value::text("#commit"))]);
+        let bytes = encode(&v);
+        assert_eq!(bytes[0], 0xA2, "map(2)");
+        assert_eq!(bytes[1], 0x61, "text(1)");
+        assert_eq!(bytes[2], b't');
+        // …and `op` follows after the "#commit" value.
+        let decoded = decode(&bytes).unwrap();
+        match &decoded {
+            Value::Map(entries) => {
+                assert_eq!(entries[0].0, "t");
+                assert_eq!(entries[1].0, "op");
+            }
+            other => panic!("expected map, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn nested_structures_round_trip() {
+        let cid = cid_for_cbor(b"nested").unwrap();
+        round_trip(Value::map([
+            ("seq", Value::Int(42)),
+            ("commit", Value::Link(cid)),
+            (
+                "ops",
+                Value::Array(vec![Value::map([
+                    ("action", Value::text("create")),
+                    ("path", Value::text("app.twi.post/3l")),
+                    ("cid", Value::Link(cid)),
+                ])]),
+            ),
+            ("blobs", Value::Array(vec![])),
+            ("since", Value::Null),
+        ]));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn decode_one_stops_at_the_value_boundary() {
+        // Two concatenated values — exactly how a firehose frame is laid out.
+        let mut buf = encode(&Value::map([("op", Value::Int(1))]));
+        let header_len = buf.len();
+        buf.extend_from_slice(&encode(&Value::map([("seq", Value::Int(7))])));
+        let (header, used) = decode_one(&buf).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(used, header_len);
+        assert_eq!(header.get("op").and_then(Value::as_i64), Some(1));
+        let body = decode(&buf[used..]).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(body.get("seq").and_then(Value::as_i64), Some(7));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn indefinite_length_is_rejected() {
+        // 0x9F == array(*) — legal CBOR, illegal DAG-CBOR.
+        assert!(decode(&[0x9F, 0x01, 0xFF]).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn trailing_bytes_are_rejected() {
+        let mut bytes = encode(&Value::Int(1));
+        bytes.push(0x01);
+        assert!(decode(&bytes).is_err());
+    }
+}

crates/pds-server/src/firehose.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,946 @@
+//! `com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos` — the event log, the frame codec and the
+//! in-process broadcast channel.
+//!
+//! # What this is for
+//!
+//! Before this module the PDS emitted no firehose. A locally created record
+//! reached the AppView through exactly one channel: the best-effort HTTP push
+//! in [`crate::appview_push`], a detached `tokio::spawn` whose failure branch
+//! logs "jetstream will replay". For records that only exist on this PDS
+//! there *is* no Jetstream to replay them, so a lost push meant the post was
+//! never indexed and nothing would ever notice. The firehose replaces that
+//! hope with a durable, ordered log: every repo write appends one row inside
+//! the same transaction as the commit, and a consumer can ask for everything
+//! after a cursor at any later time.
+//!
+//! # Frame format
+//!
+//! One WebSocket **binary** message is two DAG-CBOR values written back to
+//! back with nothing between them — a header, then a body. There is no length
+//! prefix; the reader decodes the header and continues the body at the offset
+//! where the header ended (that is what [`crate::dag_cbor::decode_one`] is
+//! for).
+//!
+//! ```text
+//! regular:  {"op": 1, "t": "#commit"}  {"seq": …, "repo": …, …}
+//!           {"op": 1, "t": "#info"}    {"name": …, "message": …}
+//! error:    {"op": -1}                 {"error": "<Name>", "message": "<Text>"}
+//! ```
+//!
+//! The `#commit` body carries:
+//!
+//! | field     | type                                                    |
+//! |-----------|---------------------------------------------------------|
+//! | `seq`     | int — the cursor value for this event                   |
+//! | `rebase`  | bool — always `false` (we never rebase a repo)          |
+//! | `tooBig`  | bool — always `false` (see the size note below)         |
+//! | `repo`    | text — the DID                                          |
+//! | `commit`  | **CID link (tag 42)** — the new commit block            |
+//! | `rev`     | text — the new commit's revision                        |
+//! | `since`   | text or null — the previous commit's revision           |
+//! | `blocks`  | byte string — a CAR v1 file, commit block as root       |
+//! | `ops`     | array of `{action, path, cid}`; `cid` is a link or null  |
+//! | `blobs`   | array — always empty (blob refs live inside the record) |
+//! | `time`    | text — RFC 3339, when the event was appended            |
+//!
+//! Map keys are emitted in DAG-CBOR canonical order (shortest first, then
+//! bytewise), so the bytes match what a reference atproto implementation
+//! would produce for the same logical value.
+//!
+//! # Deliberate deviation from the atproto spec
+//!
+//! **The frame envelope is conformant. The blocks inside `blocks` are not.**
+//!
+//! This repository encodes CIDs *inside* commit blocks as CBOR text strings
+//! rather than as DAG-CBOR links with tag 42 — see `at_repo::commit` and
+//! `at_crypto::signing::sign_dag_cbor`. That convention predates this module
+//! and is load-bearing: the block bytes determine every CID in the system,
+//! including the `did:plc:` derivation, so changing it would re-address every
+//! repo in the database. It is explicitly out of scope here.
+//!
+//! The consequence, stated plainly: a foreign atproto consumer can connect,
+//! parse every frame, read `seq` / `repo` / `rev` / `ops`, and follow the
+//! stream. It will then fail when it tries to *validate* the payload — the
+//! CAR in `blocks` parses fine and the block CIDs hash correctly over their
+//! own bytes, but decoding a commit block as DAG-CBOR yields `"prev"` and
+//! `"data"` as strings where the spec demands links, and MST traversal
+//! against a stock implementation will not work. The AppView in this
+//! workspace reads the frames with the same conventions this crate writes
+//! them, which is why it works there.
+//!
+//! `tooBig` is therefore always `false`: it exists so a producer can say "the
+//! diff was too large, go fetch the repo yourself", and we never make that
+//! call — every commit here is one record change, and its CAR is small.
+//!
+//! # Lagging consumers
+//!
+//! The broadcast channel is bounded ([`FIREHOSE_CHANNEL_CAPACITY`]). A
+//! consumer that reads slower than the PDS writes will eventually be lapped,
+//! and `tokio::sync::broadcast` reports that as `RecvError::Lagged(n)`.
+//!
+//! The write path must never wait on a reader, so the channel cannot be made
+//! blocking. When a reader lags we send it an `#info` / `OutdatedCursor`
+//! frame and **fall back to the database replay** from the last sequence it
+//! actually received, then resume live. We do not disconnect it: the events
+//! are durable in `firehose_events`, so the fallback is lossless, whereas
+//! dropping the socket would force the client to reconnect and perform
+//! exactly the same replay after two extra round trips. The only thing a
+//! disconnect would buy is protection against a client that lags forever, and
+//! that is handled separately by capping consecutive recoveries
+//! ([`MAX_LAG_RECOVERIES`]) before closing with an error frame.
+//!
+//! # Retention
+//!
+//! Nothing prunes `firehose_events`. It grows by one row per repo write, each
+//! carrying the CAR of that commit's new blocks. That is unbounded, and this
+//! deployment has no retention job — an operator who wants one has to add it.
+//! Pruning is safe by design: the cursor handshake compares the requested
+//! cursor against the oldest surviving row and answers a too-old cursor with
+//! `#info` / `OutdatedCursor` followed by a replay from the oldest row that
+//! still exists, rather than pretending the gap is not there.
+
+use crate::car::CarWriter;
+use crate::dag_cbor::{encode_into, Value};
+use anyhow::{anyhow, Result};
+use at_crypto::cid::cid_from_multihash_bytes;
+use chrono::{DateTime, SecondsFormat, Utc};
+use cid::Cid;
+use serde_json::json;
+use std::sync::Arc;
+use tokio::sync::broadcast;
+
+/// How many events the live broadcast channel buffers per subscriber before
+/// the slowest one starts reporting `Lagged`.
+///
+/// 1024 is chosen so a consumer can stall for the length of a garbage
+/// collection or a slow network write without falling back to the database,
+/// while the memory ceiling stays bounded: the channel holds `Arc`s, so the
+/// cost is one CAR blob per queued event, shared across all subscribers.
+pub const FIREHOSE_CHANNEL_CAPACITY: usize = 1024;
+
+/// How many times in a row a single connection may be rescued from a lag
+/// before we give up and close it. A client that cannot keep up even with a
+/// database replay in between is not going to start; at that point the honest
+/// answer is an error frame rather than an endless catch-up loop that burns
+/// queries on its behalf.
+pub const MAX_LAG_RECOVERIES: u32 = 5;
+
+/// Rows returned per replay query. Bounded so a client reconnecting with
+/// `cursor=0` after a long uptime streams the backlog in chunks instead of
+/// materialising the whole table (and every CAR in it) in memory at once.
+pub const REPLAY_PAGE_SIZE: i64 = 200;
+
+/// The advisory-lock key that serialises `firehose_events` INSERTs. Any
+/// constant works as long as every writer uses the same one; this is
+/// `"fhose"` read as ASCII, which makes it recognisable in `pg_locks`.
+///
+/// What it costs: the lock is global, not per-repo, so the tail of every
+/// repo write — INSERT plus COMMIT — is serialised across all accounts.
+/// That is deliberate (a per-repo lock would order each repo's events but
+/// not the shared `seq` a consumer paginates on), and it bounds write
+/// throughput to how fast Postgres can commit one small INSERT at a time.
+/// If that ever becomes the ceiling, the fix is a different sequence
+/// design — a per-repo cursor, or handing out `seq` from a single writer
+/// task — not a weaker lock: a gap in `seq` is silent data loss for every
+/// consumer replaying from a cursor.
+pub const FIREHOSE_ADVISORY_LOCK_KEY: i64 = 0x66_68_6f_73_65;
+
+// -- ops --------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// What a single repo operation did to one record.
+///
+/// `Update` exists separately from `Create` because a consumer that keeps a
+/// materialised view needs to know whether to insert or replace; the MST
+/// itself does not distinguish them, so the write path resolves it by looking
+/// the key up before writing.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum RepoOpAction {
+    Create,
+    Update,
+    Delete,
+}
+
+impl RepoOpAction {
+    pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            RepoOpAction::Create => "create",
+            RepoOpAction::Update => "update",
+            RepoOpAction::Delete => "delete",
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn parse(s: &str) -> Result<Self> {
+        match s {
+            "create" => Ok(RepoOpAction::Create),
+            "update" => Ok(RepoOpAction::Update),
+            "delete" => Ok(RepoOpAction::Delete),
+            other => Err(anyhow!("unknown repo op action `{other}`")),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// One entry of a commit frame's `ops` array.
+///
+/// `path` is `"<collection>/<rkey>"` — the MST key, not an `at://` URI. That
+/// is what the wire format specifies, and it is also what the MST is actually
+/// keyed by, so there is no reassembly step on either side.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct RepoOp {
+    pub action: RepoOpAction,
+    pub path: String,
+    /// The record value's CID for `create` / `update`; `None` for `delete`,
+    /// where there is no resulting value to point at.
+    pub cid: Option<Cid>,
+}
+
+impl RepoOp {
+    pub fn create(collection: &str, rkey: &str, cid: Cid) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            action: RepoOpAction::Create,
+            path: format!("{collection}/{rkey}"),
+            cid: Some(cid),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn update(collection: &str, rkey: &str, cid: Cid) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            action: RepoOpAction::Update,
+            path: format!("{collection}/{rkey}"),
+            cid: Some(cid),
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn delete(collection: &str, rkey: &str) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            action: RepoOpAction::Delete,
+            path: format!("{collection}/{rkey}"),
+            cid: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Pick `create` or `update` from whether the key already existed.
+    pub fn put(collection: &str, rkey: &str, cid: Cid, existed: bool) -> Self {
+        if existed {
+            Self::update(collection, rkey, cid)
+        } else {
+            Self::create(collection, rkey, cid)
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// JSON shape stored in `firehose_events.ops`. The CID is a string here
+    /// (JSONB has no link type); it becomes a tag-42 link again on the wire.
+    pub fn to_json(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
+        json!({
+            "action": self.action.as_str(),
+            "path": self.path,
+            "cid": self.cid.map(|c| c.to_string()),
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn from_json(v: &serde_json::Value) -> Result<Self> {
+        let action = RepoOpAction::parse(
+            v.get("action")
+                .and_then(|a| a.as_str())
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("op missing `action`"))?,
+        )?;
+        let path = v
+            .get("path")
+            .and_then(|p| p.as_str())
+            .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("op missing `path`"))?
+            .to_string();
+        let cid = match v.get("cid") {
+            None | Some(serde_json::Value::Null) => None,
+            Some(serde_json::Value::String(s)) => {
+                Some(s.parse::<Cid>().map_err(|e| anyhow!("op cid: {e}"))?)
+            }
+            Some(other) => return Err(anyhow!("op `cid` must be a string or null, got {other}")),
+        };
+        Ok(Self { action, path, cid })
+    }
+
+    fn to_dag_cbor(&self) -> Value {
+        Value::map([
+            ("action", Value::text(self.action.as_str())),
+            ("path", Value::text(&self.path)),
+            (
+                "cid",
+                match self.cid {
+                    Some(c) => Value::Link(c),
+                    None => Value::Null,
+                },
+            ),
+        ])
+    }
+}
+
+// -- events -----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// One row of `firehose_events`, ready to be framed.
+///
+/// Both the live path (built at write time) and the replay path (read back
+/// from Postgres) produce this exact struct, which is what makes a replayed
+/// frame byte-identical to the live one — including `time`, which comes from
+/// the stored `created_at` rather than from the clock at send time.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct FirehoseEvent {
+    pub seq: i64,
+    pub did: String,
+    pub rev: String,
+    pub since: Option<String>,
+    pub commit: Cid,
+    /// CAR v1 file: the commit block as root, plus the blocks this commit
+    /// newly created.
+    pub blocks: Vec<u8>,
+    pub ops: Vec<RepoOp>,
+    pub time: DateTime<Utc>,
+}
+
+impl FirehoseEvent {
+    /// The `#commit` body as a DAG-CBOR value.
+    pub fn to_body(&self) -> Value {
+        Value::map([
+            ("seq", Value::Int(self.seq)),
+            ("rebase", Value::Bool(false)),
+            ("tooBig", Value::Bool(false)),
+            ("repo", Value::text(&self.did)),
+            ("commit", Value::Link(self.commit)),
+            ("rev", Value::text(&self.rev)),
+            (
+                "since",
+                match &self.since {
+                    Some(s) => Value::text(s),
+                    None => Value::Null,
+                },
+            ),
+            ("blocks", Value::Bytes(self.blocks.clone())),
+            (
+                "ops",
+                Value::Array(self.ops.iter().map(RepoOp::to_dag_cbor).collect()),
+            ),
+            ("blobs", Value::Array(Vec::new())),
+            (
+                "time",
+                Value::text(self.time.to_rfc3339_opts(SecondsFormat::Micros, true)),
+            ),
+        ])
+    }
+
+    /// The full binary WebSocket payload: `#commit` header then body.
+    pub fn to_frame(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        frame(&header_value("#commit"), &self.to_body())
+    }
+}
+
+/// Build the CAR that goes into a commit event's `blocks` field.
+///
+/// Root is the commit block; the remaining entries are the blocks this commit
+/// newly wrote (MST nodes and record values). Blocks that already existed in
+/// the repo are deliberately left out — that is the whole point of a diff
+/// stream, and a consumer that needs an ancestor block asks
+/// `com.atproto.sync.getBlocks` for it.
+pub fn build_blocks_car(
+    commit_cid: Cid,
+    commit_block: &[u8],
+    new_blocks: &[(Cid, Vec<u8>)],
+) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut w = CarWriter::new();
+    w.append(commit_cid, commit_block);
+    for (cid, data) in new_blocks {
+        w.append(*cid, data);
+    }
+    w.finish(&[commit_cid])
+}
+
+// -- frame encoding ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// `{"op": 1, "t": "<t>"}` — the header of a regular frame.
+fn header_value(t: &str) -> Value {
+    Value::map([("op", Value::Int(1)), ("t", Value::text(t))])
+}
+
+/// Concatenate a header and a body into one binary WebSocket payload.
+fn frame(header: &Value, body: &Value) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let mut out = Vec::new();
+    encode_into(&mut out, header);
+    encode_into(&mut out, body);
+    out
+}
+
+/// An `#info` frame: `{"op":1,"t":"#info"}` + `{"name":…,"message":…}`.
+///
+/// Informational, not fatal — the stream continues after it. We send it when
+/// a cursor is older than anything we still have, and when a live subscriber
+/// lagged and is being put back on the database replay.
+pub fn encode_info_frame(name: &str, message: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
+    frame(
+        &header_value("#info"),
+        &Value::map([("name", Value::text(name)), ("message", Value::text(message))]),
+    )
+}
+
+/// An error frame: `{"op":-1}` + `{"error":…,"message":…}`.
+///
+/// Terminal — the server closes the socket right after sending it.
+pub fn encode_error_frame(error: &str, message: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
+    frame(
+        &Value::map([("op", Value::Int(-1))]),
+        &Value::map([
+            ("error", Value::text(error)),
+            ("message", Value::text(message)),
+        ]),
+    )
+}
+
+// -- broadcast --------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// The in-process fan-out from the write path to connected subscribers.
+///
+/// Cloneable and cheap: it is a `broadcast::Sender` plus nothing. Events are
+/// wrapped in an `Arc` so a burst of subscribers does not multiply the CAR
+/// blobs.
+#[derive(Clone)]
+pub struct Firehose {
+    tx: broadcast::Sender<Arc<FirehoseEvent>>,
+}
+
+impl Default for Firehose {
+    fn default() -> Self {
+        Self::new()
+    }
+}
+
+impl Firehose {
+    pub fn new() -> Self {
+        let (tx, _rx) = broadcast::channel(FIREHOSE_CHANNEL_CAPACITY);
+        Self { tx }
+    }
+
+    /// Publish an event to every live subscriber.
+    ///
+    /// Never blocks and never fails in a way the caller must handle: with no
+    /// subscribers the send returns `Err`, which is the normal state of a PDS
+    /// nobody is watching. The event is already durable in Postgres by the
+    /// time we get here, so a dropped broadcast costs a consumer nothing
+    /// beyond having to replay by cursor.
+    pub fn publish(&self, event: FirehoseEvent) {
+        let _ = self.tx.send(Arc::new(event));
+    }
+
+    pub fn subscribe(&self) -> broadcast::Receiver<Arc<FirehoseEvent>> {
+        self.tx.subscribe()
+    }
+
+    /// Number of live subscribers. Used for logging / the healthz surface.
+    #[allow(dead_code)]
+    pub fn subscriber_count(&self) -> usize {
+        self.tx.receiver_count()
+    }
+}
+
+// -- persistence ------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// Append one event inside an open transaction and return it with its
+/// assigned `seq` and `created_at`.
+///
+/// The advisory lock taken first is what makes the sequence usable as a
+/// cursor: without it two concurrent writers can be assigned seq 5 and 6 and
+/// commit in the other order, so a reader polling in between sees 6, records
+/// it as its cursor, and never learns about 5. Holding
+/// `pg_advisory_xact_lock` from just before the INSERT until COMMIT forces
+/// commit order to match seq order. It is taken *after* the per-repo
+/// `SELECT … FOR UPDATE` in [`crate::routes::helpers::apply_repo_write`], and
+/// every writer takes the two in that same order, so the pair cannot deadlock.
+pub async fn insert_event_in_tx(
+    tx: &mut sqlx::Transaction<'_, sqlx::Postgres>,
+    did: &str,
+    rev: &str,
+    since: Option<&str>,
+    commit: Cid,
+    blocks: Vec<u8>,
+    ops: Vec<RepoOp>,
+) -> Result<FirehoseEvent, sqlx::Error> {
+    sqlx::query("SELECT pg_advisory_xact_lock($1)")
+        .bind(FIREHOSE_ADVISORY_LOCK_KEY)
+        .execute(&mut **tx)
+        .await?;
+
+    let ops_json = serde_json::Value::Array(ops.iter().map(RepoOp::to_json).collect());
+
+    let (seq, created_at): (i64, DateTime<Utc>) = sqlx::query_as(
+        r#"INSERT INTO firehose_events (did, rev, since, commit_cid, blocks, ops)
+           VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)
+           RETURNING seq, created_at"#,
+    )
+    .bind(did)
+    .bind(rev)
+    .bind(since)
+    .bind(commit.to_bytes())
+    .bind(&blocks)
+    .bind(&ops_json)
+    .fetch_one(&mut **tx)
+    .await?;
+
+    Ok(FirehoseEvent {
+        seq,
+        did: did.to_string(),
+        rev: rev.to_string(),
+        since: since.map(|s| s.to_string()),
+        commit,
+        blocks,
+        ops,
+        time: created_at,
+    })
+}
+
+/// The `(min_seq, max_seq)` currently in the table, or `None` when it is
+/// empty. Used by the cursor handshake to tell "from the future" apart from
+/// "too old to still have".
+pub async fn seq_bounds(db: &sqlx::PgPool) -> Result<Option<(i64, i64)>, sqlx::Error> {
+    let row: (Option<i64>, Option<i64>) =
+        sqlx::query_as("SELECT MIN(seq), MAX(seq) FROM firehose_events")
+            .fetch_one(db)
+            .await?;
+    Ok(match row {
+        (Some(min), Some(max)) => Some((min, max)),
+        _ => None,
+    })
+}
+
+/// Read up to [`REPLAY_PAGE_SIZE`] events with `seq > after`, oldest first.
+pub async fn load_events_after(
+    db: &sqlx::PgPool,
+    after: i64,
+    limit: i64,
+) -> Result<Vec<FirehoseEvent>> {
+    let rows: Vec<(
+        i64,
+        String,
+        String,
+        Option<String>,
+        Vec<u8>,
+        Vec<u8>,
+        serde_json::Value,
+        DateTime<Utc>,
+    )> = sqlx::query_as(
+        r#"SELECT seq, did, rev, since, commit_cid, blocks, ops, created_at
+             FROM firehose_events
+            WHERE seq > $1
+            ORDER BY seq ASC
+            LIMIT $2"#,
+    )
+    .bind(after)
+    .bind(limit)
+    .fetch_all(db)
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| anyhow!("firehose_events replay read: {e}"))?;
+
+    rows.into_iter()
+        .map(|(seq, did, rev, since, commit_cid, blocks, ops, created_at)| {
+            let commit = cid_from_multihash_bytes(&commit_cid)
+                .map_err(|e| anyhow!("firehose_events.commit_cid at seq {seq}: {e}"))?;
+            let ops = ops
+                .as_array()
+                .ok_or_else(|| anyhow!("firehose_events.ops at seq {seq} is not an array"))?
+                .iter()
+                .map(RepoOp::from_json)
+                .collect::<Result<Vec<_>>>()?;
+            Ok(FirehoseEvent {
+                seq,
+                did,
+                rev,
+                since,
+                commit,
+                blocks,
+                ops,
+                time: created_at,
+            })
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+// -- cursor handshake -------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// What the connection handler should do with the cursor the client sent.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum CursorPlan {
+    /// No cursor: send live events only, nothing from the log.
+    LiveOnly,
+    /// Replay everything after `from`, then go live.
+    Replay { from: i64 },
+    /// The requested cursor predates the oldest row we still have. Warn with
+    /// an `#info` frame, then replay from `from` (the oldest surviving row
+    /// minus one) so the client at least gets everything that does exist.
+    OutdatedCursor { from: i64, message: String },
+    /// The cursor names an event that has not happened. This is a client bug
+    /// (or a cursor from a different server's log), and continuing would
+    /// silently strand it — so it is a terminal error frame.
+    FutureCursor { message: String },
+}
+
+/// Decide what to do with `cursor` given the log's current `(min, max)`.
+///
+/// Split out from the socket handler so the boundary conditions are testable
+/// without a database or a WebSocket.
+///
+/// Semantics of the cursor: it is the seq of the last event the client
+/// *already has*, so a replay yields `seq > cursor`. `cursor = 0` therefore
+/// means "everything", and `cursor = max` means "nothing yet, just go live" —
+/// which is a valid, empty replay rather than a future cursor.
+pub fn plan_cursor(cursor: Option<i64>, bounds: Option<(i64, i64)>) -> CursorPlan {
+    let cursor = match cursor {
+        None => return CursorPlan::LiveOnly,
+        Some(c) => c,
+    };
+    if cursor < 0 {
+        return CursorPlan::FutureCursor {
+            message: format!("cursor {cursor} is negative"),
+        };
+    }
+    let (min, max) = match bounds {
+        // An empty log accepts only cursor 0 ("give me everything, there is
+        // nothing"). Anything else refers to an event we never had.
+        None => {
+            return if cursor == 0 {
+                CursorPlan::Replay { from: 0 }
+            } else {
+                CursorPlan::FutureCursor {
+                    message: format!("cursor {cursor} is ahead of an empty log"),
+                }
+            };
+        }
+        Some(b) => b,
+    };
+    if cursor > max {
+        return CursorPlan::FutureCursor {
+            message: format!("cursor {cursor} is ahead of the latest event {max}"),
+        };
+    }
+    // `cursor >= min - 1` means the next event the client wants (cursor + 1)
+    // is still on disk. Below that, rows have been pruned and the client has
+    // a hole it can never fill.
+    if cursor < min - 1 {
+        return CursorPlan::OutdatedCursor {
+            from: min - 1,
+            message: format!(
+                "cursor {cursor} predates the oldest retained event {min}; \
+                 resuming from {min} — events {}..{} are gone",
+                cursor + 1,
+                min - 1
+            ),
+        };
+    }
+    CursorPlan::Replay { from: cursor }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::dag_cbor::{decode, decode_one};
+    use at_crypto::cid::cid_for_cbor;
+
+    fn sample_event() -> FirehoseEvent {
+        let commit = cid_for_cbor(b"commit block").unwrap();
+        let value = cid_for_cbor(b"record value").unwrap();
+        FirehoseEvent {
+            seq: 7,
+            did: "did:plc:alice".into(),
+            rev: "3lxxxxxxxx2".into(),
+            since: Some("3lxxxxxxxx1".into()),
+            commit,
+            blocks: build_blocks_car(
+                commit,
+                b"commit block",
+                &[(value, b"record value".to_vec())],
+            ),
+            ops: vec![RepoOp::create("app.twi.post", "3lrkey", value)],
+            time: DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339("2026-09-10T12:00:00.123456Z")
+                .unwrap()
+                .with_timezone(&Utc),
+        }
+    }
+
+    // -- frame encoding ----------------------------------------------------
+
+    #[test]
+    fn commit_frame_header_then_body() {
+        let ev = sample_event();
+        let bytes = ev.to_frame();
+        let (header, used) = decode_one(&bytes).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(header.get("op").and_then(Value::as_i64), Some(1));
+        assert_eq!(header.get("t").and_then(Value::as_str), Some("#commit"));
+        // Everything after the header is exactly one more value — no padding,
+        // no length prefix.
+        let body = decode(&bytes[used..]).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(body.get("seq").and_then(Value::as_i64), Some(7));
+        assert_eq!(
+            body.get("repo").and_then(Value::as_str),
+            Some("did:plc:alice")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(body.get("rev").and_then(Value::as_str), Some("3lxxxxxxxx2"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            body.get("since").and_then(Value::as_str),
+            Some("3lxxxxxxxx1")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(body.get("rebase").and_then(Value::as_bool), Some(false));
+        assert_eq!(body.get("tooBig").and_then(Value::as_bool), Some(false));
+        assert!(body.get("blobs").unwrap().as_array().unwrap().is_empty());
+        assert_eq!(
+            body.get("time").and_then(Value::as_str),
+            Some("2026-09-10T12:00:00.123456Z")
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// The header's exact bytes, locked in. The AppView builds its reader
+    /// against this, and canonical key ordering means `t` precedes `op` —
+    /// which is easy to get wrong and produces a frame a strict DAG-CBOR
+    /// decoder rejects.
+    #[test]
+    fn commit_header_has_the_exact_expected_bytes() {
+        let bytes = sample_event().to_frame();
+        assert_eq!(
+            &bytes[..15],
+            &[
+                0xA2, // map(2)
+                0x61, b't', // text(1) "t"
+                0x67, b'#', b'c', b'o', b'm', b'm', b'i', b't', // text(7) "#commit"
+                0x62, b'o', b'p', // text(2) "op"
+                0x01, // 1
+            ]
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn info_and_error_headers_have_the_exact_expected_bytes() {
+        let info = encode_info_frame("OutdatedCursor", "x");
+        assert_eq!(
+            &info[..12],
+            &[0xA2, 0x61, b't', 0x65, b'#', b'i', b'n', b'f', b'o', 0x62, b'o', b'p']
+        );
+        assert_eq!(info[12], 0x01);
+        // Error: map(1) { "op": -1 }. -1 is major type 1 with argument 0.
+        let err = encode_error_frame("FutureCursor", "x");
+        assert_eq!(&err[..5], &[0xA1, 0x62, b'o', b'p', 0x20]);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn commit_cid_is_a_tag_42_link_not_a_string() {
+        // The whole point of the hand-rolled encoder: `ciborium` would have
+        // written this as a string or a newtype struct.
+        let ev = sample_event();
+        let bytes = ev.to_frame();
+        let (_h, used) = decode_one(&bytes).unwrap();
+        let body = decode(&bytes[used..]).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(body.get("commit").and_then(Value::as_link), Some(&ev.commit));
+        // Locate the tag bytes directly, to prove it is not the decoder being
+        // generous: 0xD8 0x2A is tag(42).
+        assert!(
+            bytes.windows(2).any(|w| w == [0xD8, 0x2A]),
+            "frame must contain a tag-42 head"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ops_encode_action_path_and_link() {
+        let ev = sample_event();
+        let bytes = ev.to_frame();
+        let (_h, used) = decode_one(&bytes).unwrap();
+        let body = decode(&bytes[used..]).unwrap();
+        let ops = body.get("ops").unwrap().as_array().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(ops.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(ops[0].get("action").and_then(Value::as_str), Some("create"));
+        assert_eq!(
+            ops[0].get("path").and_then(Value::as_str),
+            Some("app.twi.post/3lrkey")
+        );
+        assert!(ops[0].get("cid").unwrap().as_link().is_some());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn delete_op_has_a_null_cid() {
+        let mut ev = sample_event();
+        ev.ops = vec![RepoOp::delete("app.bsky.feed.like", "3lrkey")];
+        let bytes = ev.to_frame();
+        let (_h, used) = decode_one(&bytes).unwrap();
+        let body = decode(&bytes[used..]).unwrap();
+        let ops = body.get("ops").unwrap().as_array().unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(ops[0].get("action").and_then(Value::as_str), Some("delete"));
+        assert!(ops[0].get("cid").unwrap().is_null());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn first_commit_has_a_null_since() {
+        let mut ev = sample_event();
+        ev.since = None;
+        let bytes = ev.to_frame();
+        let (_h, used) = decode_one(&bytes).unwrap();
+        let body = decode(&bytes[used..]).unwrap();
+        assert!(body.get("since").unwrap().is_null());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn blocks_is_a_parsable_car_rooted_at_the_commit() {
+        let ev = sample_event();
+        let bytes = ev.to_frame();
+        let (_h, used) = decode_one(&bytes).unwrap();
+        let body = decode(&bytes[used..]).unwrap();
+        let car = body.get("blocks").and_then(Value::as_bytes).unwrap();
+        let (header, blocks) = crate::car::parse(car).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(header.version, 1);
+        assert_eq!(header.roots, vec![ev.commit]);
+        assert_eq!(blocks.len(), 2, "commit block + one new record block");
+        assert_eq!(blocks[0].cid, ev.commit);
+        assert_eq!(blocks[0].data, b"commit block");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn info_frame_round_trips() {
+        let bytes = encode_info_frame("OutdatedCursor", "resuming from 12");
+        let (header, used) = decode_one(&bytes).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(header.get("op").and_then(Value::as_i64), Some(1));
+        assert_eq!(header.get("t").and_then(Value::as_str), Some("#info"));
+        let body = decode(&bytes[used..]).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            body.get("name").and_then(Value::as_str),
+            Some("OutdatedCursor")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            body.get("message").and_then(Value::as_str),
+            Some("resuming from 12")
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn error_frame_uses_op_minus_one_and_carries_no_t() {
+        let bytes = encode_error_frame("FutureCursor", "cursor 99 is ahead");
+        let (header, used) = decode_one(&bytes).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(header.get("op").and_then(Value::as_i64), Some(-1));
+        assert!(
+            header.get("t").is_none(),
+            "an error header carries op only"
+        );
+        let body = decode(&bytes[used..]).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            body.get("error").and_then(Value::as_str),
+            Some("FutureCursor")
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            body.get("message").and_then(Value::as_str),
+            Some("cursor 99 is ahead")
+        );
+    }
+
+    // -- ops derivation ----------------------------------------------------
+
+    #[test]
+    fn put_picks_create_or_update_from_prior_existence() {
+        let cid = cid_for_cbor(b"v").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            RepoOp::put("c", "r", cid, false).action,
+            RepoOpAction::Create
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            RepoOp::put("c", "r", cid, true).action,
+            RepoOpAction::Update
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn op_path_is_collection_slash_rkey() {
+        let cid = cid_for_cbor(b"v").unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(
+            RepoOp::create("app.bsky.feed.repost", "3lk", cid).path,
+            "app.bsky.feed.repost/3lk"
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn op_json_round_trips_through_the_jsonb_shape() {
+        let cid = cid_for_cbor(b"v").unwrap();
+        for op in [
+            RepoOp::create("app.twi.post", "a", cid),
+            RepoOp::update("app.bsky.actor.profile", "self", cid),
+            RepoOp::delete("app.bsky.graph.follow", "b"),
+        ] {
+            let back = RepoOp::from_json(&op.to_json()).unwrap();
+            assert_eq!(back, op);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn op_json_rejects_an_unknown_action() {
+        let v = json!({"action": "rebase", "path": "a/b", "cid": null});
+        assert!(RepoOp::from_json(&v).is_err());
+    }
+
+    // -- cursor edge cases -------------------------------------------------
+
+    #[test]
+    fn no_cursor_is_live_only() {
+        assert_eq!(plan_cursor(None, Some((1, 10))), CursorPlan::LiveOnly);
+        assert_eq!(plan_cursor(None, None), CursorPlan::LiveOnly);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cursor_zero_replays_everything() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            plan_cursor(Some(0), Some((1, 10))),
+            CursorPlan::Replay { from: 0 }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cursor_at_the_head_is_an_empty_replay_not_an_error() {
+        // The client is fully caught up. Replaying `seq > 10` yields nothing
+        // and it goes straight live — that must not be a FutureCursor.
+        assert_eq!(
+            plan_cursor(Some(10), Some((1, 10))),
+            CursorPlan::Replay { from: 10 }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cursor_past_the_head_is_a_future_cursor() {
+        assert!(matches!(
+            plan_cursor(Some(11), Some((1, 10))),
+            CursorPlan::FutureCursor { .. }
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn negative_cursor_is_a_future_cursor() {
+        assert!(matches!(
+            plan_cursor(Some(-1), Some((1, 10))),
+            CursorPlan::FutureCursor { .. }
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn empty_log_accepts_zero_and_refuses_anything_else() {
+        assert_eq!(plan_cursor(Some(0), None), CursorPlan::Replay { from: 0 });
+        assert!(matches!(
+            plan_cursor(Some(1), None),
+            CursorPlan::FutureCursor { .. }
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cursor_exactly_one_below_the_oldest_row_is_still_exact() {
+        // min = 5 means seq 5 is the oldest surviving event. A client whose
+        // cursor is 4 wants 5 next — nothing is missing.
+        assert_eq!(
+            plan_cursor(Some(4), Some((5, 10))),
+            CursorPlan::Replay { from: 4 }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn cursor_below_the_pruned_window_is_outdated() {
+        match plan_cursor(Some(2), Some((5, 10))) {
+            CursorPlan::OutdatedCursor { from, message } => {
+                assert_eq!(from, 4, "resume so the next delivered event is 5");
+                assert!(message.contains('5'), "message should name the gap: {message}");
+            }
+            other => panic!("expected OutdatedCursor, got {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+}

crates/pds-server/src/invite.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,684 @@
+//! Invite codes: minting, listing, and the single redeem operation that
+//! `com.atproto.server.createAccount` calls.
+//!
+//! # Why this exists
+//!
+//! `createAccount` had no gate at all. That was fine while the PDS only
+//! answered on `127.0.0.1:2583`; it is not fine on a public name, because
+//! each accepted account allocates a repo head, a server-held key pair, an
+//! MST that grows with every write, and a stream of firehose events every
+//! subscribed AppView is obliged to index. Invite codes are the smallest
+//! gate that turns "anyone with curl" into "anyone the operator handed a
+//! string to".
+//!
+//! The gate is off by default (`PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED`, see
+//! [`at_shared::config`]) so the existing test suites and dev instances
+//! keep creating throwaway accounts; `main` warns loudly on every boot
+//! where it is off.
+//!
+//! # Where codes come from
+//!
+//! Nowhere over HTTP. Minting lives in the `pds-server invite` subcommand
+//! ([`run_cli`]), which the operator runs on the box. Adding a
+//! `createInviteCode` endpoint would mean the thing that guards
+//! registration is itself reachable by whoever can reach registration —
+//! at which point it guards nothing, and the only question left is
+//! whether *its* auth has a hole. A subcommand has no attack surface to
+//! get wrong.
+//!
+//! # The one interesting piece of code in here
+//!
+//! [`redeem`] is a single conditional `UPDATE … RETURNING`, not a
+//! `SELECT`-then-`UPDATE`. See its docs and
+//! `migrations/pds/0004_invite_codes.sql` for why that distinction is the
+//! whole feature.
+
+use rand::rngs::OsRng;
+use rand::RngCore;
+use sqlx::{PgPool, Postgres, Transaction};
+
+/// Alphabet the codes are drawn from: Crockford base32, lowercased.
+///
+/// Exactly 32 symbols, which is the property that matters — it lets each
+/// character consume exactly 5 bits of entropy with no modulo bias, so
+/// every code in the space is equally likely. A 31- or 36-character
+/// "human friendly" alphabet would need rejection sampling to say the
+/// same thing, and the usual `byte % len` shortcut would quietly make
+/// some characters more probable than others.
+///
+/// The excluded letters are Crockford's: `i`, `l`, `o` and `u`. The
+/// first three are the ones people mistype as `1`, `1` and `0` when
+/// copying a code out of a chat message; `u` is dropped so a random draw
+/// cannot spell something the operator has to apologise for.
+const CODE_ALPHABET: &[u8; 32] = b"0123456789abcdefghjkmnpqrstvwxyz";
+
+/// Characters per group, and groups per code. Two groups of five is
+/// 50 bits of entropy — far past anything an online guesser can reach
+/// against a database round-trip per attempt, and short enough to read
+/// aloud.
+const GROUP_LEN: usize = 5;
+const GROUPS: usize = 2;
+
+/// Fixed prefix so a code is recognisable as one when it turns up out of
+/// context (a support ticket, a pasted log line) and so it cannot be
+/// confused with a handle or a DID.
+const CODE_PREFIX: &str = "mt";
+
+/// Why a redemption was refused.
+///
+/// Deliberately coarse. The route maps [`RedeemError::Invalid`] to a
+/// single `400 InvalidInviteCode` with one fixed message, so an
+/// unauthenticated caller cannot use the error text to distinguish
+/// "no such code" from "that code exists but is used up" — which would
+/// turn the endpoint into an oracle for probing the code space.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub enum RedeemError {
+    /// Unknown, disabled, or already at its use limit. One variant on
+    /// purpose: see the type docs.
+    Invalid,
+    /// The database itself failed. Distinct from [`RedeemError::Invalid`]
+    /// because this is a `500`, not a `400` — refusing a legitimate code
+    /// because Postgres hiccuped would be a lie to the user.
+    Db(sqlx::Error),
+}
+
+impl std::fmt::Display for RedeemError {
+    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            RedeemError::Invalid => write!(f, "invite code is not valid"),
+            RedeemError::Db(e) => write!(f, "invite lookup failed: {e}"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Normalise a client-supplied code into the form stored in the table.
+///
+/// Trims surrounding whitespace (people paste codes with a trailing
+/// newline out of a terminal) and lowercases. Every generated code is
+/// already lowercase ASCII, so this is an exact normalisation — which is
+/// what lets [`redeem`] look the code up with a plain `code = $1` and
+/// hit the primary-key index, instead of `lower(code) = $1`, which
+/// would force a sequential scan on the one query that runs per
+/// registration attempt.
+///
+/// Returns `None` for a code that is empty after trimming, so "field
+/// present but blank" and "field absent" reach the route as the same
+/// case.
+pub fn normalize(raw: &str) -> Option<String> {
+    let trimmed = raw.trim();
+    if trimmed.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+    Some(trimmed.to_ascii_lowercase())
+}
+
+/// Generate one cryptographically random invite code, e.g.
+/// `mt-7k3qw-z9d2m`.
+///
+/// Randomness comes from [`OsRng`] — the same source
+/// `keys::generate_user_keys` and `password::hash_password` already use
+/// in this crate, i.e. the OS CSPRNG, never a seeded or thread-local
+/// generator. A code is a bearer credential for creating an account on
+/// this server; a predictable one is the same bug as a predictable
+/// password-reset token.
+///
+/// Entropy: [`GROUPS`] × [`GROUP_LEN`] characters × 5 bits = 50 bits.
+pub fn generate_code() -> String {
+    let total = GROUPS * GROUP_LEN;
+    let mut bytes = vec![0u8; total];
+    OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut bytes);
+
+    let mut out = String::with_capacity(CODE_PREFIX.len() + total + GROUPS);
+    out.push_str(CODE_PREFIX);
+    for chunk in bytes.chunks(GROUP_LEN) {
+        out.push('-');
+        for b in chunk {
+            // Take the low 5 bits of a uniformly random byte. The
+            // alphabet is exactly 32 symbols, so this is a bijection
+            // from 5 bits onto it — no bias, no rejection loop.
+            out.push(CODE_ALPHABET[(*b & 0b0001_1111) as usize] as char);
+        }
+    }
+    out
+}
+
+/// Consume one use of `code` on behalf of the account `did` / `handle`.
+///
+/// **This must be called with the same transaction that creates the
+/// account.** The whole point is that a code is spent if and only if an
+/// account was actually created: if the caller's transaction rolls back
+/// — handle taken, key generation failed, anything — the counter goes
+/// back with it and the code is still redeemable. `create_account`
+/// therefore begins its transaction, redeems here, inserts `users` and
+/// `repos`, and only then commits.
+///
+/// # The race, and why there isn't one
+///
+/// The tempting implementation is: `SELECT used_count, max_uses …`,
+/// compare in Rust, then `UPDATE`. That is a check-then-act. Two
+/// registrations arriving together on a code with one use left both read
+/// `used_count = 0`, both conclude they may proceed, and both write
+/// `used_count = 1`. Two accounts, one use — and the row afterwards
+/// claims it was redeemed once, so nothing even shows up as wrong.
+///
+/// Instead the check *is* the write:
+///
+/// ```sql
+/// UPDATE invite_codes
+///    SET used_count = used_count + 1
+///  WHERE code = $1 AND NOT disabled AND used_count < max_uses
+/// RETURNING used_count, max_uses
+/// ```
+///
+/// Postgres serialises the two statements on the row lock. The loser
+/// blocks until the winner commits, and then — this is the part that
+/// makes it work — does *not* continue with its old snapshot: it
+/// re-fetches the committed row and re-evaluates the `WHERE` clause
+/// against it (EvalPlanQual). `used_count` is now `1`, the predicate is
+/// false, the row is dropped from the update set, and the statement
+/// affects zero rows. Zero rows is the rejection. This function never
+/// forms an opinion about validity that could be stale by the time it
+/// acts on it, because it never looks before it writes.
+///
+/// The `invite_code_uses` insert that follows is inside the same
+/// transaction and the same row lock, so the counter and the audit rows
+/// cannot drift apart.
+pub async fn redeem(
+    tx: &mut Transaction<'_, Postgres>,
+    code: &str,
+    did: &str,
+    handle: &str,
+) -> Result<(), RedeemError> {
+    let normalized = match normalize(code) {
+        Some(c) => c,
+        None => return Err(RedeemError::Invalid),
+    };
+
+    // One statement, and its row count is the verdict.
+    let claimed: Option<(i32, i32)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        r#"UPDATE invite_codes
+              SET used_count = used_count + 1
+            WHERE code = $1
+              AND NOT disabled
+              AND used_count < max_uses
+        RETURNING used_count, max_uses"#,
+    )
+    .bind(&normalized)
+    .fetch_optional(&mut **tx)
+    .await
+    .map_err(RedeemError::Db)?;
+
+    if claimed.is_none() {
+        return Err(RedeemError::Invalid);
+    }
+
+    // Audit trail: which account this code produced. Same transaction,
+    // so it lands exactly when the counter increment does.
+    //
+    // The `(code, did)` primary key makes a duplicate impossible; a
+    // conflict here would mean the same DID redeemed the same code
+    // twice in one registration, which cannot happen but would corrupt
+    // the counter/uses agreement if it did — so let it be an error
+    // rather than silently ignoring it.
+    sqlx::query(
+        r#"INSERT INTO invite_code_uses (code, did, handle)
+           VALUES ($1, $2, $3)"#,
+    )
+    .bind(&normalized)
+    .bind(did)
+    .bind(handle)
+    .execute(&mut **tx)
+    .await
+    .map_err(RedeemError::Db)?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+// =====================================================
+// CLI: `pds-server invite …`
+// =====================================================
+
+/// One row of `invite list`, and the shape `create` hands back.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct InviteRow {
+    pub code: String,
+    pub max_uses: i32,
+    pub used_count: i32,
+    pub disabled: bool,
+    pub note: Option<String>,
+    pub created_at: chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>,
+}
+
+/// What a parsed `invite` command line asks for.
+///
+/// Parsed out of `std::env::args` by hand. The workspace has no
+/// argument-parsing dependency and this subcommand is not worth adding
+/// one for: three verbs, three flags, and a hand-rolled parser that is
+/// small enough to unit-test exhaustively (which it is, below) beats a
+/// derive macro plus a new crate in the dependency tree of a server
+/// binary.
+#[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
+pub enum InviteCommand {
+    /// `invite create [--count N] [--uses N] [--note TEXT]`
+    Create {
+        count: u32,
+        uses: i32,
+        note: Option<String>,
+    },
+    /// `invite list [--all]` — without `--all`, spent and disabled codes
+    /// are hidden, because the question the operator almost always has
+    /// is "what can I still hand out".
+    List { all: bool },
+    /// `invite disable <code>` — stop honouring a code without losing
+    /// the record of which accounts it already created.
+    Disable { code: String },
+}
+
+/// Usage text. Printed for `invite help`, and for anything that fails to
+/// parse.
+pub const INVITE_USAGE: &str = "\
+usage: pds-server invite <command>
+
+  create [--count N] [--uses N] [--note TEXT]
+      Mint N codes (default 1), each good for `--uses` accounts
+      (default 1). Prints one code per line and nothing else, so the
+      output can be piped or pasted directly.
+
+  list [--all]
+      Show codes that can still be redeemed. --all includes spent and
+      disabled ones.
+
+  disable <code>
+      Stop honouring a code. The record of accounts it already created
+      is kept.
+
+The database is the one named by DATABASE_URL_PDS (read from .env like
+the server does). Codes are only meaningful while PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED
+is true.";
+
+/// Parse the arguments after the `invite` verb.
+///
+/// Returns `Err(message)` for anything malformed; the caller prints the
+/// message plus [`INVITE_USAGE`] and exits non-zero. Unknown flags are
+/// an error rather than being ignored — a typo'd `--uses` that silently
+/// became `1` would hand out the wrong codes and the operator would only
+/// find out when the second person to use one got a `400`.
+pub fn parse_invite_args(args: &[String]) -> Result<InviteCommand, String> {
+    let verb = args
+        .first()
+        .map(|s| s.as_str())
+        .ok_or_else(|| "missing invite command".to_string())?;
+    let rest = &args[1..];
+
+    match verb {
+        "create" => {
+            let mut count: u32 = 1;
+            let mut uses: i32 = 1;
+            let mut note: Option<String> = None;
+            let mut i = 0;
+            while i < rest.len() {
+                match rest[i].as_str() {
+                    "--count" => {
+                        let v = rest
+                            .get(i + 1)
+                            .ok_or_else(|| "--count needs a value".to_string())?;
+                        count = v
+                            .parse()
+                            .map_err(|_| format!("--count: not a number: {v}"))?;
+                        if count == 0 {
+                            return Err("--count must be at least 1".to_string());
+                        }
+                        i += 2;
+                    }
+                    "--uses" => {
+                        let v = rest
+                            .get(i + 1)
+                            .ok_or_else(|| "--uses needs a value".to_string())?;
+                        uses = v
+                            .parse()
+                            .map_err(|_| format!("--uses: not a number: {v}"))?;
+                        // Mirrors the table's CHECK (max_uses > 0). Caught
+                        // here so the operator gets a sentence instead of a
+                        // constraint-violation dump.
+                        if uses < 1 {
+                            return Err("--uses must be at least 1".to_string());
+                        }
+                        i += 2;
+                    }
+                    "--note" => {
+                        let v = rest
+                            .get(i + 1)
+                            .ok_or_else(|| "--note needs a value".to_string())?;
+                        note = Some(v.clone());
+                        i += 2;
+                    }
+                    other => return Err(format!("unknown option for `create`: {other}")),
+                }
+            }
+            Ok(InviteCommand::Create { count, uses, note })
+        }
+        "list" => {
+            let mut all = false;
+            for a in rest {
+                match a.as_str() {
+                    "--all" => all = true,
+                    other => return Err(format!("unknown option for `list`: {other}")),
+                }
+            }
+            Ok(InviteCommand::List { all })
+        }
+        "disable" => {
+            let code = rest
+                .first()
+                .ok_or_else(|| "disable needs a code".to_string())?;
+            if rest.len() > 1 {
+                return Err("disable takes exactly one code".to_string());
+            }
+            let code = normalize(code).ok_or_else(|| "disable needs a code".to_string())?;
+            Ok(InviteCommand::Disable { code })
+        }
+        other => Err(format!("unknown invite command: {other}")),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Insert `count` freshly generated codes, each good for `uses`
+/// accounts.
+///
+/// Retries on a primary-key collision. With 50 bits per code a
+/// collision is not something that will happen, but "not something that
+/// will happen" is exactly the class of event that turns into a
+/// confusing `duplicate key` traceback at 2am, and the retry costs three
+/// lines.
+pub async fn create_codes(
+    db: &PgPool,
+    count: u32,
+    uses: i32,
+    note: Option<&str>,
+) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<String>> {
+    let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(count as usize);
+    for _ in 0..count {
+        let mut attempt = 0;
+        loop {
+            let code = generate_code();
+            let inserted = sqlx::query(
+                r#"INSERT INTO invite_codes (code, max_uses, note)
+                   VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
+                   ON CONFLICT (code) DO NOTHING"#,
+            )
+            .bind(&code)
+            .bind(uses)
+            .bind(note)
+            .execute(db)
+            .await?
+            .rows_affected();
+            if inserted == 1 {
+                out.push(code);
+                break;
+            }
+            attempt += 1;
+            if attempt >= 5 {
+                anyhow::bail!("could not find a free invite code after 5 attempts");
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(out)
+}
+
+/// Read back codes for `invite list`.
+pub async fn list_codes(db: &PgPool, all: bool) -> anyhow::Result<Vec<InviteRow>> {
+    // Two statements rather than one with a `$1`-toggled predicate:
+    // the redeemable filter is exactly the redeem query's `WHERE`
+    // clause, and keeping it spelled the same way makes it obvious that
+    // `list` shows what `redeem` would accept.
+    let sql = if all {
+        r#"SELECT code, max_uses, used_count, disabled, note, created_at
+             FROM invite_codes
+         ORDER BY created_at DESC"#
+    } else {
+        r#"SELECT code, max_uses, used_count, disabled, note, created_at
+             FROM invite_codes
+            WHERE NOT disabled AND used_count < max_uses
+         ORDER BY created_at DESC"#
+    };
+    let rows: Vec<(String, i32, i32, bool, Option<String>, chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>)> =
+        sqlx::query_as(sql).fetch_all(db).await?;
+    Ok(rows
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(
+            |(code, max_uses, used_count, disabled, note, created_at)| InviteRow {
+                code,
+                max_uses,
+                used_count,
+                disabled,
+                note,
+                created_at,
+            },
+        )
+        .collect())
+}
+
+/// Flip `disabled` on one code. Returns `false` if there is no such
+/// code, so the CLI can say so instead of reporting a successful no-op.
+pub async fn disable_code(db: &PgPool, code: &str) -> anyhow::Result<bool> {
+    let n = sqlx::query("UPDATE invite_codes SET disabled = TRUE WHERE code = $1")
+        .bind(code)
+        .execute(db)
+        .await?
+        .rows_affected();
+    Ok(n == 1)
+}
+
+/// Run the `invite` subcommand end to end: parse, connect, act, print.
+///
+/// Connects with the same `DATABASE_URL_PDS` and runs the same
+/// migrations as [`crate::main`], so `invite create` works on a fresh
+/// checkout before the server has ever been started — otherwise the
+/// first thing an operator does after deploying would fail with
+/// "relation invite_codes does not exist".
+pub async fn run_cli(args: &[String]) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
+    if matches!(args.first().map(|s| s.as_str()), None | Some("help") | Some("-h") | Some("--help"))
+    {
+        println!("{INVITE_USAGE}");
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let cmd = match parse_invite_args(args) {
+        Ok(c) => c,
+        Err(msg) => {
+            eprintln!("pds-server invite: {msg}\n\n{INVITE_USAGE}");
+            std::process::exit(2);
+        }
+    };
+
+    let cfg = at_shared::config::AppConfig::from_env()?;
+    let db = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
+        .max_connections(2)
+        .acquire_timeout(std::time::Duration::from_secs(10))
+        .connect(&cfg.database_url_pds)
+        .await?;
+    sqlx::migrate!("../../migrations/pds").run(&db).await?;
+
+    match cmd {
+        InviteCommand::Create { count, uses, note } => {
+            let codes = create_codes(&db, count, uses, note.as_deref()).await?;
+            // Bare codes, one per line, nothing else on stdout — the
+            // operator pipes this into a message or a file. Anything
+            // decorative here would have to be stripped by hand.
+            for c in &codes {
+                println!("{c}");
+            }
+            if !cfg.pds_invite_required {
+                // Not an error: minting codes before flipping the switch
+                // is the correct order of operations. But an operator
+                // who thinks they have just closed registration should
+                // find out now.
+                eprintln!(
+                    "note: PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED is not true — createAccount currently \
+                     accepts requests without any code."
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        InviteCommand::List { all } => {
+            let rows = list_codes(&db, all).await?;
+            if rows.is_empty() {
+                eprintln!("no invite codes");
+            }
+            for r in rows {
+                let state = if r.disabled {
+                    "disabled"
+                } else if r.used_count >= r.max_uses {
+                    "spent"
+                } else {
+                    "open"
+                };
+                println!(
+                    "{}  {}/{}  {}  {}  {}",
+                    r.code,
+                    r.used_count,
+                    r.max_uses,
+                    state,
+                    r.created_at.format("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ"),
+                    r.note.as_deref().unwrap_or("")
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        InviteCommand::Disable { code } => {
+            if disable_code(&db, &code).await? {
+                println!("disabled {code}");
+            } else {
+                eprintln!("no such invite code: {code}");
+                std::process::exit(1);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+// -- tests -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::collections::HashSet;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn generated_codes_use_only_the_safe_alphabet() {
+        let code = generate_code();
+        // `mt-xxxxx-xxxxx`
+        assert!(code.starts_with("mt-"), "code = {code}");
+        let groups: Vec<&str> = code.split('-').collect();
+        assert_eq!(groups.len(), GROUPS + 1, "code = {code}");
+        assert_eq!(groups[0], CODE_PREFIX);
+        for g in &groups[1..] {
+            assert_eq!(g.len(), GROUP_LEN, "group {g} in {code}");
+            for ch in g.chars() {
+                assert!(
+                    CODE_ALPHABET.contains(&(ch as u8)),
+                    "character {ch:?} in {code} is outside the alphabet"
+                );
+            }
+        }
+        // The letters people mistype must never appear.
+        for bad in ['i', 'l', 'o', 'u'] {
+            assert!(!code[3..].contains(bad), "{code} contains {bad}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn generated_codes_do_not_repeat() {
+        // Not a randomness test — a 1000-draw collision would mean the
+        // generator is returning a constant or reusing a seeded RNG,
+        // which is the failure mode that actually happens when someone
+        // swaps `OsRng` for `thread_rng` with a fixed seed in a test
+        // helper.
+        let mut seen = HashSet::new();
+        for _ in 0..1000 {
+            assert!(seen.insert(generate_code()), "duplicate code in 1000 draws");
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn normalize_trims_and_lowercases() {
+        assert_eq!(normalize("  MT-ABCDE-FGHJK \n").as_deref(), Some("mt-abcde-fghjk"));
+        assert_eq!(normalize("mt-abcde-fghjk").as_deref(), Some("mt-abcde-fghjk"));
+        // Absent and blank must be indistinguishable to the route.
+        assert_eq!(normalize(""), None);
+        assert_eq!(normalize("   "), None);
+        assert_eq!(normalize("\t\n"), None);
+    }
+
+    fn args(v: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
+        v.iter().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parses_create_with_defaults_and_flags() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_invite_args(&args(&["create"])).unwrap(),
+            InviteCommand::Create {
+                count: 1,
+                uses: 1,
+                note: None
+            }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_invite_args(&args(&["create", "--count", "5", "--uses", "1"])).unwrap(),
+            InviteCommand::Create {
+                count: 5,
+                uses: 1,
+                note: None
+            }
+        );
+        // Order must not matter, and --note takes the next argument
+        // verbatim (spaces included).
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_invite_args(&args(&["create", "--note", "meetup 2026", "--uses", "3"])).unwrap(),
+            InviteCommand::Create {
+                count: 1,
+                uses: 3,
+                note: Some("meetup 2026".to_string())
+            }
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_malformed_create_flags() {
+        // A typo'd flag must not be silently ignored — that would hand
+        // out codes with the default limits.
+        assert!(parse_invite_args(&args(&["create", "--use", "3"])).is_err());
+        assert!(parse_invite_args(&args(&["create", "--count"])).is_err());
+        assert!(parse_invite_args(&args(&["create", "--count", "x"])).is_err());
+        assert!(parse_invite_args(&args(&["create", "--count", "0"])).is_err());
+        // max_uses > 0 is a table constraint; catch it before Postgres does.
+        assert!(parse_invite_args(&args(&["create", "--uses", "0"])).is_err());
+        assert!(parse_invite_args(&args(&["create", "--uses", "-2"])).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn parses_list_and_disable() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_invite_args(&args(&["list"])).unwrap(),
+            InviteCommand::List { all: false }
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_invite_args(&args(&["list", "--all"])).unwrap(),
+            InviteCommand::List { all: true }
+        );
+        assert!(parse_invite_args(&args(&["list", "--everything"])).is_err());
+        // `disable` normalises the code the same way redeem does, so an
+        // operator pasting a shouted code still disables the right row.
+        assert_eq!(
+            parse_invite_args(&args(&["disable", " MT-ABCDE-FGHJK "])).unwrap(),
+            InviteCommand::Disable {
+                code: "mt-abcde-fghjk".to_string()
+            }
+        );
+        assert!(parse_invite_args(&args(&["disable"])).is_err());
+        assert!(parse_invite_args(&args(&["disable", "a", "b"])).is_err());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn rejects_unknown_verb_and_empty_args() {
+        assert!(parse_invite_args(&args(&[])).is_err());
+        assert!(parse_invite_args(&args(&["destroy"])).is_err());
+    }
+}

crates/pds-server/src/jwt_issuer.rs

@@ -39,9 +39,18 @@ pub fn issue_access_jwt(
     let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
     let exp = now + 3600;
     let claims = JwtClaims {
-        iss: format!("did:web:{}", cfg.pds_public_url.trim_start_matches("http://").trim_start_matches("https://")),
+        // Same derivation as `describeServer` and `/.well-known/did.json`
+        // (`AppConfig::pds_did`), so a verifier can take `iss`, resolve
+        // the did:web document and arrive at the key this token is
+        // signed with. The previous inline version dropped the
+        // percent-encoding of the port, producing an `iss` that no
+        // did:web resolver could follow.
+        iss: cfg.pds_did(),
         sub: did.to_string(),
-        aud: "did:web:appview.maarcadetweet.local".into(),
+        // The AppView this token is meant for. Derived from
+        // `APPVIEW_PUBLIC_URL` rather than hardcoded, so the AppView can
+        // check it against its own identity (`AppConfig::appview_did`).
+        aud: cfg.appview_did(),
         iat: now,
         exp,
         jti: Some(uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string()),

crates/pds-server/src/main.rs

@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@
 mod appview_push;
 mod car;
+mod dag_cbor;
+mod firehose;
+mod invite;
 mod jwt_issuer;
 mod keys;
 mod password;
@@ -15,6 +18,16 @@ use serde_json::json;
 use tracing::{info, warn};
 use tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter;
 
+/// Usage line for the binary itself. The subcommands are operator
+/// tooling; the no-argument form is the server, which is what every
+/// deploy script and systemd unit invokes.
+const USAGE: &str = "\
+usage: pds-server [command]
+
+  (no command)   run the PDS server
+  invite …       manage invite codes (see `pds-server invite help`)
+  help           show this message";
+
 #[tokio::main]
 async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     // Load `.env` from the working directory (and upwards) if present.
@@ -23,11 +36,57 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     // PDS_HOST`. Real environment variables always win over the file.
     let _ = dotenvy::dotenv();
 
-    tracing_subscriber::fmt()
-        .with_env_filter(EnvFilter::try_from_default_env().unwrap_or_else(|_| EnvFilter::new("info")))
-        .init();
+    // Argument dispatch, by hand.
+    //
+    // The workspace carries no argument-parsing crate and this does not
+    // justify adding one: exactly one subcommand exists, and the
+    // overwhelmingly common invocation is the bare binary. Anything we
+    // do not recognise is an error rather than being ignored — a
+    // mistyped `pds-server invit create` that silently booted a server
+    // would look like it worked and mint no codes.
+    let args: Vec<String> = std::env::args().skip(1).collect();
+    match args.first().map(|s| s.as_str()) {
+        None => {}
+        Some("invite") => {
+            // CLI output is meant to be read and pasted, so keep the
+            // log stream quiet unless the operator asked for it. Without
+            // this, `sqlx::migrate` chatters over the codes.
+            init_tracing("warn");
+            return invite::run_cli(&args[1..]).await;
+        }
+        Some("help") | Some("-h") | Some("--help") => {
+            println!("{USAGE}");
+            return Ok(());
+        }
+        Some(other) => {
+            eprintln!("pds-server: unknown command: {other}\n\n{USAGE}");
+            std::process::exit(2);
+        }
+    }
+
+    init_tracing("info");
 
     let cfg = at_shared::config::AppConfig::from_env()?;
+
+    // Announce the relaxed security posture before we bind a port.
+    //
+    // `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED` is the only switch in `AppConfig` that
+    // defaults to *open* (so the integration suites and dev instances
+    // can keep creating throwaway accounts), which makes this warning
+    // the only thing standing between "we made the PDS public" and
+    // "anyone on the internet can mint repos on our disk". Mirrors
+    // `appview`'s `auth::log_startup_posture`.
+    if !cfg.pds_invite_required {
+        warn!(
+            "PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED is not true — com.atproto.server.createAccount accepts \
+             ANY caller, and every accepted account allocates a repo, a server-held key \
+             pair and firehose events. Fine on a private/dev instance; on a publicly \
+             reachable PDS set PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true and hand out codes with \
+             `pds-server invite create`."
+        );
+    } else {
+        info!("PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true — createAccount requires a valid invite code");
+    }
     let db = sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
         .max_connections(32)
         .min_connections(2)
@@ -69,10 +128,26 @@ async fn main() -> anyhow::Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Install the tracing subscriber, with `default_filter` as the level
+/// when `RUST_LOG` says nothing.
+///
+/// Factored out because the two entry points want different defaults:
+/// the server wants `info`, the `invite` subcommand wants `warn` so that
+/// migration chatter does not land in the middle of a list of codes the
+/// operator is about to copy.
+fn init_tracing(default_filter: &str) {
+    tracing_subscriber::fmt()
+        .with_env_filter(
+            EnvFilter::try_from_default_env().unwrap_or_else(|_| EnvFilter::new(default_filter)),
+        )
+        .init();
+}
+
 pub fn router(state: AppState) -> Router {
     Router::new()
         .route("/", get(root))
         .route("/healthz", get(healthz))
+        .route("/.well-known/did.json", get(did_document))
         .route(
             "/xrpc/com.atproto.server.describeServer",
             get(describe_server),
@@ -145,6 +220,13 @@ pub fn router(state: AppState) -> Router {
             "/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.getBlob",
             get(routes::blob::get_blob),
         )
+        // The firehose. A WebSocket upgrade arrives as a plain GET, so this
+        // is a normal `get` route whose handler happens to return an
+        // upgrade response.
+        .route(
+            "/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos",
+            get(routes::subscribe_repos::subscribe_repos),
+        )
         .route(
             "/blob/:cid",
             get(routes::blob::get_blob_by_cid),
@@ -163,15 +245,80 @@ async fn healthz() -> Json<serde_json::Value> {
     Json(json!({ "ok": true }))
 }
 
+/// `GET /.well-known/did.json` — the PDS's own DID document.
+///
+/// This is how the AppView (and any other relying party) learns the
+/// P-256 public key that the access JWTs in
+/// `Authorization: Bearer …` are signed with. Without it the AppView
+/// could not verify a token at all, and the only alternative would be
+/// shipping `PDS_JWT_SECRET` to a second service — a private signing
+/// key crossing a service boundary, for a check that needs nothing but
+/// the public half.
+///
+/// Nothing in this response is secret. `publicKeyMultibase` is the
+/// uncompressed P-256 point derived from `PDS_JWT_SECRET` by
+/// [`jwt_issuer::server_p256_public_multibase`]; the secret itself
+/// never leaves this process.
+///
+/// The document id is [`AppConfig::pds_did`], i.e. it follows
+/// `PDS_PUBLIC_URL` — so a `did:web:` resolver that starts from the DID,
+/// rebuilds the URL and fetches this path lands back here rather than at
+/// some other host's document.
+async fn did_document(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Result<Json<serde_json::Value>, (axum::http::StatusCode, Json<serde_json::Value>)> {
+    let did = state.cfg.pds_did();
+    let public_multibase = jwt_issuer::server_p256_public_multibase(&state.cfg).map_err(|e| {
+        // A malformed `PDS_JWT_SECRET` is the one way this fails, and
+        // it is exactly the failure that also breaks every token this
+        // server issues — surface it instead of publishing a document
+        // with a missing key.
+        (
+            axum::http::StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            Json(json!({
+                "error": "InternalServerError",
+                "message": format!("server key unavailable: {e}"),
+            })),
+        )
+    })?;
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "@context": [
+            "https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1",
+            "https://w3id.org/security/multikey/v1",
+        ],
+        "id": did,
+        "verificationMethod": [{
+            // `#atproto` is the fragment AT Proto uses for a repo's
+            // signing key; we reuse it for the server key so a generic
+            // did:web consumer finds it in the usual place.
+            "id": format!("{did}#atproto"),
+            "type": "Multikey",
+            "controller": did,
+            "publicKeyMultibase": public_multibase,
+        }],
+        "service": [{
+            "id": "#atproto_pds",
+            "type": "AtprotoPersonalDataServer",
+            "serviceEndpoint": state.cfg.pds_public_url,
+        }],
+    })))
+}
+
 async fn describe_server(State(state): State<AppState>) -> Json<DescribeServerResp> {
     Json(DescribeServerResp {
-        did: "did:web:pds.maarcadetweet.local".into(),
+        // Derived from `PDS_PUBLIC_URL`, never hardcoded — see
+        // `AppConfig::pds_did`. The same value ids the document at
+        // `/.well-known/did.json`.
+        did: state.cfg.pds_did(),
         available_user_domains: vec![state
             .cfg
             .pds_handle_dns_zone
             .trim_start_matches('.')
             .to_string()],
-        invite_code_required: false,
+        // The real switch, not a hardcoded `false`. A client reads this
+        // to decide whether to ask the user for a code *before*
+        // collecting a handle and password — advertising `false` on a
+        // server that then answers `400 InvalidInviteCode` sends the
+        // user back to the start of a form they already filled in.
+        invite_code_required: state.cfg.pds_invite_required,
         links: json!({
             "termsOfService": null,
             "privacyPolicy": null,

crates/pds-server/src/routes/auth.rs

@@ -93,6 +93,55 @@ pub async fn create_account(
 
     let mut tx = state.db.begin().await.map_err(|e| internal(e))?;
 
+    // Invite gate.
+    //
+    // Inside the transaction, and *first* inside it, for two reasons.
+    //
+    // Inside, because the code must be spent if and only if an account
+    // was really created. Redeeming before `begin()` (or in a
+    // transaction of its own) would burn a code every time the INSERT
+    // below hit the `users.handle` unique index — a user who lost a
+    // handle race would also lose their invite, with nothing to show
+    // for it. Everything from here to `tx.commit()` rolls back together.
+    //
+    // First, because `invite::redeem` takes the code row's lock, and
+    // holding it across the account INSERTs is what serialises two
+    // registrations that present the same last remaining use. See
+    // `invite::redeem` for how the conditional UPDATE turns that lock
+    // into a correct decision rather than a stale one.
+    //
+    // Note this runs after the handle/password validation above, so a
+    // malformed request is rejected without touching a code at all.
+    if state.cfg.pds_invite_required {
+        let supplied = req
+            .invite_code
+            .as_deref()
+            .and_then(crate::invite::normalize);
+        match supplied {
+            None => return Err(invalid_invite_code()),
+            Some(code) => {
+                if let Err(e) =
+                    crate::invite::redeem(&mut tx, &code, &did, &req.handle).await
+                {
+                    return match e {
+                        crate::invite::RedeemError::Invalid => {
+                            // Deliberately not logged with the code at
+                            // info level: a public endpoint that echoes
+                            // every guessed code into the log is a way
+                            // to fill the disk from outside.
+                            warn!(
+                                handle = %req.handle,
+                                "createAccount rejected: invite code invalid, disabled or spent"
+                            );
+                            Err(invalid_invite_code())
+                        }
+                        crate::invite::RedeemError::Db(db_err) => Err(internal(db_err)),
+                    };
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     sqlx::query(
         r#"INSERT INTO users (did, handle, email, password_hash, signing_key, rotation_key)
            VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)"#,
@@ -306,6 +355,28 @@ pub async fn refresh_session(
     }))
 }
 
+/// The one error a failed invite check produces.
+///
+/// Same `(StatusCode, Json<ErrorBody>)` shape every other route in this
+/// module returns, so a client parses it with the code it already has:
+/// `{"error": "InvalidInviteCode", "message": "..."}` under a `400`.
+///
+/// One message for every failure mode — missing, unknown, disabled,
+/// spent — on purpose. A distinct "that code exists but is used up"
+/// would let an unauthenticated caller walk the code space and learn
+/// which strings are real, which is most of the work of stealing one.
+/// The operator can tell the cases apart from `pds-server invite list`;
+/// the internet cannot.
+fn invalid_invite_code() -> (StatusCode, Json<crate::routes::types::ErrorBody>) {
+    (
+        StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
+        Json(crate::routes::types::ErrorBody::new(
+            "InvalidInviteCode",
+            Some("a valid invite code is required to create an account on this server".into()),
+        )),
+    )
+}
+
 fn internal(e: impl std::fmt::Display) -> (StatusCode, Json<crate::routes::types::ErrorBody>) {
     (
         StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,

crates/pds-server/src/routes/feed.rs

@@ -17,7 +17,10 @@
 //! removed from the MST, a new commit is signed, the AppView is
 //! told to drop the row, and we return the new commit CID + rev.
 
-use crate::routes::helpers::{apply_repo_write, err, lookup_handle, to_sqlx_error, RepoWriteOutcome};
+use crate::firehose::RepoOp;
+use crate::routes::helpers::{
+    apply_repo_write, err, lookup_handle, to_sqlx_error, RepoWriteOutcome, RepoWriteResult,
+};
 use at_repo::blockstore::Blockstore;
 use crate::routes::types::ErrorBody;
 use crate::state::AppState;
@@ -189,11 +192,16 @@ fn build_like_record(req: &CreateLikeReq) -> Result<Value, (StatusCode, Json<Err
 /// Postgres transaction with `SELECT … FOR UPDATE` on the user's
 /// `repos` row. Concurrent writers for the same DID now serialise
 /// behind the row lock instead of clobbering each other.)
+///
+/// Returns the full [`RepoWriteResult`] rather than just the commit: the
+/// firehose event that went into the same transaction carries the sequence
+/// number, which the handlers log so an operator can line a write up against
+/// what a subscriber received.
 async fn apply_and_commit<F>(
     state: &AppState,
     did: &str,
     f: F,
-) -> Result<at_repo::commit::Commit, (StatusCode, Json<ErrorBody>)>
+) -> Result<RepoWriteResult, (StatusCode, Json<ErrorBody>)>
 where
     F: for<'b> FnOnce(
         &'b mut at_repo::repo::Repo<at_repo::blockstore::MemoryBlockstore>,
@@ -201,7 +209,7 @@ where
         Box<dyn std::future::Future<Output = Result<RepoWriteOutcome, sqlx::Error>> + Send + 'b>,
     >,
 {
-    apply_repo_write(state, did, f).await.map(|o| o.commit)
+    apply_repo_write(state, did, f).await
 }
 
 // -- handlers ---------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -275,7 +283,7 @@ pub async fn create_like(
     let push_rkey = rkey.clone();
     let push_handle_str: Option<String> = lookup_handle(&state, &did).await;
 
-    let commit = apply_and_commit(&state, &did, move |repo| {
+    let write = apply_and_commit(&state, &did, move |repo| {
         let value_cid = value_cid;
         let rkey = rkey;
         let record_buf = record_buf;
@@ -297,16 +305,21 @@ pub async fn create_like(
                 commit,
                 head_cid_bytes,
                 head_commit_bytes,
+                // Always a create: the rkey is a freshly minted TID, so it
+                // cannot collide with an existing entry.
+                ops: vec![RepoOp::create(LIKE_COLLECTION, &rkey, value_cid)],
             })
         })
     })
     .await?;
 
+    let commit = write.commit;
     info!(
         collection = LIKE_COLLECTION,
         rkey = %push_rkey,
         cid = %value_cid,
         commit = %commit.cid,
+        seq = write.event.seq,
         "like created"
     );
 
@@ -366,10 +379,21 @@ pub async fn delete_record(
     // `Repo::delete_record` is idempotent at the MST level (returns
     // an unchanged tree if the key isn't present), so we always
     // sign a new commit — the spec says 200 on a no-op delete.
-    let commit = apply_and_commit(&state, &did, move |repo| {
+    let write = apply_and_commit(&state, &did, move |repo| {
         let collection = collection;
         let rkey = rkey;
         Box::pin(async move {
+            // Report the op only when there was something to remove.
+            // `delete_record` is idempotent — deleting a missing rkey signs
+            // an unchanged tree — and announcing a delete for a record that
+            // never existed would make a consumer drop a row it may legitimately
+            // hold under a different rkey, or (worse) log a phantom deletion
+            // on every retry of a duplicate unlike.
+            let existed = repo
+                .get_record(&collection, &rkey)
+                .await
+                .map_err(to_sqlx_error)?
+                .is_some();
             repo.delete_record(&collection, &rkey)
                 .await
                 .map_err(to_sqlx_error)?;
@@ -380,15 +404,22 @@ pub async fn delete_record(
                 commit,
                 head_cid_bytes,
                 head_commit_bytes,
+                ops: if existed {
+                    vec![RepoOp::delete(&collection, &rkey)]
+                } else {
+                    Vec::new()
+                },
             })
         })
     })
     .await?;
 
+    let commit = write.commit;
     info!(
         collection = %push_collection,
         rkey = %push_rkey,
         commit = %commit.cid,
+        seq = write.event.seq,
         "record deleted"
     );
 

crates/pds-server/src/routes/helpers.rs

@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 //!   writers for the same DID can't trample each other's MST updates
 //!   (Phase 5b review C1).
 
+use crate::firehose::{self, FirehoseEvent, RepoOp};
 use crate::routes::types::ErrorBody;
 use crate::state::AppState;
 use at_crypto::cid::cid_from_multihash_bytes;
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ use cid::Cid;
 use k256::ecdsa::SigningKey;
 use k256::SecretKey;
 use sqlx::Postgres;
+use std::collections::HashSet;
 use std::sync::Arc;
 
 /// Load every block belonging to `did` from the `repo_blocks` table into a
@@ -184,14 +186,31 @@ pub fn to_sqlx_error(e: anyhow::Error) -> sqlx::Error {
 // transaction commits or rolls back, so concurrent writers serialise
 // behind the holder rather than racing on the head_commit column.
 
-/// Result of a successful repo write: the new signed commit, the CID
-/// pointing at the freshly-written head block, and the new revision
-/// string. Callers use the commit for AppView ingest pushes.
+/// What the closure handed to [`apply_repo_write`] returns: the new signed
+/// commit, the CID pointing at the freshly-written head block, and the record
+/// operations the closure performed.
+///
+/// `ops` is not derivable from the commit — the MST stores the resulting
+/// tree, not the edit that produced it, and it cannot tell a create from an
+/// update at all. Only the closure knows what it did, so it says so, and the
+/// firehose event is built from that. Every write path must fill this in
+/// truthfully: an empty `ops` produces a commit frame that tells the AppView
+/// "something changed, guess what".
 #[derive(Debug, Clone)]
 pub struct RepoWriteOutcome {
     pub commit: at_repo::commit::Commit,
     pub head_cid_bytes: Vec<u8>,
     pub head_commit_bytes: Vec<u8>,
+    pub ops: Vec<RepoOp>,
+}
+
+/// What [`apply_repo_write`] returns to the route handler: the commit (used
+/// for the response body and the AppView push) plus the firehose event that
+/// was appended in the same transaction and has already been broadcast.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct RepoWriteResult {
+    pub commit: at_repo::commit::Commit,
+    pub event: FirehoseEvent,
 }
 
 /// Apply a write to the user's repo under a row-level lock on the
@@ -218,11 +237,27 @@ pub struct RepoWriteOutcome {
 /// write the row), but the transaction stays open until after the
 /// `UPDATE`. If the closure or `UPDATE` fails, the transaction rolls
 /// back and no head pointer or block row changes are visible.
+///
+/// ## The firehose event rides in the same transaction
+///
+/// Between step 7 and the COMMIT we append one row to `firehose_events`
+/// (see [`crate::firehose`]). It has to be the *same* transaction, not a
+/// follow-up write: if the event were appended afterwards, a crash in the
+/// window between the two would leave a repo whose head has moved but whose
+/// event log never mentions it — and since a consumer's cursor only ever
+/// moves forward, that commit would be invisible to every subscriber
+/// permanently. Sharing the transaction makes "the head moved" and "an event
+/// exists for it" one atomic fact. Conversely, a rollback discards both, so
+/// no subscriber ever sees an event for a commit that did not happen.
+///
+/// The broadcast to live subscribers happens *after* `COMMIT`, for the same
+/// reason in reverse: a subscriber must never receive an event that a
+/// rollback then erases.
 pub async fn apply_repo_write<F>(
     state: &AppState,
     did: &str,
     f: F,
-) -> Result<RepoWriteOutcome, (StatusCode, Json<ErrorBody>)>
+) -> Result<RepoWriteResult, (StatusCode, Json<ErrorBody>)>
 where
     F: for<'b> FnOnce(
         &'b mut Repo<MemoryBlockstore>,
@@ -240,8 +275,12 @@ where
 
     // 2. Take the row-level write lock. Postgres parks competing
     //    transactions here until we COMMIT/ROLLBACK.
-    let head_row: Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Option<Vec<u8>>)> = sqlx::query_as(
-        "SELECT head_cid, head_commit, prev_commit
+    // `rev` comes along because it is the *previous* commit's revision,
+    // which the firehose frame publishes as `since` — a consumer uses it to
+    // notice that it skipped an intermediate commit. It has to be read here,
+    // under the lock, before the UPDATE below overwrites it.
+    let head_row: Option<(Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>, Option<Vec<u8>>, String)> = sqlx::query_as(
+        "SELECT head_cid, head_commit, prev_commit, rev
            FROM repos
           WHERE did = $1
           FOR UPDATE",
@@ -257,8 +296,8 @@ where
         )
     })?;
 
-    let (head_cid_blob, head_commit_blob) = match head_row {
-        Some(r) => (r.0, r.1),
+    let (head_cid_blob, head_commit_blob, prev_rev) = match head_row {
+        Some(r) => (r.0, r.1, r.3),
         None => {
             return Err((
                 StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
@@ -354,6 +393,26 @@ where
     //    to run additional queries under the row lock, we'd extend
     //    this helper to also hand out a `&mut PgConnection` (which
     //    doesn't have the lifetime headache of `&mut Transaction`).
+    //    Snapshot the CIDs the repo already had *before* the closure runs.
+    //    Diffing against this afterwards is what tells us which blocks are
+    //    new in this commit — the firehose CAR carries only those, because a
+    //    diff stream that re-sent the whole repo on every post would be
+    //    useless. The snapshot is taken here, after the head block re-seed
+    //    above, so the existing head commit does not look new.
+    let blocks_before: HashSet<Cid> = blockstore
+        .list()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| {
+            err(
+                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+                "InternalServerError",
+                format!("blockstore list: {e:#}"),
+            )
+        })?
+        .into_iter()
+        .map(|(cid, _)| cid)
+        .collect();
+
     let outcome: RepoWriteOutcome = f(&mut repo).await.map_err(|e| {
         err(
             StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
@@ -409,6 +468,51 @@ where
         )
     })?;
 
+    // 8. Append the firehose event. Same transaction as everything above —
+    //    see the "rides in the same transaction" note on this function.
+    //
+    //    The CAR carries the commit block as its root plus every block that
+    //    was not in the repo when we started: the new MST nodes and the new
+    //    record value. Blocks that already existed are omitted; a consumer
+    //    that needs an ancestor asks `com.atproto.sync.getBlocks` for it.
+    let new_blocks: Vec<(Cid, Vec<u8>)> = all_blocks
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|(cid, _)| !blocks_before.contains(*cid) && **cid != outcome.commit.cid)
+        .map(|(cid, bytes)| (*cid, bytes.clone()))
+        .collect();
+    let blocks_car = firehose::build_blocks_car(
+        outcome.commit.cid,
+        &outcome.head_commit_bytes,
+        &new_blocks,
+    );
+
+    // A repo whose head was the all-zero sentinel had no previous commit, so
+    // there is no previous revision to report — `since` is null rather than
+    // the `"0"` placeholder `createAccount` seeds the row with.
+    let since: Option<&str> = if is_zero_blob(&head_cid_blob) {
+        None
+    } else {
+        Some(prev_rev.as_str())
+    };
+
+    let event = firehose::insert_event_in_tx(
+        &mut tx,
+        did,
+        &outcome.commit.rev,
+        since,
+        outcome.commit.cid,
+        blocks_car,
+        outcome.ops.clone(),
+    )
+    .await
+    .map_err(|e| {
+        err(
+            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
+            "InternalServerError",
+            format!("firehose_events insert: {e}"),
+        )
+    })?;
+
     tx.commit().await.map_err(|e| {
         err(
             StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
@@ -417,7 +521,18 @@ where
         )
     })?;
 
-    Ok(outcome)
+    // 9. Only now, with the commit durable, hand the event to live
+    //    subscribers. Publishing is non-blocking and cannot fail in a way
+    //    that matters: a slow subscriber is dealt with on its own side (see
+    //    the lag policy in `crate::firehose`), and with no subscribers at all
+    //    the send is a no-op. The row is on disk either way, so nothing is
+    //    lost if this reaches nobody.
+    state.firehose.publish(event.clone());
+
+    Ok(RepoWriteResult {
+        commit: outcome.commit,
+        event,
+    })
 }
 
 /// Persist every block in `blocks` into `repo_blocks` using the open

crates/pds-server/src/routes/mod.rs

@@ -5,5 +5,6 @@ pub mod helpers;
 pub mod identity;
 pub mod profile;
 pub mod repo;
+pub mod subscribe_repos;
 pub mod sync;
 pub mod types;

crates/pds-server/src/routes/profile.rs

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 //! overwrite the corresponding fields. Best-effort push to the
 //! AppView follows so the `profiles` cache reflects the new avatar /
 //! display name / bio without waiting for the Jetstream replay.
+use crate::firehose::RepoOp;
 use crate::jwt_issuer;
 use crate::routes::helpers::{
     apply_repo_write, err, load_head_commit, load_signing_key, load_user_blockstore,
@@ -98,6 +99,9 @@ pub async fn set_profile(
 
     // Fetch the existing record, if any.
     let existing = read_profile_record(&state, &did).await?;
+    // Remembered before `existing` is consumed by the merge — the firehose op
+    // needs to know whether this is the first profile write for the account.
+    let existing_present = existing.is_some();
 
     // For any blob CIDs in the request, look up the real
     // `mime_type` / `size` from the `blobs` table — and verify
@@ -152,6 +156,12 @@ pub async fn set_profile(
     };
 
     let next_for_block = next.clone();
+    // `existing` was read before the merge above: a profile record that was
+    // already there makes this an `update` on the firehose, a first-ever
+    // `setProfile` a `create`. The rkey is the fixed `self`, so this is the
+    // one write path where updates are the common case rather than the
+    // exception.
+    let profile_existed = existing_present;
     let outcome = apply_repo_write(&state, &did, move |repo| {
         let value_cid = value_cid;
         let next_for_block = next_for_block;
@@ -175,6 +185,12 @@ pub async fn set_profile(
                 commit,
                 head_cid_bytes,
                 head_commit_bytes,
+                ops: vec![RepoOp::put(
+                    "app.bsky.actor.profile",
+                    "self",
+                    value_cid,
+                    profile_existed,
+                )],
             })
         })
     })
@@ -183,6 +199,7 @@ pub async fn set_profile(
     info!(
         did = %did,
         cid = %outcome.commit.cid,
+        seq = outcome.event.seq,
         "profile record created"
     );
 

crates/pds-server/src/routes/repo.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+use crate::firehose::RepoOp;
 use crate::routes::helpers::{
     apply_repo_write, err, lookup_handle, to_sqlx_error, RepoWriteOutcome,
 };
@@ -110,6 +111,17 @@ pub async fn create_record(
         let record_buf = record_buf;
         let collection = collection;
         Box::pin(async move {
+            // Ask the MST whether the key is already there *before* writing.
+            // The firehose distinguishes `create` from `update` and the tree
+            // itself cannot: after `put_record` both look identical. A
+            // caller-supplied `rkey` (rather than the generated TID) is the
+            // case that actually hits this — an overwrite of an existing
+            // record must not be announced as a create.
+            let existed = repo
+                .get_record(&collection, &rkey)
+                .await
+                .map_err(to_sqlx_error)?
+                .is_some();
             // Repo assumes the value block is already in the
             // blockstore — that's the caller's responsibility.
             repo.blockstore
@@ -127,23 +139,34 @@ pub async fn create_record(
                 commit,
                 head_cid_bytes,
                 head_commit_bytes,
+                ops: vec![RepoOp::put(&collection, &rkey, value_cid, existed)],
             })
         })
     })
     .await?;
 
     let uri = format!("at://{did}/{push_coll}/{push_rkey}");
+    let seq = outcome.event.seq;
     let commit = outcome.commit;
-    info!(uri = %uri, cid = %value_cid, commit = %commit.cid, "record created");
+    info!(
+        uri = %uri,
+        cid = %value_cid,
+        commit = %commit.cid,
+        seq,
+        "record created"
+    );
 
     // 10. Best-effort push to the AppView's `/internal/ingest-commit`.
     //     We send the full record value (not just the CID) because the
     //     AppView's indexer reads `embed` and `reply` off it.
     //
     //     **Spawned** (not awaited) so a transient AppView outage never
-    //     blocks the user's write response. If the push fails, the
-    //     global Jetstream feed will eventually replay the commit to
-    //     the AppView.
+    //     blocks the user's write response. Losing the push is no longer
+    //     terminal: the same commit was appended to `firehose_events` in
+    //     the write transaction above (see `seq` in the log line), so an
+    //     AppView that reconnects to `com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos`
+    //     with its cursor picks it up. The push is now purely a latency
+    //     optimisation, not the only delivery path.
     tokio::spawn(async move {
         if let Err(e) = push_handle
             .push_create(

crates/pds-server/src/routes/subscribe_repos.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
+//! `GET /xrpc/com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos` — the firehose WebSocket.
+//!
+//! The frame format, the deviation from the atproto spec, the lag policy and
+//! the retention story all live in the module header of [`crate::firehose`];
+//! this file is only the socket.
+//!
+//! ## The handshake, and why it is ordered the way it is
+//!
+//! ```text
+//!   1. subscribe to the live broadcast          <-- BEFORE any DB read
+//!   2. read (min, max) from firehose_events
+//!   3. decide what the cursor means             <-- firehose::plan_cursor
+//!   4. drain the DB replay, remembering the highest seq sent
+//!   5. forward live events with seq > that high-water mark
+//! ```
+//!
+//! Step 1 has to come first. If we read the database and *then* subscribed,
+//! an event committed in between would be in neither: too late for the replay
+//! query, too early for the receiver. Subscribing first turns that race into
+//! a duplicate instead of a gap — the event is both replayed from the table
+//! and sitting in the channel — and a duplicate is something we can filter,
+//! which is what the high-water mark in step 5 does.
+//!
+//! The filter is exact rather than approximate because the write path
+//! serialises `firehose_events` inserts under an advisory lock (see
+//! [`crate::firehose::insert_event_in_tx`]): if the replay query saw seq `N`,
+//! then every seq below `N` is already committed and was also seen. So
+//! "everything the replay covered" is precisely "seq <= N", and every event
+//! that arrives on the channel afterwards has seq > N. No gap, no duplicate,
+//! at the handover.
+//!
+//! Without a cursor there is no replay at all and the high-water mark stays
+//! at zero: a `broadcast::Receiver` only ever yields messages sent after it
+//! was created, so "live only" needs no filtering.
+
+use crate::firehose::{
+    self, CursorPlan, FirehoseEvent, MAX_LAG_RECOVERIES, REPLAY_PAGE_SIZE,
+};
+use crate::state::AppState;
+use axum::extract::ws::{CloseFrame, Message, WebSocket, WebSocketUpgrade};
+use axum::extract::{Query, State};
+use axum::response::Response;
+use serde::Deserialize;
+use tokio::sync::broadcast::error::RecvError;
+use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
+
+use futures::{SinkExt, StreamExt};
+
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+pub struct SubscribeQuery {
+    /// The seq of the last event the client already has. Everything with a
+    /// larger seq is replayed before the live stream starts. Absent means
+    /// "live only".
+    pub cursor: Option<i64>,
+}
+
+/// The upgrade handler. Everything interesting happens in [`run`].
+pub async fn subscribe_repos(
+    State(state): State<AppState>,
+    Query(q): Query<SubscribeQuery>,
+    ws: WebSocketUpgrade,
+) -> Response {
+    ws.on_upgrade(move |socket| run(socket, state, q.cursor))
+}
+
+/// Drive one subscriber for the life of its connection.
+async fn run(socket: WebSocket, state: AppState, cursor: Option<i64>) {
+    // 1. Subscribe first — see the ordering note in the module header.
+    let mut rx = state.firehose.subscribe();
+
+    let (mut sink, mut stream) = socket.split();
+
+    // A firehose subscriber sends nothing after the upgrade, but we still
+    // have to read the socket: that is the only way a Close frame (or a
+    // client that vanishes without sending data) is noticed while we are
+    // parked waiting for an event that may not come for hours. The reader
+    // task does nothing but detect the end of the connection and say so.
+    let (dead_tx, mut dead_rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel::<()>();
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        while let Some(msg) = stream.next().await {
+            match msg {
+                Ok(Message::Close(_)) | Err(_) => break,
+                // Ping/Pong are handled by axum itself; anything else a
+                // client sends on this endpoint is meaningless and ignored
+                // rather than treated as an error.
+                Ok(_) => continue,
+            }
+        }
+        let _ = dead_tx.send(());
+    });
+
+    // 2./3. Work out what the cursor asks for.
+    let bounds = match firehose::seq_bounds(&state.db).await {
+        Ok(b) => b,
+        Err(e) => {
+            warn!(error = %e, "subscribeRepos: firehose_events bounds read failed");
+            let _ = send_error(&mut sink, "InternalServerError", "event log unavailable").await;
+            return;
+        }
+    };
+
+    let mut replay_from = match firehose::plan_cursor(cursor, bounds) {
+        CursorPlan::LiveOnly => None,
+        CursorPlan::Replay { from } => Some(from),
+        CursorPlan::OutdatedCursor { from, message } => {
+            // Not fatal: the client keeps its connection and gets everything
+            // we still have. It is told about the hole so it can decide
+            // whether to backfill some other way.
+            info!(cursor = ?cursor, %message, "subscribeRepos: outdated cursor");
+            if sink
+                .send(Message::Binary(firehose::encode_info_frame(
+                    "OutdatedCursor",
+                    &message,
+                )))
+                .await
+                .is_err()
+            {
+                return;
+            }
+            Some(from)
+        }
+        CursorPlan::FutureCursor { message } => {
+            // Fatal. Continuing would leave the client waiting for events
+            // that will be numbered below its cursor and therefore filtered
+            // out forever — silence is the worst possible answer here.
+            info!(cursor = ?cursor, %message, "subscribeRepos: future cursor");
+            let _ = send_error(&mut sink, "FutureCursor", &message).await;
+            return;
+        }
+    };
+
+    info!(
+        cursor = ?cursor,
+        replay_from = ?replay_from,
+        subscribers = state.firehose.subscriber_count(),
+        "subscribeRepos: client connected"
+    );
+
+    // 4. Drain the replay. `high_water` ends up as the last seq the client
+    //    has been given, which is exactly the boundary the live filter needs.
+    let mut high_water: i64 = 0;
+    if let Some(from) = replay_from.take() {
+        match replay(&mut sink, &state, from, &mut dead_rx).await {
+            Ok(last) => high_water = last,
+            // The socket died mid-replay, or the log became unreadable.
+            // Either way there is nothing left to do for this connection.
+            Err(()) => return,
+        }
+    }
+
+    // 5. Live.
+    let mut lag_recoveries: u32 = 0;
+    loop {
+        tokio::select! {
+            _ = &mut dead_rx => {
+                debug!("subscribeRepos: client closed");
+                return;
+            }
+            recv = rx.recv() => match recv {
+                Ok(event) => {
+                    if event.seq <= high_water {
+                        // Already delivered by the replay. This is the
+                        // duplicate the subscribe-first ordering trades the
+                        // gap for.
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                    if !send_event(&mut sink, &event).await {
+                        return;
+                    }
+                    high_water = event.seq;
+                }
+                Err(RecvError::Lagged(skipped)) => {
+                    lag_recoveries += 1;
+                    warn!(
+                        skipped,
+                        attempt = lag_recoveries,
+                        high_water,
+                        "subscribeRepos: subscriber lagged; falling back to the database replay"
+                    );
+                    if lag_recoveries > MAX_LAG_RECOVERIES {
+                        // See the lag policy in `crate::firehose`: we rescue a
+                        // slow client, repeatedly, but not forever.
+                        let _ = send_error(
+                            &mut sink,
+                            "ConsumerTooSlow",
+                            "consumer fell behind repeatedly; reconnect with a cursor",
+                        )
+                        .await;
+                        return;
+                    }
+                    let message = format!(
+                        "consumer lagged by {skipped} events; resuming from seq {high_water} \
+                         via the durable log"
+                    );
+                    if sink
+                        .send(Message::Binary(firehose::encode_info_frame(
+                            "OutdatedCursor",
+                            &message,
+                        )))
+                        .await
+                        .is_err()
+                    {
+                        return;
+                    }
+                    // Nothing is lost: every event is in `firehose_events`,
+                    // so re-reading from the high-water mark is the same
+                    // stream the channel dropped. The advisory-lock ordering
+                    // guarantees the new high-water mark is again an exact
+                    // boundary for the live filter.
+                    match replay(&mut sink, &state, high_water, &mut dead_rx).await {
+                        Ok(last) => high_water = last.max(high_water),
+                        Err(()) => return,
+                    }
+                }
+                Err(RecvError::Closed) => {
+                    // Only happens at process shutdown, when the AppState
+                    // (and with it the sender) is dropped.
+                    debug!("subscribeRepos: broadcast channel closed");
+                    return;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Stream every event with `seq > from` out of the database, page by page.
+///
+/// Returns the highest seq actually sent (or `from` when there was nothing to
+/// send), or `Err(())` when the connection or the database gave out — in
+/// which case the caller should drop the connection.
+///
+/// Paging matters: a client reconnecting with `cursor=0` after a long uptime
+/// would otherwise pull the whole table, CARs and all, into memory at once.
+/// It also gives the loop a natural place to notice a client that closed the
+/// socket halfway through a large backfill.
+async fn replay(
+    sink: &mut futures::stream::SplitSink<WebSocket, Message>,
+    state: &AppState,
+    from: i64,
+    dead_rx: &mut tokio::sync::oneshot::Receiver<()>,
+) -> Result<i64, ()> {
+    let mut cursor = from;
+    loop {
+        if dead_rx.try_recv().is_ok() {
+            return Err(());
+        }
+        let page = match firehose::load_events_after(&state.db, cursor, REPLAY_PAGE_SIZE).await {
+            Ok(p) => p,
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!(error = %format!("{e:#}"), "subscribeRepos: replay read failed");
+                let _ = send_error(sink, "InternalServerError", "event log read failed").await;
+                return Err(());
+            }
+        };
+        if page.is_empty() {
+            return Ok(cursor);
+        }
+        for event in &page {
+            if !send_event(sink, event).await {
+                return Err(());
+            }
+            cursor = event.seq;
+        }
+        // A short page means we reached the end of the log.
+        if (page.len() as i64) < REPLAY_PAGE_SIZE {
+            return Ok(cursor);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Send one `#commit` frame. Returns `false` when the socket is gone.
+async fn send_event(
+    sink: &mut futures::stream::SplitSink<WebSocket, Message>,
+    event: &FirehoseEvent,
+) -> bool {
+    sink.send(Message::Binary(event.to_frame())).await.is_ok()
+}
+
+/// Send a terminal error frame and close the socket.
+///
+/// The close is explicit (rather than just dropping the sink) so a client
+/// distinguishes "the server said no" from "the connection broke".
+async fn send_error(
+    sink: &mut futures::stream::SplitSink<WebSocket, Message>,
+    error: &str,
+    message: &str,
+) -> bool {
+    if sink
+        .send(Message::Binary(firehose::encode_error_frame(error, message)))
+        .await
+        .is_err()
+    {
+        return false;
+    }
+    sink.send(Message::Close(Some(CloseFrame {
+        code: axum::extract::ws::close_code::NORMAL,
+        reason: error.to_string().into(),
+    })))
+    .await
+    .is_ok()
+}

crates/pds-server/src/routes/types.rs

@@ -6,6 +6,18 @@ pub struct CreateAccountReq {
     pub email: Option<String>,
     pub password: Option<String>,
     pub did: Option<String>,
+    /// The invite code, when `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED` is on.
+    ///
+    /// The alias is not cosmetic. This struct — like every other type in
+    /// this module — is snake_case on the wire, which is what our own
+    /// clients send. The AT Protocol lexicon for
+    /// `com.atproto.server.createAccount` spells the field `inviteCode`,
+    /// so every off-the-shelf atproto client sends *that*, and without
+    /// the alias serde would drop it into `None` silently — the account
+    /// would be refused with "an invite code is required" while the user
+    /// is looking at the code they just pasted. Accepting both spellings
+    /// costs one attribute; debugging that report costs an afternoon.
+    #[serde(alias = "inviteCode")]
     pub invite_code: Option<String>,
     pub recovery_key: Option<String>,
 }

crates/pds-server/src/state.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 use crate::appview_push::AppViewPushClient;
+use crate::firehose::Firehose;
 use at_blob::S3BlobStore;
 use at_identity::plc::PlcClient;
 use at_lexicon::{Lex, LexRegistry};
@@ -16,6 +17,14 @@ pub struct AppState {
     pub blockstore: Arc<MemoryBlockstore>,
     pub plc: PlcClient,
     pub appview: AppViewPushClient,
+    /// Live fan-out for `com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos`.
+    ///
+    /// Lives on the shared state rather than in the route module because the
+    /// *write* paths publish into it — `routes::helpers::apply_repo_write`
+    /// hands every committed event over here — while the WebSocket handler
+    /// only subscribes. Cloning `AppState` clones the sender, which is the
+    /// intended way to reach it from a handler.
+    pub firehose: Firehose,
 }
 
 impl AppState {
@@ -26,9 +35,9 @@ impl AppState {
             Lex::from_json(include_str!("../../../lexicons/app/twi/post.json")).unwrap(),
         );
         // AT-Protocol standard collections: only the records the user
-        // might legitimately create server-side (feed.like + feed.repost).
-        // The full atproto collection library is out of scope — for
-        // anything else, callers pass `validate: false` in the
+        // might legitimately create server-side (feed.like, feed.repost,
+        // graph.follow). The full atproto collection library is out of
+        // scope — for anything else, callers pass `validate: false` in the
         // createRecord body.
         lex.lexicons.insert(
             "app.bsky.feed.like".to_string(),
@@ -38,6 +47,17 @@ impl AppState {
             "app.bsky.feed.repost".to_string(),
             Lex::from_json(include_str!("../../../lexicons/app/bsky/feed/repost.json")).unwrap(),
         );
+        // Follow record. Its absence was a real outage: the desktop
+        // client creates follows through `createRecord`, which validates
+        // by default, so every follow came back
+        // `unknown lexicon: app.bsky.graph.follow` — the button could
+        // never have worked. `subject` is a bare DID string here, not a
+        // strongRef like like/repost use, matching what the client sends
+        // and what the AppView's `follow_subject_did` reads.
+        lex.lexicons.insert(
+            "app.bsky.graph.follow".to_string(),
+            Lex::from_json(include_str!("../../../lexicons/app/bsky/graph/follow.json")).unwrap(),
+        );
         // Profile record — avatar/banner/display name/description.
         // Validates the createRecord body when the Tauri client calls
         // its setProfile command. Other fields stay optional so a
@@ -63,6 +83,7 @@ impl AppState {
             blockstore: Arc::new(MemoryBlockstore::new()),
             plc: PlcClient::new(plc_url),
             appview,
+            firehose: Firehose::new(),
         }
     }
 }

crates/pds-server/tests/blob_integration.rs

@@ -314,19 +314,32 @@ async fn upload_blob_rejects_oversized() {
     // 413 from axum's body extractor.
     let payload = vec![0u8; 2 * 1024 * 1024];
 
-    let resp = c
+    // Two legitimate outcomes, and which one happens is a race the test
+    // cannot win: the limit trips while the client is still writing the
+    // 2 MiB body. If the rejection reaches the socket first, the client
+    // reads `413`; if the server closes its side first, the client's
+    // write fails with a connection reset and never gets to read a
+    // status. Asserting only on `413` made this test fail roughly one run
+    // in three. What actually matters — and what both outcomes prove — is
+    // that the upload was refused rather than accepted.
+    match c
         .post(format!("{}/xrpc/com.atproto.uploadBlob", PDS_URL))
         .bearer_auth(&jwt)
         .header("Content-Type", "image/png")
         .body(payload)
         .send()
         .await
-        .unwrap();
-    assert_eq!(
-        resp.status().as_u16(),
-        413,
-        "oversized upload must return 413"
-    );
+    {
+        Ok(resp) => assert_eq!(
+            resp.status().as_u16(),
+            413,
+            "oversized upload must be refused with 413"
+        ),
+        Err(e) => assert!(
+            e.is_request(),
+            "the only acceptable error is the server hanging up mid-body, got {e:?}"
+        ),
+    }
 }
 
 /// `com.atproto.uploadBlob` rejects requests with no `Authorization`

crates/pds-server/tests/firehose_integration.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,677 @@
+//! Integration tests for `com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos`.
+//!
+//! Same contract as the other integration suites in this crate: they talk to a
+//! PDS listening on `127.0.0.1:2583` and **fail open** — if nothing answers
+//! `/healthz`, the test prints a note and returns green rather than failing a
+//! developer's `cargo test` on a machine with no server running. Start the
+//! server (`./target/debug/pds-server` with `.env` sourced) to actually
+//! exercise them.
+//!
+//! ## Why the frames are decoded by hand here
+//!
+//! `pds-server` is a binary, so a test crate cannot import its `dag_cbor`
+//! module — and that is a feature, not a limitation. These tests are the
+//! *consumer* side of the wire contract, and a consumer that reuses the
+//! producer's encoder proves nothing: it would happily agree with a frame
+//! that no other implementation can read. The decoder below is written from
+//! the spec (tag 42, identity prefix, length-first map keys) and knows
+//! nothing about how the server produced the bytes.
+
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::collections::BTreeMap;
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+use futures::{SinkExt, StreamExt};
+use tokio_tungstenite::tungstenite::Message;
+
+const PDS_URL: &str = "http://127.0.0.1:2583";
+const PDS_WS: &str = "ws://127.0.0.1:2583";
+
+// -- harness ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+fn http() -> reqwest::Client {
+    reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(5))
+        .build()
+        .unwrap()
+}
+
+async fn wait_for_pds() -> bool {
+    let c = http();
+    for _ in 0..20 {
+        if let Ok(r) = c.get(format!("{PDS_URL}/healthz")).send().await {
+            if r.status().is_success() {
+                return true;
+            }
+        }
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(250)).await;
+    }
+    false
+}
+
+async fn fresh_user(prefix: &str) -> (reqwest::Client, String, String) {
+    let c = http();
+    let handle = format!(
+        "{}_{}.maarcadetweet.local",
+        prefix,
+        uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple()
+    );
+    let acc: Value = c
+        .post(format!("{PDS_URL}/xrpc/com.atproto.server.createAccount"))
+        .json(&json!({"handle": handle, "password": "hunter2hunter2"}))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let did = acc["did"].as_str().expect("createAccount did").to_string();
+    let jwt = acc["access_jwt"].as_str().expect("access_jwt").to_string();
+    (c, did, jwt)
+}
+
+async fn create_post(c: &reqwest::Client, did: &str, jwt: &str, text: &str) -> Value {
+    c.post(format!("{PDS_URL}/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.createRecord"))
+        .bearer_auth(jwt)
+        .json(&json!({
+            "repo": did,
+            "collection": "app.twi.post",
+            "record": { "text": text, "createdAt": "2026-09-10T12:00:00Z" },
+        }))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+}
+
+type Socket = tokio_tungstenite::WebSocketStream<
+    tokio_tungstenite::MaybeTlsStream<tokio::net::TcpStream>,
+>;
+
+async fn subscribe(cursor: Option<i64>) -> Socket {
+    let url = match cursor {
+        Some(c) => format!("{PDS_WS}/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos?cursor={c}"),
+        None => format!("{PDS_WS}/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos"),
+    };
+    let (socket, _resp) = tokio_tungstenite::connect_async(&url)
+        .await
+        .unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("subscribeRepos connect to {url}: {e}"));
+    socket
+}
+
+/// Read the next **binary** message, or `None` on timeout.
+///
+/// Text messages would be a protocol violation on this endpoint and are
+/// asserted against rather than skipped.
+async fn next_frame(socket: &mut Socket) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
+    let deadline = Duration::from_secs(10);
+    loop {
+        match tokio::time::timeout(deadline, socket.next()).await {
+            Err(_) => return None,
+            Ok(None) => return None,
+            Ok(Some(Ok(Message::Binary(b)))) => return Some(b),
+            Ok(Some(Ok(Message::Ping(_)))) | Ok(Some(Ok(Message::Pong(_)))) => continue,
+            Ok(Some(Ok(Message::Close(_)))) => return None,
+            Ok(Some(Ok(other))) => panic!("subscribeRepos sent a non-binary frame: {other:?}"),
+            Ok(Some(Err(e))) => panic!("subscribeRepos socket error: {e}"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Give the server a moment to finish `on_upgrade` and actually subscribe to
+/// the broadcast channel before we trigger a write.
+///
+/// The TCP handshake completing does not mean the handler has run. Without
+/// this the test would occasionally write before the subscription exists and
+/// then wait for a frame that was published to nobody. (The *cursor* replay
+/// path is the real fix for that race in production; the live-only test is
+/// deliberately testing the raceable path, so it waits.)
+async fn settle() {
+    tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(300)).await;
+}
+
+// -- an independent DAG-CBOR reader ----------------------------------------
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
+enum Cbor {
+    Null,
+    Bool(bool),
+    Int(i64),
+    Bytes(Vec<u8>),
+    Text(String),
+    Array(Vec<Cbor>),
+    Map(BTreeMap<String, Cbor>),
+    /// tag(42) + bytes(0x00 || cid) — the binary CID is kept raw and
+    /// re-encoded to a `bafy…` string on demand, so the test never depends on
+    /// the server's own CID formatting.
+    Link(Vec<u8>),
+}
+
+impl Cbor {
+    fn get(&self, key: &str) -> &Cbor {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Map(m) => m
+                .get(key)
+                .unwrap_or_else(|| panic!("missing key `{key}` in {self:?}")),
+            other => panic!("not a map: {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+    fn opt(&self, key: &str) -> Option<&Cbor> {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Map(m) => m.get(key),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+    fn int(&self) -> i64 {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Int(i) => *i,
+            other => panic!("not an int: {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+    fn text(&self) -> &str {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Text(s) => s,
+            other => panic!("not text: {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+    fn bool(&self) -> bool {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Bool(b) => *b,
+            other => panic!("not a bool: {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+    fn bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Bytes(b) => b,
+            other => panic!("not bytes: {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+    fn array(&self) -> &[Cbor] {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Array(a) => a,
+            other => panic!("not an array: {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+    /// The link's CID rendered as a base32 `bafy…` string, for comparison
+    /// against what the XRPC JSON responses return.
+    fn link_cid(&self) -> String {
+        match self {
+            Cbor::Link(raw) => cid::Cid::read_bytes(&raw[..])
+                .expect("tag-42 payload must be a valid binary CID")
+                .to_string(),
+            other => panic!("not a link: {other:?}"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn read_head(b: &[u8], p: usize) -> (u8, u64, usize) {
+    let first = b[p];
+    let major = first >> 5;
+    let low = first & 0x1f;
+    let (arg, extra) = match low {
+        0..=23 => (low as u64, 0usize),
+        24 => (b[p + 1] as u64, 1),
+        25 => (u16::from_be_bytes([b[p + 1], b[p + 2]]) as u64, 2),
+        26 => (
+            u32::from_be_bytes([b[p + 1], b[p + 2], b[p + 3], b[p + 4]]) as u64,
+            4,
+        ),
+        27 => {
+            let mut n = 0u64;
+            for i in 0..8 {
+                n = (n << 8) | b[p + 1 + i] as u64;
+            }
+            (n, 8)
+        }
+        other => panic!("indefinite or reserved CBOR head 0x{other:02x} — illegal in DAG-CBOR"),
+    };
+    (major, arg, p + 1 + extra)
+}
+
+fn decode_at(b: &[u8], p: usize) -> (Cbor, usize) {
+    let (major, arg, mut p) = read_head(b, p);
+    match major {
+        0 => (Cbor::Int(arg as i64), p),
+        1 => (Cbor::Int(-(arg as i64) - 1), p),
+        2 => {
+            let end = p + arg as usize;
+            (Cbor::Bytes(b[p..end].to_vec()), end)
+        }
+        3 => {
+            let end = p + arg as usize;
+            (
+                Cbor::Text(std::str::from_utf8(&b[p..end]).unwrap().to_string()),
+                end,
+            )
+        }
+        4 => {
+            let mut items = Vec::new();
+            for _ in 0..arg {
+                let (v, next) = decode_at(b, p);
+                items.push(v);
+                p = next;
+            }
+            (Cbor::Array(items), p)
+        }
+        5 => {
+            let mut m = BTreeMap::new();
+            let mut prev_key: Option<String> = None;
+            for _ in 0..arg {
+                let (k, next) = decode_at(b, p);
+                p = next;
+                let key = k.text().to_string();
+                // Canonical DAG-CBOR order: shorter keys first, then
+                // bytewise. Asserted here because a consumer written against
+                // a strict codec (cborg's `dag-cbor` decoder, for one) will
+                // reject a frame whose keys are out of order.
+                if let Some(prev) = &prev_key {
+                    let ordered = (prev.len(), prev.as_bytes()) < (key.len(), key.as_bytes());
+                    assert!(ordered, "map keys out of canonical order: {prev:?} then {key:?}");
+                }
+                prev_key = Some(key.clone());
+                let (v, next) = decode_at(b, p);
+                p = next;
+                m.insert(key, v);
+            }
+            (Cbor::Map(m), p)
+        }
+        6 => {
+            assert_eq!(arg, 42, "DAG-CBOR permits only tag 42");
+            let (inner, next) = decode_at(b, p);
+            let raw = match inner {
+                Cbor::Bytes(v) => v,
+                other => panic!("tag 42 must wrap bytes, got {other:?}"),
+            };
+            assert_eq!(
+                raw.first(),
+                Some(&0x00),
+                "a binary CID link must start with the 0x00 multibase identity prefix"
+            );
+            (Cbor::Link(raw[1..].to_vec()), next)
+        }
+        7 => match arg {
+            20 => (Cbor::Bool(false), p),
+            21 => (Cbor::Bool(true), p),
+            22 => (Cbor::Null, p),
+            other => panic!("unsupported CBOR simple value {other}"),
+        },
+        other => panic!("unsupported CBOR major type {other}"),
+    }
+}
+
+/// Split one binary frame into its header and body values, and assert that
+/// the two together consume the whole message — a frame with trailing bytes
+/// would silently desynchronise a streaming consumer.
+fn parse_frame(bytes: &[u8]) -> (Cbor, Cbor) {
+    let (header, after_header) = decode_at(bytes, 0);
+    let (body, end) = decode_at(bytes, after_header);
+    assert_eq!(end, bytes.len(), "frame must be exactly two CBOR values");
+    (header, body)
+}
+
+/// Minimal CAR v1 reader: returns the root CIDs and the block CIDs, both as
+/// `bafy…` strings.
+fn parse_car(bytes: &[u8]) -> (Vec<String>, Vec<String>) {
+    fn varint(b: &[u8], p: &mut usize) -> u64 {
+        let (mut v, mut shift) = (0u64, 0u32);
+        loop {
+            let byte = b[*p];
+            *p += 1;
+            v |= ((byte & 0x7f) as u64) << shift;
+            if byte & 0x80 == 0 {
+                return v;
+            }
+            shift += 7;
+        }
+    }
+    let mut p = 0usize;
+    let header_len = varint(bytes, &mut p) as usize;
+    let header = &bytes[p..p + header_len];
+    p += header_len;
+
+    // The CAR header is a CBOR map; walk it with the same head reader. Note
+    // that this server's CAR header tags its roots *without* the 0x00
+    // identity prefix (a documented deviation in `car.rs`), so the roots are
+    // read as plain tagged byte strings rather than through `decode_at`.
+    let mut hp = 0usize;
+    let (major, n, next) = read_head(header, hp);
+    assert_eq!(major, 5, "CAR header must be a map");
+    hp = next;
+    let mut roots = Vec::new();
+    for _ in 0..n {
+        let (m, len, next) = read_head(header, hp);
+        assert_eq!(m, 3);
+        hp = next;
+        let key = std::str::from_utf8(&header[hp..hp + len as usize]).unwrap().to_string();
+        hp += len as usize;
+        if key == "version" {
+            let (m, v, next) = read_head(header, hp);
+            assert_eq!(m, 0);
+            assert_eq!(v, 1, "CAR must be v1");
+            hp = next;
+        } else if key == "roots" {
+            let (m, count, next) = read_head(header, hp);
+            assert_eq!(m, 4);
+            hp = next;
+            for _ in 0..count {
+                let (m, tag, next) = read_head(header, hp);
+                assert_eq!((m, tag), (6, 42), "root must be a tag-42 link");
+                hp = next;
+                let (m, len, next) = read_head(header, hp);
+                assert_eq!(m, 2);
+                hp = next;
+                // A DAG-CBOR link wraps `0x00 || <binary CID>`; the 0x00 is
+                // the multibase identity prefix and is not part of the CID.
+                // Assert on it rather than skipping it silently — this
+                // reader stands in for a foreign consumer, and dropping the
+                // check would let the header regress unnoticed.
+                let raw = &header[hp..hp + len as usize];
+                assert_eq!(
+                    raw.first(),
+                    Some(&0x00),
+                    "CAR root link must carry the multibase identity prefix"
+                );
+                roots.push(cid::Cid::read_bytes(&raw[1..]).unwrap().to_string());
+                hp += len as usize;
+            }
+        } else {
+            panic!("unexpected CAR header key {key}");
+        }
+    }
+
+    let mut blocks = Vec::new();
+    while p < bytes.len() {
+        let section_len = varint(bytes, &mut p) as usize;
+        let section = &bytes[p..p + section_len];
+        let cid = cid::Cid::read_bytes(section).unwrap();
+        blocks.push(cid.to_string());
+        p += section_len;
+    }
+    (roots, blocks)
+}
+
+// -- tests -----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// A live subscriber receives a `#commit` frame for a record created after it
+/// connected, and every field of that frame says what it should.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn live_subscriber_receives_a_commit_frame() {
+    if !wait_for_pds().await {
+        eprintln!("pds not running, skipping");
+        return;
+    }
+    let (c, did, jwt) = fresh_user("fhlive").await;
+
+    let mut socket = subscribe(None).await;
+    settle().await;
+
+    let created = create_post(&c, &did, &jwt, "hello firehose").await;
+    let record_cid = created["cid"].as_str().expect("createRecord cid").to_string();
+    let commit_cid = created["commit"]["cid"]
+        .as_str()
+        .expect("createRecord commit.cid")
+        .to_string();
+    let commit_rev = created["commit"]["rev"].as_str().unwrap().to_string();
+    let uri = created["uri"].as_str().unwrap().to_string();
+    let rkey = uri.rsplit('/').next().unwrap().to_string();
+
+    // The account was created moments ago and has never written before, so
+    // the first frame we see for it is this post's. Other accounts may be
+    // writing concurrently, so filter by DID rather than taking frame 1.
+    let (header, body) = loop {
+        let bytes = next_frame(&mut socket)
+            .await
+            .expect("expected a #commit frame within the timeout");
+        let (header, body) = parse_frame(&bytes);
+        if header.opt("t").map(|t| t.text()) == Some("#commit")
+            && body.get("repo").text() == did
+        {
+            break (header, body);
+        }
+    };
+
+    assert_eq!(header.get("op").int(), 1, "regular frames carry op = 1");
+    assert_eq!(header.get("t").text(), "#commit");
+
+    assert!(body.get("seq").int() > 0, "seq must be a real cursor value");
+    assert_eq!(body.get("repo").text(), did);
+    assert_eq!(body.get("rev").text(), commit_rev);
+    assert_eq!(body.get("commit").link_cid(), commit_cid);
+    assert!(!body.get("rebase").bool());
+    assert!(!body.get("tooBig").bool());
+    assert!(body.get("blobs").array().is_empty());
+    // First-ever commit on a brand new repo — there is no predecessor.
+    assert_eq!(*body.get("since"), Cbor::Null, "first commit has since = null");
+    // RFC 3339 with a Z offset.
+    let time = body.get("time").text();
+    assert!(
+        chrono_like_rfc3339(time),
+        "time must be RFC 3339, got {time}"
+    );
+
+    // ops
+    let ops = body.get("ops").array();
+    assert_eq!(ops.len(), 1, "one record write means one op");
+    assert_eq!(ops[0].get("action").text(), "create");
+    assert_eq!(ops[0].get("path").text(), format!("app.twi.post/{rkey}"));
+    assert_eq!(ops[0].get("cid").link_cid(), record_cid);
+
+    // blocks: a CAR rooted at the commit, containing the commit block and the
+    // new record block.
+    let (roots, blocks) = parse_car(body.get("blocks").bytes());
+    assert_eq!(roots, vec![commit_cid.clone()], "CAR root is the commit");
+    assert!(
+        blocks.contains(&commit_cid),
+        "CAR must carry the commit block itself; got {blocks:?}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        blocks.contains(&record_cid),
+        "CAR must carry the new record block; got {blocks:?}"
+    );
+
+    let _ = socket.send(Message::Close(None)).await;
+}
+
+/// The same event, fetched again from the durable log with a cursor, is
+/// byte-identical to the live frame.
+///
+/// Byte-identity is the strong form of the claim and the one that matters: a
+/// consumer that deduplicates by hashing frames, or that verifies a signature
+/// over them, must not see two different representations of one event.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn cursor_replay_reproduces_the_live_frame_exactly() {
+    if !wait_for_pds().await {
+        eprintln!("pds not running, skipping");
+        return;
+    }
+    let (c, did, jwt) = fresh_user("fhreplay").await;
+
+    let mut live = subscribe(None).await;
+    settle().await;
+    create_post(&c, &did, &jwt, "replay me").await;
+
+    let live_bytes = loop {
+        let bytes = next_frame(&mut live)
+            .await
+            .expect("expected a live #commit frame");
+        let (header, body) = parse_frame(&bytes);
+        if header.opt("t").map(|t| t.text()) == Some("#commit")
+            && body.get("repo").text() == did
+        {
+            break bytes;
+        }
+    };
+    let (_h, live_body) = parse_frame(&live_bytes);
+    let seq = live_body.get("seq").int();
+    let _ = live.send(Message::Close(None)).await;
+
+    // Reconnect asking for everything after the event *before* ours, so the
+    // replay's first matching frame is the one we just saw.
+    let mut replayed = subscribe(Some(seq - 1)).await;
+    let replay_bytes = loop {
+        let bytes = next_frame(&mut replayed)
+            .await
+            .expect("expected the event to come back from the replay");
+        let (header, body) = parse_frame(&bytes);
+        if header.opt("t").map(|t| t.text()) == Some("#commit")
+            && body.get("seq").int() == seq
+        {
+            break bytes;
+        }
+    };
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        replay_bytes, live_bytes,
+        "a replayed frame must be byte-identical to the live one"
+    );
+    let _ = replayed.send(Message::Close(None)).await;
+}
+
+/// Handing over from replay to live loses nothing and duplicates nothing.
+///
+/// Connect with a cursor at the current head (so the replay is empty), then
+/// write twice: both events must arrive, in order, exactly once each.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn replay_to_live_handover_has_no_gap_and_no_duplicate() {
+    if !wait_for_pds().await {
+        eprintln!("pds not running, skipping");
+        return;
+    }
+    let (c, did, jwt) = fresh_user("fhhandover").await;
+
+    // Establish where the log currently ends by writing one event and reading
+    // its seq off the live stream.
+    let mut probe = subscribe(None).await;
+    settle().await;
+    create_post(&c, &did, &jwt, "probe").await;
+    let head_seq = loop {
+        let bytes = next_frame(&mut probe).await.expect("probe frame");
+        let (header, body) = parse_frame(&bytes);
+        if header.opt("t").map(|t| t.text()) == Some("#commit")
+            && body.get("repo").text() == did
+        {
+            break body.get("seq").int();
+        }
+    };
+    let _ = probe.send(Message::Close(None)).await;
+
+    // Now reconnect at that exact cursor: nothing to replay, straight to live.
+    let mut socket = subscribe(Some(head_seq)).await;
+    settle().await;
+
+    create_post(&c, &did, &jwt, "after handover one").await;
+    create_post(&c, &did, &jwt, "after handover two").await;
+
+    let mut seen: Vec<i64> = Vec::new();
+    while seen.len() < 2 {
+        let bytes = next_frame(&mut socket)
+            .await
+            .expect("expected both post-handover frames");
+        let (header, body) = parse_frame(&bytes);
+        if header.opt("t").map(|t| t.text()) != Some("#commit") {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let seq = body.get("seq").int();
+        assert!(
+            seq > head_seq,
+            "the cursor said we already had seq {head_seq}; got {seq} again"
+        );
+        if body.get("repo").text() == did {
+            assert!(!seen.contains(&seq), "event {seq} delivered twice");
+            seen.push(seq);
+        }
+    }
+    assert_eq!(seen.len(), 2);
+    assert!(seen[0] < seen[1], "events must arrive in seq order: {seen:?}");
+    let _ = socket.send(Message::Close(None)).await;
+}
+
+/// A cursor past the end of the log is a terminal error frame, not silence.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn future_cursor_gets_an_error_frame() {
+    if !wait_for_pds().await {
+        eprintln!("pds not running, skipping");
+        return;
+    }
+    let mut socket = subscribe(Some(i64::MAX / 2)).await;
+    let bytes = next_frame(&mut socket)
+        .await
+        .expect("expected an error frame for a future cursor");
+    let (header, body) = parse_frame(&bytes);
+    assert_eq!(header.get("op").int(), -1, "error frames carry op = -1");
+    assert!(
+        header.opt("t").is_none(),
+        "an error header has no `t`, only `op`"
+    );
+    assert_eq!(body.get("error").text(), "FutureCursor");
+    assert!(
+        !body.get("message").text().is_empty(),
+        "the error should say what went wrong"
+    );
+}
+
+/// A record deleted through `deleteRecord` produces a `delete` op with a null
+/// CID — the one op shape that is not a link.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn delete_produces_a_delete_op_with_a_null_cid() {
+    if !wait_for_pds().await {
+        eprintln!("pds not running, skipping");
+        return;
+    }
+    let (c, did, jwt) = fresh_user("fhdelete").await;
+    let created = create_post(&c, &did, &jwt, "to be deleted").await;
+    let rkey = created["uri"]
+        .as_str()
+        .unwrap()
+        .rsplit('/')
+        .next()
+        .unwrap()
+        .to_string();
+
+    let mut socket = subscribe(None).await;
+    settle().await;
+
+    let resp = c
+        .post(format!("{PDS_URL}/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.deleteRecord"))
+        .bearer_auth(&jwt)
+        .json(&json!({
+            "repo": did,
+            "collection": "app.twi.post",
+            "rkey": rkey,
+        }))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert!(resp.status().is_success(), "deleteRecord: {:?}", resp.status());
+
+    let (_header, body) = loop {
+        let bytes = next_frame(&mut socket).await.expect("expected a delete frame");
+        let (header, body) = parse_frame(&bytes);
+        if header.opt("t").map(|t| t.text()) == Some("#commit")
+            && body.get("repo").text() == did
+        {
+            break (header, body);
+        }
+    };
+
+    let ops = body.get("ops").array();
+    assert_eq!(ops.len(), 1);
+    assert_eq!(ops[0].get("action").text(), "delete");
+    assert_eq!(ops[0].get("path").text(), format!("app.twi.post/{rkey}"));
+    assert_eq!(*ops[0].get("cid"), Cbor::Null, "a delete has no resulting CID");
+
+    // The second commit on this repo, so `since` is the previous revision.
+    assert!(
+        matches!(body.get("since"), Cbor::Text(_)),
+        "a follow-up commit must name its predecessor's rev, got {:?}",
+        body.get("since")
+    );
+    let _ = socket.send(Message::Close(None)).await;
+}
+
+/// Shape check for the frame's `time`: RFC 3339, UTC, with a `Z` suffix.
+fn chrono_like_rfc3339(s: &str) -> bool {
+    chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(s).is_ok() && s.ends_with('Z')
+}

crates/pds-server/tests/invite_integration.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,793 @@
+//! Invite-code enforcement on `com.atproto.server.createAccount`.
+//!
+//! # Why this file starts its own PDS
+//!
+//! Every other integration suite in this crate talks to whatever PDS the
+//! developer already has running on `:2583` and skips itself when there
+//! isn't one. That works because those tests only need *a* PDS. These
+//! need a PDS with `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true`, and the ambient one is
+//! (correctly) started with the default `false` — otherwise every other
+//! suite, which creates throwaway accounts with no code, would fail.
+//!
+//! Asking the developer to restart their PDS with a different flag
+//! before this file passes would mean the flag's behaviour is only ever
+//! tested by hand. So each test here spawns its own `pds-server` on a
+//! free port with the flag set the way that test needs it, and kills it
+//! on the way out ([`Pds`]'s `Drop`). `env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_pds-server")`
+//! is cargo's own path to the binary it just built for this test run, so
+//! the process under test is always the current code.
+//!
+//! The suite still fails open, in the same spirit as its neighbours: if
+//! the child never becomes healthy — no Postgres, no `.env`, no
+//! `DATABASE_URL_PDS` — the tests print why and return green rather than
+//! failing a workstation that simply isn't running the stack.
+
+use serde_json::{json, Value};
+use std::process::{Child, Command};
+use std::time::Duration;
+
+/// A `pds-server` child process bound to its own port, killed when the
+/// test that started it goes out of scope.
+///
+/// The `Drop` impl is the reason this is a struct at all: a test that
+/// panics mid-way must not leave a server holding a port and a pool of
+/// Postgres connections for the rest of the run.
+struct Pds {
+    child: Child,
+    port: u16,
+    http: reqwest::Client,
+}
+
+impl Drop for Pds {
+    fn drop(&mut self) {
+        let _ = self.child.kill();
+        let _ = self.child.wait();
+    }
+}
+
+impl Pds {
+    fn url(&self, path: &str) -> String {
+        format!("http://127.0.0.1:{}{}", self.port, path)
+    }
+
+    async fn create_account(&self, body: Value) -> (u16, Value) {
+        let resp = self
+            .http
+            .post(self.url("/xrpc/com.atproto.server.createAccount"))
+            .json(&body)
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .expect("createAccount request");
+        let status = resp.status().as_u16();
+        let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or(Value::Null);
+        (status, body)
+    }
+
+    async fn describe(&self) -> Value {
+        self.http
+            .get(self.url("/xrpc/com.atproto.server.describeServer"))
+            .send()
+            .await
+            .expect("describeServer")
+            .json()
+            .await
+            .expect("describeServer json")
+    }
+}
+
+/// Ask the OS for a port nobody is using, then let go of it.
+///
+/// There is a window between the drop and the child's `bind` in which
+/// something else could take the port; on a test machine that window is
+/// theoretical, and the alternative (a fixed port) would make two
+/// concurrently running tests in this file collide *reliably* instead of
+/// never.
+fn free_port() -> Option<u16> {
+    let l = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").ok()?;
+    let p = l.local_addr().ok()?.port();
+    drop(l);
+    Some(p)
+}
+
+/// Start a `pds-server` with `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED` set to `required`.
+///
+/// Returns `None` when the stack this needs isn't available, which the
+/// callers turn into a skip. The child inherits the ambient environment
+/// (so `DATABASE_URL_PDS` and friends come from `.env` exactly as they
+/// do for the real server — `dotenvy` does not override real variables,
+/// so our overrides below win).
+async fn start_pds(required: bool) -> Option<Pds> {
+    let port = free_port()?;
+    let child = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_pds-server"))
+        .env("PDS_HOST", "127.0.0.1")
+        .env("PDS_PORT", port.to_string())
+        .env("PDS_PUBLIC_URL", format!("http://127.0.0.1:{port}"))
+        .env("PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED", if required { "true" } else { "false" })
+        // Point the PLC submit at a closed port. `create_account`
+        // tolerates a failed submit by design (the DID is computed
+        // locally), and a connection refused on loopback fails in
+        // microseconds — whereas the real directory would add a network
+        // round-trip to every account this file creates, and might
+        // actually publish throwaway test DIDs.
+        .env("PLC_DIRECTORY_URL", "http://127.0.0.1:1")
+        .env("RUST_LOG", "warn")
+        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::null())
+        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::null())
+        .spawn()
+        .ok()?;
+
+    let http = reqwest::Client::builder()
+        .timeout(Duration::from_secs(30))
+        .build()
+        .ok()?;
+    let mut pds = Pds { child, port, http };
+
+    for _ in 0..80 {
+        // If the child already exited (bad/missing env, no Postgres),
+        // stop waiting — there is nothing to become healthy.
+        if let Ok(Some(_)) = pds.child.try_wait() {
+            return None;
+        }
+        if let Ok(r) = pds.http.get(pds.url("/healthz")).send().await {
+            if r.status().is_success() {
+                return Some(pds);
+            }
+        }
+        tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(150)).await;
+    }
+    None
+}
+
+async fn db_pool() -> Option<sqlx::PgPool> {
+    let url = std::env::var("DATABASE_URL_PDS")
+        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "postgres://pds:pds@127.0.0.1:5434/pds".to_string());
+    sqlx::postgres::PgPoolOptions::new()
+        .max_connections(4)
+        .acquire_timeout(Duration::from_secs(3))
+        .connect(&url)
+        .await
+        .ok()
+}
+
+/// Put a code straight into the table in whatever state the test needs.
+///
+/// Tests seed through SQL rather than through `pds-server invite create`
+/// because the states that matter here — already spent, disabled — are
+/// not states the CLI can mint directly, and because a test that had to
+/// shell out to a second binary to arrange its fixture would be testing
+/// two things at once.
+async fn seed_code(db: &sqlx::PgPool, max_uses: i32, used: i32, disabled: bool) -> String {
+    let code = format!("mt-test-{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
+    sqlx::query(
+        "INSERT INTO invite_codes (code, max_uses, used_count, disabled) VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)",
+    )
+    .bind(&code)
+    .bind(max_uses)
+    .bind(used)
+    .bind(disabled)
+    .execute(db)
+    .await
+    .expect("seed invite code");
+    code
+}
+
+async fn used_count(db: &sqlx::PgPool, code: &str) -> i32 {
+    sqlx::query_scalar::<_, i32>("SELECT used_count FROM invite_codes WHERE code = $1")
+        .bind(code)
+        .fetch_one(db)
+        .await
+        .expect("read used_count")
+}
+
+async fn use_rows(db: &sqlx::PgPool, code: &str) -> Vec<(String, String)> {
+    sqlx::query_as::<_, (String, String)>(
+        "SELECT did, handle FROM invite_code_uses WHERE code = $1 ORDER BY used_at",
+    )
+    .bind(code)
+    .fetch_all(db)
+    .await
+    .expect("read invite_code_uses")
+}
+
+/// A unique throwaway handle.
+///
+/// `createAccount` caps handles at 64 characters, and
+/// `<prefix>_<32 hex>.maarcadetweet.local` overshoots that for anything
+/// but the shortest prefix — a limit that shows up as a confusing
+/// `InvalidHandle` in a test that is about invite codes. Half the UUID
+/// is 64 bits of uniqueness, which is plenty for a test fixture and
+/// leaves room for a readable prefix.
+fn handle(prefix: &str) -> String {
+    let uniq = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple().to_string();
+    format!("{}_{}.maarcadetweet.local", prefix, &uniq[..16])
+}
+
+/// Every invite rejection must look the same to a client: `400` with the
+/// module's usual `{error, message}` body and the name
+/// `InvalidInviteCode`.
+fn assert_invalid_invite(status: u16, body: &Value, what: &str) {
+    assert_eq!(status, 400, "{what}: expected 400, body = {body}");
+    assert_eq!(
+        body["error"], "InvalidInviteCode",
+        "{what}: wrong error name, body = {body}"
+    );
+    assert!(
+        body["message"].is_string(),
+        "{what}: error body must carry a message, body = {body}"
+    );
+    // No DID may have been minted on a rejected request.
+    assert!(
+        body["did"].is_null(),
+        "{what}: rejected request returned a did, body = {body}"
+    );
+}
+
+// -- enforcement ------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// The happy path, and the property that makes a single-use code
+/// single-use: after the account exists, the same code is dead.
+///
+/// Also checks the audit trail, which is the reason
+/// `invite_code_uses` exists at all — "which account did this code
+/// create" has to be answerable after the fact.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn valid_code_admits_one_account_then_is_spent() {
+    let Some(db) = db_pool().await else {
+        eprintln!("no pds database, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+    let Some(pds) = start_pds(true).await else {
+        eprintln!("could not start a pds with PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    // The switch must be advertised, not just enforced — a client reads
+    // this before it asks the user for anything.
+    assert_eq!(
+        pds.describe().await["invite_code_required"],
+        json!(true),
+        "describeServer must report the actual PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED value"
+    );
+
+    let code = seed_code(&db, 1, 0, false).await;
+    let h = handle("inv_ok");
+    let (status, body) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": h,
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+            "invite_code": code,
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(status, 200, "valid code must create an account: {body}");
+    let did = body["did"].as_str().expect("did").to_string();
+
+    assert_eq!(used_count(&db, &code).await, 1, "code must be counted as used");
+    let uses = use_rows(&db, &code).await;
+    assert_eq!(uses.len(), 1);
+    assert_eq!(uses[0].0, did, "audit row must name the account it created");
+    assert_eq!(uses[0].1, h, "audit row must snapshot the handle");
+
+    // Second attempt on the now-spent code.
+    let (status2, body2) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_second"),
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+            "invite_code": code,
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_invalid_invite(status2, &body2, "spent code");
+    assert_eq!(
+        used_count(&db, &code).await,
+        1,
+        "a rejected attempt must not move the counter"
+    );
+}
+
+/// Every way a code can fail, and the missing-code case, all land on the
+/// same `400 InvalidInviteCode`.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn unknown_disabled_spent_and_missing_codes_are_rejected() {
+    let Some(db) = db_pool().await else {
+        eprintln!("no pds database, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+    let Some(pds) = start_pds(true).await else {
+        eprintln!("could not start a pds with PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    // Unknown.
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_unknown"),
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+            "invite_code": "mt-zzzzz-zzzzz",
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_invalid_invite(s, &b, "unknown code");
+
+    // Disabled, with uses left — proves `disabled` is checked and not
+    // just the counter.
+    let disabled = seed_code(&db, 5, 0, true).await;
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_disabled"),
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+            "invite_code": disabled,
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_invalid_invite(s, &b, "disabled code");
+    assert_eq!(used_count(&db, &disabled).await, 0);
+
+    // Already at its limit.
+    let spent = seed_code(&db, 2, 2, false).await;
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_spent"),
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+            "invite_code": spent,
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_invalid_invite(s, &b, "exhausted code");
+
+    // No field at all.
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_none"),
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_invalid_invite(s, &b, "missing code");
+
+    // Present but blank / whitespace — must be indistinguishable from
+    // absent, not an attempt to look up the empty string.
+    for blank in ["", "   "] {
+        let (s, b) = pds
+            .create_account(json!({
+                "handle": handle("inv_blank"),
+                "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+                "invite_code": blank,
+            }))
+            .await;
+        assert_invalid_invite(s, &b, "blank code");
+    }
+}
+
+/// The camelCase spelling from the atproto lexicon, and the multi-use
+/// case the schema exists for.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn camel_case_spelling_works_and_multi_use_codes_stop_at_the_limit() {
+    let Some(db) = db_pool().await else {
+        eprintln!("no pds database, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+    let Some(pds) = start_pds(true).await else {
+        eprintln!("could not start a pds with PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    // `inviteCode` is what an off-the-shelf atproto client sends.
+    let code = seed_code(&db, 3, 0, false).await;
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_camel"),
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+            "inviteCode": code,
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(s, 200, "inviteCode spelling must be accepted: {b}");
+
+    // Case and stray whitespace are normalised, so a code shouted or
+    // pasted out of a chat window still works.
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_case"),
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+            "invite_code": format!("  {}  ", code.to_uppercase()),
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(s, 200, "normalised code must be accepted: {b}");
+
+    // Third and last use.
+    let (s, _) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_third"),
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+            "invite_code": code,
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(s, 200);
+
+    // Fourth is one too many.
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_fourth"),
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+            "invite_code": code,
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_invalid_invite(s, &b, "one past max_uses");
+
+    assert_eq!(used_count(&db, &code).await, 3);
+    assert_eq!(use_rows(&db, &code).await.len(), 3);
+}
+
+/// A failed account creation must not consume the code.
+///
+/// The cheapest way to make the account creation fail *after* the
+/// redemption has already run is a handle that is already taken: the
+/// redeem happens first inside the transaction, the `users` insert then
+/// trips the unique index, and the whole transaction rolls back. If the
+/// redemption had been done outside the transaction (or committed
+/// separately) the user would have lost their code to someone else's
+/// handle.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn a_failed_registration_does_not_burn_the_code() {
+    let Some(db) = db_pool().await else {
+        eprintln!("no pds database, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+    let Some(pds) = start_pds(true).await else {
+        eprintln!("could not start a pds with PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    let taken = handle("inv_taken");
+    let first = seed_code(&db, 1, 0, false).await;
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": taken, "password": "hunter2hunter2", "invite_code": first,
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(s, 200, "{b}");
+
+    // Now a *different* code, used on a handle that cannot be created.
+    let code = seed_code(&db, 1, 0, false).await;
+    let (s, _b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": taken, "password": "hunter2hunter2", "invite_code": code,
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(s, 409, "duplicate handle is still a 409");
+    assert_eq!(
+        used_count(&db, &code).await,
+        0,
+        "the code must survive a registration that rolled back"
+    );
+    assert!(use_rows(&db, &code).await.is_empty());
+
+    // And it still works afterwards.
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_retry"), "password": "hunter2hunter2", "invite_code": code,
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(s, 200, "unburned code must still be redeemable: {b}");
+}
+
+// -- the race ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// Two (here: eight) registrations arriving at the same instant on the
+/// last remaining use of a code. Exactly one may get in.
+///
+/// This is the test the whole design is built around. A
+/// `SELECT`-then-`UPDATE` implementation passes every other test in this
+/// file and fails this one: all eight requests read `used_count = 0`,
+/// all eight decide they are allowed, and the server hands out eight
+/// accounts for a one-use code while the row afterwards claims a single
+/// redemption. The fix is that `invite::redeem` never reads before it
+/// writes — the `WHERE used_count < max_uses` is part of the `UPDATE`,
+/// so Postgres re-evaluates it against the committed row after the
+/// row lock is released and the losers match zero rows.
+///
+/// Every request uses a distinct handle, so nothing but the invite code
+/// can be what serialises them.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn concurrent_registrations_cannot_share_one_use() {
+    let Some(db) = db_pool().await else {
+        eprintln!("no pds database, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+    let Some(pds) = start_pds(true).await else {
+        eprintln!("could not start a pds with PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    const N: usize = 8;
+    let code = seed_code(&db, 1, 0, false).await;
+
+    let mut tasks = Vec::with_capacity(N);
+    for i in 0..N {
+        let http = pds.http.clone();
+        let url = pds.url("/xrpc/com.atproto.server.createAccount");
+        let code = code.clone();
+        let h = handle(&format!("inv_race{i}"));
+        tasks.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let resp = http
+                .post(url)
+                .json(&json!({
+                    "handle": h,
+                    "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+                    "invite_code": code,
+                }))
+                .send()
+                .await
+                .expect("concurrent createAccount");
+            let status = resp.status().as_u16();
+            let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or(Value::Null);
+            (status, body)
+        }));
+    }
+
+    let mut ok = Vec::new();
+    let mut rejected = 0usize;
+    for t in tasks {
+        let (status, body) = t.await.unwrap();
+        match status {
+            200 => ok.push(body),
+            400 => {
+                assert_eq!(body["error"], "InvalidInviteCode", "body = {body}");
+                rejected += 1;
+            }
+            other => panic!("unexpected status {other}: {body}"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        ok.len(),
+        1,
+        "a one-use code let {} concurrent registrations through — the redeem is racy",
+        ok.len()
+    );
+    assert_eq!(rejected, N - 1);
+    assert_eq!(used_count(&db, &code).await, 1);
+    let uses = use_rows(&db, &code).await;
+    assert_eq!(uses.len(), 1, "counter and audit rows disagree: {uses:?}");
+    assert_eq!(uses[0].0, ok[0]["did"].as_str().unwrap());
+}
+
+/// The same race with room for more than one winner: a three-use code
+/// hit by eight simultaneous registrations must admit exactly three.
+///
+/// Worth having next to the one-use case because an implementation can
+/// be "safe" by accident for a single use (e.g. by serialising every
+/// registration globally) and still lose count when several are
+/// genuinely allowed to proceed.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn concurrent_registrations_respect_a_multi_use_limit() {
+    let Some(db) = db_pool().await else {
+        eprintln!("no pds database, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+    let Some(pds) = start_pds(true).await else {
+        eprintln!("could not start a pds with PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    const N: usize = 8;
+    const USES: i32 = 3;
+    let code = seed_code(&db, USES, 0, false).await;
+
+    let mut tasks = Vec::with_capacity(N);
+    for i in 0..N {
+        let http = pds.http.clone();
+        let url = pds.url("/xrpc/com.atproto.server.createAccount");
+        let code = code.clone();
+        let h = handle(&format!("inv_mrace{i}"));
+        tasks.push(tokio::spawn(async move {
+            let resp = http
+                .post(url)
+                .json(&json!({
+                    "handle": h,
+                    "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+                    "invite_code": code,
+                }))
+                .send()
+                .await
+                .expect("concurrent createAccount");
+            let status = resp.status().as_u16();
+            let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap_or(Value::Null);
+            (status, body)
+        }));
+    }
+
+    let mut ok = 0usize;
+    for t in tasks {
+        let (status, body) = t.await.unwrap();
+        match status {
+            200 => ok += 1,
+            400 => assert_eq!(body["error"], "InvalidInviteCode", "body = {body}"),
+            other => panic!("unexpected status {other}: {body}"),
+        }
+    }
+    assert_eq!(ok, USES as usize, "a {USES}-use code admitted {ok} accounts");
+    assert_eq!(used_count(&db, &code).await, USES);
+    assert_eq!(use_rows(&db, &code).await.len(), USES as usize);
+}
+
+// -- the switch off ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// With `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=false` — the default, and what every other
+/// test suite in this workspace relies on — nothing about `createAccount`
+/// changes.
+///
+/// This is the regression test for the whole feature's blast radius: the
+/// switch is off by default precisely so that the existing suites keep
+/// creating accounts with no code, and if that ever stopped being true
+/// the failure would show up as dozens of unrelated tests breaking. It
+/// shows up here instead.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn switch_off_leaves_create_account_untouched() {
+    let Some(_db) = db_pool().await else {
+        eprintln!("no pds database, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+    let Some(pds) = start_pds(false).await else {
+        eprintln!("could not start a pds with PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=false, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    assert_eq!(
+        pds.describe().await["invite_code_required"],
+        json!(false),
+        "describeServer must report the actual PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED value"
+    );
+
+    // No code at all: the historical behaviour.
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_off"),
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(s, 200, "no-code registration must still work: {b}");
+    assert!(b["did"].as_str().unwrap().starts_with("did:"));
+    assert!(b["access_jwt"].is_string());
+
+    // A code that does not exist is simply ignored rather than becoming
+    // a new way to fail — a client that was talking to an invite-only
+    // PDS yesterday must not break when the operator opens the server up.
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_off_bogus"),
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+            "invite_code": "mt-does-notexist",
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(s, 200, "an ignored code must not fail the request: {b}");
+
+    // The other validations are untouched.
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_off_short"),
+            "password": "short",
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(s, 400);
+    assert_eq!(b["error"], "InvalidPassword");
+}
+
+// -- the CLI ----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+/// `pds-server invite create` / `list` / `disable`, run as the operator
+/// would run them, against the real database.
+///
+/// The point is not that the SQL works (the tests above cover that) but
+/// that the *binary* exposes it: that `invite` short-circuits before the
+/// server starts, that `create` prints bare codes one per line so they
+/// can be pasted, and that a code it minted is actually redeemable.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn invite_cli_mints_listable_redeemable_codes() {
+    let Some(db) = db_pool().await else {
+        eprintln!("no pds database, skipping");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    let out = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_pds-server"))
+        .args(["invite", "create", "--count", "3", "--uses", "2", "--note", "cli test"])
+        .env("RUST_LOG", "warn")
+        .output()
+        .expect("run invite create");
+    if !out.status.success() {
+        eprintln!(
+            "invite create failed (no env/db?), skipping: {}",
+            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
+        );
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout);
+    let codes: Vec<&str> = stdout.lines().filter(|l| !l.trim().is_empty()).collect();
+    assert_eq!(codes.len(), 3, "one code per line, nothing else: {stdout:?}");
+    for c in &codes {
+        // Bare, paste-ready: no labels, no quotes, no indentation.
+        assert_eq!(*c, c.trim(), "code line has surrounding whitespace: {c:?}");
+        assert!(c.starts_with("mt-"), "unexpected code shape: {c}");
+        assert_eq!(
+            sqlx::query_scalar::<_, i32>("SELECT max_uses FROM invite_codes WHERE code = $1")
+                .bind(c)
+                .fetch_one(&db)
+                .await
+                .expect("minted code must be in the table"),
+            2,
+            "--uses must reach the row"
+        );
+    }
+    // All three distinct — a generator that returned a constant would
+    // otherwise only show up as a primary-key error.
+    let unique: std::collections::HashSet<&&str> = codes.iter().collect();
+    assert_eq!(unique.len(), 3);
+
+    // `list` must show what `redeem` would accept.
+    let listed = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_pds-server"))
+        .args(["invite", "list"])
+        .env("RUST_LOG", "warn")
+        .output()
+        .expect("run invite list");
+    assert!(listed.status.success());
+    let listed = String::from_utf8_lossy(&listed.stdout);
+    for c in &codes {
+        assert!(listed.contains(*c), "invite list omitted {c}");
+    }
+
+    // `disable` takes a code out without deleting it.
+    let disabled = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_pds-server"))
+        .args(["invite", "disable", codes[0]])
+        .env("RUST_LOG", "warn")
+        .output()
+        .expect("run invite disable");
+    assert!(disabled.status.success());
+    assert!(
+        sqlx::query_scalar::<_, bool>("SELECT disabled FROM invite_codes WHERE code = $1")
+            .bind(codes[0])
+            .fetch_one(&db)
+            .await
+            .unwrap()
+    );
+    let listed = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_pds-server"))
+        .args(["invite", "list"])
+        .env("RUST_LOG", "warn")
+        .output()
+        .expect("run invite list");
+    let listed = String::from_utf8_lossy(&listed.stdout);
+    assert!(
+        !listed.contains(codes[0]),
+        "a disabled code must not show in the default listing"
+    );
+
+    // And a minted code really lets an account through.
+    let Some(pds) = start_pds(true).await else {
+        eprintln!("could not start a pds with PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true, skipping redeem check");
+        return;
+    };
+    let (s, b) = pds
+        .create_account(json!({
+            "handle": handle("inv_cli"),
+            "password": "hunter2hunter2",
+            "invite_code": codes[1],
+        }))
+        .await;
+    assert_eq!(s, 200, "CLI-minted code must be redeemable: {b}");
+}
+
+/// An unknown subcommand must not silently boot a server, and `help`
+/// must not need a database.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn unknown_subcommand_fails_instead_of_starting_a_server() {
+    let out = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_pds-server"))
+        .args(["invit"])
+        .env("RUST_LOG", "warn")
+        .output()
+        .expect("run bad subcommand");
+    assert!(!out.status.success(), "a typo'd subcommand must not exit 0");
+    let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr);
+    assert!(stderr.contains("unknown command"), "stderr = {stderr}");
+
+    let out = Command::new(env!("CARGO_BIN_EXE_pds-server"))
+        .args(["invite", "help"])
+        .env("RUST_LOG", "warn")
+        .output()
+        .expect("run invite help");
+    assert!(out.status.success());
+    assert!(String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout).contains("pds-server invite"));
+}

crates/pds-server/tests/pds_integration.rs

@@ -38,9 +38,109 @@ async fn describe_server() {
         .json()
         .await
         .unwrap();
-    assert!(r["did"].is_string());
+    // The DID is derived from `PDS_PUBLIC_URL`, not hardcoded — so we
+    // assert the *shape* (any deployment must produce a did:web) and
+    // leave the exact value to `at_shared::config`'s unit tests.
+    let did = r["did"].as_str().expect("describeServer must return a did");
+    assert!(did.starts_with("did:web:"), "did = {did}");
     assert!(r["available_user_domains"].is_array());
-    assert_eq!(r["invite_code_required"], json!(false));
+    // `invite_code_required` used to be a hardcoded `false` here. It is
+    // now whatever `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED` says, so this suite — which
+    // talks to whatever PDS the developer happens to be running — can
+    // only assert the type. That the value actually tracks the switch is
+    // pinned in `invite_integration.rs`, which starts a PDS with the
+    // flag set both ways and checks both answers.
+    assert!(
+        r["invite_code_required"].is_boolean(),
+        "invite_code_required = {}",
+        r["invite_code_required"]
+    );
+    // If this test process shares the server's environment (the
+    // documented way to run the suite is
+    // `set -a; . ./.env; set +a; cargo test`), hold it to the exact
+    // value too.
+    if let Ok(raw) = std::env::var("PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED") {
+        let expected = matches!(
+            raw.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str(),
+            "1" | "true" | "yes" | "on"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            r["invite_code_required"],
+            json!(expected),
+            "describeServer disagrees with PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED={raw}"
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+/// `GET /.well-known/did.json` — the document the AppView fetches to
+/// learn the key our access tokens are signed with.
+///
+/// Two properties matter beyond "it returns JSON": the document's `id`
+/// must be the same DID `describeServer` advertises (otherwise a client
+/// that trusts one and resolves the other ends up at a different
+/// identity), and it must carry a usable `publicKeyMultibase`.
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn did_document_publishes_the_server_key() {
+    if !wait_for_pds().await {
+        eprintln!("pds not running, skipping");
+        return;
+    }
+    let c = client().await;
+    let doc: Value = c
+        .get(format!("{}/.well-known/did.json", PDS_URL))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+
+    let id = doc["id"].as_str().expect("did document needs an id");
+    assert!(id.starts_with("did:web:"), "id = {id}");
+
+    let described: Value = c
+        .get(format!("{}/xrpc/com.atproto.server.describeServer", PDS_URL))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    assert_eq!(
+        described["did"].as_str().unwrap(),
+        id,
+        "describeServer and the did document must name the same identity"
+    );
+
+    let vm = &doc["verificationMethod"][0];
+    assert_eq!(vm["type"], json!("Multikey"));
+    assert_eq!(vm["controller"], json!(id));
+    assert_eq!(vm["id"], json!(format!("{id}#atproto")));
+    let key = vm["publicKeyMultibase"]
+        .as_str()
+        .expect("verificationMethod needs publicKeyMultibase");
+    // base58-btc multibase — the `z` prefix the AppView's decoder wants.
+    assert!(key.starts_with('z'), "key = {key}");
+
+    // And it really is the key our tokens verify against: mint a
+    // session and check the access JWT against the published key.
+    let handle = format!("didjson_{}.maarcadetweet.local", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().simple());
+    let acc: Value = c
+        .post(format!("{}/xrpc/com.atproto.server.createAccount", PDS_URL))
+        .json(&json!({"handle": handle, "password": "hunter2hunter2"}))
+        .send()
+        .await
+        .unwrap()
+        .json()
+        .await
+        .unwrap();
+    let jwt = acc["access_jwt"].as_str().expect("access_jwt");
+    let claims = at_crypto::jwt::verify_jwt(jwt, key)
+        .expect("access token must verify against the published key");
+    assert_eq!(claims.sub, acc["did"].as_str().unwrap());
+    assert_eq!(claims.scope.as_deref(), Some("com.atproto.access"));
+    // `iss` is the same did:web the document identifies.
+    assert_eq!(claims.iss, id);
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
@@ -360,7 +460,17 @@ fn parse_car(bytes: &[u8]) -> ParsedCar {
                 assert_eq!(maj, 2, "root CID must be a byte string");
                 p += c;
                 let cid_bytes = &bytes[p..p + ln as usize];
-                let cid_hex: String = cid_bytes
+                // A DAG-CBOR link wraps `0x00 || <binary CID>`. The 0x00 is
+                // the multibase identity prefix, not part of the CID, so it
+                // comes off before the hex comparison against a real CID's
+                // bytes. Asserted rather than skipped: this helper is the
+                // only place the header's wire shape is checked.
+                assert_eq!(
+                    cid_bytes.first(),
+                    Some(&0x00),
+                    "root link must carry the multibase identity prefix"
+                );
+                let cid_hex: String = cid_bytes[1..]
                     .iter()
                     .map(|b| format!("{:02x}", b))
                     .collect();
@@ -981,42 +1091,86 @@ async fn sync_list_repos_keyset_pagination() {
         assert!(resp["uri"].is_string(), "createRecord: {:?}", resp);
         created_dids.push(did);
     }
-    let min_did = created_dids.iter().min().unwrap().clone();
-    let start_cursor = did_cursor_lt(&min_did);
+    // Two separate properties, deliberately not tested by one long walk
+    // from the top of the table: `repos` grows without bound on a
+    // long-lived instance (a few thousand rows here), the seeded DIDs are
+    // random `did:plc:bafy…` hashes scattered across that range, and a
+    // full scan at two rows per page ran into its own iteration cap —
+    // failing for table size rather than for anything about pagination.
 
-    let mut seen: std::collections::HashSet<String> = std::collections::HashSet::new();
-    let mut cursor: Option<String> = Some(start_cursor);
-    let mut pages = 0;
-    loop {
-        pages += 1;
-        assert!(pages < 2000, "pagination did not terminate");
+    // 1. Every seeded DID is reachable: anchor the cursor immediately
+    //    before it and it must be on the first page.
+    for did in &created_dids {
         let url = format!(
             "{}/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.listRepos?limit=2&cursor={}",
             PDS_URL,
-            urlencode(cursor.as_deref().unwrap_or(""))
+            urlencode(&did_cursor_just_before(did))
         );
         let resp = client().await.get(&url).send().await.unwrap();
         assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 200);
         let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
         let repos = body["repos"].as_array().expect("repos array");
+        assert!(
+            repos.iter().any(|r| r["did"].as_str() == Some(did.as_str())),
+            "DID not on the page starting immediately before it: {did}"
+        );
+    }
+
+    // 2. The keyset itself: walking forward from the lowest seeded DID
+    //    yields strictly increasing DIDs, never a duplicate, and the
+    //    cursor the server hands back is always the last DID of the page.
+    //    A bounded number of pages is enough — these are properties of
+    //    every step, not of the whole table.
+    let min_did = created_dids.iter().min().unwrap().clone();
+    let mut cursor = did_cursor_just_before(&min_did);
+    let mut seen: std::collections::HashSet<String> = std::collections::HashSet::new();
+    let mut last: Option<String> = None;
+    for _ in 0..25 {
+        let url = format!(
+            "{}/xrpc/com.atproto.sync.listRepos?limit=2&cursor={}",
+            PDS_URL,
+            urlencode(&cursor)
+        );
+        let resp = client().await.get(&url).send().await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(resp.status().as_u16(), 200);
+        let body: Value = resp.json().await.unwrap();
+        let repos = body["repos"].as_array().expect("repos array");
+        if repos.is_empty() {
+            break;
+        }
         for r in repos {
             let did = r["did"].as_str().unwrap().to_string();
             assert!(
                 seen.insert(did.clone()),
                 "duplicate DID across pages: {did}"
             );
-        }
-        if created_dids.iter().all(|d| seen.contains(d)) {
-            break;
+            if let Some(prev) = &last {
+                assert!(
+                    &did > prev,
+                    "listRepos must be strictly ascending by DID: {prev} then {did}"
+                );
+            }
+            last = Some(did);
         }
         match body["cursor"].as_str() {
-            Some(c) => cursor = Some(c.to_string()),
-            None => panic!(
-                "pagination exhausted before all created DIDs were seen; missing {:?}",
-                created_dids.iter().filter(|d| !seen.contains(*d)).collect::<Vec<_>>()
-            ),
+            Some(c) => {
+                assert_eq!(
+                    Some(c),
+                    last.as_deref(),
+                    "cursor must be the last DID of the page just served"
+                );
+                cursor = c.to_string();
+            }
+            // Fewer rows than the limit: the end of the table, and the
+            // server correctly stops handing out a cursor.
+            None => break,
         }
     }
+    assert!(
+        seen.len() >= 2,
+        "expected the walk to cover at least two pages, saw {}",
+        seen.len()
+    );
 }
 
 fn urlencode(s: &str) -> String {

crates/tauri-app/src-tauri/src/appview_client.rs

@@ -1,8 +1,30 @@
 //! Thin HTTP client the Tauri commands use to talk to the AppView.
 //!
-//! All four methods return parsed JSON or a stringified error that the
+//! Every method returns parsed JSON or a stringified error that the
 //! Tauri command layer surfaces to the Svelte frontend as the
 //! `Result::Err` payload.
+//!
+//! # Authentication
+//!
+//! The AppView's *viewer-scoped* endpoints require the account's access
+//! JWT in an `Authorization: Bearer` header, and additionally check that
+//! the token's `sub` equals the `did` query parameter:
+//!
+//!   * `GET  /api/timeline/home`
+//!   * `GET  /api/notifications`
+//!   * `GET  /api/notifications/count`
+//!   * `POST /api/notifications/seen`
+//!
+//! Those four methods therefore take an `access_jwt` argument (last, the
+//! same position `pds_client.rs` uses). Everything else —
+//! `/api/profile*`, `/api/search`, `/api/post/{uri}`, `/api/thread`,
+//! `/api/followers`, `/api/following` — stays public and deliberately
+//! sends no token, so the read-only views keep working while logged out.
+//!
+//! On an auth failure the AppView answers `401` with
+//! `{"error":"AuthMissing"|"TokenInvalid","message":…}` or `403` with
+//! `{"error":"Forbidden",…}`. See [`status_error`] for why the response
+//! body must survive into the error message.
 
 use anyhow::{anyhow, Context, Result};
 use reqwest::Client;
@@ -58,9 +80,10 @@ pub struct SearchResponse {
 ///
 /// `like_count` and `repost_count` are included when the server
 /// resolves a real post; they're `None` for the "not in index"
-/// sentinel response (where `post` is null). The AppView has no
-/// auth yet, so we don't get `viewer_liked` / `viewer_reposted`
-/// from the server.
+/// sentinel response (where `post` is null). `/api/post/{uri}` is a
+/// public endpoint that takes no token, so there is no viewer to
+/// resolve against and we don't get `viewer_liked` /
+/// `viewer_reposted`; [`Self::fetch_thread`] with a `viewer_did` does.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct ThreadResponse {
     pub post: Option<PostDto>,
@@ -192,16 +215,22 @@ impl AppViewClient {
         }
     }
 
-    /// `GET /api/timeline/home?did=&limit=&cursor=`
+    /// `GET /api/timeline/home?did=&limit=&cursor=` — **authenticated**.
+    ///
+    /// `access_jwt` goes out as `Authorization: Bearer`; the AppView
+    /// rejects the call with 401 without it and with 403 when the
+    /// token's `sub` doesn't match `did`.
     pub async fn fetch_timeline(
         &self,
         did: &str,
         cursor: Option<&str>,
         limit: u32,
+        access_jwt: &str,
     ) -> Result<TimelineResponse> {
         let mut req = self
             .client
             .get(format!("{}/api/timeline/home", self.base_url))
+            .bearer_auth(access_jwt)
             .query(&[("did", did), ("limit", &limit.to_string())]);
         if let Some(c) = cursor {
             req = req.query(&[("cursor", c)]);
@@ -211,13 +240,7 @@ impl AppViewClient {
             .await
             .context("appview: failed to send timeline request")?;
         if !resp.status().is_success() {
-            let status = resp.status();
-            let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            return Err(anyhow!(
-                "appview: timeline home returned {}: {}",
-                status,
-                body
-            ));
+            return Err(status_error("timeline home", resp).await);
         }
         resp
             .json::<TimelineResponse>()
@@ -244,13 +267,7 @@ impl AppViewClient {
             .await
             .context("appview: failed to send profile request")?;
         if !resp.status().is_success() {
-            let status = resp.status();
-            let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            return Err(anyhow!(
-                "appview: profile returned {}: {}",
-                status,
-                body
-            ));
+            return Err(status_error("profile", resp).await);
         }
         resp
             .json::<ProfileResponse>()
@@ -268,13 +285,7 @@ impl AppViewClient {
             .await
             .context("appview: failed to send profile-by-did request")?;
         if !resp.status().is_success() {
-            let status = resp.status();
-            let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            return Err(anyhow!(
-                "appview: profile-by-did returned {}: {}",
-                status,
-                body
-            ));
+            return Err(status_error("profile-by-did", resp).await);
         }
         resp
             .json::<ProfileResponse>()
@@ -292,13 +303,7 @@ impl AppViewClient {
             .await
             .context("appview: failed to send search request")?;
         if !resp.status().is_success() {
-            let status = resp.status();
-            let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            return Err(anyhow!(
-                "appview: search returned {}: {}",
-                status,
-                body
-            ));
+            return Err(status_error("search", resp).await);
         }
         resp
             .json::<SearchResponse>()
@@ -323,13 +328,7 @@ impl AppViewClient {
             .await
             .context("appview: failed to send post request")?;
         if !resp.status().is_success() {
-            let status = resp.status();
-            let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            return Err(anyhow!(
-                "appview: post returned {}: {}",
-                status,
-                body
-            ));
+            return Err(status_error("post", resp).await);
         }
         resp
             .json::<ThreadResponse>()
@@ -363,13 +362,7 @@ impl AppViewClient {
             .await
             .context("appview: failed to send thread request")?;
         if !resp.status().is_success() {
-            let status = resp.status();
-            let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            return Err(anyhow!(
-                "appview: thread returned {}: {}",
-                status,
-                body
-            ));
+            return Err(status_error("thread", resp).await);
         }
         resp
             .json::<ThreadFullResponse>()
@@ -377,17 +370,20 @@ impl AppViewClient {
             .context("appview: thread JSON parse")
     }
 
-    /// `GET /api/notifications?did=&limit=&cursor=` — newest first,
-    /// same opaque-cursor pagination contract as the timeline.
+    /// `GET /api/notifications?did=&limit=&cursor=` — **authenticated**;
+    /// newest first, same opaque-cursor pagination contract as the
+    /// timeline.
     pub async fn fetch_notifications(
         &self,
         did: &str,
         cursor: Option<&str>,
         limit: u32,
+        access_jwt: &str,
     ) -> Result<NotificationsResponse> {
         let mut req = self
             .client
             .get(format!("{}/api/notifications", self.base_url))
+            .bearer_auth(access_jwt)
             .query(&[("did", did), ("limit", &limit.to_string())]);
         if let Some(c) = cursor {
             req = req.query(&[("cursor", c)]);
@@ -397,13 +393,7 @@ impl AppViewClient {
             .await
             .context("appview: failed to send notifications request")?;
         if !resp.status().is_success() {
-            let status = resp.status();
-            let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            return Err(anyhow!(
-                "appview: notifications returned {}: {}",
-                status,
-                body
-            ));
+            return Err(status_error("notifications", resp).await);
         }
         resp
             .json::<NotificationsResponse>()
@@ -411,25 +401,24 @@ impl AppViewClient {
             .context("appview: notifications JSON parse")
     }
 
-    /// `GET /api/notifications/count?did=` — unread count for the
-    /// NavRail badge. Cheap enough to poll (partial index on the
-    /// server side).
-    pub async fn notification_count(&self, did: &str) -> Result<NotificationCountResponse> {
+    /// `GET /api/notifications/count?did=` — **authenticated**; unread
+    /// count for the NavRail badge. Cheap enough to poll (partial index
+    /// on the server side).
+    pub async fn notification_count(
+        &self,
+        did: &str,
+        access_jwt: &str,
+    ) -> Result<NotificationCountResponse> {
         let resp = self
             .client
             .get(format!("{}/api/notifications/count", self.base_url))
+            .bearer_auth(access_jwt)
             .query(&[("did", did)])
             .send()
             .await
             .context("appview: failed to send notification-count request")?;
         if !resp.status().is_success() {
-            let status = resp.status();
-            let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            return Err(anyhow!(
-                "appview: notification count returned {}: {}",
-                status,
-                body
-            ));
+            return Err(status_error("notification count", resp).await);
         }
         resp
             .json::<NotificationCountResponse>()
@@ -437,9 +426,10 @@ impl AppViewClient {
             .context("appview: notification count JSON parse")
     }
 
-    /// `POST /api/notifications/seen` — mark everything indexed at or
-    /// before `seen_at` as read. Passing `None` marks *all* currently
-    /// unread rows. Idempotent; a second call reports `updated: 0`.
+    /// `POST /api/notifications/seen` — **authenticated**; mark
+    /// everything indexed at or before `seen_at` as read. Passing `None`
+    /// marks *all* currently unread rows. Idempotent; a second call
+    /// reports `updated: 0`.
     ///
     /// The server accepts both `seenAt` and `seen_at`; we send the
     /// camelCase spelling because that's what the wire contract
@@ -448,6 +438,7 @@ impl AppViewClient {
         &self,
         did: &str,
         seen_at: Option<&str>,
+        access_jwt: &str,
     ) -> Result<NotificationSeenResponse> {
         let mut body = serde_json::json!({ "did": did });
         if let Some(ts) = seen_at {
@@ -456,18 +447,13 @@ impl AppViewClient {
         let resp = self
             .client
             .post(format!("{}/api/notifications/seen", self.base_url))
+            .bearer_auth(access_jwt)
             .json(&body)
             .send()
             .await
             .context("appview: failed to send notifications-seen request")?;
         if !resp.status().is_success() {
-            let status = resp.status();
-            let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            return Err(anyhow!(
-                "appview: notifications seen returned {}: {}",
-                status,
-                body
-            ));
+            return Err(status_error("notifications seen", resp).await);
         }
         resp
             .json::<NotificationSeenResponse>()
@@ -517,9 +503,7 @@ impl AppViewClient {
             .await
             .with_context(|| format!("appview: failed to send {path} request"))?;
         if !resp.status().is_success() {
-            let status = resp.status();
-            let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
-            return Err(anyhow!("appview: {} returned {}: {}", path, status, body));
+            return Err(status_error(path, resp).await);
         }
         resp
             .json::<ActorListResponse>()
@@ -528,6 +512,33 @@ impl AppViewClient {
     }
 }
 
+/// Turn a non-2xx AppView response into an `anyhow::Error` whose
+/// message carries the server's response body **verbatim**.
+///
+/// Keeping the body is load-bearing, not cosmetic. The AppView answers
+/// an expired or malformed access token with
+/// `401 {"error":"TokenInvalid","message":…}`, and the frontend's
+/// `safeInvoke` (`src/lib/api/client.ts`) decides whether to refresh the
+/// session and retry by sniffing the *stringified* Rust error for the
+/// literal substring `"TokenInvalid"` (or `"ExpiredSignature"`). The
+/// chain is therefore:
+///
+/// ```text
+/// AppView 401 body ──► status_error() ──► anyhow msg
+///   ──► lib.rs `.map_err(|e| e.to_string())` ──► Tauri IPC reject
+///   ──► safeInvoke's isTokenInvalid() ──► auth_refresh + retry once
+/// ```
+///
+/// Every link is a plain string, so swallowing the body here (e.g.
+/// formatting only the status code) silently breaks token renewal —
+/// the user's timeline just stops updating an hour after login. The
+/// unit tests below pin the substring so that can't regress.
+async fn status_error(label: &str, resp: reqwest::Response) -> anyhow::Error {
+    let status = resp.status();
+    let body = resp.text().await.unwrap_or_default();
+    anyhow!("appview: {} returned {}: {}", label, status, body)
+}
+
 /// Percent-encode every byte of `s` for use as a URL path segment.
 /// `axum`'s path extractor will decode it back. We use this rather
 /// than `url::Url::parse(...).path_segments()` because AT-Protocol
@@ -553,6 +564,9 @@ fn percent_encode_path(s: &str) -> String {
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
+    use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+    use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
+    use tokio::net::TcpListener;
 
     #[test]
     fn percent_encode_path_at_uri() {
@@ -563,4 +577,241 @@ mod tests {
             "at%3A%2F%2Fdid%3Aplc%3Aabc%2Fapp.twi.post%2F3k2"
         );
     }
+
+    // -- mock AppView -------------------------------------------------
+    //
+    // A ~40-line HTTP/1.1 server on an ephemeral port, rather than a
+    // mocking crate, so the test adds no dependency to a workspace that
+    // currently has none for this. It answers every request with a
+    // canned status + body and records each request head so the tests
+    // can assert on the `Authorization` header we did (or deliberately
+    // did not) send.
+
+    /// The raw request heads (request line + header block) the mock saw,
+    /// in arrival order.
+    type Recorded = Arc<Mutex<Vec<String>>>;
+
+    /// Byte offset of the `\r\n\r\n` that ends the header block.
+    fn headers_end(buf: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
+        buf.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n")
+    }
+
+    /// Announced body length from a request head, if any. Needed so the
+    /// POST test drains the JSON body before the mock closes the socket
+    /// — closing mid-write would surface to `reqwest` as a connection
+    /// error instead of the 401 we're trying to assert on.
+    fn content_length(head: &str) -> usize {
+        head.lines()
+            .find_map(|l| {
+                let (k, v) = l.split_once(':')?;
+                k.trim()
+                    .eq_ignore_ascii_case("content-length")
+                    .then(|| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())?
+            })
+            .unwrap_or(0)
+    }
+
+    /// Serve `n` connections, answering each with `status`/`reason` and
+    /// `body`. Returns the base URL to point an [`AppViewClient`] at,
+    /// plus the recording handle.
+    async fn spawn_mock(
+        status: u16,
+        reason: &'static str,
+        body: &'static str,
+        n: usize,
+    ) -> (String, Recorded) {
+        let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
+        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
+        let recorded: Recorded = Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
+        let rec = recorded.clone();
+        tokio::spawn(async move {
+            for _ in 0..n {
+                let Ok((mut sock, _)) = listener.accept().await else {
+                    return;
+                };
+                let mut buf: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
+                let mut chunk = [0u8; 2048];
+                loop {
+                    let read = match sock.read(&mut chunk).await {
+                        Ok(0) | Err(_) => break,
+                        Ok(k) => k,
+                    };
+                    buf.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..read]);
+                    if let Some(p) = headers_end(&buf) {
+                        let head = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..p]).into_owned();
+                        if buf.len() - (p + 4) >= content_length(&head) {
+                            rec.lock().unwrap().push(head);
+                            break;
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+                // `connection: close` keeps every request on a fresh
+                // socket, so the recorded order matches the call order.
+                let resp = format!(
+                    "HTTP/1.1 {status} {reason}\r\n\
+                     content-type: application/json\r\n\
+                     content-length: {}\r\n\
+                     connection: close\r\n\r\n{body}",
+                    body.len()
+                );
+                let _ = sock.write_all(resp.as_bytes()).await;
+                let _ = sock.shutdown().await;
+            }
+        });
+        (format!("http://{addr}"), recorded)
+    }
+
+    /// Value of the `Authorization` header in a recorded request head,
+    /// or `None` when the request carried none.
+    fn auth_header(head: &str) -> Option<String> {
+        head.lines().find_map(|l| {
+            let (k, v) = l.split_once(':')?;
+            k.trim()
+                .eq_ignore_ascii_case("authorization")
+                .then(|| v.trim().to_string())
+        })
+    }
+
+    // -- the contract the TS retry chain depends on -------------------
+
+    /// The AppView's 401 body for an expired access token.
+    const TOKEN_INVALID_BODY: &str =
+        r#"{"error":"TokenInvalid","message":"ExpiredSignature"}"#;
+
+    /// **This is the test the token-renewal path hangs off.**
+    ///
+    /// `src/lib/api/client.ts`'s `safeInvoke` refreshes the session and
+    /// retries exactly once when `isTokenInvalid(e)` matches — and that
+    /// predicate is a substring search for `"TokenInvalid"` /
+    /// `"ExpiredSignature"` over the *stringified* error that came up
+    /// from Rust. The AppView only ever states the code in its JSON
+    /// body, so if [`status_error`] were to drop the body (or truncate
+    /// it to the status code) the retry would never fire and the desktop
+    /// client would sit on a dead timeline until the user restarts it.
+    ///
+    /// So: for each of the four authenticated endpoints, assert the code
+    /// survives verbatim all the way into `Error::to_string()` — which
+    /// is exactly what `lib.rs` hands the Tauri IPC layer via
+    /// `.map_err(|e| e.to_string())`.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn token_invalid_code_survives_into_the_error_string() {
+        let (base, _rec) = spawn_mock(401, "Unauthorized", TOKEN_INVALID_BODY, 4).await;
+        let c = AppViewClient::new(base);
+
+        let errs = vec![
+            c.fetch_timeline("did:plc:me", None, 30, "stale")
+                .await
+                .unwrap_err()
+                .to_string(),
+            c.fetch_notifications("did:plc:me", None, 30, "stale")
+                .await
+                .unwrap_err()
+                .to_string(),
+            c.notification_count("did:plc:me", "stale")
+                .await
+                .unwrap_err()
+                .to_string(),
+            c.mark_notifications_seen("did:plc:me", None, "stale")
+                .await
+                .unwrap_err()
+                .to_string(),
+        ];
+
+        for e in &errs {
+            // The literal the TS `isTokenInvalid()` greps for. Both
+            // spellings it accepts are in this body.
+            assert!(
+                e.contains("TokenInvalid"),
+                "error must carry the AppView's code verbatim, got: {e}"
+            );
+            assert!(
+                e.contains("ExpiredSignature"),
+                "error must carry the AppView's message verbatim, got: {e}"
+            );
+            // The status is useful context, but it is NOT what the retry
+            // keys off — asserting it here documents that both travel.
+            assert!(e.contains("401"), "status should travel too, got: {e}");
+        }
+
+        // Each endpoint still labels itself, so a log line says which
+        // call failed.
+        assert!(errs[0].contains("timeline home"));
+        assert!(errs[1].contains("notifications"));
+        assert!(errs[2].contains("notification count"));
+        assert!(errs[3].contains("notifications seen"));
+    }
+
+    /// The 403 the AppView returns when the token is valid but its
+    /// `sub` doesn't match the `did` query parameter. Deliberately
+    /// *not* something `isTokenInvalid` matches: refreshing wouldn't
+    /// help, so the retry must not fire — but the code still has to
+    /// reach the UI so the message is actionable.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn forbidden_body_survives_and_does_not_look_refreshable() {
+        let (base, _rec) = spawn_mock(
+            403,
+            "Forbidden",
+            r#"{"error":"Forbidden","message":"did does not match token subject"}"#,
+            1,
+        )
+        .await;
+        let c = AppViewClient::new(base);
+
+        let e = c
+            .fetch_timeline("did:plc:someone-else", None, 30, "good-jwt")
+            .await
+            .unwrap_err()
+            .to_string();
+
+        assert!(e.contains("Forbidden"), "got: {e}");
+        assert!(e.contains("403"), "got: {e}");
+        assert!(!e.contains("TokenInvalid"));
+        assert!(!e.contains("ExpiredSignature"));
+    }
+
+    /// The four viewer-scoped endpoints must actually put the JWT on
+    /// the wire — an empty or missing header is a 401 from the server.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn authenticated_endpoints_send_the_bearer_header() {
+        let (base, rec) = spawn_mock(500, "Internal Server Error", "{}", 4).await;
+        let c = AppViewClient::new(base);
+
+        let _ = c.fetch_timeline("did:plc:me", None, 30, "jwt-abc").await;
+        let _ = c.fetch_notifications("did:plc:me", None, 30, "jwt-abc").await;
+        let _ = c.notification_count("did:plc:me", "jwt-abc").await;
+        let _ = c
+            .mark_notifications_seen("did:plc:me", Some("2026-09-09T10:00:00Z"), "jwt-abc")
+            .await;
+
+        let heads = rec.lock().unwrap().clone();
+        assert_eq!(heads.len(), 4, "every call should have reached the server");
+        for h in &heads {
+            assert_eq!(
+                auth_header(h).as_deref(),
+                Some("Bearer jwt-abc"),
+                "missing/!= bearer token in:\n{h}"
+            );
+        }
+        // The POST still carries its JSON body alongside the header.
+        assert!(heads[3].starts_with("POST /api/notifications/seen"));
+    }
+
+    /// The public half of the API must keep working while logged out,
+    /// so it must not grow an `Authorization` header by accident.
+    #[tokio::test]
+    async fn public_endpoints_send_no_authorization_header() {
+        let (base, rec) = spawn_mock(200, "OK", r#"{"posts":[],"q":"hi"}"#, 1).await;
+        let c = AppViewClient::new(base);
+        let r = c.fetch_search("hi", 30).await.unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(r.q, "hi");
+        assert!(auth_header(&rec.lock().unwrap()[0]).is_none());
+
+        let (base2, rec2) = spawn_mock(200, "OK", r#"{"profiles":[],"cursor":null}"#, 2).await;
+        let c2 = AppViewClient::new(base2);
+        c2.fetch_followers("did:plc:me", None, 30).await.unwrap();
+        c2.fetch_following("did:plc:me", None, 30).await.unwrap();
+        for h in rec2.lock().unwrap().iter() {
+            assert!(auth_header(h).is_none(), "unexpected auth header in:\n{h}");
+        }
+    }
 }

crates/tauri-app/src-tauri/src/lib.rs

@@ -34,15 +34,32 @@ async fn pds_describe(state: tauri::State<'_, AppState>) -> Result<serde_json::V
     state.pds.describe_server().await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())
 }
 
+/// `auth_register(handle, password, inviteCode?)` — create an account
+/// on the configured PDS and store the resulting session.
+///
+/// `invite_code` arrives from the frontend as `inviteCode` (Tauri maps
+/// camelCase JS argument keys onto snake_case Rust parameters, the same
+/// way `mark_notifications_seen` receives `seenAt`). It is `Option`
+/// because the invite gate is a *server* setting
+/// (`PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED`): the public instance at
+/// `https://tweet.maarcade.com` demands a code, a locally run dev PDS
+/// usually does not, and the client has no business deciding which.
+/// When no code is given the field is dropped from the request body
+/// rather than sent empty — see [`pds_client::CreateAccountReq`].
+///
+/// A refused code surfaces as the PDS's `400
+/// {"error":"InvalidInviteCode", …}` inside the stringified error, and
+/// `errorMessage()` in `client.ts` turns that into German copy.
 #[tauri::command]
 async fn auth_register(
     state: tauri::State<'_, AppState>,
     handle: String,
     password: String,
+    invite_code: Option<String>,
 ) -> Result<AccountSession, String> {
     let sess = state
         .pds
-        .create_account(&handle, &password)
+        .create_account(&handle, &password, invite_code.as_deref())
         .await
         .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
     let s = AccountSession {
@@ -250,7 +267,12 @@ async fn repost_post(
     });
     let resp = state
         .pds
-        .create_record_with(&sess.did, "app.bsky.feed.repost", record, false, &sess.access_jwt)
+        // `true`: `app.bsky.feed.repost` is in the PDS's lexicon registry
+        // and this record passes it (verified against a live PDS). The
+        // `false` that stood here was inert — the flag was dropped before
+        // the request — so validating is what has actually been happening
+        // all along; saying so keeps the behaviour and drops the fiction.
+        .create_record_with(&sess.did, "app.bsky.feed.repost", record, true, &sess.access_jwt)
         .await
         .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
     Ok(serde_json::json!({
@@ -354,6 +376,28 @@ async fn unfollow_user(
     }))
 }
 
+/// Access JWT for the AppView's viewer-scoped endpoints.
+///
+/// The four authenticated AppView calls (`timeline_home`,
+/// `fetch_notifications`, `notification_count`,
+/// `mark_notifications_seen`) all need the same thing: the stored
+/// session's access JWT, or a message the UI can render when there
+/// isn't one. Factored out so no call site can accidentally send an
+/// empty `Authorization: Bearer` header — which the AppView would
+/// answer with a 401 `TokenInvalid`, and the frontend would then burn a
+/// pointless refresh round trip on before failing anyway.
+///
+/// The message deliberately contains neither `TokenInvalid` nor
+/// `ExpiredSignature`: `safeInvoke`'s `isTokenInvalid()` greps for those
+/// substrings, and a logged-out client has nothing to refresh *with*.
+fn require_access_jwt(state: &AppState, what: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
+    state
+        .store
+        .load()
+        .map(|s| s.access_jwt)
+        .ok_or_else(|| format!("not logged in: {what} requires a signed-in session"))
+}
+
 #[tauri::command]
 async fn timeline_home(
     state: tauri::State<'_, AppState>,
@@ -362,9 +406,10 @@ async fn timeline_home(
     limit: Option<u32>,
 ) -> Result<appview_client::TimelineResponse, String> {
     let lim = limit.unwrap_or(30).clamp(1, 100);
+    let jwt = require_access_jwt(&state, "the home timeline")?;
     state
         .appview
-        .fetch_timeline(&did, cursor.as_deref(), lim)
+        .fetch_timeline(&did, cursor.as_deref(), lim, &jwt)
         .await
         .map_err(|e| e.to_string())
 }
@@ -460,9 +505,10 @@ async fn fetch_notifications(
     limit: Option<u32>,
 ) -> Result<appview_client::NotificationsResponse, String> {
     let lim = limit.unwrap_or(30).clamp(1, 100);
+    let jwt = require_access_jwt(&state, "notifications")?;
     state
         .appview
-        .fetch_notifications(&did, cursor.as_deref(), lim)
+        .fetch_notifications(&did, cursor.as_deref(), lim, &jwt)
         .await
         .map_err(|e| e.to_string())
 }
@@ -473,9 +519,10 @@ async fn notification_count(
     state: tauri::State<'_, AppState>,
     did: String,
 ) -> Result<appview_client::NotificationCountResponse, String> {
+    let jwt = require_access_jwt(&state, "the unread-notification count")?;
     state
         .appview
-        .notification_count(&did)
+        .notification_count(&did, &jwt)
         .await
         .map_err(|e| e.to_string())
 }
@@ -491,9 +538,10 @@ async fn mark_notifications_seen(
     did: String,
     seen_at: Option<String>,
 ) -> Result<appview_client::NotificationSeenResponse, String> {
+    let jwt = require_access_jwt(&state, "marking notifications seen")?;
     state
         .appview
-        .mark_notifications_seen(&did, seen_at.as_deref())
+        .mark_notifications_seen(&did, seen_at.as_deref(), &jwt)
         .await
         .map_err(|e| e.to_string())
 }
@@ -737,16 +785,74 @@ async fn show_notification(
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Default PDS base URL — the public instance.
+///
+/// This is what a *shipped* build talks to. It used to be
+/// `http://127.0.0.1:2583`, which meant a packaged `.app` handed to
+/// anyone but the developer pointed at a server that does not exist on
+/// their machine: every call failed with a connection error and the
+/// login screen could not even render `describeServer`. A default is
+/// the configuration of the people who never set one, so it has to be
+/// the production deployment.
+///
+/// No trailing slash: [`PdsHttpClient`] builds its endpoints as
+/// `{base}/xrpc/com.atproto.…`, so the base must end at the host.
+const DEFAULT_PDS_URL: &str = "https://tweet.maarcade.com";
+
+/// Default AppView base URL. Same host as the PDS — the reverse proxy
+/// in front of `tweet.maarcade.com` routes by path prefix: `/xrpc/…`
+/// to the PDS, `/api/…` to the AppView. [`AppViewClient`] appends
+/// `/api/…` to this base (see the `format!("{}/api/…", self.base_url)`
+/// calls in `appview_client.rs`), so the two clients can and must
+/// share the one origin.
+const DEFAULT_APPVIEW_URL: &str = "https://tweet.maarcade.com";
+
+/// Resolve one base URL from its environment variable, falling back to
+/// the compiled-in default.
+///
+/// **The environment always wins.** Development runs against a local
+/// stack — `MAARCADETWEET_PDS_URL=http://127.0.0.1:2583` and
+/// `MAARCADETWEET_APPVIEW_URL=http://127.0.0.1:2584`, which is what
+/// `scripts/` and the dev docker-compose set up — and pointing the
+/// desktop client at it must stay a matter of exporting two variables,
+/// never of rebuilding. Only an *unset* variable takes the production
+/// default.
+///
+/// A variable set to whitespace (or the empty string) counts as unset:
+/// an empty base URL would silently produce request URLs like
+/// `/xrpc/…` with no host, and `reqwest` would reject them as a
+/// relative-URL error far away from the actual mistake. Trailing
+/// slashes are trimmed because both clients append an absolute path to
+/// this string, and `https://host//api/x` is not the same route to
+/// every proxy.
+///
+/// Takes the already-performed lookup rather than the variable name so
+/// it stays a pure function — testable without mutating the process
+/// environment, and without a Tauri runtime.
+fn base_url_or_default(from_env: Result<String, std::env::VarError>, default: &str) -> String {
+    let configured = from_env.ok();
+    let trimmed = configured
+        .as_deref()
+        .map(|v| v.trim().trim_end_matches('/'))
+        .filter(|v| !v.is_empty());
+    trimmed.unwrap_or(default).to_string()
+}
+
 #[cfg_attr(mobile, tauri::mobile_entry_point)]
 pub fn run() {
     tracing_subscriber::fmt()
         .with_env_filter(tracing_subscriber::EnvFilter::try_from_default_env().unwrap_or_else(|_| "info".into()))
         .init();
 
-    let pds_url = std::env::var("MAARCADETWEET_PDS_URL")
-        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "http://127.0.0.1:2583".to_string());
-    let appview_url = std::env::var("MAARCADETWEET_APPVIEW_URL")
-        .unwrap_or_else(|_| "http://127.0.0.1:2584".to_string());
+    let pds_url = base_url_or_default(
+        std::env::var("MAARCADETWEET_PDS_URL"),
+        DEFAULT_PDS_URL,
+    );
+    let appview_url = base_url_or_default(
+        std::env::var("MAARCADETWEET_APPVIEW_URL"),
+        DEFAULT_APPVIEW_URL,
+    );
+    tracing::info!(%pds_url, %appview_url, "resolved backend base URLs");
 
     let state = AppState {
         pds: PdsHttpClient::new(pds_url.clone()),
@@ -1025,3 +1131,75 @@ async fn profile_set(
         .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
     Ok(())
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use std::env::VarError;
+
+    /// The whole point of the change: a build with nothing configured
+    /// must talk to the public instance, not to a loopback port that
+    /// only exists on a developer's laptop. Pinned as a literal so a
+    /// well-meant "let's default back to localhost for dev" has to
+    /// argue with a red test first.
+    #[test]
+    fn unset_env_falls_back_to_the_public_instance() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            base_url_or_default(Err(VarError::NotPresent), DEFAULT_PDS_URL),
+            "https://tweet.maarcade.com"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            base_url_or_default(Err(VarError::NotPresent), DEFAULT_APPVIEW_URL),
+            "https://tweet.maarcade.com"
+        );
+        // Both services live behind the same origin — the proxy splits
+        // them by path prefix (`/xrpc/` vs `/api/`), which the clients
+        // append themselves.
+        assert_eq!(DEFAULT_PDS_URL, DEFAULT_APPVIEW_URL);
+        assert!(!DEFAULT_PDS_URL.ends_with('/'));
+    }
+
+    /// Development against a local stack has to keep working by
+    /// exporting a variable, so a set value always beats the default.
+    #[test]
+    fn env_var_overrides_the_default() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            base_url_or_default(Ok("http://127.0.0.1:2583".into()), DEFAULT_PDS_URL),
+            "http://127.0.0.1:2583"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            base_url_or_default(Ok("http://127.0.0.1:2584".into()), DEFAULT_APPVIEW_URL),
+            "http://127.0.0.1:2584"
+        );
+    }
+
+    /// An empty or whitespace-only variable is a misconfiguration, not
+    /// a request for an empty base URL: `reqwest` would answer the
+    /// resulting host-less URL with a relative-URL error nowhere near
+    /// the cause. Trailing slashes go because both clients append an
+    /// absolute path (`{base}/xrpc/…`, `{base}/api/…`).
+    #[test]
+    fn blank_env_is_ignored_and_trailing_slashes_are_trimmed() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            base_url_or_default(Ok("".into()), DEFAULT_PDS_URL),
+            DEFAULT_PDS_URL
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            base_url_or_default(Ok("   ".into()), DEFAULT_PDS_URL),
+            DEFAULT_PDS_URL
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            base_url_or_default(Ok("http://127.0.0.1:2584/".into()), DEFAULT_APPVIEW_URL),
+            "http://127.0.0.1:2584"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            base_url_or_default(Ok(" https://tweet.maarcade.com// ".into()), DEFAULT_PDS_URL),
+            "https://tweet.maarcade.com"
+        );
+        // A non-UTF-8 variable is as unusable as an unset one.
+        assert_eq!(
+            base_url_or_default(Err(VarError::NotUnicode("\u{fffd}".into())), DEFAULT_PDS_URL),
+            DEFAULT_PDS_URL
+        );
+    }
+}

crates/tauri-app/src-tauri/src/pds_client.rs

@@ -26,6 +26,27 @@ pub struct CreateAccountReq {
     pub handle: String,
     pub email: Option<String>,
     pub password: String,
+    /// Invite code, required by the PDS whenever it runs with
+    /// `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true` (the public instance at
+    /// `https://tweet.maarcade.com` does). Rejected codes come back as
+    /// `400 {"error":"InvalidInviteCode", …}`.
+    ///
+    /// **Wire name.** The server's `CreateAccountReq`
+    /// (`crates/pds-server/src/routes/types.rs`) is snake_case with an
+    /// `#[serde(alias = "inviteCode")]` for off-the-shelf atproto
+    /// clients. We are not one of those: every body this client sends
+    /// is snake_case (`refresh_jwt` in `refresh_session`, `handle` /
+    /// `password` right here), so `invite_code` is the field name that
+    /// matches the rest of the file. The alias exists for other people.
+    ///
+    /// **Skipped when `None`.** Same reasoning as `validate` below —
+    /// a PDS with the invite gate *off* must keep accepting our
+    /// registrations, and sending `"invite_code": null` (let alone
+    /// `""`) would be claiming the user supplied something. Omitting
+    /// the key leaves the server's `Option` at `None`, which is exactly
+    /// "the user gave no code".
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub invite_code: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -41,6 +62,10 @@ pub struct CreateRecordReq {
     pub repo: String,
     pub collection: String,
     pub record: serde_json::Value,
+    /// Omitted rather than sent as `null` when the caller has no
+    /// opinion — the PDS's own default (`true`) then applies.
+    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
+    pub validate: Option<bool>,
 }
 
 /// Strong reference as defined by
@@ -126,15 +151,31 @@ impl PdsHttpClient {
         Ok(r)
     }
 
+    /// `com.atproto.server.createAccount`.
+    ///
+    /// `invite_code` is `None` when the user left the field empty; the
+    /// key is then left out of the body entirely (see
+    /// [`CreateAccountReq::invite_code`]) so a PDS running without the
+    /// invite gate still registers the account. A code that only
+    /// contains whitespace is treated as absent for the same reason —
+    /// the server's `invite::normalize` trims before looking it up, so
+    /// `"  "` could never match a real code anyway, and passing it on
+    /// would only turn "you forgot the field" into "your code is
+    /// wrong".
     pub async fn create_account(
         &self,
         handle: &str,
         password: &str,
+        invite_code: Option<&str>,
     ) -> Result<AccountSession> {
         let body = CreateAccountReq {
             handle: handle.to_string(),
             email: None,
             password: password.to_string(),
+            invite_code: invite_code
+                .map(str::trim)
+                .filter(|c| !c.is_empty())
+                .map(str::to_string),
         };
         let r = self
             .client
@@ -184,12 +225,19 @@ impl PdsHttpClient {
         Ok(r.json().await?)
     }
 
+    /// `validate` is forwarded to the PDS, which defaults it to `true`.
+    ///
+    /// It used to be `_validate` — accepted and silently dropped, so a
+    /// caller asking for `false` still got server-side validation. That
+    /// made no difference in practice (every collection the client writes
+    /// is in the PDS's lexicon registry and passes), but a parameter that
+    /// does nothing is a trap for the next caller who relies on it.
     pub async fn create_record_with(
         &self,
         repo: &str,
         collection: &str,
         record: serde_json::Value,
-        _validate: bool,
+        validate: bool,
         jwt: &str,
     ) -> Result<CreateRecordResp> {
         let r = self
@@ -200,6 +248,7 @@ impl PdsHttpClient {
                 repo: repo.to_string(),
                 collection: collection.to_string(),
                 record,
+                validate: Some(validate),
             })
             .send()
             .await?;

crates/tauri-app/src/App.svelte

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@
     fetchTimeline,
     fetchSearch,
     fetchPost,
+    errorMessage,
+    isAuthFailure,
     notificationCount,
     openExternalUrl,
     showError,
@@ -377,6 +379,16 @@
   /// Pull the unread count for the NavRail badge. Swallows errors:
   /// the badge is ambient information, and a transient AppView hiccup
   /// shouldn't produce a toast every 5 seconds.
+  ///
+  /// One class of error is *not* swallowed-and-retried, though. Since
+  /// the AppView started requiring the access JWT on
+  /// `/api/notifications/count`, a rejected token surfaces here — and
+  /// by the time it does, `safeInvoke` has already spent its one
+  /// automatic refresh. Retrying on a 5s timer would then be a request
+  /// loop against a server that keeps answering 401/403 for as long as
+  /// the app is open. So an auth failure stops the poll outright; the
+  /// next successful login restarts it via the `session.subscribe`
+  /// handler in `onMount`.
   async function refreshUnreadCount() {
     if (!currentUser) return;
     // While the notifications view is open the user is by definition
@@ -386,8 +398,13 @@
     if (view === "notifications") return;
     try {
       unreadCount = await notificationCount(currentUser.did);
-    } catch {
-      /* ignore — keep the last known count */
+    } catch (e) {
+      if (isAuthFailure(e)) {
+        console.warn("notification poll stopped: session rejected", e);
+        stopPoll();
+        return;
+      }
+      /* otherwise ignore — keep the last known count */
     }
   }
 
@@ -420,7 +437,7 @@
         if (fresh.length > 0) userPosts = [...fresh, ...userPosts];
       }
     } catch (e) {
-      timelineError = String(e);
+      timelineError = errorMessage(e);
       // Keep whatever we had on a transient failure.
     } finally {
       timelineLoading = false;
@@ -440,7 +457,7 @@
       }
       timelineCursor = r.cursor;
     } catch (e) {
-      timelineError = String(e);
+      timelineError = errorMessage(e);
     } finally {
       timelineLoading = false;
     }
@@ -528,17 +545,23 @@
   // Used in the Settings view to show which backends the client is
   // talking to. Kept as plain helpers so they can be swapped for a
   // `pds_describe`/`appview_describe` Tauri command later.
+  // The fallbacks mirror `DEFAULT_PDS_URL` / `DEFAULT_APPVIEW_URL` in
+  // `src-tauri/src/lib.rs`: both services sit behind the one public
+  // origin, split by path prefix (`/xrpc/` → PDS, `/api/` → AppView).
+  // If those constants ever move, move these with them — a Settings
+  // pane that names the wrong backend is worse than one that names
+  // none.
   function pdsBase(): string {
     if (typeof import.meta !== "undefined" && (import.meta as any).env?.VITE_PDS_URL) {
       return (import.meta as any).env.VITE_PDS_URL as string;
     }
-    return "http://127.0.0.1:2583";
+    return "https://tweet.maarcade.com";
   }
   function appviewBase(): string {
     if (typeof import.meta !== "undefined" && (import.meta as any).env?.VITE_APPVIEW_URL) {
       return (import.meta as any).env.VITE_APPVIEW_URL as string;
     }
-    return "http://127.0.0.1:2584";
+    return "https://tweet.maarcade.com";
   }
 </script>
 

crates/tauri-app/src/lib/api/appview-auth.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
+// The AppView auth contract, from the client's side.
+//
+// Same setup as `notifications.test.ts`: `@tauri-apps/api/core` is
+// mocked so no Tauri shell is needed, and every assertion is about the
+// exact sequence of commands we hand the Rust IPC layer.
+//
+// What's pinned here:
+//   * the **token-renewal chain** — a `TokenInvalid` coming out of the
+//     AppView (not the PDS) triggers exactly one `auth_refresh` + one
+//     retry, for each of the four now-authenticated endpoints;
+//   * that the chain fires for a **bare string** rejection, which is
+//     what `invoke` actually rejects with for our `Result<T, String>`
+//     commands — the shape the old `typeof e !== "object"` guard
+//     silently skipped;
+//   * that it fires **once**, never in a loop, and not at all when the
+//     refresh itself fails or when the error isn't refreshable;
+//   * that the **public** endpoints still work with no session at all
+//     and never reach for a refresh.
+//
+// The error strings below are verbatim what the Rust side produces:
+// `appview_client.rs`'s `status_error()` formats
+// `"appview: {label} returned {status}: {body}"`, and `lib.rs`
+// stringifies that into the command's `Err(String)`. The Rust test
+// `token_invalid_code_survives_into_the_error_string` pins the other
+// half of the same contract.
+//
+// Run with:
+//   npx vitest run src/lib/api/appview-auth.test.ts
+
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+
+const invokeMock = vi.fn();
+
+vi.mock("@tauri-apps/api/core", () => ({
+  invoke: (...args: unknown[]) => invokeMock(...args),
+  isTauri: () => true,
+}));
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  invokeMock.mockReset();
+});
+
+/// Exactly what a Tauri command rejects with once the AppView has
+/// refused an expired access token: a bare string, because our
+/// commands are `Result<T, String>` and `invoke` rejects with the
+/// deserialised payload — not an `Error`.
+function appviewTokenInvalid(label: string): string {
+  return (
+    `appview: ${label} returned 401 Unauthorized: ` +
+    `{"error":"TokenInvalid","message":"ExpiredSignature"}`
+  );
+}
+
+const FRESH_SESSION = {
+  did: "did:plc:me",
+  handle: "me.test",
+  access_jwt: "fresh-access",
+  refresh_jwt: "fresh-refresh",
+};
+
+/// The four endpoints that grew an auth guard, each with the command
+/// name the Rust side registers, the AppView's label in the error
+/// string, a caller, and the payload the retry should resolve with.
+const AUTHED = [
+  {
+    name: "timeline_home",
+    label: "timeline home",
+    payload: { posts: [], cursor: null },
+    call: async () => {
+      const { fetchTimeline } = await import("./client");
+      return fetchTimeline("did:plc:me");
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    name: "fetch_notifications",
+    label: "notifications",
+    payload: { notifications: [], cursor: null },
+    call: async () => {
+      const { fetchNotifications } = await import("./client");
+      return fetchNotifications("did:plc:me");
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    name: "notification_count",
+    label: "notification count",
+    payload: { count: 3 },
+    call: async () => {
+      const { notificationCount } = await import("./client");
+      return notificationCount("did:plc:me");
+    },
+  },
+  {
+    name: "mark_notifications_seen",
+    label: "notifications seen",
+    payload: { ok: true, updated: 2 },
+    call: async () => {
+      const { markNotificationsSeen } = await import("./client");
+      return markNotificationsSeen("did:plc:me", "2026-09-09T10:00:00Z");
+    },
+  },
+] as const;
+
+describe("AppView token renewal", () => {
+  for (const ep of AUTHED) {
+    it(`${ep.name}: a TokenInvalid from the AppView refreshes and retries once`, async () => {
+      invokeMock
+        // 1. the call, rejected by the AppView's auth guard
+        .mockRejectedValueOnce(appviewTokenInvalid(ep.label))
+        // 2. auth_refresh mints a new access JWT from the refresh JWT
+        .mockResolvedValueOnce(FRESH_SESSION)
+        // 3. the same call again, now with the fresh token
+        .mockResolvedValueOnce(ep.payload);
+
+      await expect(ep.call()).resolves.toBeDefined();
+
+      expect(invokeMock.mock.calls.map((c) => c[0])).toEqual([
+        ep.name,
+        "auth_refresh",
+        ep.name,
+      ]);
+      // The retry must repeat the *same* argument bag — a dropped
+      // cursor or limit here would silently change what the user sees.
+      expect(invokeMock.mock.calls[0][1]).toEqual(invokeMock.mock.calls[2][1]);
+    });
+  }
+
+  it("returns the retry's payload, not the failed first attempt", async () => {
+    const { notificationCount } = await import("./client");
+    invokeMock
+      .mockRejectedValueOnce(appviewTokenInvalid("notification count"))
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(FRESH_SESSION)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({ count: 7 });
+
+    await expect(notificationCount("did:plc:me")).resolves.toBe(7);
+  });
+
+  it("fires for a bare-string rejection — the shape Tauri actually uses", async () => {
+    // Regression guard. `invoke` rejects with the deserialised
+    // `Err(String)` payload, i.e. a primitive string. A guard that
+    // bails on anything that isn't an object never sees the code and
+    // the retry silently never runs — the user's timeline just dies an
+    // hour after login with no error anyone would connect to auth.
+    const { fetchTimeline } = await import("./client");
+    invokeMock
+      .mockRejectedValueOnce(appviewTokenInvalid("timeline home"))
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(FRESH_SESSION)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({ posts: [], cursor: null });
+
+    await expect(fetchTimeline("did:plc:me")).resolves.toEqual({
+      posts: [],
+      cursor: null,
+    });
+    expect(invokeMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
+  });
+
+  it("also fires when the error arrives as an Error object", async () => {
+    const { fetchTimeline } = await import("./client");
+    invokeMock
+      .mockRejectedValueOnce(new Error(appviewTokenInvalid("timeline home")))
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(FRESH_SESSION)
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce({ posts: [], cursor: null });
+
+    await expect(fetchTimeline("did:plc:me")).resolves.toBeDefined();
+    expect(invokeMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
+  });
+
+  it("retries exactly once — a still-failing retry is not refreshed again", async () => {
+    const { fetchNotifications } = await import("./client");
+    invokeMock
+      .mockRejectedValueOnce(appviewTokenInvalid("notifications"))
+      .mockResolvedValueOnce(FRESH_SESSION)
+      .mockRejectedValueOnce(appviewTokenInvalid("notifications"));
+
+    await expect(fetchNotifications("did:plc:me")).rejects.toThrow(
+      /TokenInvalid/,
+    );
+    // Three calls, not five: no second refresh, no third attempt.
+    expect(invokeMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(3);
+    expect(invokeMock.mock.calls.filter((c) => c[0] === "auth_refresh")).toHaveLength(1);
+  });
+
+  it("propagates the original error when the refresh itself fails", async () => {
+    // The refresh JWT is good for 90 days, but it does eventually
+    // expire (or get revoked). At that point there's nothing left to
+    // do but surface the failure — retrying with the same dead token
+    // would just be a second 401.
+    const { notificationCount } = await import("./client");
+    invokeMock
+      .mockRejectedValueOnce(appviewTokenInvalid("notification count"))
+      .mockRejectedValueOnce("refresh token expired");
+
+    await expect(notificationCount("did:plc:me")).rejects.toThrow(
+      /TokenInvalid/,
+    );
+    expect(invokeMock.mock.calls.map((c) => c[0])).toEqual([
+      "notification_count",
+      "auth_refresh",
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it("does not refresh on a 403 Forbidden — a new token wouldn't help", async () => {
+    // The AppView returns this when the token is perfectly valid but
+    // its `sub` doesn't match the `did` query parameter. Refreshing
+    // mints another token for the same subject, so a retry is pure
+    // waste.
+    const { fetchTimeline } = await import("./client");
+    invokeMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(
+      'appview: timeline home returned 403 Forbidden: ' +
+        '{"error":"Forbidden","message":"did does not match token subject"}',
+    );
+
+    await expect(fetchTimeline("did:plc:someone-else")).rejects.toThrow(
+      /Forbidden/,
+    );
+    expect(invokeMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("does not refresh when the shell says there is no session at all", async () => {
+    // `require_access_jwt` in lib.rs. Nothing to refresh *from*, so the
+    // message deliberately carries neither `TokenInvalid` nor
+    // `ExpiredSignature`.
+    const { fetchNotifications } = await import("./client");
+    invokeMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(
+      "not logged in: notifications requires a signed-in session",
+    );
+
+    await expect(fetchNotifications("did:plc:me")).rejects.toThrow(
+      /not logged in/,
+    );
+    expect(invokeMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("treats a 503 AuthUnavailable as transient, not as an auth failure", async () => {
+    // The AppView answers 503 `AuthUnavailable` when it cannot reach
+    // the PDS to fetch the verification key — it fails closed rather
+    // than guessing. Our token is fine; the *server* is temporarily
+    // unable to check it. So: no refresh (nothing is wrong with the
+    // token), and `isAuthFailure` must stay false so the background
+    // poll keeps trying instead of shutting itself down over an outage
+    // that will resolve on its own.
+    const { notificationCount, isAuthFailure } = await import("./client");
+    const err =
+      'appview: notification count returned 503 Service Unavailable: ' +
+      '{"error":"AuthUnavailable","message":"could not fetch PDS key"}';
+
+    invokeMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(err);
+    await expect(notificationCount("did:plc:me")).rejects.toThrow(
+      /AuthUnavailable/,
+    );
+    expect(invokeMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(isAuthFailure(err)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("does not refresh on a transient server error", async () => {
+    const { notificationCount } = await import("./client");
+    invokeMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(
+      "appview: notification count returned 500 Internal Server Error: db down",
+    );
+
+    await expect(notificationCount("did:plc:me")).rejects.toThrow(/500/);
+    expect(invokeMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+
+  it("an auth_* command never triggers a refresh (no login loop)", async () => {
+    const { session } = await import("./client");
+    invokeMock.mockRejectedValueOnce("TokenInvalid");
+
+    await expect(session.login("me.test", "pw")).rejects.toBeDefined();
+    expect(invokeMock.mock.calls.map((c) => c[0])).toEqual(["auth_login"]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("public AppView endpoints", () => {
+  // These stay unauthenticated server-side, so they must keep working
+  // with no session in the store: one invoke, no bearer token to fetch,
+  // no refresh.
+  const PUBLIC = [
+    {
+      name: "search",
+      payload: { posts: [], q: "hi" },
+      call: async () => (await import("./client")).fetchSearch("hi"),
+    },
+    {
+      name: "profile_get",
+      payload: {
+        did: "did:plc:a",
+        handle: "a.test",
+        posts: [],
+        followers: 0,
+        following: 0,
+        post_count: 0,
+      },
+      call: async () => (await import("./client")).fetchProfile("a.test"),
+    },
+    {
+      name: "profile_get_by_did",
+      payload: {
+        did: "did:plc:a",
+        handle: "a.test",
+        posts: [],
+        followers: 0,
+        following: 0,
+        post_count: 0,
+      },
+      call: async () => (await import("./client")).fetchProfileByDid("did:plc:a"),
+    },
+    {
+      name: "post_get",
+      payload: { post: null, thread: { parent: null, root: null } },
+      call: async () =>
+        (await import("./client")).fetchPost("at://did:plc:a/app.twi.post/1"),
+    },
+    {
+      name: "fetch_thread",
+      payload: { post: null, parents: [], root: null, replies: [] },
+      call: async () =>
+        (await import("./client")).fetchThread("at://did:plc:a/app.twi.post/1"),
+    },
+    {
+      name: "fetch_followers",
+      payload: { profiles: [], cursor: null },
+      call: async () => (await import("./client")).fetchFollowers("did:plc:a"),
+    },
+    {
+      name: "fetch_following",
+      payload: { profiles: [], cursor: null },
+      call: async () => (await import("./client")).fetchFollowing("did:plc:a"),
+    },
+  ] as const;
+
+  for (const ep of PUBLIC) {
+    it(`${ep.name} resolves without a session and without refreshing`, async () => {
+      invokeMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(ep.payload);
+
+      await expect(ep.call()).resolves.toBeDefined();
+
+      expect(invokeMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      expect(invokeMock.mock.calls[0][0]).toBe(ep.name);
+      expect(
+        invokeMock.mock.calls.some((c) => c[0] === "auth_refresh"),
+      ).toBe(false);
+    });
+  }
+
+  it("a public call's own failure surfaces untouched", async () => {
+    const { fetchSearch } = await import("./client");
+    invokeMock.mockRejectedValueOnce(
+      "appview: search returned 400 Bad Request: q is required",
+    );
+    await expect(fetchSearch("")).rejects.toThrow(/q is required/);
+    expect(invokeMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+  });
+});
+
+describe("isAuthFailure / errorMessage", () => {
+  it("recognises every shape the AppView's auth guard can answer with", async () => {
+    const { isAuthFailure } = await import("./client");
+    for (const msg of [
+      'appview: timeline home returned 401 Unauthorized: {"error":"AuthMissing","message":"no bearer"}',
+      'appview: notifications returned 401 Unauthorized: {"error":"TokenInvalid","message":"ExpiredSignature"}',
+      'appview: notification count returned 403 Forbidden: {"error":"Forbidden"}',
+      "not logged in: the home timeline requires a signed-in session",
+    ]) {
+      expect(isAuthFailure(msg)).toBe(true);
+      expect(isAuthFailure(new Error(msg))).toBe(true);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it("does not mistake a server or network failure for an auth failure", async () => {
+    const { isAuthFailure } = await import("./client");
+    expect(
+      isAuthFailure("appview: notifications returned 500: db down"),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(
+      isAuthFailure("appview: failed to send timeline request"),
+    ).toBe(false);
+    expect(isAuthFailure(null)).toBe(false);
+    expect(isAuthFailure(undefined)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it("swaps the raw 401 wire string for copy the user can act on", async () => {
+    const { errorMessage } = await import("./client");
+    const raw =
+      'appview: notifications returned 401 Unauthorized: {"error":"TokenInvalid","message":"ExpiredSignature"}';
+    expect(errorMessage(raw)).toBe(
+      "Sitzung abgelaufen oder abgelehnt — bitte neu anmelden.",
+    );
+    // Anything else is shown verbatim: there's nothing better to say
+    // about a 500 than what the server said.
+    expect(errorMessage("appview: search returned 500: db down")).toContain(
+      "500",
+    );
+  });
+});

crates/tauri-app/src/lib/api/client.ts

@@ -59,14 +59,22 @@ export async function getAppviewUrl(): Promise<string> {
  * webview it falls through to a normal `invoke` call.
  *
  * **Auto-refresh on 401**: the access JWT expires after 1 hour. When
- * the PDS rejects our token with `TokenInvalid` (the rusty
- * `routes::auth` handlers return `{"error":"TokenInvalid",...}`),
- * we ask the Rust shell for a fresh access JWT via the
- * `auth_refresh` Tauri command. The Rust side reads the stored
- * refresh JWT (valid for 90 days) and rotates both. We retry
- * exactly once on the same `cmd` + `args`. The `auth_*` commands
- * themselves are skipped so a failing login doesn't trigger an
- * infinite refresh loop.
+ * the PDS *or the AppView* rejects our token with `TokenInvalid`
+ * (both return `{"error":"TokenInvalid",...}` — the PDS from its
+ * `routes::auth` handlers, the AppView from the guard on
+ * `/api/timeline/home`, `/api/notifications`,
+ * `/api/notifications/count` and `/api/notifications/seen`), we ask
+ * the Rust shell for a fresh access JWT via the `auth_refresh` Tauri
+ * command. The Rust side reads the stored refresh JWT (valid for 90
+ * days) and rotates both. We retry exactly once on the same `cmd` +
+ * `args`. The `auth_*` commands themselves are skipped so a failing
+ * login doesn't trigger an infinite refresh loop.
+ *
+ * The whole chain is string-matching, end to end: the AppView states
+ * the code only in its JSON body, `appview_client.rs`'s
+ * `status_error()` formats that body into the `anyhow` message, and
+ * `lib.rs` stringifies it into the command's `Err(String)`. See the
+ * Rust-side test `token_invalid_code_survives_into_the_error_string`.
  */
 async function safeInvoke<T>(cmd: string, args?: Record<string, unknown>): Promise<T> {
   if (!isTauri()) {
@@ -82,17 +90,101 @@ async function safeInvoke<T>(cmd: string, args?: Record<string, unknown>): Promi
   }
 }
 
+/// Normalise whatever a rejected `invoke` handed us into a string.
+///
+/// This is not defensive padding — it is the difference between the
+/// retry chain working and not. Our Tauri commands are
+/// `Result<T, String>`, and `@tauri-apps/api`'s `invoke` rejects with
+/// the *deserialised* error payload, i.e. a bare JS **string**, not an
+/// `Error`. Anything that only reads `e.message` therefore sees
+/// nothing at all on the exact path that matters. Errors thrown
+/// locally (the browser-preview guard above, and the `Error` instances
+/// the tests use) still arrive as objects, so both shapes are handled.
+function errorText(e: unknown): string {
+  if (typeof e === "string") return e;
+  if (typeof e === "object" && e !== null) {
+    const m = (e as { message?: unknown }).message;
+    if (typeof m === "string") return m;
+  }
+  return String(e ?? "");
+}
+
 /// Sniff out a `TokenInvalid` response from the Rust error string.
-/// Returns true when the error message looks like an expired/
-/// invalid JWT (the PDS uses a stable `"TokenInvalid"` code in its
-/// JSON error body, which `@tauri-apps/api/core` surfaces verbatim).
+/// Returns true when the error looks like an expired/invalid JWT —
+/// both the PDS and the AppView use a stable `"TokenInvalid"` code in
+/// their JSON error body, which travels verbatim through the Rust
+/// error message and out over the Tauri IPC boundary.
 function isTokenInvalid(e: unknown): boolean {
-  if (typeof e !== "object" || e === null) return false;
-  const msg = (e as { message?: string }).message ?? String(e);
+  const msg = errorText(e);
   if (!msg) return false;
   return msg.includes("TokenInvalid") || msg.includes("ExpiredSignature");
 }
 
+/// True when an error means "this call will not succeed until the user
+/// signs in again" — as opposed to a transient network/server hiccup.
+///
+/// Covers everything the AppView's auth guard can answer with
+/// (`AuthMissing` / `TokenInvalid` on 401, `Forbidden` on 403) plus the
+/// Rust shell's own "no session stored" message from
+/// `require_access_jwt`. Callers that poll in the background use this
+/// to *stop* polling: by the time one of these surfaces, `safeInvoke`
+/// has already spent its one refresh attempt, so retrying on a timer
+/// would just be a request loop against a server that keeps saying no.
+export function isAuthFailure(e: unknown): boolean {
+  const msg = errorText(e);
+  if (!msg) return false;
+  return (
+    msg.includes("AuthMissing") ||
+    msg.includes("TokenInvalid") ||
+    msg.includes("ExpiredSignature") ||
+    msg.includes("Forbidden") ||
+    msg.includes("not logged in")
+  );
+}
+
+/// True when the PDS refused a registration because of the invite
+/// code. The public instance runs with `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true` and
+/// answers `400 {"error":"InvalidInviteCode","message":…}` — the same
+/// code for a missing, misspelled, disabled and already-spent code, on
+/// purpose: the server does not tell an unauthenticated caller which
+/// of those it was, since that would make invite codes enumerable.
+///
+/// Matched on the string for the same reason as [`isTokenInvalid`]:
+/// `pds_client.rs` bails with `createAccount failed: {status} {body}`
+/// and `lib.rs` stringifies that into the command's `Err(String)`, so
+/// the code travels verbatim across the IPC boundary.
+function isInvalidInviteCode(e: unknown): boolean {
+  return errorText(e).includes("InvalidInviteCode");
+}
+
+/// User-facing copy for a failed call, in the app's German UI voice.
+///
+/// An auth failure gets a sentence naming the actual remedy. The raw
+/// string a view would otherwise render —
+/// `appview: timeline home returned 401 Unauthorized:
+/// {"error":"TokenInvalid","message":"ExpiredSignature"}` — is precise
+/// and completely unactionable for the person reading it. Everything
+/// else falls through verbatim: a network error or a 500 is worth
+/// showing as-is, since there is nothing better to say about it.
+export function errorMessage(e: unknown): string {
+  if (isAuthFailure(e)) {
+    return "Sitzung abgelaufen oder abgelehnt — bitte neu anmelden.";
+  }
+  if (isInvalidInviteCode(e)) {
+    // Deliberately covers "no code given" too: the raw body a user
+    // would otherwise read is `createAccount failed: 400 Bad Request
+    // {"error":"InvalidInviteCode","message":"a valid invite code is
+    // required to create an account on this server"}`. Since the
+    // server refuses to say *which* way the code was wrong, the copy
+    // names both plausible fixes rather than guessing one.
+    return (
+      "Einladungscode ungültig oder bereits verbraucht — " +
+      "bitte prüfen oder einen neuen Code anfordern."
+    );
+  }
+  return String(e);
+}
+
 export type Session = {
   did: string;
   handle: string;
@@ -143,11 +235,38 @@ function createSessionStore() {
       set(s);
       return s;
     },
-    async register(handle: string, password: string) {
+    /// Create an account on the configured PDS.
+    ///
+    /// `inviteCode` is optional because the invite gate lives on the
+    /// *server* (`PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED`): the public instance at
+    /// `https://tweet.maarcade.com` requires a code, a local dev PDS
+    /// normally does not. The client therefore never refuses a
+    /// registration for a missing code on its own — it would break
+    /// development against localhost — it just forwards what the user
+    /// typed and lets the PDS decide.
+    ///
+    /// An empty (or whitespace-only) field is *omitted*, not sent as
+    /// `""`. Those are two different statements: "I gave no code" vs.
+    /// "my code is the empty string". The first is legitimate against
+    /// an open server; the second is never true and would only turn
+    /// into a confusing `InvalidInviteCode` on a server that has the
+    /// gate switched off. Dropping the key leaves the Rust
+    /// `Option<String>` at `None`, and `create_account` then leaves
+    /// the field out of the JSON body entirely.
+    async register(handle: string, password: string, inviteCode?: string) {
       if (!isTauri()) {
         throw new Error("register requires the Tauri desktop runtime");
       }
-      const s = await safeInvoke<Session>("auth_register", { handle, password });
+      const code = inviteCode?.trim();
+      const s = await safeInvoke<Session>("auth_register", {
+        handle,
+        password,
+        // Explicit `null` rather than a dropped key, matching how
+        // `createPost` passes its optional `embed` / `reply`: it
+        // deserialises into the Rust `Option<String>` as `None`
+        // without depending on how `invoke` treats `undefined`.
+        inviteCode: code ? code : null,
+      });
       set(s);
       return s;
     },
@@ -253,8 +372,10 @@ export type SearchResponse = {
 ///
 /// `like_count` and `repost_count` are present when the post was
 /// found; they're `undefined` (or absent) for the "not in index"
-/// sentinel response (where `post` is null). AppView has no auth
-/// yet, so `viewer_liked` / `viewer_reposted` aren't returned.
+/// sentinel response (where `post` is null). `/api/post/{uri}` is one
+/// of the AppView's public endpoints — it takes no token and so has no
+/// viewer to resolve against, hence no `viewer_liked` /
+/// `viewer_reposted`. Use [`fetchThread`] with a `viewerDid` for those.
 export type ThreadResponse = {
   post: Post | null;
   thread: {

crates/tauri-app/src/lib/api/invite.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+// Unit tests for the invite-code half of the registration path.
+//
+// Same setup as `notifications.test.ts`: `@tauri-apps/api/core` is
+// mocked so no Tauri shell is needed, and every assertion is about the
+// exact command name + argument bag we hand the Rust IPC layer. That
+// argument bag is the contract — `invoke` maps camelCase JS keys onto
+// the snake_case Rust command parameters (`inviteCode` → `invite_code`
+// on `auth_register`), so a typo here surfaces at runtime as a null
+// argument, not at compile time.
+//
+// Covered:
+//   * `session.register` — the code is forwarded as `inviteCode`,
+//     alongside the unchanged `handle` / `password`;
+//   * the empty / whitespace-only field — must reach the shell as
+//     `null` ("no code given"), never as `""` ("my code is the empty
+//     string"), because a PDS without the invite gate has to keep
+//     accepting registrations;
+//   * `errorMessage` — the PDS's `InvalidInviteCode` body becomes
+//     German copy instead of the raw wire string.
+//
+// Run with:
+//   npx vitest run src/lib/api/invite.test.ts
+
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+
+const invokeMock = vi.fn();
+
+vi.mock("@tauri-apps/api/core", () => ({
+  invoke: (...args: unknown[]) => invokeMock(...args),
+  isTauri: () => true,
+}));
+
+/// What the Rust `auth_register` command answers with on success.
+const SESSION = {
+  did: "did:plc:alice",
+  handle: "alice.tweet.maarcade.com",
+  access_jwt: "acc",
+  refresh_jwt: "ref",
+};
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  invokeMock.mockReset();
+});
+
+describe("session.register", () => {
+  it("forwards the invite code as `inviteCode`", async () => {
+    const { session } = await import("./client");
+    invokeMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(SESSION);
+
+    const s = await session.register(
+      "alice.tweet.maarcade.com",
+      "hunter2hunter2",
+      "mt-7k3qw-z9d2m",
+    );
+
+    expect(invokeMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(invokeMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith("auth_register", {
+      handle: "alice.tweet.maarcade.com",
+      password: "hunter2hunter2",
+      inviteCode: "mt-7k3qw-z9d2m",
+    });
+    expect(s.did).toBe("did:plc:alice");
+  });
+
+  it("trims the surrounding whitespace off a pasted code", async () => {
+    const { session } = await import("./client");
+    invokeMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(SESSION);
+
+    // Copying a code out of a chat message routinely drags a space or
+    // a newline along. The server trims too (`invite::normalize`), but
+    // sending the untrimmed string would mean the *client* and the
+    // server disagree about whether the field is empty.
+    await session.register("alice.test", "pw", "  mt-7k3qw-z9d2m\n");
+
+    expect(invokeMock.mock.calls[0][1]).toMatchObject({
+      inviteCode: "mt-7k3qw-z9d2m",
+    });
+  });
+
+  it("sends null — never an empty string — when the field is blank", async () => {
+    const { session } = await import("./client");
+
+    // Three ways the UI can hand us "nothing": the argument omitted
+    // entirely (login-shaped call), an untouched input, and an input
+    // holding only whitespace. All three mean "the user gave no code"
+    // and must arrive at the Rust `Option<String>` as `None`, so that
+    // a PDS running without `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED` still registers the
+    // account instead of rejecting a blank code.
+    for (const blank of [undefined, "", "   "]) {
+      invokeMock.mockReset();
+      invokeMock.mockResolvedValueOnce(SESSION);
+
+      await session.register("alice.test", "pw", blank);
+
+      const args = invokeMock.mock.calls[0][1] as Record<string, unknown>;
+      expect(args.inviteCode).toBeNull();
+      expect(args.inviteCode).not.toBe("");
+      // The rest of the bag is unaffected.
+      expect(args.handle).toBe("alice.test");
+      expect(args.password).toBe("pw");
+    }
+  });
+});
+
+describe("errorMessage for InvalidInviteCode", () => {
+  /// Exactly what crosses the IPC boundary when the PDS refuses the
+  /// code: `pds_client.rs` bails with `createAccount failed: {status}
+  /// {body}` and `lib.rs` stringifies that into `Err(String)`, which
+  /// `invoke` rejects with as a bare JS string.
+  const RAW =
+    'createAccount failed: 400 Bad Request {"error":"InvalidInviteCode",' +
+    '"message":"a valid invite code is required to create an account on this server"}';
+
+  it("replaces the raw 400 body with copy the user can act on", async () => {
+    const { errorMessage } = await import("./client");
+    const msg = errorMessage(RAW);
+
+    expect(msg).toContain("Einladungscode");
+    // None of the wire noise survives into the UI.
+    expect(msg).not.toContain("InvalidInviteCode");
+    expect(msg).not.toContain("400");
+    // Both shapes a rejected `invoke` can produce — a bare string and
+    // an Error — go through the same `errorText` normalisation.
+    expect(errorMessage(new Error(RAW))).toBe(msg);
+  });
+
+  it("leaves unrelated registration failures verbatim", async () => {
+    const { errorMessage } = await import("./client");
+    // A taken handle is a different 400 and has its own message worth
+    // showing; the invite branch must not swallow it.
+    expect(
+      errorMessage(
+        'createAccount failed: 400 Bad Request {"error":"HandleNotAvailable"}',
+      ),
+    ).toContain("HandleNotAvailable");
+    expect(errorMessage("createAccount failed: 500 db down")).toContain("500");
+  });
+});

crates/tauri-app/src/lib/components/LoginScreen.svelte

@@ -1,6 +1,11 @@
 <script lang="ts">
   import { onMount } from "svelte";
-  import { session, describeServer, type Session } from "../api/client";
+  import {
+    session,
+    describeServer,
+    errorMessage,
+    type Session,
+  } from "../api/client";
 
   let { onLogin }: { onLogin: (s: Session) => void } = $props();
 
@@ -10,6 +15,9 @@
   let mode: "login" | "register" = $state("login");
   let handle: string = $state("");
   let password: string = $state("");
+  // Only meaningful in "register" mode — the field below is rendered
+  // solely there, and `submit()` only forwards it on that branch.
+  let inviteCode: string = $state("");
   let busy = $state(false);
   let error: string | null = $state(null);
   let serverInfo: any = $state(null);
@@ -27,16 +35,40 @@
     busy = true;
     error = null;
     try {
+      // The invite code is deliberately *not* part of the guard above.
+      // Whether one is required is a server setting
+      // (`PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED`): the public instance demands a code, a
+      // dev PDS on localhost usually does not. Refusing to submit
+      // without one would make the client unusable against the second
+      // kind of server for a rule it cannot see. So we forward what
+      // the user typed — `session.register` drops an empty string
+      // instead of sending a blank code — and let the PDS answer.
       const s = mode === "register"
-        ? await session.register(handle, password)
+        ? await session.register(handle, password, inviteCode)
         : await session.login(handle, password);
       onLogin(s);
     } catch (e) {
-      error = String(e);
+      // `errorMessage` translates the failures worth naming — an
+      // expired session, and a rejected `InvalidInviteCode` — into
+      // German copy, and passes everything else through verbatim.
+      error = errorMessage(e);
     } finally {
       busy = false;
     }
   }
+
+  /// Clear the form's mode-specific state when switching sides.
+  ///
+  /// Without this, a code typed while registering would linger in the
+  /// hidden field: switch to login, switch back, and the stale value
+  /// is silently submitted again. The error goes too — the message
+  /// from a failed registration says nothing about the login the user
+  /// is now attempting.
+  function toggleMode() {
+    mode = mode === "register" ? "login" : "register";
+    inviteCode = "";
+    error = null;
+  }
 </script>
 
 <div class="login">
@@ -75,6 +107,30 @@
           autocomplete={mode === "register" ? "new-password" : "current-password"}
         />
       </label>
+      {#if mode === "register"}
+        <!--
+          Registration only. Logging in never carries a code, and a
+          field that is present but meaningless invites people to
+          fill it in. `{#if}` removes it from the DOM rather than
+          hiding it, so it also drops out of the tab order.
+        -->
+        <label class="field">
+          <span class="key">einladungscode</span>
+          <input
+            type="text"
+            bind:value={inviteCode}
+            placeholder="mt-xxxxx-xxxxx"
+            disabled={busy}
+            onkeydown={(e) => e.key === "Enter" && submit()}
+            autocomplete="off"
+            autocapitalize="none"
+            spellcheck="false"
+          />
+          <span class="hint">
+            // von dieser Instanz verlangt — ohne Code keine Registrierung
+          </span>
+        </label>
+      {/if}
     </form>
     {#if error}
       <div class="err">err: {error}</div>
@@ -83,7 +139,7 @@
       <button class="btn btn--primary" onclick={submit} disabled={busy || !handle || !password}>
         {busy ? "..." : mode === "register" ? "create account" : "log in"}
       </button>
-      <button class="btn btn--ghost" onclick={() => (mode = mode === "register" ? "login" : "register")} disabled={busy}>
+      <button class="btn btn--ghost" onclick={toggleMode} disabled={busy}>
         {mode === "register" ? "have an account? log in" : "no account? register"}
       </button>
     </div>
@@ -172,6 +228,15 @@
     font-size: var(--fs-50);
     letter-spacing: var(--tracking-label);
   }
+  /* Sub-label under the invite field. Same dim mono voice as the
+     `// pds: …` server meta line above the form, so it reads as a
+     comment on the field rather than as a second input label. */
+  .hint {
+    color: var(--text-dim);
+    font-family: var(--font-mono);
+    font-size: var(--fs-50);
+    opacity: 0.8;
+  }
   .form input {
     background: var(--bg);
     border: 1px solid var(--line-2);

crates/tauri-app/src/lib/components/LoginScreen.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+// Regression guard for the invite-code field on the login screen.
+//
+// The public instance runs the PDS with `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED=true`, so
+// `createAccount` without a code is refused with `400
+// {"error":"InvalidInviteCode", …}`. Three things have to hold for the
+// screen to be usable against it:
+//
+//   1. the field exists in "register" mode and *not* in "login" mode —
+//      a code is meaningless when signing in, and an input that is
+//      present but ignored invites people to fill it in;
+//   2. what the user typed reaches `session.register` as its third
+//      argument, and an untouched field does not become a blank code;
+//   3. a rejected code renders as German copy, not as the raw wire
+//      body, which is where the user would otherwise read
+//      `createAccount failed: 400 Bad Request {"error":…}`.
+//
+// Setup follows `NotificationsView.test.ts`: the component is mounted
+// against jsdom with `../api/client` partially mocked — the real
+// `errorMessage` is kept, since the error copy is part of what we are
+// asserting on, and only the calls that would need a Tauri runtime are
+// stubbed.
+
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
+import { mount, unmount, tick } from "svelte";
+
+const registerMock = vi.fn();
+const loginMock = vi.fn();
+const describeServerMock = vi.fn();
+
+vi.mock("../api/client", async () => {
+  const actual =
+    await vi.importActual<typeof import("../api/client")>("../api/client");
+  return {
+    ...actual,
+    // Keep the real `errorMessage` from `actual` — the German copy for
+    // `InvalidInviteCode` is exactly what test 3 checks.
+    describeServer: (...args: unknown[]) => describeServerMock(...args),
+    session: {
+      ...actual.session,
+      register: (...args: unknown[]) => registerMock(...args),
+      login: (...args: unknown[]) => loginMock(...args),
+    },
+  };
+});
+
+import LoginScreen from "./LoginScreen.svelte";
+
+let target: HTMLDivElement;
+let app: ReturnType<typeof mount> | null = null;
+
+const SESSION = {
+  did: "did:plc:alice",
+  handle: "alice.tweet.maarcade.com",
+  access_jwt: "acc",
+  refresh_jwt: "ref",
+};
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  target = document.createElement("div");
+  document.body.appendChild(target);
+  registerMock.mockReset();
+  loginMock.mockReset();
+  describeServerMock.mockReset();
+  // `onMount` calls this; a resolved stub keeps the meta line quiet.
+  describeServerMock.mockResolvedValue({ did: "did:web:tweet.maarcade.com" });
+});
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  if (app) unmount(app);
+  app = null;
+  target.remove();
+});
+
+/// Let `onMount`, the mocked promises and Svelte's flush settle.
+async function flush(turns = 6) {
+  for (let i = 0; i < turns; i++) {
+    await Promise.resolve();
+    await tick();
+  }
+}
+
+/// The screen has no test ids; the inputs are addressed the way a user
+/// would, by the label text beside them.
+function fieldByLabel(label: string): HTMLInputElement | null {
+  for (const el of target.querySelectorAll("label.field")) {
+    if (el.querySelector(".key")?.textContent?.trim() === label) {
+      return el.querySelector("input");
+    }
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+function typeInto(input: HTMLInputElement, value: string) {
+  input.value = value;
+  input.dispatchEvent(new Event("input", { bubbles: true }));
+}
+
+/// Flip login ⇄ register via the ghost button under the form.
+async function toggleMode() {
+  const buttons = [...target.querySelectorAll("button.btn--ghost")];
+  buttons[buttons.length - 1].dispatchEvent(
+    new MouseEvent("click", { bubbles: true }),
+  );
+  await tick();
+}
+
+async function submitForm() {
+  target
+    .querySelector("button.btn--primary")!
+    .dispatchEvent(new MouseEvent("click", { bubbles: true }));
+  await flush();
+}
+
+async function mountScreen() {
+  app = mount(LoginScreen, { target, props: { onLogin: vi.fn() } });
+  await flush();
+}
+
+describe("LoginScreen invite field", () => {
+  it("shows the code field only while registering", async () => {
+    await mountScreen();
+
+    // "login" is the default mode — no invite field, and nothing in
+    // the tab order either, since `{#if}` removes it from the DOM.
+    expect(fieldByLabel("einladungscode")).toBeNull();
+
+    await toggleMode();
+    expect(fieldByLabel("einladungscode")).not.toBeNull();
+
+    await toggleMode();
+    expect(fieldByLabel("einladungscode")).toBeNull();
+  });
+
+  it("passes the typed code to session.register as the third argument", async () => {
+    registerMock.mockResolvedValue(SESSION);
+    await mountScreen();
+    await toggleMode();
+
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("handle")!, "alice.tweet.maarcade.com");
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("password")!, "hunter2hunter2");
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("einladungscode")!, "mt-7k3qw-z9d2m");
+    await submitForm();
+
+    expect(loginMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(registerMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(registerMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      "alice.tweet.maarcade.com",
+      "hunter2hunter2",
+      "mt-7k3qw-z9d2m",
+    );
+  });
+
+  it("does not turn an untouched field into a blank code", async () => {
+    registerMock.mockResolvedValue(SESSION);
+    await mountScreen();
+    await toggleMode();
+
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("handle")!, "alice.test");
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("password")!, "hunter2hunter2");
+    // Invite field deliberately left alone. The submit must still go
+    // through: whether a code is required is the *server's* call
+    // (`PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED`), and a dev PDS on localhost runs without
+    // the gate. What must not happen is a blank code travelling on as
+    // if the user had entered one.
+    await submitForm();
+
+    expect(registerMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    const code = registerMock.mock.calls[0][2];
+    expect(code === "" || code === undefined).toBe(true);
+    expect(code?.trim?.() ?? "").toBe("");
+  });
+
+  it("clears a typed code when switching back to login", async () => {
+    loginMock.mockResolvedValue(SESSION);
+    await mountScreen();
+    await toggleMode();
+
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("handle")!, "alice.test");
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("password")!, "hunter2hunter2");
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("einladungscode")!, "mt-stale-code0");
+
+    // Back to login, then to register again: a stale code lingering in
+    // the hidden field would be submitted silently on the next try.
+    await toggleMode();
+    await toggleMode();
+    expect(fieldByLabel("einladungscode")!.value).toBe("");
+  });
+
+  it("renders German copy when the PDS rejects the code", async () => {
+    // Verbatim what reaches the component: `pds_client.rs` bails with
+    // `createAccount failed: {status} {body}`, `lib.rs` stringifies it
+    // into the command's `Err(String)`, and `invoke` rejects with that
+    // bare string.
+    registerMock.mockRejectedValue(
+      'createAccount failed: 400 Bad Request {"error":"InvalidInviteCode",' +
+        '"message":"a valid invite code is required to create an account on this server"}',
+    );
+    await mountScreen();
+    await toggleMode();
+
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("handle")!, "alice.test");
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("password")!, "hunter2hunter2");
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("einladungscode")!, "mt-wrong-code0");
+    await submitForm();
+
+    const err = target.querySelector(".err");
+    expect(err).not.toBeNull();
+    expect(err!.textContent).toContain("Einladungscode");
+    // The wire noise the user would otherwise be shown is gone.
+    expect(err!.textContent).not.toContain("InvalidInviteCode");
+    expect(err!.textContent).not.toContain("400 Bad Request");
+  });
+
+  it("still shows an unrelated failure verbatim", async () => {
+    // The invite branch must not swallow every registration error —
+    // a taken handle has its own message worth reading.
+    registerMock.mockRejectedValue(
+      'createAccount failed: 400 Bad Request {"error":"HandleNotAvailable"}',
+    );
+    await mountScreen();
+    await toggleMode();
+
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("handle")!, "alice.test");
+    typeInto(fieldByLabel("password")!, "hunter2hunter2");
+    await submitForm();
+
+    expect(target.querySelector(".err")!.textContent).toContain(
+      "HandleNotAvailable",
+    );
+  });
+});

crates/tauri-app/src/lib/components/NotificationsView.svelte

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
   import Avatar from "./Avatar.svelte";
   import Skeleton from "./Skeleton.svelte";
   import {
+    errorMessage,
     fetchNotifications,
     markNotificationsSeen,
     notificationIcon,
@@ -71,7 +72,7 @@
         }
       }
     } catch (e) {
-      error = String(e);
+      error = errorMessage(e);
     } finally {
       loading = false;
     }
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@
       items = [...items, ...r.notifications.filter((n) => !seen.has(n.id))];
       cursor = r.cursor;
     } catch (e) {
-      error = String(e);
+      error = errorMessage(e);
     } finally {
       loading = false;
     }

crates/tauri-app/src/lib/components/NotificationsView.test.ts

@@ -194,6 +194,48 @@ describe("NotificationsView actor navigation", () => {
     expect(onThreadClick).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
   });
 
+  it("shows actionable copy when the AppView rejects the session", async () => {
+    // Since `/api/notifications` grew an auth guard, this is what a
+    // rejected token looks like by the time it reaches the view: the
+    // AppView's JSON body, wrapped by `appview_client.rs`'s
+    // `status_error()` and stringified across the Tauri IPC boundary.
+    // `safeInvoke` has already spent its one refresh attempt getting
+    // here, so the only thing left to tell the user is "log in again" —
+    // rendering the raw wire string would be accurate and useless.
+    fetchNotificationsMock.mockRejectedValue(
+      'appview: notifications returned 401 Unauthorized: ' +
+        '{"error":"TokenInvalid","message":"ExpiredSignature"}',
+    );
+
+    app = mount(NotificationsView, {
+      target,
+      props: { did: "did:plc:me" },
+    });
+    await flush();
+
+    expect(target.textContent).toContain("bitte neu anmelden");
+    expect(target.textContent).not.toContain("TokenInvalid");
+    expect(target.textContent).not.toContain("401");
+    // A failed load must not leave the spinner up or ack a page it
+    // never rendered.
+    expect(markNotificationsSeenMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it("still shows a server error verbatim — there's nothing better to say", async () => {
+    fetchNotificationsMock.mockRejectedValue(
+      "appview: notifications returned 500 Internal Server Error: db down",
+    );
+
+    app = mount(NotificationsView, {
+      target,
+      props: { did: "did:plc:me" },
+    });
+    await flush();
+
+    expect(target.textContent).toContain("500");
+    expect(target.textContent).toContain("db down");
+  });
+
   it("opens the thread for a row that has a subject", async () => {
     fetchNotificationsMock.mockResolvedValue({
       notifications: [row()],

docs/architecture.md

@@ -19,12 +19,14 @@ auf welchem Weg kommt ein Post vom Client bis in die Timeline zurück.
     ┌──────────────────────────────────┐   ┌──────────────────────────────┐
     │ pds-server  (axum, :2583)        │   │ appview  (axum, :2584)       │
     │                                  │   │                              │
-    │  /xrpc/com.atproto.*             │   │  GET /api/timeline/home      │
+    │  /xrpc/com.atproto.*             │   │  GET /api/timeline/home  🔒  │
     │  /xrpc/app.bsky.actor.profile.*  │   │  GET /api/profile[/:handle]  │
     │  /blob/:cid                      │   │  GET /api/search             │
     │  /healthz                        │   │  GET /api/post|thread/*uri   │
-    │                                  │   │  GET /api/notifications…     │
-    │                                  │   │  GET /api/followers|following│
+    │  /.well-known/did.json ──────────┼───┼─▶ Schlüssel für 🔒           │
+    │                                  │   │  GET /api/notifications…  🔒 │
+    │  /xrpc/…sync.subscribeRepos ─────┼───┼─▶ pds_firehose.rs (WS)       │
+    │      (WebSocket, seq-Cursor)     │   │  GET /api/followers|following│
     │                                  │   │  GET /healthz                │
     │  at-lexicon  Validierung (160)   │   │                              │
     │  at-repo/at-mst  MST + Commit    │   │  indexer.rs  Upserts         │
@@ -40,37 +42,61 @@ auf welchem Weg kommt ein Post vom Client bis in die Timeline zurück.
   ┌───────────┐  ┌────────┐              ┌─────────────────┐     │
   │ Postgres  │  │ MinIO  │              │ Postgres        │     │
   │ pds :5434 │  │ :9100  │              │ appview :5435   │     │
-  └───────────┘  └────────┘              └─────────────────┘     │
-        │                                                        │
-        │  (heute: kein eigener Firehose-Ausgang)                 │
-        ▼                                                        │
+  │ +firehose │  └────────┘              │ +cursor         │     │
+  │  _events  │                          └─────────────────┘     │
+  └───────────┘                                                  │
+                                                                 │
    ┌──────────────────────────────────────────┐                  │
    │ Jetstream-Relay (extern, WebSocket)      │──────────────────┘
-   │ JETSTREAM_URL                            │   at-firehose
+   │ JETSTREAM_URL — kennt diese PDS nicht    │   at-firehose
    └──────────────────────────────────────────┘   JetstreamConsumer
 ```
 
-Zwei Wege führen in die AppView, und das ist Absicht:
+🔒 = Bearer-Token nötig, und der `sub` des Tokens muss der angefragten DID
+entsprechen. Die AppView verifiziert die ES256-Signatur mit dem öffentlichen
+Schlüssel, den die PDS in ihrem DID-Dokument veröffentlicht — `PDS_JWT_SECRET`
+verlässt die PDS nie. Details in [`deployment.md`](deployment.md), Abschnitt 6.
+
+Drei Wege führen in die AppView, und das ist Absicht:
 
 1. **Direkter Push (schnell, lokal).** Jeder erfolgreiche Commit auf der PDS
    wird per `POST /internal/ingest-commit` an die AppView geschoben
    (`crates/pds-server/src/appview_push.rs`). Best effort, 5 s Timeout, blockiert
    den Record-Write nie. Damit sieht der Nutzer seinen eigenen Post sofort.
-2. **Jetstream (global, verzögert).** `at-firehose::JetstreamConsumer` hängt an
+2. **PDS-Firehose (lokal, garantiert).** Die PDS führt in derselben
+   Transaktion wie den Commit ein Event in `firehose_events` und liefert es
+   über `com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos` als WebSocket aus
+   (`crates/pds-server/src/firehose.rs`). Die AppView konsumiert das mit
+   persistiertem Cursor (`crates/appview/src/pds_firehose.rs`).
+3. **Jetstream (global, verzögert).** `at-firehose::JetstreamConsumer` hängt an
    einem externen Jetstream-Relay und liefert alles, was in den konfigurierten
    Collections weltweit passiert.
 
-Wichtig für das Verständnis der Topologie: **die eigene PDS speist den
-Jetstream nicht.** Es gibt keinen `com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos`-Endpoint im
-PDS-Router. Der Firehose-Weg ist ein reiner Konsum-Pfad für fremde Repos; die
-eigenen Records erreichen die AppView ausschließlich über den Push aus
-Punkt 1 (noch offen).
+Warum 1 **und** 2: Der Push ist der schnelle Weg, der Firehose der
+verlässliche. Ein verlorener Push (AppView kurz weg, Netzwerkfehler) war
+früher endgültig — der öffentliche Jetstream kennt diese PDS nicht, also
+wäre der Post nie angekommen. Jetzt holt der Cursor-Replay ihn nach.
+Dass beide Wege denselben Commit liefern, ist unkritisch: die Indexer-Pfade
+sind Upserts, und der Dedupe-Index der Notifications fängt den Rest.
+
+Wichtig für das Verständnis der Topologie bleibt: **die eigene PDS speist den
+*öffentlichen* Jetstream nicht.** Weg 2 ist ein lokaler Firehose zwischen den
+eigenen zwei Diensten; ein fremder Relay erfährt von dieser PDS weiterhin
+nichts.
+
+Zur Spec-Treue: Die Frame-Hülle ist konformes DAG-CBOR mit Tag-42-CID-Links.
+Die Blöcke *darin* tragen die Konvention dieses Codebases — CIDs innerhalb von
+Commit-Blöcken sind Strings, nicht Links (`at-repo/src/commit.rs`). Ein
+fremder atproto-Consumer kann die Frames also lesen, scheitert aber beim
+Validieren der Blockinhalte. Das zu ändern hieße, die Blockkodierung zu
+ändern, und damit ändern sich sämtliche CIDs inklusive der
+`did:plc:`-Ableitung — eine eigene, bewusste Migration.
 
 ## Crates
 
 | Crate | Typ | Aufgabe |
 |---|---|---|
-| `at-lexicon` | lib | Lexicon-Schemas laden (`Lex::from_json`) und Records validieren. `LexRegistry` in der PDS kennt `app.twi.post` (160 Zeichen), `app.bsky.feed.like`, `app.bsky.feed.repost`, `app.bsky.actor.profile` — alle vier per `include_str!` einkompiliert |
+| `at-lexicon` | lib | Lexicon-Schemas laden (`Lex::from_json`) und Records validieren. `LexRegistry` in der PDS kennt `app.twi.post` (160 Zeichen), `app.bsky.feed.like`, `app.bsky.feed.repost`, `app.bsky.graph.follow`, `app.bsky.actor.profile` — alle per `include_str!` einkompiliert |
 | `at-crypto` | lib | secp256k1/P-256-Keypairs, DAG-CBOR-CIDs, multibase/base58btc, JWT (`issue_jwt` / `verify_jwt`), PLC-Operationen inkl. `did_plc_from_op` |
 | `at-identity` | lib | Handle- und DID-Auflösung. Drei Resolver hinter dem Trait `DidHandleResolver`: `PlcClient` (PLC-Directory), `WebResolver` (`.well-known/did.json`), `PdsHandleResolver` (fragt die lokale PDS) |
 | `at-mst` | lib | Merkle-Search-Tree: Knoten, `split_around`, `wrap_with_split`, spec-konformes `encode_key` |
@@ -158,9 +184,11 @@ Alle Schreibpfade sind Upserts, das Replay nach einem Reconnect ist damit
 unschädlich. Fehlerhafte Events rücken den Cursor **nicht** vor.
 
 `ingest.rs` bedient denselben Indexer über HTTP, mit den Aktionen
-`create` / `delete`; für `app.bsky.graph.follow`-Deletes braucht der Aufrufer
-`subject_did` im Body, weil der Record-Wert bei Deletes nicht garantiert
-mitkommt.
+`create` / `delete`. Für `app.bsky.graph.follow`-Deletes gibt es zwei Wege:
+der Push schickt `subject_did` im Body mit, der Firehose kennt nur `did` +
+`rkey` — deshalb speichert `follows` seit Migration 0011 den rkey des
+Follow-Records und löst darüber auf. Ohne den rkey war ein Unfollow über den
+Firehose nicht anwendbar und hing allein am Push.
 
 ## Datenbanken und Tabellen
 

docs/deployment.md

@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ Hinweise:
 * Es gibt **keinen** Signal-Handler für graceful Shutdown. `systemctl stop`
   beendet den Prozess hart; bei der AppView bedeutet das, dass der letzte
   Cursor-Flush nur passiert, wenn der Kanal regulär geschlossen wird —
-  praktisch also mit bis zu 100 Events Verlust (siehe Abschnitt 8). Das ist
+  praktisch also mit bis zu 100 Events Verlust (siehe Abschnitt 10). Das ist
   unkritisch, weil der Cursor beim Resume ohnehin leicht in die Vergangenheit
   zeigt und Events idempotent verarbeitet werden.
 * Eine Abhängigkeit `After=` auf Postgres/MinIO ist nur nötig, wenn diese auf
@@ -296,7 +296,81 @@ Hinweise:
   `PgPoolOptions` mit `acquire_timeout(10s)`, bricht aber ebenfalls ab, wenn
   der erste Connect scheitert. `Restart=on-failure` fängt das ab.
 
-## 6. Reverse-Proxy
+## 6. Authentifizierung
+
+Die AppView prüft seit Phase 9 Bearer-Tokens. Wie das zusammenhängt:
+
+1. Die PDS stellt beim Login ein ES256-Access-JWT aus (`sub` = DID,
+   `scope` = `com.atproto.access`, eine Stunde gültig).
+2. Die PDS veröffentlicht den *öffentlichen* Teil ihres P-256-Schlüssels unter
+   `GET /.well-known/did.json`. `PDS_JWT_SECRET` verlässt den PDS-Prozess nicht.
+3. Die AppView holt dieses Dokument beim Start von `PDS_INTERNAL_URL`
+   (Fallback: `PDS_PUBLIC_URL`), cached den Schlüssel und lädt ihn bei einem
+   Verifikationsfehler einmal nach — höchstens einmal pro Minute, damit
+   Müll-Tokens kein Werkzeug werden, die PDS zu fluten. Ein Schlüsselwechsel
+   braucht also keinen Neustart der AppView.
+
+Ist die PDS beim Start nicht erreichbar, warnt die AppView nur und startet
+trotzdem — sie indiziert den Firehose, was von der lokalen PDS unabhängig ist.
+Der Schlüssel wird dann beim ersten authentifizierten Request geholt. Klappt
+auch das nicht, antwortet sie `503 AuthUnavailable`: **fail closed**, nie
+fail open.
+
+### Welche Endpoints
+
+| Endpoint | Zugriff |
+|---|---|
+| `/api/timeline/home`, `/api/notifications`, `/api/notifications/count`, `/api/notifications/seen` | Token nötig, `sub` muss dem `did`-Parameter entsprechen |
+| `/api/profile*`, `/api/search`, `/api/post/*`, `/api/thread*`, `/api/followers`, `/api/following` | öffentlich (in AT Proto öffentliche Records) |
+| `/internal/ingest-commit` | `APPVIEW_INGEST_SECRET`, server-zu-server |
+
+### Fehlercodes
+
+| Fall | Status | `error` |
+|---|---|---|
+| Header fehlt oder ist kein Bearer | 401 | `AuthMissing` |
+| Signatur falsch, abgelaufen, falscher `scope` | 401 | `TokenInvalid` |
+| Token gültig, aber `sub` ≠ `did` | 403 | `Forbidden` |
+| Schlüssel der PDS nicht beschaffbar | 503 | `AuthUnavailable` |
+
+`TokenInvalid` ist ein Vertrag mit dem Desktop-Client: daran erkennt er, dass
+er sein Access-JWT erneuern und den Request einmal wiederholen muss. Wer den
+Code umbenennt, loggt jeden Nutzer eine Stunde nach dem Login aus.
+
+### `APPVIEW_AUTH_REQUIRED=false`
+
+Schaltet die Prüfung ab und stellt das alte Verhalten her — gedacht für eine
+Instanz hinter VPN und für die fail-open-Integrationstests. Die AppView warnt
+beim Start in Großbuchstaben. Öffentlich erreichbar heißt das: jeder kann die
+Notifications jeder DID lesen und als gelesen markieren.
+
+## 7. Firehose
+
+Die PDS liefert `com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos` als WebSocket aus, die
+AppView konsumiert ihn. Betrieblich wichtig:
+
+* **Das Event liegt in derselben Transaktion wie der Commit.** Es kann keinen
+  Commit ohne Event geben und umgekehrt.
+* **Die `seq` ist lückenfrei.** Ein globaler `pg_advisory_xact_lock` sorgt
+  dafür, dass Commit-Reihenfolge und `seq`-Reihenfolge übereinstimmen — sonst
+  könnte ein Consumer eine Nummer überspringen, die erst danach sichtbar wird,
+  und sie nie nachholen. Preis: das Ende jeder schreibenden Transaktion ist
+  über alle Accounts hinweg serialisiert.
+* **Cursor:** `?cursor=<seq>` liefert alles mit `seq > cursor` aus der
+  Datenbank nach und geht dann nahtlos live weiter. Ohne Cursor nur live. Ein
+  Cursor aus der Zukunft ist ein Fehler-Frame, ein zu alter ein
+  `#info`/`OutdatedCursor`.
+* **`firehose_events` wächst unbegrenzt.** Es gibt keine Retention. Beschneiden
+  ist sicher, weil ein zu alter Cursor sauber behandelt wird — wer die Tabelle
+  aufräumt, sollte aber wissen, wie weit die eigenen Consumer zurückhängen
+  dürfen (`pds_firehose_seq` in `/healthz` der AppView gegen `MAX(seq)`).
+* **Reverse-Proxy:** die Route braucht ein WebSocket-Upgrade (`Upgrade`/
+  `Connection`-Header durchreichen) und einen Read-Timeout, der längere
+  Ruhephasen überlebt.
+* `PDS_FIREHOSE_ENABLED=false` schaltet den Consumer in der AppView ab; lokale
+  Commits hängen dann wieder allein am Best-Effort-Push.
+
+## 8. Reverse-Proxy
 
 ### PDS
 
@@ -357,25 +431,31 @@ im DID-Doc-`serviceEndpoint`, im JWT-`iss` und als Basis der Blob-URLs.
 kein `/.well-known/atproto-did` aus (im Router nicht vorhanden). `at-identity`
 kann solche Dokumente *auflösen*, aber wer `did:web`-Handles auf dieser PDS
 betreiben will, muss die Dateien vorerst statisch über den Proxy ausliefern.
-Ebenfalls offen: `describeServer` gibt die DID hart als
-`did:web:pds.maarcadetweet.local` zurück, unabhängig von `PDS_PUBLIC_URL`.
+Die Service-DID wird inzwischen aus `PDS_PUBLIC_URL` abgeleitet
+(`AppConfig::pds_did()`, did:web mit `%3A`-kodiertem Port) und von
+`describeServer` **und** `/.well-known/did.json` identisch ausgeliefert. Das
+heißt auch: ändert sich `PDS_PUBLIC_URL`, ändert sich die Service-DID.
 
 ### AppView
 
-Die AppView setzt ihr CORS selbst — `crates/appview/src/routes.rs`:
+Die AppView setzt ihr CORS selbst (`cors_layer()` in
+`crates/appview/src/routes.rs`). Ohne `APPVIEW_CORS_ORIGINS` bleibt es beim
+alten `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` — die AppView warnt dann beim Start.
+Mit gesetzter Variable gilt eine Allowlist:
 
-```rust
-let cors = CorsLayer::new()
-    .allow_origin(Any)
-    .allow_methods(Any)
-    .allow_headers(Any);
+```
+APPVIEW_CORS_ORIGINS=tauri://localhost,http://tauri.localhost,http://127.0.0.1:1430
 ```
 
-Also `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` für alle Routen, inklusive
-`/internal/ingest-commit`. Der Grund steht im Code: der Tauri-Webview ruft die
-AppView von einem anderen Origin aus auf (`http://127.0.0.1:1430` im Dev,
-`tauri://` / `asset://` im Bundle), und die Read-Endpoints tragen keine
-Auth-Cookies.
+Der Tauri-Webview ruft die AppView von einem anderen Origin aus auf — im Dev
+die Vite-Adresse, im Bundle `tauri://localhost` (macOS/Linux) bzw.
+`http://tauri.localhost` (Windows). Alle drei gehören in die Liste, sonst
+scheitert der Preflight.
+
+`/internal/ingest-commit` liegt bewusst **außerhalb** der CORS-Schicht: die
+Route wird von der PDS server-zu-server aufgerufen, nie von einem Browser. Ein
+`Access-Control-Allow-Origin` darauf würde ausschließlich einer Webseite
+helfen, in den Index zu schreiben.
 
 Für ein öffentliches Deployment heißt das:
 
@@ -408,7 +488,7 @@ HTTP-Aufrufe an PDS/AppView laufen über den Rust-IPC-Layer
 (`src-tauri/src/pds_client.rs`, `appview_client.rs`), nicht aus dem Webview —
 die CSP muss also für neue Backend-URLs nicht angefasst werden.
 
-## 7. Health-Checks und Logs
+## 9. Health-Checks und Logs
 
 ### PDS
 
@@ -472,7 +552,7 @@ Log-Zeilen, auf die es sich lohnt zu achten:
 | `s3 ping failed at startup` | MinIO beim PDS-Start nicht erreichbar |
 | `plc submit failed (dev ok)` | PLC-Directory nicht erreichbar; die DID bleibt lokal gültig, ist aber global nicht registriert |
 
-## 8. Neustart-Verhalten
+## 10. Neustart-Verhalten
 
 **PDS.** Zustandslos bis auf Postgres und MinIO. Der In-Memory-Blockstore
 (`MemoryBlockstore` in `state.rs`) wird beim Start neu aufgebaut; persistent
@@ -515,14 +595,22 @@ nach — zuerst über die lokale PDS (`PdsHandleResolver`, 2 s Timeout), dann PL
 bzw. `did:web`. Nach einem Neustart holt der erste Durchlauf das nach; der
 Zustand ist reine Anzeigekosmetik.
 
-## 9. Was noch offen ist
+## 11. Was noch offen ist
 
 * Kein Compose-Service für `pds-server` / `appview` — das Compose-File deckt nur
   Postgres und MinIO ab. Es gibt kein Dockerfile im Repo.
 * `at-blob` spricht ausschließlich MinIO ohne Signature V4 (siehe Modul-Doku in
   `crates/at-blob/src/s3.rs`); echtes AWS S3 funktioniert damit nicht.
 * Kein Graceful-Shutdown, keine Readiness- (im Unterschied zur Liveness-)Probe.
-* Keine konfigurierbare CORS-Allowlist in der AppView.
-* Kein `.well-known`-Handling in der PDS, `describeServer` liefert eine
-  hartkodierte DID.
+* `aud` wird beim Token-Check nicht validiert (`verify_jwt` setzt
+  `validate_aud = false`), obwohl die PDS `did:web:appview.maarcadetweet.local`
+  einsetzt. Signatur, Ablauf, `scope` und `sub` werden geprüft.
+* Notifications werden nie gelöscht; ein Unlike/Unfollow lässt die Zeile stehen.
 * Kein Backfill-Werkzeug für Jetstream-Lücken.
+* **Keine Retention für `firehose_events`.** Die Tabelle wächst mit jedem
+  Commit und wird nie beschnitten. Pruning ist sicher — ein Consumer mit zu
+  altem Cursor bekommt `#info`/`OutdatedCursor` und läuft ab der ältesten
+  überlebenden Zeile weiter — aber es gibt weder Job noch Policy dafür.
+* Der globale Advisory-Lock, der die `seq`-Vergabe ordnet, serialisiert das
+  Ende jeder schreibenden Transaktion über alle Accounts hinweg. Das
+  begrenzt den Schreibdurchsatz auf ein COMMIT nach dem anderen.

docs/tauri-release.md

@@ -296,13 +296,57 @@ beiden.
 5. Mit einer älteren installierten Version gegenprüfen, dass `check()` das
    Update findet und die Signaturprüfung durchgeht.
 
-## 8. Offene Punkte
+## 8. CI: Tag-Release über Gitea Actions
+
+`.gitea/workflows/release.yml` baut Schritt 2 der Checkliste für **Windows und
+Linux** automatisch. Trigger ist ein Tag `v*.*.*` (zusätzlich manuell per
+`workflow_dispatch`, dann ohne Release-Anlage).
+
+| Job | `runs-on` | Runner | Bundles |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `windows` | `windows` | winbuild, 192.168.1.69 (on-demand) | `msi/*.msi`, `nsis/*-setup.exe` |
+| `linux` | `ubuntu-latest` | ci-runner, 192.168.1.72 | `deb/*.deb`, `rpm/*.rpm`, `appimage/*.AppImage` |
+
+Beide Jobs laufen `npm ci` (es gibt eine `package-lock.json`) und danach den
+npm-Skript-Umweg `npm run tauri -- build --ci` aus `crates/tauri-app/`, damit
+die im Lock gepinnte `@tauri-apps/cli` benutzt wird und nicht die zufällig auf
+dem Runner installierte. Die Pfade sind die aus Abschnitt 5. Beide laden ihre
+Bundles als Job-Artefakt hoch **und** hängen sie an dasselbe Gitea-Release zum
+Tag (anlegen, und falls der andere Job schneller war, das vorhandene per Tag
+holen). Die Release-Beschreibung kommt aus dem passenden
+`## [<version>]`-Abschnitt einer `CHANGELOG.md`, sobald es eine gibt — bis
+dahin steht dort der Commit-SHA.
+
+Zwei Dinge, die der Workflow *nicht* tut:
+
+* **macOS.** Es gibt keinen macOS-Runner. `.dmg`/`.app` werden lokal nach
+  Abschnitt 4 gebaut und im Gitea-Release von Hand angehängt.
+* **Signierte Updater-Artefakte.** Der Workflow baut ohne Release-Overlay und
+  ohne `TAURI_SIGNING_PRIVATE_KEY*`; es entstehen also keine `.sig`-Dateien
+  (Abschnitt 2 und 5). Für ein echtes Auto-Update müssen Overlay-Datei und
+  Secrets ergänzt und der Build-Aufruf um
+  `--config src-tauri/tauri.release.conf.json` erweitert werden.
+
+**Vor dem Tag zu bumpen** (Schritt 1 der Checkliste): Die Release-Version kommt
+aus dem Tag, die Version im *Dateinamen* aus `src-tauri/tauri.conf.json`. Ohne
+Bump heißt das Artefakt zu `v0.2.0` weiterhin
+`maarcadetweet_0.1.0_x64-setup.exe`. `src-tauri/Cargo.toml` und `package.json`
+mitziehen — alle drei stehen aktuell auf `0.1.0`.
+
+> **Falle:** Sobald `.gitea/workflows/` existiert, ignoriert Gitea
+> `.github/workflows/` vollständig — kommentarlos, ohne roten Lauf. Im
+> Nachbarprojekt `lserver` waren Tests dadurch einen Tag lang still
+> abgeschaltet. Dieses Repo hat kein `.github/`, und das soll so bleiben: neue
+> Workflows gehören nach `.gitea/workflows/`.
+
+## 9. Offene Punkte
 
 * Kein Release-Overlay im Repo — die Datei aus Abschnitt 2 muss angelegt
   werden. Der Endpoint `https://releases.maarcadetweet.local/…` in der aktuellen
   Config ist ein Platzhalter und existiert nicht.
-* Kein Update-Server, kein CI-Workflow, kein Skript, das `latest.json` erzeugt
-  (`scripts/` ist leer).
+* Kein Update-Server und kein Skript, das `latest.json` erzeugt (`scripts/` ist
+  leer). Der CI-Workflow aus Abschnitt 8 baut und veröffentlicht Installer,
+  aber keine Updater-Artefakte.
 * Keine Code-Signierung/Notarisierung für macOS und keine Authenticode-Signatur
   für Windows konfiguriert (`bundle` enthält weder `macOS.signingIdentity` noch
   `windows.certificateThumbprint`). Der Tauri-Updater-Schlüssel ersetzt das

lexicons/app/bsky/graph/follow.json

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+{
+  "lexicon": 1,
+  "id": "app.bsky.graph.follow",
+  "defs": {
+    "main": {
+      "type": "record",
+      "key": "tid",
+      "record": {
+        "type": "object",
+        "required": ["subject", "createdAt"],
+        "properties": {
+          "subject": { "type": "string", "format": "did" },
+          "createdAt": { "type": "datetime" }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

migrations/appview/0009_handle_lookup_indexes.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+-- AppView database schema 0009: indexes for handle → DID lookups.
+--
+-- `/api/profile/<handle>` took 9.5 s on a 3.3 M-row `posts` table
+-- (measured against the dev instance). Both halves of `resolve_profile`
+-- were unindexed:
+--
+--   1. SELECT did FROM profiles WHERE LOWER(handle) = LOWER($1)
+--   2. SELECT did FROM posts    WHERE handle = $1
+--      ORDER BY indexed_at DESC LIMIT 1        -- the fallback
+--
+-- Step 2 was a parallel sequential scan over every post ever indexed
+-- (`Rows Removed by Filter: 1101310` per worker), and it runs on every
+-- profile view in the client.
+--
+-- On `profiles`: migration 0007 dropped exactly this index, reasoning
+-- that "every caller derives a DID first (via posts.handle or the
+-- handle-sync worker) and then queries profiles by PK". That stopped
+-- being true when `resolve_profile` learned to prefer the profiles
+-- cache — it now asks `profiles` by handle *first*, precisely the
+-- lookup 0007 removed the support for. Re-added, matching the
+-- expression in the query (`LOWER(handle)`) so the planner can use it.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS profiles_handle_lower_idx
+    ON profiles (LOWER(handle));
+
+-- On `posts`: `(handle, indexed_at DESC)` covers filter *and* sort, so
+-- the LIMIT 1 becomes an index scan that stops at the first row.
+--
+-- Partial on `handle <> ''`: empty handles are the un-backfilled
+-- majority on a firehose-fed instance and are never looked up by this
+-- path (the handle-sync worker queries them through its own predicate),
+-- so excluding them keeps the index small on the largest table we have.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS posts_handle_indexed_at_idx
+    ON posts (handle, indexed_at DESC)
+    WHERE handle <> '';
+
+-- =====================================================
+-- posts: the cold-start global feed
+-- =====================================================
+--
+-- `/api/timeline/home` falls back to the global recent feed for users
+-- without a follow graph — every new account's first screen. It took
+-- 7.4 s (parallel seq scan + top-N sort over 3.3 M rows) and timed out
+-- the integration tests' 5 s client.
+--
+-- `posts_collection_indexed_at_uri_idx (collection, indexed_at DESC,
+-- uri DESC)` cannot serve it: the query filters
+-- `collection IN ('app.twi.post','app.bsky.feed.post')`, and with two
+-- leading values the index no longer yields rows in `indexed_at` order,
+-- so the planner falls back to scanning and sorting.
+--
+-- A partial index over exactly that predicate moves the collection
+-- filter into the index definition, which leaves `(indexed_at DESC,
+-- uri DESC)` as the sort key — the LIMIT then stops after the first
+-- page. Same shape as the existing `posts_did_indexed_at_uri_idx`,
+-- which is partial on the same two collections.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS posts_feed_indexed_at_uri_idx
+    ON posts (indexed_at DESC, uri DESC)
+    WHERE collection IN ('app.twi.post', 'app.bsky.feed.post');

migrations/appview/0010_pds_firehose_cursor.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+-- AppView database schema 0010: cursor for the local PDS firehose.
+--
+-- Why a second cursor table
+--
+-- The AppView now consumes two event streams, and they are numbered in
+-- completely different spaces:
+--
+--   * `jetstream_cursor.cursor` is a Jetstream `time_us` — microseconds
+--     since the epoch, produced by a public relay we do not control.
+--   * this table's `cursor` is the `seq` of our own PDS's
+--     `com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos` — a small monotonic counter
+--     that starts at 1 in a fresh PDS database.
+--
+-- Sharing one row between them would mean the larger of the two values
+-- (always the Jetstream timestamp) permanently swallowing the other:
+-- `cursor_advance` uses GREATEST, so the very first Jetstream event
+-- would push the PDS cursor to ~1.7e15 and every subsequent
+-- subscribeRepos connect would ask for a sequence the PDS will never
+-- reach. Hence a table of its own, deliberately in the same shape as
+-- `jetstream_cursor` so both read/advance the same way.
+--
+-- Shape
+--   id          pinned to 1 by a CHECK — a single-row table, the same
+--               pattern `jetstream_cursor` uses. It makes "advance the
+--               cursor" a plain UPDATE with no upsert dance and makes a
+--               second row impossible to create by accident.
+--   cursor      the last `seq` we durably applied. 0 means "nothing
+--               yet": the consumer then subscribes without a `cursor`
+--               query parameter, which the PDS reads as "start from the
+--               current head" rather than replaying the entire repo
+--               history into a fresh index.
+--   updated_at  observability only — how stale the stream is can be
+--               read straight off the row.
+--
+-- The row is inserted here so `cursor_advance`'s UPDATE always has a
+-- target; `pds_firehose::cursor_get` still tolerates a missing row and
+-- returns 0.
+
+CREATE TABLE pds_firehose_cursor (
+    id             INTEGER PRIMARY KEY DEFAULT 1 CHECK (id = 1),
+    cursor         BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    updated_at     TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+);
+INSERT INTO pds_firehose_cursor (id, cursor) VALUES (1, 0);

migrations/appview/0011_follows_rkey.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+-- AppView database schema 0011: remember which record a follow came from.
+--
+-- Why
+--
+-- A `follows` row was addressable only as `(follower_did, subject_did)`.
+-- That is the right identity for the *relationship*, but it is not the
+-- identity a delete event carries. A firehose / Jetstream delete op is
+-- just `did` + `rkey`:
+--
+--   {"action": "delete", "path": "app.bsky.graph.follow/3lmnop"}
+--
+-- There is no record body on a delete — the record is gone, that is the
+-- whole point of the event — so the subject DID is nowhere in it. With
+-- no rkey stored, the indexer had no way from `3lmnop` back to
+-- "did:plc:bob" and logged-and-skipped the op
+-- (`indexer::apply_commit`, `app.bsky.graph.follow` arm).
+--
+-- The practical consequence: unfollows only ever landed through the
+-- PDS's best-effort `POST /internal/ingest-commit` push, which knows the
+-- subject from its own snapshot. That push has no retry and no
+-- acknowledgement (see `pds_firehose`'s module docs). If it was lost —
+-- AppView restarting, request timing out — the follow stayed in the
+-- index forever, and the firehose, the stream that exists precisely to
+-- repair such gaps, could not repair this one. Storing the rkey closes
+-- that hole: the firehose replay can now apply the unfollow on its own.
+--
+-- The primary key deliberately stays `(follower_did, subject_did)`
+-- ------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- It is what makes `upsert_follow` idempotent. The same follow reaches
+-- us over both transports (push *and* firehose) and again after any
+-- replay, and every one of those must converge on one row. Keying on
+-- the rkey instead — or adding it to the key — would make a re-follow
+-- under a fresh rkey a *second* row for the same relationship, and then
+-- `follower_count` would count the same follower twice.
+--
+-- So `rkey` is not identity here; it is a second *access path* to a row
+-- the primary key already identifies.
+--
+-- Nullable, because history has no rkey
+-- -------------------------------------
+-- Every row written before this migration was inserted without one, and
+-- there is nothing to backfill it from: the AppView never stored the
+-- follow record itself. A NOT NULL column would need a fabricated
+-- placeholder that a later delete could accidentally match. NULL says
+-- exactly what is true — "we do not know which record this came from" —
+-- and a delete-by-rkey simply finds nothing for those rows, which is the
+-- documented no-op path in `indexer::delete_follow_by_rkey`. Those rows
+-- keep working through the push path (which sends `subject_did`) and
+-- heal on their own the next time the follow is re-created.
+--
+-- Re-follow under a new rkey
+-- --------------------------
+-- Follow → unfollow → follow again produces a *different* rkey each
+-- time (rkeys are TIDs; the client never reuses one). The upsert
+-- therefore hits the primary key and overwrites `rkey` with the newer
+-- record's: the youngest record wins. That ordering is what makes a
+-- late or replayed delete for the *old* rkey harmless — it matches no
+-- row and is skipped, instead of tearing down a follow that is
+-- currently live.
+--
+-- The index is NOT unique
+-- -----------------------
+-- `(follower_did, rkey)` is unique in practice — an rkey identifies one
+-- record inside one repo's collection — but a unique index would turn
+-- the one situation this migration exists for into a *write failure*:
+-- if a delete was lost and a create later reused that rkey, the insert
+-- would abort instead of the stale row being cleaned up. An index whose
+-- only job is to serve a lookup should not be able to reject a write.
+-- Partial (`WHERE rkey IS NOT NULL`) because a lookup key is never
+-- NULL, so the pre-migration rows have no business bloating it.
+
+ALTER TABLE follows ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS rkey TEXT;
+
+-- Serves `DELETE FROM follows WHERE follower_did = $1 AND rkey = $2
+--         RETURNING subject_did` — the delete path for a firehose
+-- unfollow, which is the only lookup this column exists for.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS follows_follower_rkey_idx
+    ON follows (follower_did, rkey)
+    WHERE rkey IS NOT NULL;

migrations/pds/0003_firehose.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+-- PDS database schema 0003: the firehose event log.
+--
+-- Why
+--
+-- Until now the PDS produced no `com.atproto.sync.subscribeRepos` stream at
+-- all. The only way a local record reached the AppView was the best-effort
+-- HTTP push in `appview_push.rs` — a fire-and-forget `tokio::spawn` that is
+-- explicitly documented as "the Jetstream replay will catch up". There is no
+-- Jetstream replay for records that only exist on this PDS, so a dropped push
+-- meant the post was simply never indexed. Nothing retried it, and nothing
+-- could: the commit lived in `repos` / `repo_blocks` but there was no ordered
+-- log of *what changed* for a consumer to walk.
+--
+-- This table is that log. Every repo write appends exactly one row, in the
+-- same transaction as the head-pointer update, so the sequence and the repo
+-- head can never disagree. A consumer that reconnects with a cursor replays
+-- from here; a consumer that is live gets the same rows pushed over a
+-- broadcast channel.
+--
+-- Column choices
+--
+--   seq         BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY — the cursor. It has to be a single
+--               monotonically increasing integer because that is what the
+--               `subscribeRepos` wire contract hands the client and takes
+--               back as `?cursor=`. BIGSERIAL (not an `(timestamp, id)`
+--               keyset like the AppView's notifications table) because the
+--               protocol's cursor is opaque-but-numeric and clients compare
+--               it with `>`.
+--
+--               Sequence values are handed out at INSERT time, which by
+--               itself does NOT guarantee that they become *visible* in seq
+--               order — two transactions can grab 5 and 6 and commit in the
+--               opposite order, leaving a reader that polls in between with a
+--               gap it would never fill. The write path therefore takes
+--               `pg_advisory_xact_lock` on a fixed key immediately before
+--               this INSERT (see `routes::helpers::apply_repo_write`), which
+--               serialises the tail of every firehose-writing transaction so
+--               commit order == seq order. That is what makes "give me
+--               everything with seq > N" an exact, gap-free replay rather
+--               than a best guess.
+--
+--   did         the repo the event belongs to. Not a FK to `users(did)`:
+--               the log outlives the account. If a user is deleted we still
+--               want consumers that are mid-replay to see the events that
+--               already happened rather than have the rows cascade out from
+--               under their cursor.
+--
+--   rev         the new commit's revision (TID string), mirrored from
+--               `repos.rev`. Goes out as the frame's `rev`.
+--
+--   since       the *previous* commit's rev, or NULL for the first commit on
+--               a repo. The frame's `since` field; a consumer uses it to
+--               detect that it missed an intermediate commit.
+--
+--   commit_cid  BYTEA holding the raw binary CID of the new commit, stored
+--               the same way `repos.head_cid` stores it so the two are
+--               directly comparable with `=` and no text/binary conversion
+--               is needed to join them.
+--
+--   blocks      BYTEA holding a complete CAR v1 file: the commit block as the
+--               root plus every block this commit newly created (MST nodes
+--               and record values). Stored pre-serialised rather than
+--               reassembled from `repo_blocks` at read time because the
+--               *diff* — which blocks were new for this particular commit —
+--               is only knowable at write time. Recomputing it later would
+--               mean diffing two MST snapshots on every replayed event.
+--
+--   ops         JSONB array of `{action, path, cid}`, the same objects that
+--               go into the frame's `ops` field. JSONB rather than a child
+--               table because it is always read as a whole, is never queried
+--               by content, and a child table would need its own ordering
+--               column to reproduce the array faithfully.
+--
+--   created_at  when the event was appended. This is what the frame's `time`
+--               field carries, so a replayed frame is byte-identical to the
+--               live one that was broadcast at commit time — a consumer that
+--               deduplicates by hashing frames does not see two different
+--               frames for one event.
+--
+-- Retention: there is none
+-- ------------------------
+-- Nothing prunes this table. It grows by one row per repo write, and each row
+-- carries a CAR of the commit's new blocks (a few hundred bytes for a plain
+-- post, more when a record is large). At the volume this deployment sees that
+-- is fine for a long time, but it is unbounded, and an operator who wants a
+-- bound has to add one. Deleting the oldest rows is safe: a client whose
+-- cursor points before the surviving range gets an `#info`/`OutdatedCursor`
+-- frame and resumes from the oldest row that still exists. See the module
+-- header of `crates/pds-server/src/firehose.rs`.
+
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS firehose_events (
+    seq            BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
+    did            TEXT NOT NULL,
+    rev            TEXT NOT NULL,
+    since          TEXT,
+    commit_cid     BYTEA NOT NULL,
+    blocks         BYTEA NOT NULL,
+    ops            JSONB NOT NULL,
+    created_at     TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+);
+
+-- Cursor replay is `WHERE seq > $1 ORDER BY seq LIMIT $2`, which the
+-- BIGSERIAL primary key's own index already serves — no second index for
+-- that, on purpose: an extra index on `seq` would be pure write amplification
+-- on the hottest path in this table.
+--
+-- What the PK does *not* serve is "replay one repo", which is how an operator
+-- re-drives a single account into the AppView after an ingest bug, and how
+-- `getRepo`-style backfills are debugged. `(did, seq)` covers that and keeps
+-- the per-repo scan in seq order.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS firehose_events_did_seq_idx
+    ON firehose_events (did, seq);

migrations/pds/0004_invite_codes.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+-- PDS database schema 0004: invite codes for `com.atproto.server.createAccount`.
+--
+-- Why
+--
+-- Until now `createAccount` had no gate of any kind: no invite code, no rate
+-- limit, and `describeServer` advertised `invite_code_required: false`. That
+-- was survivable while the only reachable instance was `127.0.0.1:2583`. It
+-- stops being survivable the moment the PDS answers on a public name, because
+-- every accepted account is not just a row in `users` — it creates a `repos`
+-- head, a key pair the server has to keep, an MST that grows with every write,
+-- and firehose events that every subscribed AppView is obliged to index. A
+-- single script could mint accounts until the disk filled up, and nothing in
+-- the write path would consider that abnormal.
+--
+-- This migration adds the smallest gate that actually closes that hole: an
+-- account may only be created by presenting a code the operator handed out.
+-- The gate is opt-in via `PDS_INVITE_REQUIRED` (default `false`, so the dozens
+-- of integration tests that create throwaway accounts keep working); the
+-- tables below exist unconditionally so that switching the flag on is a
+-- restart, not a migration.
+--
+-- Two tables, not one
+-- -------------------
+-- A code can be worth more than one account (`--uses 5` for a group of
+-- friends, a conference badge, a family). That means "who redeemed this code"
+-- is a *set*, not a single column, so it cannot live on the code row. Putting
+-- a `redeemed_by TEXT` column on `invite_codes` would have forced either
+-- one-code-one-account (losing the multi-use case the operator actually wants)
+-- or an array column that no foreign key, index or `COUNT(*)` can reason
+-- about. `invite_code_uses` is that set, one row per redemption.
+--
+-- The redemption *counter* still lives on the code row even though it is
+-- derivable from `COUNT(*)` over `invite_code_uses`. That duplication is
+-- deliberate and is the entire concurrency story — see below.
+--
+-- invite_codes
+-- ------------
+--
+--   code        TEXT PRIMARY KEY — the code itself, and the natural key. No
+--               surrogate `id`: the code is what the user types, what the
+--               operator pastes into a chat window, and what the redeem query
+--               looks up, so a second identifier would only add a join.
+--               Codes are generated lowercase from a 32-character
+--               Crockford-style alphabet (`crates/pds-server/src/invite.rs`),
+--               and the server lowercases and trims what the client sends
+--               before looking it up. Because every stored code is already
+--               lowercase ASCII, that normalisation happens in Rust rather
+--               than as `WHERE lower(code) = …`, which would throw away this
+--               primary-key index on the hottest lookup this table has.
+--
+--   created_at  when the operator minted it. Purely for the `invite list`
+--               output and for answering "where did this wave of signups come
+--               from" after the fact.
+--
+--   note        free-text label the operator can attach at creation time
+--               (`--note "meetup 2026-09"`). Nullable, never interpreted.
+--               It exists because a bare list of random strings is unusable
+--               a month later.
+--
+--   max_uses    how many accounts this code may create. `CHECK (max_uses > 0)`
+--               because a zero-use code is not a thing you would ever mean to
+--               create — it is a typo that would silently hand out a code that
+--               can never work.
+--
+--   used_count  how many it has already created. Kept in sync with
+--               `invite_code_uses` inside the same transaction that writes
+--               both.
+--
+--   disabled    a code the operator wants to stop honouring *without* losing
+--               the audit trail. Deleting the row would work for the future
+--               but would take the `invite_code_uses` rows with it (see the
+--               FK below) and with them the record of which accounts came
+--               from that code — which is the one question you ask when a
+--               code leaks. A boolean keeps the history and is checked in the
+--               same `WHERE` clause as the counter, so disabling costs nothing
+--               at redeem time.
+--
+--   CHECK (used_count <= max_uses) — the belt to the redeem query's braces.
+--               The application never over-redeems (the conditional UPDATE
+--               below makes that impossible), but this constraint means that
+--               *no* future query — a hand-written `UPDATE` during an
+--               incident, a bug in a later refactor — can hand out more
+--               accounts than the operator authorised. The database refuses.
+--
+-- How the redeem race is closed
+-- -----------------------------
+-- The obvious implementation is "SELECT the code, check `used_count <
+-- max_uses` in Rust, then UPDATE". That is a check-then-act, and two
+-- registrations arriving at the same instant with the same last remaining use
+-- both read `used_count = 0`, both decide they are allowed, and both write
+-- `used_count = 1` — two accounts from a one-use code, with the row still
+-- claiming a single redemption.
+--
+-- So the check and the act are one statement, and the database performs both:
+--
+--     UPDATE invite_codes
+--        SET used_count = used_count + 1
+--      WHERE code = $1
+--        AND NOT disabled
+--        AND used_count < max_uses
+--     RETURNING used_count, max_uses;
+--
+-- Under Postgres's READ COMMITTED isolation the second transaction to reach
+-- this row blocks on the row lock the first one took. When the first commits,
+-- the second does not proceed with its stale snapshot: it re-reads the updated
+-- row and re-evaluates the `WHERE` clause against it (EvalPlanQual). The
+-- counter is now `1`, `used_count < max_uses` is false, the row no longer
+-- matches, and the statement returns zero rows. Zero rows returned *is* the
+-- rejection — the route turns it into `400 InvalidInviteCode` without ever
+-- having formed an opinion of its own about whether the code was still valid.
+--
+-- If the first transaction instead rolls back — the handle turned out to be
+-- taken, key generation failed, anything — the lock is released with the
+-- counter back at `0` and the waiting transaction's re-check succeeds. The
+-- code is only consumed by a registration that actually completed, which is
+-- why the redemption is issued inside `create_account`'s existing
+-- transaction rather than before it.
+--
+-- This is also why `used_count` is stored rather than computed. A
+-- `COUNT(*) FROM invite_code_uses` has no row to lock — concurrent counters
+-- both see the same pre-insert count and both pass. The counter column gives
+-- the conditional UPDATE a single row to serialise on.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS invite_codes (
+    code           TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
+    created_at     TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    note           TEXT,
+    max_uses       INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
+    used_count     INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
+    disabled       BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    CONSTRAINT invite_codes_max_uses_positive CHECK (max_uses > 0),
+    CONSTRAINT invite_codes_used_count_sane   CHECK (used_count >= 0 AND used_count <= max_uses)
+);
+
+-- `invite list` shows the newest codes first, and that is the only listing
+-- this table has. Small table, but the operator runs it interactively and an
+-- ordered index keeps the output instant even after a few thousand codes.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS invite_codes_created_at_idx
+    ON invite_codes (created_at DESC);
+
+-- =====================================================
+-- invite_code_uses — which account came from which code
+-- =====================================================
+--
+--   code       FK to `invite_codes(code)` ON DELETE CASCADE. Cascading is the
+--              right call *here* (unlike `firehose_events.did` in 0003, which
+--              deliberately has no FK) because these rows are meaningless
+--              without the code they describe: they exist to answer "which
+--              accounts did code X create", and a use-row whose code has been
+--              deleted answers nothing. The operator who wants to stop a code
+--              but keep the trail sets `disabled` instead of deleting — which
+--              is precisely why that column exists.
+--
+--   did        the account that was created. Intentionally NOT a foreign key
+--              to `users(did)`: this is an audit record of something that
+--              happened, and it has to survive the account being deleted. If
+--              it cascaded from `users`, deleting a spam account would erase
+--              the evidence linking it to the code that let it in — the exact
+--              moment the link matters most. The trade-off is that a `did`
+--              here may point at a user that no longer exists; that is
+--              accepted and is what an audit log looks like.
+--
+--   handle     the handle as it was at creation time, denormalised on
+--              purpose. Handles can change, and `users` may be gone entirely
+--              (see above); this column is a snapshot so the listing stays
+--              readable without a join that may find nothing.
+--
+--   used_at    when the redemption happened.
+--
+--   PRIMARY KEY (code, did) — one account can only consume a given code once.
+--              This is not the mechanism that enforces the use limit (the
+--              conditional UPDATE is), it is a guard against a redemption
+--              being recorded twice for one account, which would make
+--              `used_count` and this table disagree.
+CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS invite_code_uses (
+    code           TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES invite_codes(code) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    did            TEXT NOT NULL,
+    handle         TEXT NOT NULL,
+    used_at        TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    PRIMARY KEY (code, did)
+);
+
+-- The reverse lookup: "which code let this account in?". Asked per-account
+-- during abuse triage, so it needs its own index — the (code, did) primary
+-- key cannot serve a query whose only predicate is `did`.
+CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS invite_code_uses_did_idx
+    ON invite_code_uses (did);